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ABSTRACT
This thesis traces British reactions to the development of the 
Chinese revolutionary movement from its beginnings in the British colony 
of Hong Kong, to the involvement of returned students in the Yangtze ports, 
the outbreak of the Revolution in October 1911, and finally studies Britain' 
role in the negotiations between the government and the revolutionaries 
leading to the peaceful establishment of the Chinese Republic. British 
policy in China was influenced variously by the China merchants, the 
missionaries and most important of all, by members of the Diplomatic and 
Consular Services in China, who were the only reliable sources of informa­
tion emanating from a country geographically and culturally remote from 
Great Britain. In practical terms there was really no definite policy 
towards the Chinese revolutionary movements Britain was caught in the 
dilemma between desire for conditions of peace and stability to enable her 
to carry on her main business in China, namely trade and commerce, and the 
hopes among many in the late Victorian period to see the Chinese undertake 
radical reforms in all aspects of their government and administration#
This resulted in Britain's official stand of absolute neutrality and non­
intervention when the Revolution finally erupted, while unofficially the 
British Legation in Peking was given free rein to influence the course 
of events in China by mediation and indirect pressure, to expediate the 
return to normalcy after the chaos of the Revolution. Policy-making in 
China was thus in the hands of those experts on the scene upon whose 
personal attitudes and idiosyncracies regarding reform and revolution in 
China statesmen in Britain depended.
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CHAPTER I
BRITAIN AMD CHINA, POLICIES AND PERSONALITIES, 1895-1912
British foreign policy in the late Victorian and Edwardian periods 
was concerned with a series of important international issues. The growth 
of German strength, Russia's territorial ambitions in Asia, the astonishing 
transformation of Japan into a modern power and the appearance of United States 
influence in the Carribean and Central America were all developments which 
affected British policy; in Africa an international scramble for territory and 
the Boer Wars diverted British attention to that part of the world for at least 
three years, 1899-1902.
The basic problem which dominated British foreign policy thinking
at this time was the general security of the Empire in a world where the
balance of power, both political and economic was fast changing.'*' It was
necessity rather than choice which ended the era of "Splendid Isolation" in
2
Britain's foreign relations. The Far Eastern situation following Japan's defeat 
of China in 1895, and the "Scramble for Concessions" in 1898-99 dwelt the first 
blow to the viability of isolation as a policy, and the signing of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance in 1902 marked the re-emergence of Britain as a participant
See Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Reference 
Division, British Foreign Policy, a Brief Collection of Fact and Quotations 
(London 1961) 2-19 for a summary of Britain's foreign interests of this period.
2
In May 1901, Salisbury expressed to Lansdowne his thoughts on 
isolation as a policy. "Except during(Napoleon I's reign) we have never even 
been in danger and therefore, it is impossible for us to judge whether the 
'isolation* under which we are supposed to suffer, does or does not contain in 
it any element of peril. It would hardly be wise to incur novel and most 
onerous obligations, in order to guard against a danger in whose existence we 
have no historical reason for believing." Quoted in Lord William Strang,
Britain in World Affairs (London 1961) 249-50. It was not quite true, of course, 
that England had been in no danger. See also C. Howard, Splendid isolation 
(London 1967) 14-25.
2
33
in international politics. In this scheme of foreign policy principles and 
aims, China was therefore only one aspect-, and probably not the most important 
in her eyes,, of Britain's interests in the period 1895-1912.
British policy in China had always been coloured by economic considerations. 
Because Britain enjoyed the largest share of China's foreign trade, any break­
up of the Chinese Empire could only be a change for the worse. It thus became 
Britain's aim to uphold China's territorial integrity and sovereignty as far 
as possible, and the principles of such a policy became identified with the 
catch-words "Chinese integrity" and the "Open door". Russia, of course, was 
viewed as the supreme menace to the furtherance of British trade and commerce.
To frustrate Russian ambitions Britain was prepared at various times to bolster . 
a weak Chinese regime or to lay claim to Chinese rights and territories, all
4
in the interests of preserving "Chinese Integrity" and the "Open door."
By the twentieth century, through the acquisition of treaty ports, a colony
(Hong Kong), leased territories (Wei-hai-wei and the New Territories),
spheres of influence (in the Yangtze), railway, mining and other industrial
concessions, Britain had built what was termed an "imperium in imperio" in 
5China. The maintenance of such a complex structure led inevitably to
G^. Monger, The End of Isolation (London 1963) 250-1; see also I. 
Nish, The Anqlo-Japanese Alliance (London 1966) D. C. Watt, Personalities and 
Policies, Studies in the Formation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth 
Century (Notre Dame 1965) 228-9 supplies areview of public reaction to the 
signing of the Alliance.
4British policy in China is discussed in Sir F. Whyte, China 
and the Foreign Powers (New York 1928) 36-9; G. E. Hubbard, British Far Eastern 
Policy (London 1939) 3-5; M.R.D. Foot, British Foreign Policy Since 1898 
(London 1956) 19-20; E. Luard, Britain and China (London 1962) 36-7; W. Strang, 
op.cit. 252 suggests that the fear of Russia was somewhat exaggerated.
5Grey used the term, in Grey to Jordan, 31 Aug. 1906 (confidential) 
FQ 371/35. See also R. T. Barrett, "Britain's Responsibility in South China" 
in Asiatic Review, 34 (1938) 147-9.
4Britain being gradually drawn into China's internal affairs. To secure the neces­
sary conditions for improved trade and commerce, Britain could not ignore the 
inadequacies of the late Ch'ing reign in China, and the need for reform and 
modernization in all aspects of her administration. Thus partly out of self- 
interest, and partly from high moral principles,^ Great Britain unwittingly 
became involved in the reform and revolutionary movements in China in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries.
Yet it must be recognised that among Britons even at the best of times,
knowledge of and interest in China's affairs was limited. China was never
fully part of the British experience in Asia (as India was), not known
geographically or culturally. Few of the British ruling class ever travelled
to China, and it was only a handful among the higher officals at the Foreign
Office who had any responsibility in connection with China. Public opinion,
such as existed in late Victorian England, still ascribed all matters of
foreign policy to those in office, content to remain in Ignorant bliss of all 
7foreign affairs. Nevertheless there were still some who for different 
reasons entertained a special interest in China, and in time they exerted 
an important influence over the conduct of British policy in China.
The China merchants constituted the most consistent source of pressure 
on the British government for action in China. They claimed superiority in 
Chinese affairs over Downing Street, although their residence in China in the 
cramped surroundings of concessions and treaty ports, which many regarded as 
civilized islands in a hostile, barbarian and frightening land, produced in
^The late Victorians were particularly identified with a crusading 
spirit In their imperialistic endeavours overseas. See an excellent treatment 
of the subject, R. Robinson and J'. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London 
1965) 1-26. See also P. T. Moon, Imperialism and World Politics (New York 1926) 
58-67.
7
See A. J. P. Taylor, The Trouble-Makers. Dissent over Foreign 
Policy (London 1957) 95-6$ Donald Bishop, The Administration of British 
Foreign Relations. (Seattle, Wash. 1967) 183-4, 192-3, R. Postgate and A.
Vallance, England Goes to Press (New York 1937) 183.
58
them a "fortress mentality" which certainly did not qualify them as the best
advisors available to the British Foreign Office. The China Association, for
instance, organized since 1889 for the promotion of trade in China, contributed
much towards the advancement of British concerns in the Far Hast. Yet as
the problems of China became involved in the complexities of world politics
by the end of the 19th century, the influence of vested mercantile interests
usually more local than national in outlook, was a stumbling block rather
9than an advantage to British policy. The same could also be said of the
missionaries, whose enjoyment of extraterritorial rights in China, and eagerness
to create spheres of British Protestant influence in the Chinese Empire, were
often occasions for friction in the diplomatic relations between China and 
10
Great Britain.
When it came to influencing the general public in connection with 
affairs in China however, neither the merchants nor the missionaries came close 
to the power the press exerted, in an age when literacy was widespread and 
Parliament was no longer the direct and only sounding board of the nation.
g
N. Cantlie and G. Seaver, Sir James Cantlie (London 1939)
114-5. During the years when the Chinese revolutionary movement intensified
its activities against the Dynasty we thus see the merchants generally 
hostile to Southern China (from whence came most of the revolutionaries) and 
friendly to the North, since the former urged disorder and rebellion while the 
latter promised peace and stability, 
g
See N. A. Pelcovits, Old China Hands and the Foreign Office 
(New York 1948) Preface; J. 0. P. Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies 
in China (Philadelphia 1912) 264-5.
10A recent work on this is by Edmund S. Wehrle, Britain, China
and the Antimissionary Riots 1891-1900 (Minneapolis 1966) 3-18; see also
L. R. Marchant, A Guide to the Archives and Records of Protestant Christian 
Missions from the British Isles to China 1796-1914 (Australia 1966) 4-5; A. J. 
Garnier, in No Speedier Way, Golden Jubilee of Christian Literature Society 
for China, 1887-1938 (Shanghai 1938) 4, suggests that had the missionaries been 
given larger resources and allowed to do more, the Chinese Revolution of 1911 
could even have been averted.
6The two leading papers in this field were the London Times and the North China
Daily News, with its weekly edition the North China Herald, published in Shanghai.
11
The Times has always held a special relationship to the government, and this
was also true of its work in China, mainly because of the personality of its
12
correspondent in Peking, Dr. George E. Morrison (1897-1912.). Morrison
was genuinely devoted to China and the Chinese people, and though his methods
were sometimes questionable, he was an ardent advocate of reform in China,
Thus he often found himself acting as mediator between the Chinese reformers
and revolutionaries and the British government in London, from whom the Chinese
13innovators sought support. While always cooperative and available to his 
many Chinese friends, Morrison did not get on well with his own government 
officials in China and London. His eagerness and talent for extracting infor­
mation occasionally resulted in the Times publishing news before the Legation 
or Foreign Office was aware of the developments, though seldom with any 
serious consequences.14 The North China Herald also advocated reform in China,
11D. Bishop, op.cit. 200
12
Dates in parentheses throughout this chapter refer to terms
of office.
13In August and September, 1909, Morrison wrote a series of 
twelve articles on conditions in China and the need for foreign help in the 
Chinese reform movement. See the Times, Aug.- Sept. 1909.
14For example, in March 1898, the House of Commons demanded to 
know from the Foreign Office a reason for the Times being so rapid with 
their China news, and Curzon (Undersecretary for Parliamentary Affairs) 
explained that it was the journalists' "intelligent anticipation of facts even 
before they occur" which led to the "unequal competition," See Hansard LV, 29 
Mar 1898, 1244-5. The Times' editor defended Morrison against the charges 
"Events themselves have shown that in another sense from that intended by the 
author, the gibe conveyed a well-merited compliment which unhappily cannot be 
reciprocated to the Department, at least in the Far East ..." Times, 12 Sept. 
1900, P. 7, col. 2-3, editorial. In his diary, Morrison wrote, "I never did, 
as was implied in the papers, forestall the government. Always I told Sir 
Claude MacDonald (British Minister) anything important I happened to hear.
The difference was he did not believe things which I credited." C. Pearl, 
Morrison of Peking (Australia 1967) 102. Morrison maintained a wide circle
7but being the mouthpiece of the Shanghai mercantile community, its policies 
arose less from any feeling for the advancement of the Chinese than from the
15
desire for better conditions of trade. The North China Herald thus stood
foremost for peace and order, and tended to regard with disfavour the
potentially anarchical activities of the Chinese revolutionaries.
Within the British government structure, the Far Eastern Department
(comprising then China, Japan and Korea) was only one of nine other divisions
of the Foreign Office, In late Victorian England the connection between public
opinion and public policy was slighter in foreign affairs than in any other
sphere of politics. Control of the Foreign Office was always in the hands of
a professional staff and drawn perennially from upper class families, whose
sympathies were naturally remote from those of the general public. Members
of Parliament and the Cabinet were politicians who rarely entertained any
intimate knowledge of foreign relations. Accordingly the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs was usually subjected to less criticism and control over
16his work than any other Minister of the period. In the actual conduct of 
British foreign affairs individuals thus counted for more than institutions.
of friends among the Chinese population in and out of Peking, and it was no 
wonder that by mingling with the natives he was often given information which 
was otherwise denied the Legation officials. See Chen Chih-mai, ’'Two Australian 
Friends of China" in Free China Review, X (June 1960) 16-205 L. James, "Morrison 
of Peking" In The Nineteenth Century and After, Vol. 88 (1920) 164-70.
i 5
N. Britton, The Chinese Periodical Press (Shanghai 1933) 49.
i 6Robert T. Nightingale, "The Personnel of the British Foreign 
Office and Diplomatic Service, 1851-1929" in The Realist, II, 3 (1929)
328-305 H. K. Norton, Foreign Office Organization (Philadelphia 1929) 9-11? 
in A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch (eds) The Cambridge History of British Foreign 
Policy 1783-1919 (New York 1922-3) III, 540, the Foreign Office is described 
by a witty undergraduates "the last choice preserve of administration 
practised as a sport ..." D. Bishop, op.cit. Chap. 9-10 has a clear and 
comprehensive account of the Foreign Office in the past and at present.
8Lord Salisbury for over ten years between 1887 and 1900 combined
the offices of Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister in his own person.
He was therefore, one of the most experienced of British Foreign Secretaries,
and yet his handling of foreign affairs was not always favourably received.
The combination of the two important offices was often regarded as a mistake
17and a cause of weakness in the British government. Furthermore despite
his wide knowledge and experience, Salisbury seemed to have little concern
for the administration of the Foreign Office itself, and the charge of
18indifference was not infrequent. The trouble was/Salisbury liked to work
b
in isolation and away from the office, usually in his country estate at Hatfield.
He was by nature self-contained, cautious and conservative, possessed of a sort
of intellectual aloofness which made it difficult for those outside of his
19immediate circles to understand him.
Salisbury's China policy in his last administration (1895-1902) was 
characterized by weakness, indecision and fear of involvement. Because of 
his firm belief in the importance of the integrity of the Chinese Empire, he
17D. Bishop, op.cit. 86; S. J. Reid, The Prime Ministers of 
Queen Victoria (London 1890-5, new rev.ed. 1905-6) VII, 206-8.
18
Sir John Tilley and Sir S. Gaselee, The Foreign Office 
(London 1933) 139, recounts how Lady Salisbury once remarked that Lord 
Salisbury knew no more about the clerks at the Foreign Office than he did 
about the housemaids at home, and that he did not know his own precis writer 
by sight.
19Salisbury's personality and capabilities are variously criticised 
or defended in these works: Lady G. Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury
(London 1921-32) IV; Dame Lilian Penson, Foreign Affairs under the Third 
Marquis of Salisbury (London 1962)5 J. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and 
Foreign Policy (London 1964) 3-23; A. L. Kennedy, Salisbury 1830-1903 (London 
1953) 347-9; Hon. Clive Bigham, The Prime Ministers of Britain, 1721-1921 
(London 1922) 306-8.
was prepared to sacrifice British self-interests to prevent the break-up of 
20China, For this he was widely criticized. The North China Herald was
outspoken: "... British policy as directed by him during the past few years
21cannot be looked upon with pride and gratification ..." The London and
China Express conceded that Salisbury jeopardized British rights and
opportunities only because of his desire for peace. Nevertheless the faith
of the nation in his leadership was shaken, especially when he failed to
appreciate the general alarm over Russian ambitions and allowed them a free
22
hand in Manchuria after the Boxer crisis. Even the Times on the day
Salisbury's death was announced, asserted that "It would be a mistake to say
that Lord Salisbury was an ideal Prime Minister, or even an ideal Minister
23
for Foreign Affairs." Sir Henry Blake, then Governor of Hong Kong, confided
to the British Minister in Peking, Sir Ernest Satow, that Salisbury "was not
a great man. Obstinate to a point, and then liable to break short off like 
24
a carrot." Salisbury's handling of Sun Yat-sen and the early years of the 
Chinese revolutionary movement seemed to justify all the charges of his critics. 
Lord Lansdowne succeeded Salisbury in the Foreign Office (1900-5),
M.
His administration was best known for termination Britain's isolation in
25
20The view was generally held in England and Europe that after 
1900 China was on the brink of dissolution, and Salisbury was blamed for not 
securing opportunities for Britain in the forthcoming partition. He ended 
up by attempting to negotiate agreements separately with Germany and Russia.
See A, L. Kennedy, op.cit. 321-2.
^ North China Herald 16 July, 1902, p.Ill, col.3.
22
London and China Express. 18 July 1902, p.586, col. 1-2, leader,
23
Times 24 Aug. 1903, p. 7 col. 2-4, leader
24Blake to Satow, 26 Aug. 1903, PRO 30/33.9/16.
25
See Chapter II.
10
international relations and negotiating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Lansdowne
was partly of French parentage, which was responsible for a Continental flavour
o c
in his personality and politics that was agreeable to many. He also had a
particular flair for foreign affairs which made his term of office a successful
27one, though it was perhaps not a great nor brilliant period. His policy 
in China in the post-Boxer era was announced in a session in the House of 
Lordst Lansdowne believed, as did Salisbury, that Britain must seek to 
avoid any danger of a partition of China, Furthermore although the temptation 
was present, Britain must refrain from any tendencies to place the Chinese govern­
ment in the tutelage of any foreign Power* What he aimed at was the promotion 
of the freedom of commerce in China in cooperation with all the other 
interested Powers,^
Lansdownefs work in the Foreign Office was completed and crowned by 
his successor, Sir Edward Grey (1905-16), Grey was a politician of thorough 
straight-forwardness and grit, whose long tenure of the Foreign Office 
brought him prominence. He was fairminded, moderate, calm and reflective, and 
always worked in close cooperation with his staff at the Foreign Office,
He had sometimes been charged with being of a "negative character," which one
biographer has interpreted as meaning there was no self-seeking, vanity nor
29
display or self advertisement. Grey pursued a policy of peace when events
26
B. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (London 1936) I, 335,
27
A. L, Kennedy, op.cit. 96-7, 138,
2 Q
Hansard. 18 July 1902, House of Lords, Vol. Ill, p. 658.
^G. Murray, The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey (Oxford
1915) 122,
.11
in Europe were heading towards the first World War. Despite advice to the
contrary. Grey would not engage in experiments or unnecessary opportunism
in his foreign policies, and his judgments always prevailed. "I did not regard
30anything except my own letters and official papers as deciding policy."
He was widely respected among those who worked with him, and was regarded
31as the kind of chief "any official would most wish to serve."
In China Grey stood for the preservation of the status quo, the
strengthening of alliances, and the promotion of trade, if the latter did
32
not conflict with his first two objectives. In 1906 he announced the general
principles of his China policy to the new British Minister in Peking* Sir John
Jordan. Grey stipulted that the old policy of concession extortion and the
use of force must be terminated* The new policy would combine firmness with
tact, caution with opportunism. It was necessary to maintain a sympathetic
attitude towards the endeavours of the Chinese government and people to reform
their institutions, lending them a hand when required. Grey also desired
33closer cooperation between the Consuls and the Legation in China. Grey was
firmly against interference in Chinese internal affairs, and by 1911 felt that
the British position in China was secure enough to counsel absolute neutrality
34
m  the Chinese Revolution,
30
Quoted in George M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon (London 1937) 
169? cf. A, J. P. Taylor, op.cit, 97, who says that Grey was the "prisoner of 
his staff." See also A. L. Kennedy, op.cit. 140-1? P. Knaplund, Introduction 
to E. Grey, Speeches on Foreign Affairs 1904-1914 (London 1931) 10-15.
31W. Strang, op.cit. 270.
32
S. J. Reid, op.cit. 301-2.
33
Grey to Jordan, 31 Aug. 1906 (confidential) FO 371/35.
34
S. J. Reid, op.cit. 302.
12
In practical terms, despite the qualities of masterfulness and leader­
ship in the Secretaries of State, a good deal of the preliminary policy-decisions 
were made by lower level officials in the Foreign Office. In the China Department 
of this period, there were some outstanding individuals. Sir Thomas Sanderson, 
Permanent Undersecretary (1894-1906) and Sir Francis Bertie, Assistant Under­
secretary (1894-1903) were sharply contrasted in temperament and policies, yet 
they managed to work closely together on the affairs of China. Bertie was 
brusque, peremptory and rather arrogant, respecting neither persons nor repu­
tations, He disliked public recognition, often used blunt language, but was 
a man of a shrewd mind. Since he was a strict taskmaster and always insisted 
on accuracy, he did not consistently get on well with his juniors in the Foreign
Office. Morrison of the Times dismissed him as "an ignorant man who had never
35read a book since he left Eton,'1 and described him as "a florid-faced over­
eating Englishman” whose views were "so vulgarly expressed and so ill-considered
36that he wasn’t worth listening to." Bertie was promoted to the Embassy in
37Rome in 1903 and Paris in 1905. Sanderson served forty-seven years at the
Foreign Office, and was somewhat fussy and set in his ways. But he had complete
knowledge of the administration of the office, and on principle advocated
cautious and unemotional policies. He abhorred extremism, such as often ex-
38pounded by Bertie. The direction of the Chinese Department passed from Bertie
to Sir Francis Campbell (Assistant Undersecretary 1903-11) with whom Sir John 
&
Jordan formed a close friendship by their mutual
 ... ■■— "' -"V
C, Pearl, o p .cit. 161.
36Quoted from William Lavino, the Times representative in Paris, 
in C. Pearl, op.cit. 170.
37
See G. Monger, o p .cit. 99; V, Chiral to Satow, 31 July 1901,
PRO 30/33 I0/4 in which Bertie advocated that Britain ought to have destroyed 
Peking root and branch immediately after the relief expedition in 1900, so 
that the Court would not be able to return; see also. J. Tilley and S, Gaselee, 
op.cit. 130-1.
38
G. Monger, o p .cit. 100.
13
interest in China. Campbell was succeeded by Sir Walter Langley after his
39death in December 1911.
If the administration of the China Department was fairly straight­
forward at the hands of experienced officials in the Foreign Office, the same 
could not be said of the Colonial Office in its supervision of the colonial 
territories. It has been said of British colonial policy, "Why - there is no
such thing5 Great Britain has merely blundered into the best places of the
40
earth and means to keep them." Traditionally the office of Secretary of
State for the Colonies carried with it no prestige, and it was generally shunned
41by prominent politicians. The very nature of the collection of widely diver­
gent territories under its administration made it questionable whether any 
colonial policy was possible. At any time a line of action could be upset by 
the impetuosity of a Governor, by the misfortunes of war somewhere in the Empire, 
or by the sheer rapidity of changing circumstances in the distant lands. 
Consequently there was little continuity of policy, the office was generally 
run by a host of junior officials, and there were constant conflicts with the 
Foreign Office and with the local Governors. The Colonial Office had by the 
late 19th century degenerated into a sort of private club where the atmosphere
i 42
was variously "friendly, informal, or even cosy It required the
appointment of a dynamic Colonial Secretary such as Chamberlain to undertake 
complete changes in the prestige and efficiency of the Colonial Office.
39
Langley to Jordan, 29 Dec. 1911 (private) FO 350/l
40
Quoted in H. E. Egerton, A Short History of British Colonial
Policy 1606-1909 (London, 9th ed. 1932) Preface.
41
See H. L. Hall, The Colonial Office (London 1937) 52? Sir
George V. Fiddes, The Dominions and Colonial Offices,(London 1926) 6.
42
Sir C. Jeffries, The Colonial Office (London 1956) 18-9? see 
also H. L, Hall, op.cit. 157-8; Sir C. Bruce, The Broad Stone of Empire 
(London 1910) 293; Sir C. Parkinson, The Colonial Office From Within (London 
1947) 99-100; Sir F. Swettenham, Footprints in Malaya (London 1942) 161.
14
Salisbury’s appointment of Joseph Chamberlain to the Colonial Office
(1895-1903) was a complete surprise to British political circles. Hitherto
Colonial Secretaries had been placid and insignificant personages, "with not
43
a bark nor a bite to their names." Chamberlain was aggressive, forceful,
cool and hardhitting? a man of action rather than words, and he soon proceeded
to change the face of the Colonial Office and its public image. He improved
communications between London and the colonies; sought to dictate foreign as
well as colonial policies; battled with the Treasury, and began the gigantic
task of reform in the colonial administration which was not completed for 
44
thirty years. Chamberlain also turned his mind to the problem of China,
and urged there the opening of markets to the fair and even competition of all
45foreign Powers, while refraining from any tendencies of acquiring territory.
None of Chamberlain1s successors at the Colonial Office however, came
close to his energy and dynamism, not to say controversial policies. Alfred
Lyttelton (1903-5) by contrast was hesitant and diffident in personality. He
was a man of great sympathy, who was easy to work with and who introduced the
human element into colonial politics. He left behind him no resentment, no
enmity. But he was unhappily caught in the problem of Chinese coolie labour
in the Rand, and handled badly the agitation in sympathy with the Chinese 
46
coolies. Both Lord Elgin (1905-8) and Lord Crewe (1908-10) were quiet, 
ordinary men with retiring dispositions. The colonial affairs of Hong Kong
43
L. Creswicke, The Life of the Rt. Hon. Joseph Chamberlain 
(London 1904) III, 4.
44For Chamberlain's achievements, see G. L. Gavin and J. Amery 
The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (London 1932-51) III, 242-53; C. E. Carrington,
The British Qverseas (Cambridge, 1950) 837-41; Sir C.- Petrie, Joseph 
Chamberlain, (London 1940) 62-3.
45P. Joseph, Foreign Diplomacy in China (London 1928) 379; G.E. 
Hubbard, op.cit. 23.
4^E.C. Wingfield-Stratford. The Victorian Aftermath (Londonl933) 
96-8; See also E. Lyttelton, Alfred Lyttelton (London 1917) 286-313; J. A. Spender 
and C. Asquith, Life of Herbert' Henery Asqurbh, Lord Oxford and Asquith 
(London 1932) I, 365-6.
15
and the Straits Settlements of this period continued to be dominated by the
personalities and idiosyncracies of the individual Governors appointed to
these colonies. The home government at best could only supervise, and not judge
The Governors of Hong Kong were necessarily more closely in touch
with the Chinese revolutionary movement, due to the proximity of the Colony
to the Chinese mainland. Sir William Robinson (1891-98) governed during a parti
cularly trying period. Plague was endemic on the China Coast and in Hong Kong
in 1894, but Chinese prejudice against Western medicine frustrated most of
Robinson's emergency measures. The disease also added to the Colony's financial
difficulties, and the tense situation in the Far East made defense questions
urgent. The circumstances thus served to convince Robinson of the extreme
unfriendliness of the Chinese towards England, and he became an advocate of
forceful policies in dealing with China. His precipitate banishment of Sun
Yat-sen from the Colony in 1896 characterized his attitude towards the
47
Chinese revolutionaries.
Sir Henry Blake (1898-1903) hesitated to go out to the Colony when 
first appointed Governor, but once arrived he quickly found himself a place 
in the local communities. Blake was known for his genuine affection for the 
people in all the places in which he had worked, and this was again proved 
true in Hong Kong. He became intimate friends with many of the leaders in the 
Chinese population and through them cultivated a great deal of sympathy for 
the reform movement then nascent in China. On the other hand, his relations 
with the Colonial Office in London were often strained, mainly because of his 
tendency to act independently of outside control and take hasty action without 
benefit
■'  Ml Il A  *~7
This is discussed in Chapter IX. See G. B. Endacott, A 
History of Hono Kong (London 1958) 215-27, for an account of Robinson's 
administration.
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48of instructions. But his administration was a good one, and an outstanding
achievement was the elimination of the practice of torture being applied
49to Chinese prisoners extradited British territories. In his parting speech,
50
Blake summed up his own views of his years in Hong Kong;
"I will touch upon a statement that has been reiterated many times during 
the term of my administration. That is that I am too pro-Chinese in my 
views .... If it means that I have favoured Chinese members of the 
community at the expense of Europeans, I deny it most strenuously ... to 
give equal protection to all, and to bring home the feeling that under 
the British flag, justice is pure and unpurchasable, and every man 
through all the grades ... is free to think what he likes, to speak what 
he thinks, without let or hindrance so long as he obeys the laws ....
This is the estimate I have formed of my duty and I have endeavoured to 
carry it out with a keen and abiding sense of my responsibility ...."
Blake was succeeded by Sir Matthew Nathan (1904-7) whose reputation
as an .energetic reformer and an able and broadminded administrator In the
Gold Coast preceded his arrival In the Colony. Everywhere he served Nathan
was identified with success and progress, and in Hong Kong he contributed
51much to the material well-being of the population.
Sir Frederick Lugard (1907-11) was a man of iron will. In 1906 he resigned
the High Commission of Northern Nigeria because he was dissatisfied with Colonial
Office restrictions on his administration, and also displeased that Downing
Street would not allow him to serve his office in England every summer.
In Hong Kong his hatred of intervention and intolerance of superior authority
52
continued to cause friction with the government at home. He never really 
liked the Colony nor the people there, and soon regretted ever accepting the
Governorship. He confessed to his brother that he felt "horribly circumscribed,"
.
His sudden visit to the Viceroy of Canton in April 1899 was 
an example. His action was criticised on all sides. See Blake tel. C.O. 1 April 
1899, CO 129/290, and subsequent correspondence.
49
See Chapter IV.
May to C.O., 27 Nov. 1903, CO 129/320.
"^See the T.ondon and China Express, 1 July 1904, p. 538, col. 1, 
and China Mail 29 July 1904, p. 4 col. 2-3, leader.
52
, , v See F. Lugard, No.. Series A. ■British.-Onimonwe.aXt]rJ^aafIirLs,
(London 1946).
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and that in Hong Kong "my role is to perpetually functionalize ... to
endure fools gladly? to sign my name perpetually and agree to the faultless
53
suggestions of the Honorable the Colonial Secretary’'. His relations with
the Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong? F. H. May (who became Governor after
him in 1912) were hostile at the best of times, although the personal
differences between the two men did not adversely affect the day-to-day duties 
54
of their offices.
Lugard was in Hong Kong at a time when the Chinese revolutionary
movement was passing from its propaganda phase to a period of action, and there
were many incidents involving the Chinese in the Colony. The Governor had no
patience nor sympathy with reformers or revolutionaries? and strove only
to keep the peace in the Colony and expel all disruptive elements. When the
55Hong Kong Chinese joined in the 1908 Japanese boycott? Lugard acted with
speed and severity, earning a charge of being high-handed from the Colonial
56
Office which was not previously consulted as to his line of policy. When
the Chinese Revolution had taken place and a republic declared in Canton,, it
fell to Lugard to offer refuge to the ex-Viceroy of Canton? though he refused
57adamantly to recognise the new government in China. On the whole though? 
despite the difficulties under which he laboured, both in Hong Kong and from 
London, Lugard was one of the outstanding Governors in the history of Hong 
Kong. His interest in educational reforms culminated in the establishment of
53
Quoted in M. Perham, Lugard, the Years of Authority, 1898-1945 
(London 1960) 287.
54M. Perham, op.cit. 356.
55
See Chapter V.
56
M. Perham, op.cit. 307.
57
M. Perham, op.cit. 360.
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the University of Hong Kong in 1912, and in 19X0 he submitted a detailed
58
scheme for the general economic and administrative reform of China,
The Straits Settlements figured in the early Chinese revolutionary 
movement when Sun Yat-sen and others made frequent trips to the Colonies to 
solicit funds and support. Sir Charles Mitchell was Governor then (1896-99) 
but due to his ailing health Sir Frank Swettenham (then Resident-General 
of the Federated Malay States) often administered for him, until Swettenham 
took over the Governorship in 1901, Swettenham was a scholar of Malay, 
completely versed in the local cultures of the area. His tenure was character­
ized by vigorous initiative, administrative ability, and the great confidence 
and respect with which he was regarded by the natives. In a tribute to his 
predecessor, Sir John Anderson (1904-11) compared the advances made under 
Swettenham in British Malaya to the other states of the areas "To pass from
one to the other is to pass from the Anglo-Saxon period to the twentieth 
59century."
If it was true that in the British colonial administration policies 
were more often formulated by the distant Governors than by London, then 
it was certainly a fact that policies regarding the affairs of China were 
also initiated by such men on the spot as the Legation staff in Peking and the 
Consular staff in the various provinces, rather than by the Foreign Office 
itself. The role of Britain in China had always been the work of individuals,
^Lugard to Grey, 16 June 1910, FQ 371/877. The project was 
ridiculed by the F.O. and Jordan as being too far-fetched. Lord Crewe commented, 
"Sir F. Lugard ... a man of very fertile mind and wide views, and one who may 
not fully appreciate the difficulties involved," Crewe minutes, ibid.
59Quoted in H. F. Egerton, op.cit. 231; see also F. Swettenham,
op.cit. 161-3.
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notably in the customs administration, the salt gabelle, and the postal 
services. Thus official British reactions to the Chinese revolutionary 
movement mainly originated from the Legation in Peking, under the direction 
of the British Minister who possessed the exact knowledge on which decisions 
from London must be based, and who was the Secretary of State’s chief means 
of implementing whatever policies he decided on. The day-to-day contacts 
with the Chinese Government were entirely in the hands of the Minister, who 
enjoyed virtual independence from central control. In Chinese as in other 
foreign affairs, passing incidents often proved subsequently to be crucial, 
while crises usually arose without warning. On such occasions the actual 
conduct of foreign relations would depend on the interaction of personalities 
rather than on institutions or even central instructions. In the particular 
case of China, attitudes could further be affected by the "deadening" influence 
of life in Peking, where diplomats were walled up in isolation from other 
nationals and completely detached from the Chinese. "Perhaps the most 
dedicated exponents of this splended isolation were the British. In a little 
transplanted world, they allayed their nostalgia with dinners and dancing, gossip 
and golf, happily ignorant of the customs or language or feelings of the 
people they lived among.Nevertheless Peking did provide the environment 
for the careers of some prominent diplomatists, notably Sir Ernest Satow and 
Sir John Jordan, the two greatest authorities on the Far East in their day.
Their predecessors In the British Legation at Peking included Sir 
Nicholas R, O'Conor (1892-5) who did not conceal his opinion that British interests 
in China were up to 1895 entirely trade interests* From the first O’Conor showed 
keen enthusiasm for every improvement he could seek for the sake of the 
50
C. Pearl, op.cit. 86; see also Mrs. A. Little, Intimate China 
(London 1899) 295.
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British merchant in China. The North China Herald applauded his efforts as
AT
being "an infinite improvement on the sluggish but courtly Sir John Walsham" 
(1886-92).
Sir Claude M. MacDonald (1896-1900) was an elongated man, with a long
nose, reproachful eyes, and long, lovingly waxed thin moustaches. He had
been in the Army since 1872, and in 1896 retired from his Commission to take
up his diplomatic post at Peking, His appointment was naturally a surprise
to many, who thought that the China situation needed a man of great skill
63and experience in diplomacy, not a militarist. Other reviews reflect the
* 3^4opinion that perhaps a man of action was a change for the better. Neverthe­
less MacDonald proceeded to handle political situations as if they were 
military manoeuvres and liked to call for landing parties to reinforce his
diplomatic endeavours. Lord Salisbury on one occasion chided him, "I think
65your proposals are too drastic." MacDonald was thus hardly the sort of man
who would have any patience or sympathy with the reform and revolutionary
66movements then beginning in China. His absence from Peking during the 1898 
reform coup and his subsequent pronouncements regarding his ignorance of the
^ North China Herald 29 Nov. 1895, p.885, col, 2-3 leader.
62
Described by Morrison, in C. Pearl, op.cit. 83.
63Times 13 Jan. 1896, p.9, col. 4-5 leader, Morrison in his 
diary wrote that he would have endorsed the popular estimate of MacDonald as 
"imperfectly educated, ... weak, flippant and garrulous ..." but in a later 
manuscript explained, "Such were the criticisms levelled against a British 
officer of singular charm of manner, who had not sought the post thrust on 
him by Lord Salisbury, and who quickly inspired to an unusual degree the 
confidence of his famous chief." C. Pearl, op.cit. 83.
64
See the North China Herald, 17 Jan 1896, p. 76, col. 2-3, and 
London and China Express 17 Jan. 1896, p. 62, col. 3.
65
See MacDonald Tel. F.O. 20 July 1896, and Salisbury tel. MacDonald, 
21 July 1896, FQ 17/1280.
^MacDonald to Bertie, 2 Feb 1899 (private) FQ 17/1372.
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67activities of K'ang Yu-wei won him some criticism for lack of foresight.
C M -'
But he soon regained the limelight in the British public for his masterly
organization during the siege of Peking in the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.
Satow confided to Villiers at the Foreign Office that "possibly MacDonald
68
being a soldier would have found the Siege rather stimulating."
In 1900 MacDonald was transferred to the Tokyo Embassy, and Sir Ernest
Satow left Tokyo to take his place in Peking (1900-6) Satow was a short man,
iron-grey with an abnormally large forehead. "In a vague way he seems to suggest
69the old Japanese drawings of learned men Which was not inappropriate
as he was a scholar of Japanese as well as an experienced diplomat. Satow himself
admitted that he was somewhat of a heretic to popular ideas, that he believed
the Orientals had rights as well as the Occidentals, and that Imperial
70necessities sometimes overrode local interests. His appointment to
Peking was welcomed because of his great learning and knowledge of the Oriental
character and Satow came to China believing that the Chinese were capable of
71developing into a great nation. He was an industrious administrator and
suggested that the Consular staff in China should work in closer cooperation
with the Legation, despite the increased responsibility that this would
72
entail for the Minister. Sir Edward Grey always appreciated having such
_  „ "~Tn
See Chapter III.
^Satow Diary, 20 August 1900, PRO 30/33 16/3.
^"M.A.P." magazine, 29 Sept. 1900, PRO 30/33 lO/lO. See also 
B.M. Allen, The Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Satow (London 1933) 117-36; George A.
Lensen, Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, the Observations of Sir 
Earnest Satow (Florida 1966) 5-16.
7^Satow’s Diary, 25 Sept. 1900, PRO 30/33 16/3.
71North China Herald, 17 Oct. 1900, p. 820, col. 1.
7^Satow to Grey 27 Dec. 1905, PRO 30/33 14/16.
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a Minister as Satow in the Far East, and on his retirement Grey regretted that
the government had to "lose the benefit ...» of your judgment and experience
73
upon which they have always been able to rely with confidence." The 
London and China Express too praised his term of office at the Peking Legation 
for having retained the goodwill of Chinese officialdom and then proceeding 
to show "that the velvet glove had a lining of very hard steel .... He has
distinctly raised the prestige of his country in his dealings with the Tsungli-
74
yamen and its modern successor the Wai-wu Pu ..." Morrison of the Times alone
appeared to entertain a personal enmity towards Satow. In a splenetic mood
Morrison called him "a selfish old dryasdust who uses me and gives me nothing
75in return but frequent bad dinners...." This was probably the result of
Satow1s investigation into Morrison's sources of information which were often
76
superior even to the Legation1s intelligence service.
Sir John Jordan (1906-16), widely recognised as the most brilliant
of British Ministers in China, rose through the China Consular Service which
he joined In 1876 as a student interpreter in Peking. In 1896 he was appointed
Consul-General at Seoul, where he became Minister-Resident in 1901. During
this period he made lasting friendships with the Chinese Commissioners at Seoul,
notably Tfang Shao-i and YUan Shih-k'ai. These friendships were to be of
service in later years in promoting understanding during the revolutionary 
77negotiations. When the Legation at Seoul was withdrawn in 1906, Jordan was
73Grey to Satow, 25 Oct. 1906, PRO 30/33 7/5.
74London and China Express, 11 May 1906, p. 352-3,
75C. Pearl, op.cit, 140.
7^See Satow to Bertie, 17 Jan. 1901, PRO 30/33 14/11. Satow 
suspected a leakage through the U.S. Legation.
77See Chapter VII.
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appointed to Peking. By that time he had acquired complete intimacy with
Chinese affairs and spoke the Chinese language fluently. He was sympathetic
to all Chinese causes, but was not overly compliant. On the contrary, he was
firm and straightforward, and if he sometimes appeared harsh to Chinese
officials they nevertheless respected his views. The American Minister in
Peking found it a pleasure and source of instruction to work with the British
representative.^
Jordan was of a kind and cheerful nature, winning the affection and
esteem of all those who came in contact with him, Chinese as well as British.
He had a gift of style, and his despatches to London were models of conciseness,
interest and lucidity. Jordan was extraordinarily conscientious, and until
the Foreign Office suggested it never thought to delegate to his junior staff
the burden of writing the useful Annual Intelligence Reports of developments 
79in China. On another occasion when the Foreign Office offered to bring
him home on paid leave to synchronize with a visit of T’ang Shao-i to England,
Jordan declined on the grounds that there were outstanding problems to be
80settled in Peking which required his continued presence in China.
Jordan entertained great feelings of affection for the Chinese people,
and even the Chinese officials in Peking knew that he would.never support
a cause unless he was convinced of its justice to both China and Britain. He
told Campbell, "No one will be more heartily pleased than I shall be, if China
works out her own salvation without any serious trouble. They are a fine
81people and one cannot live amongst them without liking them." He freely
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P. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (London 1922) 51.
79See F.O. Minutes on Jordan’s Annual Report for the year 1909, 
submitted 31 Jan. 1910, FQ 371/866.
80Campbell tel. Jordan, 23 Dec. 1908, and Jordan tel, Campbell,
25 Dec. (private) FO 371/433.
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Jordan to Campbell, 26 Dec. 1907 (private) FO 350/5.
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admitted that he was partial to the Chinese over the Japanese: "... there is
something about the Chinaman that makes him a more human and likeable being
82
than the average Japanese It was the maintenance of this special rela­
tionship with the native population which made Jordan so valuable as the British 
representative in China during the final years before the Revolution transformed 
that Empire into a modern republic. Grey was the first to recognize the contri­
butions such a capable Minister could make in the field of British relations 
with China. "I rely very much on your knowledge of how to deal with the
Chinese, and I hope you will write to me freely, or telegraph, whenever you
83
require support or think we are not taking the right line at home." But
perhaps the best testimony to Jordan's career in Peking would be the spontaneous
attribute of a junior official at the Legation, Arnold Robertson, who wrote
to Lampson at the Foreign Office, "I hope it is fully realized at home what
a splendid Minister we have here. He is worth the whole of the rest of his
colleagues put together, and is universally liked and respected. It Is a
84genuine pleasure to work under him." B. Alston, a senior clerk, minuted,
"I may assure him privately that Sir John Jordan Is appreciated. I have
85
heard nothing but praise of him (and unstinted)
Despite the presence of such outstanding diplomats in the country, 
the events in China during 1895-1912 formed only one aspect of Britain's foreign 
interests in this period. China was after all very remote and Britons In 
general had little to do with that Empire. Whatever information and education
1 " 1 1  " o O
Jordan to Campbell, 2 Feb.1911 (Private) FO 350/7.
^Grey to Jordan, 13 Aug 1909, PRO 800/43.
^Robertson to Lampson, 15 Oct 1907, (private) FO 371/233.
85Alston1s minutes on above, ibid.
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the British public received had to come from those newspapers which carried 
specialized items from China. The importance of the press in linking 
Victorian England and China must therefore be emphasized. As British 
statesmen at this time were concerned first with the African wars, then 
the near Eastern problem and finally with developments in Europe leading to 
1914, it was doubtful whether London would be free to follow a definite 
policy in the Far East. In realistic terms the general guide-lines were 
worked out by men on the spot, who met each situation as it arose. British 
interests in China and in the revolutionary movement thus tended to be 
sporadically aroused by the occurrence of "incidents" or the suasion of some 
energetic representative in China. Personalities were therefore one of 
the key factors in the formulation of policies towards China.
CHAPTER II
SUN. YAT-SEN AND THE FIRST REVOLUTIONARY ATTEMPT
The Chinese revolutionary movement developed out of the special
conditions, geographical, political and social, which obtained in the South
of the Chinese Empire, and in particular in the province of Kwangtung. The
Cantonese people who inhabit the province had been for many decades the closest
in touch with Western trade and Western ideas, and they consequently developed
a tradition of advanced thinking of a type which readily fitted them for
anti-government movements of various kinds during the Ch*ing dynasty, (1644-
1911). They have thus been called the nrebellion-makers-in-ordinary to the 
2
Chinese people.” So it was that the Chinese revolution of 1911 also had
its beginnings among a group of Cantonese radical thinkers. Yet as it was a
movement subversive to the existing government, it could not be conveniently
nurtured on Chinese soil, and it came about that the British colony of Hong
3
Kong became the secret headquarters of this early revolutionary movement.
It was only when the movement was stabilised after 1905 by efficient leader­
ship and diversified membership that it shifted the bulk of its activities 
back into Chinese territory.
^This feature of the Cantonese is discussed in C. A. Middleton- 
Smith, The British in China (London, 1920) 121-1315 W. W. Clayton, "Canton, 
1901-1910” in the Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal (July 1911) 387-92,
B. S. Lee, Modern Canton (Shanghai, 1936) and J. A. Turner, Kwangtung (London 
1894) 171-9. See also North China Herald of 28 Feb. 1898, p. 305-6. For an 
interesting analysis of Cantonese xenophobia see Frederic Wakeman, Strangers 
at the Gate, Social Disorder in South China 1839-1861 (California 1966) 
especially Chapters 4 and 5,
^N. D. Palmer, "K'ang Yu-wei” in Current History N.S. XV, 84
(1948) 89.
^Feng Tzu-yu Ko-ming i-shih (Chungking, 1945) III, 227 says, "In 
the revolutionary movement, the importance of Hong Kong occupied the first 
chapter of its history."
Hong Kong in the late 19th century was in many respects ideally situated 
for its role as a revolutionary headquarters. Ever since its establishment 
as a British Crown Colony by the Treaties of Nanking, 1842, it had steadily 
grown and had become an important trading mart between the Far East and the 
Western World. Its population was predominantly Chinese, more than 80 percent
4
of whom were Cantonese. But owing to its proximity t.o the Chinese mainland,
a sizeable proportion of this community consisted of Chinese who had had to
flee their homeland for various reasons, A ready example was the influx during
5the Taiping Rebellion. Consequently the Chinese population of the Colony 
was heterogeneous and representative of all social classes. Generally it 
remained stable and law-abiding, though the Chinese still maintained close 
consciousness of events in China. By the late 19th century, when internal 
conditions in China deteriorated, largely the result of administrative 
inefficiency and incapacity to deal with foreign pressures, there were 
significant stirrings among a section of the Chinese in Hong Kong. This 
was to be the genesis of the revolutionary movement.
Early in 1892 a group of well-educated young Chinese employed in 
British shipping concerns began to Interest themselves in the political 
future of China. They held meetings to discuss the hopelessness of the 
Ch1ing government when compared with the efficiency of the British system 
as they saw it in Hong Kong, and they began to talk of reforms for their 
homeland.
4Hong Kong Government Gazette of 22 Aug. 1891; Hong Kong 
Government, Historical and Statistical Abstract of the Colony of Hong Kong, 
1841-1930 (Hong Kong, 1932) chart. 7.
5During the twelve years of the rebellion, the Chinese population 
of Hong Kong soared from 35,517 in 1852 to 117,868 in 1864. See charts 2 
and 3 of the Historical and Statistical Abstract.
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These meetings led to the formation of a secret political association under 
the cover of an educational concern, the Fu-jen Wen-she, in March 1892. The 
two leaders of this venture were Yang Ch'd-ylln and Hsieh Tsuan-t'ai.^ Yang, 
born and educated in the Colony, came from a well-to-do family, and was 
employed in one of the largest shipping companies in Hong Kong, the David 
Sassoon and Sons' Company. Hsieh was born in Australia, but received his 
early education in Hong Kong at the Government Central School. There 
he came into the company of many "promising and patriotic young men," and 
gradually evolved the concept of reform in China and of driving out the 
Manchus from the Chinese throne. The membership list of the Society included 
fourteen others, and there is no indication that it ever expanded beyond 
these sixteen founder members. They chose as their motto "Ducit Amor Patriae" 
(Be whole-heartedly patriotic)^ and aspired to promote education among the 
Chinese people of the Colony, as well as propagate China's need for political 
reforms. In itself therefore, this restricted group of young patriots would 
not have been able to achieve much, but it was to form the basis of a 
revolutionary society soon to be established by Sun Yat-sen.
6Biographies of Yang are given in Ch’en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung 
Hui Ko-ming Shih pieh-lu appended in Ch’en Te-yttn (ed) Ch'en Shao-pai 
hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu (Canton, 1934?) 114; HsOeh Chtin-tu, ’ Sun Yat-sen, Yang 
Ch'ti-yUn and the early revolutionary movement in China" in Journal of Asian 
Studies, XIX, 3 (May 1960) 307; Wang Hsing-jui, "Ch1ing-chi Fu-wen Wen- 
she yli ko-ming ytin-tung ti Icuan-hsi" in Shih-hsueh Tsa-chih (Chung-King) I, 1
(Dec 1945) 36; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-minq-t*anq shih-kao (Shanghai, 1938)
IV, 1226; Lo Hsianq-lin,Kuo-fu Chih ta-hsBeh shih-tai (Taiwan, 1954) 29, For 
Hsieh, see C. Duncan, Tse Tsan-tai (London, 1917); Tse Tsan-tai, The Chinese 
Republic - Secret History of the Revolution (Hong Kong, 1924) 7; Hsueh, op.cit 
308; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit.11,23-5; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit, 114b. The Cantonese 
rendering of Hsieh Tsuan-t'ai is Tse toe- Tsan-tai
7Though not quite accurate, the translation of the slogan is 
given by Hsieh, in Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit.8; see also Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch* iao 
ko-ming kai-kuo shih (Chungking, 1946) 3; Hua-ch' iao ko-ming tzu-chih shih-hua 
(Taiwan, 1954) 4; Hstleh ChUn-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution 
(Stanford 1961) 27.
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Sun Yat-sen, or Sun Wen, (1866-1925), was born in a village in Kwangtung
g
province. In 1879 he was sent to join his brother Sun Wei in Hawaii, where 
he was educated at British and American Missionary schools. By 1883 he was 
sent back to China, his brother fearing that he was becoming too Westernised. 
After a short stay in his native village, where his Westernization, manifest 
in outspoken criticism of traditional social and political beliefs, brought 
disgrace upon himself and his family, he was sent to the Government Central 
School in Hong Kong in 1884, By then he was already pondering the problem of 
reform in China. In the free thinking atmosphere of Hong Kong his tendencies 
were therefore further encouraged and fostered.
In 1886 Sun joined the Po Chi Hospital in Canton as a medical student, 
and there he met a fellow student, Cheng Shih-liang, who encouraged his 
radical thinking and even implanted the idea of a revolution in China in 
Sun's mind. The next year, Sun transferred to the Hong Kong Medical College, 
and from then on he began to devote much of his leisure hours to discussion 
of political reform and change in China. His associates at this time included 
Yang Ho-lin, a shop-keeper in Hong Kong, who offered his premises as a club­
house for his friends; Ch'en Shao-pai, a Cantonese from a good family, and a 
colleague of Sun for some time at the College of Medicine; and Yu Shao-wan 
(Yu Lieh) whom Sun met in Canton and brought along to Hong Kong to join his 
discussion group. These four called themselves the "Four Brigands of the 
Ch1ing Dynasty." There was also Lu Hao-tung, another student at the College
g
Accounts of Sun's early life are given in P. Linebarger, Sun 
Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic (Hew York, 1925) 6-173; Wu Shou-i, Kuo-fu 
ti Ch'ing-nien shih-tai (Taipei, 1960) 14-48; H. B. Restarick, Sun Yat-sen,
Literator of China (Yale, 1931) 1-26; S. Chen and R. Payne, Sun Yat-sen, a 
Portrait (New York, 1946) 5-25; Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan Hsien- 
shenq nien-p’u ch'u-kao (Taipei, 1958) I, 1-30; L. Sharman, Sun Yat-sen,
His Life and Its Meaning (New York 1934, reissued 1968, California) Part I.
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of Medicine, who later became the first martyr for the revolutionary cause.
These young men soon began talking of following the foot-steps of the Taipings
and raising a revolution against the Ch' ing government? their rebellious
intentions thus distinguished this group from the less radical operators of
the Fu-jen Society.
Yet it cannot be concluded that Sun Yat-sen was a convinced rebel against
the Manchus from the very beginning. In 1894 at least, he tried to work
through legal constitutional channels by presenting a petition to Li Hung-
i. 10
chang, then Governor of Chihli, asking for reforms under ir's direction. His 
presumptuousness, indeed arrogance, in sending the petition failed to win the 
favour of the Governor. It was after the failure of this venture, together 
with China's defeat by Japan in the 1894-5 war, that Sun embarked upon a real 
revolutionary career.
His first step was to return to Hawaii, where his brother enjoyed a 
certain amount of influence in the mercantile community, and where Sun 
himself had made friends during his earlier sojourn in the islands. Gathering 
a handful of supporters, Sun established his first revolutionary society, 
the Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society) on 24 November, 1894. He was 
elected chairman, and it was significant that on the occasion of this
^For accounts of these men see M. B. Jansen, The Japanese and 
Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge, Mass. 1954) 61; Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih I, 38-9;
T1an Yung-nien, Hsin-hai ko-ming; Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, 1211; Wu Shou-i, 
op.cit. hui-i lu (Hong Kong, 1958) I, 39-40.
10See Ch’ en Shao-pai, op. cit, 94b-95; Hsiung Nan-yUeh, Sun 
Chung-shan hsien-sheng hstian-chi (Hong Kong, n.d. ) 167-80; Chung-hua Min-lcuo 
K’ai-kuo wu-shih nien wen-hsien pien-tsuan wei-ytian-hui (ed) Chung-hua Min-lcuo 
K'ai-kuo wu-shih nien wen-hsien (Taipei, 1963- ) IX, 275-6; Sun Yat-sen,
Kuo-fu ch*Ban - chi (Taiwan, 1957) II, 81; Ch'en Hsi-ch'i, T'ung Meng Hui ch'eng- 
li ch1ien ti Sun Chung-shan (Canton, 1957).
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inaugural meeting, he managed to collect some thirteen thousand Hong Kong
11dollars in contributions for his cause* Encouraged by this. Sun hurried
back to Hong Kong, established contact with the members of the Fu-jen Wen she,
and was able to persuade them to amalgamate their two movements into the
12
Hong Kong Hsing Chung Hui, founded on 21 February, 1895. This amalgamation,
however, was purchased at a price, as Yang Ch’tA-yhn, by dint of his seniority
in age and his influence among both the European and Chinese communities of
13the Colony, was elected chairman instead of Sun. Nevertheless, Sun Yat-sen
continued to be the most active revolutionary among them during this period.
On 6 October, 1895, a branch of the Hsing Chung Hui was secretly established 
14in Canton,' and at the end of that year, when Sun, Ch’en Shao-pai and Cheng
15Shih-liang went to Japan, another branch was established in Yokohama.
11Lo Chian-lun, op.cit. I, 51-3; Sun Wen "T1an-hsiang-shan Hsing 
Chung Hui ch’eng-li hsttan-yen" in Ch1ai Te'keng et.al. (ed) Hsin-hai ko-ming 
(Shanghai, 1957) hereafter quoted as HHKM I, 85-6; and Feng Tzu-yu in Lo 
Chia-lun (ed) Ko-ming Wen-hsien (Tawiwan, 1953-5) III, 331-72 gives a list of 
the Hsing Chung Hui members during 1894-1903.
12Hao yen-p1ing, "The abortive cooperation between reformers 
and revolutionaries" in Harvard University, Papers on China XV (1961) 92;
Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao ko-ming kai-kuo shih 5-8; Hsueh Chun-tu, op.cit 28-30;
Ku Yen-shih, Chung-kuo mi-mi she-hui shih(Shanghai, 1927) 138-41; Sun Wen, 
"Hsiang-Kang Hsing Chung Hui HsOan-yen" in HHKM I, 86-9; Hu Ch'U-fei, Tsung- 
li shih-lUeh 22-5; Ch'en Hsiung, Min-tsu ko-ming wen-hsien (Taipei, 1954)
14-17 gives the regulations. Evidence shows that only three members of the 
Fu Jen Society joined the Hong Kong Hsing Chung Huis Yang, Hsieh and Chou 
Chao-chhn; see Wang Hsing-jui, op.cit. 37. The literary society probably 
disintegrated after this split.
13For accounts of the Sun-Yang conflict, see HsUeh Chhn-tu,op.cit. 
27; Ch’en Shao-pai, op.cit. 95b; Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih I, 7; Chou Lu, 
op.cit. IV, 1226; Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. 8, where he claims that "...in the 
spring of 1895... we joined hands with Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his friends and 
established the Hing Chung Whui (Hsing Chung Hui) revolutionary party."
In V.V. Chow, "Sun Yat-sen's fatherhood of New China" in United China Magazine 
(Shanghai) Oct. 1933, 424, it was even suggested that Sun was only Yang's 
secretary at this period.
14Lo Hsiang-lxn, op. cit. 79; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch' iao ko-mmg 
Kai-kuo shih 4; Wu Shou-i, op.cit. 78-9.
15Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch* iao ko-ming t-su-chih shih-hua. 7-8.
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By the end of 1895, the revolutionary movement was thus launched. To 
try its effectiveness it was now necessary to take direct action against 
the Ch!ing government. In this respect, it is interesting to note the sources 
from which support came from the revolutionaries, at this early stage of 
their activities.
The single most important source of moral, and what was more necessary, 
financial support for the Chinese revolutionaries came from the overseas Chinese 
communities, the hua-ch1iao. We have seen how conditions In Hong Kong, when 
contrasted with affairs in their homeland, caused the educated Chinese there 
to talk of political reforms. This same pattern was repeated in Singapore, 
another British colony not far from the Chinese mainland, as well as other 
areas of the world where Chinese communities flourished. It is not difficult 
to see why the Chinese abroad should prove such ready sympathisers of the 
revolutionary movement. The Chinese were traditionally bound by ties of home 
and family, so that when for reasons of trade or other means of livelihood 
they had to settle in foreign lands, they invariably continued to keep in close 
contact with affairs in China. But with the spread of education, and as the 
’hua-ch1iao became aware of the modern political institutions in their host 
countries, they began to grow dissatisfied with the machinery of government 
in their native land. Sometimes, they were victims of ill-treatment or 
discrimination by the countries in which they were domiciled, and this 
further led to the desire for a strong home government, which would afford 
some form of protection or prestige for her expatriates. There was disagreement 
as to how China was to be transformed? but the dream of China as a great
33
nation was fairly universally held among the overseas Chinese, This was
to be sucessfully exploited by the revolutionaries.
On the other hand, the attitude of the Chinese government towards
these emigrants had been one of disapproval, if not hostility, throughout
17the Ch’ing period. However, with the opening of treaty ports in the 
mid-nineteenth century, and the growth of European imperialism resulting in 
the operation of the coolie trade, the Chinese government began to interest 
itself in the welfare of the Chinese abroad. Furthermore, when the government 
found itself in a position of weakness, as it did by the late 19th century, 
it began to recognise the value of the wealth and loyalty of its overseas 
subjects. Then it was important to win back their allegiance and detach them 
from the influence of the foreign governments which played host to them. One 
case in point was the situation in Singapore. In 1896, the Governor, Sir Charles 
Mitchell, suggested to the Colonial Office that the British government of the 
Straits Settlements should occasionally confer cetain degrees of rank, or 
other marks of honour, analogous to those conferred by the Emperor of China, 
on deserving Chinese residents. His argument was that the Chinese government, 
through its Consulate-General in the Straits, had been increasingly active in
16See L. E. Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism (Illinois,
27? S. Spector, "The Chinese in Singapore" in M. Fried (ed) Colloquium on 
Overseas Chinese (New York, 1958) 23? T. Mende, The Chinese Revolution 
(London, 1961)' 25-6; Ch'en Li-te, Chunq-kuo hai-wei i-min""shih (Shanghai, 1946)
62-71; V. W. Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London, 1951) 354;
Ta Chen, Emigrant Communities in China (London & New York, 1939) 273-4.
17Ch1en Li-te, op.cit. 52-4, argues that after the Ch' ing conquest 
in 1644, Cheng Ch1eng-kung, still loyal to the Ming dynasty, began drifting 
abroad and rallying followers against the Manchus. Hence successive Ch'ing 
rulers tended to discourage intercourse with the outside world. Also see 
Sir George Thomas Staunton (trans.) Ta Tsing Leu Lee (London, 1810) 543-4 
for clauses denouncing emigrants. Williams, op.cit. 146-7 shows that the 
laws were injurious to overseas Chinese interests, for they made possible the 
extortion by local officials of the wealth of returning emigrants. On the 
whole though, such legislation tended only to discourage emigration, and did 
not altogether curb it.
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obtaining subscriptions from and selling titles to the Chinese, and he felt
that it needed some overt signs of recognition for their services to the
British government to prevent the "feelings and tendencies of their Chinese
13subjects from gravitating Chinawards."
The Colonial Office tended at first to look with favour on the proposal,
though they decided to solicit the opinion of Sir Cecil Clementi Smith, a former
19Governor of the Straits, Smith condemned the scheme, and he evidenced the
situation in the Dutch Indies, whereby the appointment of a leading Chinese
settler as "Captain China" led to oppression and misery for those under his 
20
charge. He refused to believe that the customary sale of buttons and other
marks of honour had any political significance for the Chinese in the Straits,
and could not advise the British government to enter the competition with
the Chinese government in this method of winning the loyalty of the Chinese 
21
subjects. The matter was thus shelved. But it does illustrate that by 
the end of the 19th century, the Chinese abroad had become important both 
to the waning Manchu Dynasty as well as to the revolutionaries plotting its 
overthrow.
Chinese residents in various overseas countries were often an 
essential element In the budding revolutionary movement. Frequently they were 
men who for obvious reasons were not Hsing Chung Hui members. In Hong Kong, one 
outstanding instance was of Ho Ch'i (later Sir Kai Ho Kai) a doctor and a 
barrister-at-law, who had represented Chinese interests on the Colony's 
18Mitchell to C.O. 6 Oct. 1896, enclosing a lengthy report by 
the Assistant Protector of Chinese, Mr, G, T. Hare, CO 273/218
19C. P. Lucas Minutes on the above; and C.O. to Smith, 12 
Nov. 1896, ibid For an account of Sir Cecil C. Smith, see F. Swettenham,
British Malaya (London, 1929) 245-50.
20See Williams, op.cit. for a description of the system, 124-9 
^Smith to C.O. 3 Dec. 1896, CO 273/223
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Legislative Council since 1890. From time to time he wrote reform articles
in the local English press, and in 1895 helped the organization of the
Hsing Chung Hui's first revolutionary attempt, though he was never a member 
22
of the Society. In Singapore, there were wealthy merchants like Ch'en
Chu-nan, Chang Yung-fu and Lin I-shun, who were particularly useful for Sun
23
Yat-sen when he later made frequent trips to the Straits Settlements.
In Hawaii one of Sun's earliest adherents and the first to join the Hsing
Chung Hui was Teng Yin-nan, who donated a large sum of money to the revolutionary
24
society by selling a farm. And in Yokohama, Feng Chin-ju, a well-to-do
25
shopkeeper, was a founder member of the Japanese branch of the Hsing Chung Hui. 
These are some typical instances of the class of men who had the resources 
as well as the kind of political consciousness which drew them to the activities 
of the Hsing Chung Hui.
22
The activities of Ho are described in .G» B. Endacott, A History 
of Hong Kong (London 1958) 249-505 Dr. J. M. Atkinson, 1 Health and Hospitals," 
in A. Wright (ed) 20th Century Impressions of Hong Kong, Shanghai and other 
Treaty Ports of China TEondon, 1908) 264; Woo Sing-1im, The Prominent Chinese 
in Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1937) II, 2* Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, Chung-kuo Cheng-chih 
ssu-hsianq shih (Shanghai, 1946) 795; Li Shu-fan, Hong Kong Surgeon TEondon 
1964) 24-5; B. Harrison (ed) The University of Hong Kong, the first fifty 
years (Hong Kong, 1962) 11-2; Lord C. Beresford, The Break-up of China 
(London, 1899) 218 contains a letter to him from Ho on reform. See also 
China Mail 12 Mar. 1895. p. 2 col. 6-7 for his reform article. Also see 
the North China Herald of 19 Feb. 1897, p.290, and 26 Mar. 1897, p. 539- 
for accounts of his career. In March 1897 Ho accepted the post of legal 
adviser and secretary to Wu T*ing-fang, the newly appointed Chinese Minister 
to Washington.
23
For their brief biographies, see Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, 1620;
Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih I, 249, III, 183-6; Wang Gung-wu, "Sun Yat-sen 
and Singapore in Journal of the South Seas Society XV, Part 2, 58; Huang Fu- 
luan, Hua-ch* iao ytt Chung-kuo ko-ming (Hong Kong, 1955) 68.
24Accounts of Teng are given in Wu Shou-i, op.cit. 77; Feng 
Tzu-yu, op.cit I, 65-6.
25
Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch* iao ko-ming Kai-kuo shih 42; Ch'en 
Shao-pai, op.cit. 96b-97; Wu Shou-i, op.cit. 88.
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The many foreign missionaries working in China also gave much moral
encouragement and even practical assistance to the revolutionaries. For
a long time, it was a point of missionary endeavour in China to work for
the ''awakening" of that country, and in the slogans of the young revolutionaries
they seemed to see that possibility being realised. There is no denying that
it was through the educational efforts of the missionaries in introducing
Western culture and thought that many literate Chinese became familiar with
the political institutions of the West, and as a result of intelligent
analytical studies they began to regard their own Chinese institutions with
dissatisfaction. It is not clear however, whether some of the foreign
missionaries were entirely cognisant of the full implications of the aspirations 
27of "Young China"5 there was certainly a tendency to ignore the distinction
28
between the constitutional reforms advocated by K’ang Yu-wei, and the 
more radical political changes urged by Sun Yat-sen. An exception was 
Timothy Richard (1845-1919) the Baptist missionary and General Secretary of 
the Society for the Diffusion of Christian Knowledge (established In 1887)
26See the chapter on the stimulus of missions and their 
influence on Chinese society and thinking, In G. Lanning, Old Forces in 
Mew China (London, 1912) 18-24; also see Hsieh Sung-kao and Ytt Mu-jen, Chu-chiao 
ti yen-chiu (Hong Kong, 1954) especially the Appendix, 1-11, on Christianity 
in China; Dr. D. T. Huntingdon, "The Chinese Revolution in relation to 
mission work" in The Hast and the West XII, (1914) 137-44; A. H. Smith, The 
Uplift of China (London, 1914) 141-56; A. Mij^ fiie, China and Christianity 
(Shanghai, 1892) 64-70; N. Bitton, The Regeneration of New China (London,
1914) 89-90. A useful account of the British missionary movement in China 
and its effect on policy-making in London is given by Edmund S. Wehrle,
Britain, China and the Anti-missionary Riots, 1891-1900 (Minneapolis,
1966)3-18. *
27
The term was freely used in most 19th and early 20th century 
writings to encompass an undefined group, consisting on occasion of foreign- 
educated students, missionary converts, reformers, or revolutionaries. The 
practice is particularly evident in missionary works.
0 0
See Chapter III.
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which was responsible for much of the Western literature made available to the
29
Chinese people during the 19th century. Richard was able to see quite
early the determination with which Sun was working for the destruction of the
Manchu dynasty, and soon refused to cooperate with him, to devote himself
30
more energentically to K1ang Yu-wei*s reform movement. Yet Sun Yat-sen seemed 
to enjoy special popularity among most of the other missionaries who came into 
contact with the Hsing Chung Hui activists. This was perhaps not unusual due 
to his being under missionary influence ever since his school days in Hawaii 
and Hong Kong. Among his close missionary friends was the Rev. Frank Damon
29
The Society was later called the Christian Literature Society 
for China. For the work of Richard in China, see W. E. Soothill, Timothy 
Richard of China (London, 1924) 173-80; Wu Chao-kwang, International Aspects 
of the missionary movement in China (Baltimore, 1930) 71-3, 225-7; P. A. Cohen, 
’’Missionary approaches: Hudson Taylor and Timothy Richard" in Harvard
University, Papers on China XI, (1957) 29-62; E. W. P. Evans, Timothy Richard 
(London, 1945) 9-95; A. J. Garnier, A maker of modern China (London, Y945) 
31-86; T. Richard, Forty-five years inChinaTkew York, 1916) 218-28; and
B. Reeve, 73-90, Timothy Richard, China Missionary, Statesman and Reformer 
(London 1912) 73-90. The Peking and Tientsin Times, leading article of 7 
Mar. 1896, p. 2,
30Richard first met Sun in 1896 in London. When Sun began 
to expound on the tyranny and corruption of the Manchu government, and insisted 
on their being replaced by a Chinese ruler, Richard endeavoured to show him 
that there had been splendid Manchu officials and rascally Chinese ones, and 
that the mere transfer of rule from Manchu to Chinese would have been futile. 
Reform and not revolution was needed for China. But Sun was adamant. In
1900 Richard met Sun again in Yokohama, and the latter was still busy with
planning a revolution. Richard decided that they would have to part 
company, "as I believed in enlightening the government by literature. I saw
he had never forgiven the Manchus for imprisoning him in the Chinese Legation 
in London." See Richard, op.cit. 350-1, and Soothill, op.cit. 323. His 
attitude was further made clear in a letter to a Chinese correspondent of 18 
Feb. 1903: "As to reform in China there are two views ... one revolutionary
and one reformatory. I do not belong to the former as I have seen such 
terrible disasters arising from violent measures. But I do all I can in 
favour of shedding light on all problems of real interest to China...
"Richard, op.cit. 350, Soothill, op.cit. 303-4; Wu Chao-kwang, op.cit. 228. 
Richard's relations with the constitutional reformers is discussed in 
Chapter III.
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of the American Congressional Church in Hawaii who furnished him with three
31hundred Hong Kong dollars for his journey to Hong Kong in 1883. In that
year, Sun was baptised while he was at the Government School in Hong Kong by
the Rev. C. R. Hager; and during his medical training at Canton, he met again
his former tutor the Rev. John L. Kerr of the Anglo-American Mission, who
32
managed to have his tuition fees specially reduced. From these and others,
both foreign and Chinese, Sun Yat-sen was able to count on much missionary
support for his revolutionary activities; this was to be important when the
Hsing Chung Hui embarked on its programme of uprisings against the Chinese 
33
government.
However, the Hsing Chung Hui, by virtue of the size as well as 
character of its membership, was hardly equipped with the fighting power 
or the technical knowledge for raising insurrections; for this reason, the 
Society had to resort to the support of the various secret societies prevalent 
in South and Central China. Briefly, those active In the Yangtze provinces were 
off-shoots of the White Lotus Society while those operating in areas South
of the Yangtze as well as among the overseas Chinese communities (mainly
v 34emigrants from the South) were branches of the San Tien Hui or Triads.
^Lu Tan-lin, Ko-ming Shih-t'an (Nanaking, 1947) 92; C. Glide 
and Hong Sheng-hwa, Swords of Silence (New York and London, 1947) 3.
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See Lu Tan-lin, op.cit. 92-3; Lin Tzu-hsdn, Kuo-fu hsheh-shuo 
yO Hsi-fang wen-hua (Taipei, 1953) 175; L. Sharman, op.cit. Appendix B.
"Some personal reminiscence by C. R. Hager"
33Lu Tan-lin, op.cit. 91-120 describes the missionary influence on 
revolutionary activities and lists all the missionaries who gave assistance 
to the movement up to 1911. See also Lo Hsiang-lin, Kuo-fu yh Ou-Mei chih 
yu-hao (Taipei, 1951) 30
34Accounts of the origins, objectives and activities of these 
two main secret society groups can be seen in Lo Erh-k’ang, T’ien-ti-hui 
wen-hsien-lu (Chung-king, 1943) 61-8; Hsiao I-shan, Chin-tai Chung-kuo mi-mi 
she-hui shih-liao (Peking, 1935); 4b-10b; G. Schlegel, Thian Ti Hwui 
(Batavia, l866) i'-19; J. C. de Korne, "Sun Yat-sen and the secret societies" 
in Pacific Affairs VII, 4 (1934) 425-33; W. Stanton, The Triad Society 
(Hong Kong 1900) 2-38.
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It is worthy of note that the secret societies played a major part in the
revolutionary programme only during the attempts before 1905, After this date
students and soldiers came into prominence. Nevertheless they were an
essential feature of the early insurrections. The society men were generally
paid well for services, so that the remuneration probably accounts for their
enthusiasm to work with the revolutionaries. By tradition, the secret
societies were anti-dynastic, and for those who were merely concerned with
feathering their own nests, a political label such as was furnished by the
35
Hsing Chung Hui could perhaps give their societies weight and prestige. 
Consequently, into the revolutionary ranks came all sorts and conditions of 
men, ’’the dreamers of dreams, lewd fellows of the baser sort, men who were
3 6out for plunder and the spoils of war, place-seekers as well as patriots."
With this motley crew the Hsing Chung Hui perpetrated its first armed rising 
against the Chinese government with the proposed seizure of Canton. Since 
this attempt was mainly organized and armed in Hong Kong, the event therefore 
directly involved the British government for the first time in the Chinese 
revolutionary movement.
The Governor of Hong Kong at this time was Sir William Robinson (1891- 
1898) who had little sympathy to spare in his dealings with the Chinese 
government. He was convinced that the Chinese harboured an innate hatred of 
Europeans,especially among the gentry and literate classes, and he felt that 
any generosity in British policy would be regarded as a sign of weakness or
35
See John Lust, "Secret Societies and the Revolution of 1911", 
unpublished paper presented at the Research Conference on the Chinese 
Revolution of 1911, New Hampshire, 1965; G. A. Floris, "Chinese Secret 
Societies" in Contemporary Review* Vol. 193 (1958) 320.
36
N. Bitton, op.cit. 13.
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fear. He blamed the non-interference of Britain in the recent Sino-Japanese
war as the chief cause of a deterioration in the position of Britain in 
37China. Such a man could hardly be expected to pursue a policy calculated 
to placate the neighbouring Chinese government when it came to the question 
of an anti-dynastic movement being developed in the Colony. Chinese efforts 
to demand the handing over of political offenders, it will be seen, were 
vigorously rejected by Robinson. Yet in the case of Sun Yat-sen, whose 
activities in the Colony could not have escaped Robinson's notice, rather 
than having to wait for a Chinese request which was certain to be forthcoming, 
Robinson took the unexpected stop of ordering his banishment from the Colony 
even without the previous sanction of the Colonial Office. The 1895 Canton 
uprising and the subsequent case of Sun Yat-sen were thus the first trials of 
British policy towards the growth of a Chinese revolutionary movement on 
British soil.
The Hong Kong Hsing Chung Hui began planning this revolutionary 
attempt in March, 1895, the leading figures in the operation being Sun Yat- 
sen, Yang Ch'h-yhn, Hsieh Tsuan-t'ai and Huang Yung-shang, a wealthy merchant.
In addition, they managed to obtain the active support of two foreign journa­
lists in the Colony? Chesney Duncan was the editor of the Hong Kong Telegraph 
whose pro-revolutionary writings soon led to a warning from the Colonial 
Secretary who charged that his articles "amounted to incitement of the Chinese
38to revolt against a government with which Great Britain was on friendly terms.”
^Robinson to C.O. (confidential) of 6 Aug. 1895, in F.O. 17/1263 % 
his views were expressed again in Robinson to MacDonald of 1 June, 1896 (confi- 
dential) in CO 129/372. See also G. B. Endacott, op.cit. 215-27 for an 
account of his administration.
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Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. 8
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Thomas Reid was the editor of the China Mail., who later reminded Hsieh of his
39role in the Chinese revolutionary movements
"...and I personally am proud to think that I was the first to 
support the movement publicly in the China Mail when other English 
newspapers in China and the Far East scoffed at the movement.”
It was in fact the China Mail which first announced in March 1895 that the
"Reform Party" was planning action against the Ch’ing governments and
40
called on Foreign Powers not to support the Manchus. Whether or not
this early announcement was advantageous to the revolutionaries would soon be
seen.
Both Reid and Duncan were present at some of the conspiratorial meetings
at the Hsing Chung Hui headquarters, and they promised to rally the support
of the British government and the English people. It was decided to raise the
rebellion in Canton*, beginning with an attack upon public buildings as well
as on the foreign settlement5 the latter however, was only meant as a feint
41to draw off the attention of the city authorities. The public officers m  
the city were then to be captured, the Treasury and Arsenal seized, and with 
Canton in their possession the revolutionaries would march Northwards. The 
day chosen was the ninth day of the ninth lunar month, (26 October 1895)
39Letter to Tse from London, dated 9 Oct. 1912, in Tse Tsan-tai, 
op.cit. 33, See also accounts of some foreign sympathisers in Chou Lu "I-wei 
Kuang-chou ch’i-i” in HHKM I, 225; Lo Hsiang-lin, Kuo-fu chih ta'hsheh shih-tai, 
85-90, Kuo-fu ytt Qu-Mei chih yu-hao 78-9; Feng Tzu-yu, ko-ming i-shih I, 18;
Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t’ang shih-kao III, 655.
^See the China Mail of 12 March, 1895, and 16 March, 1895.
^Professor Frederic Wakeman, of the University of California 
at Berkeley, has suggested to the author that designating the attack on the 
foreign settlement as a "feint" could have been a ploy used by the revolutionaries 
to soothe whatever alarm the foreign journalists might have felt. On the 
other hand, the revolutionaries could also have actually planned it as a way 
of using Cantonese antiforeignxsm to summon support both against the Manchus 
and the imperialists. From other evidences of the motives of the revolution­
aries, however, at least in this early stage of the movement, the author feels 
that the first interpretation Is probably closer to the truth than the second.
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which was the Chuna-vano or "Mid Autumn" festival. It was Chinese custom to
visit ancestral graves on this day, and there was bound to be a great deal of
activity in Canton with numerous Cantonese entering the city. The circumstances
seemed ideal for an insurrection. The date having been fixed, Ho Ch'i under-™
took to draft a proclamation and the outlines of a Provisional Government to
42be established in China if the uprising proved a success.
It is interesting to note that when an election was held on 10 October,
to select the President of the Provisional Government it was again Yang Ch’fl-
yiln who proved to be a stronger force in the Hsing Chung Hu is though Sun
Yat-sen won by the number of votes, Yang was able to cause Sun’s "resignation"
43and have himself elected instead. In fact, at this stage of the movement, 
both Sun Yat-sen as a revolutionary leader and the Hsing Chung Hui as a 
revolutionary organization left much to be desired. But Sun was to gain much 
experience and prestige from the consequences of the Canton fiasco, while the 
amateurish handling of the insurrection could be seen from the events of
October, 1895.
" ' —
Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, 10, 26-37$ Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. 9$
P. Linebarger, op.cit. 211-3$ Sun Yat-sen, "My Reminiscences" in The Strand 
Magazine XLIII, 255 (1912) 301-7$ Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, 57-8$ Hstteh Chdn-tu 
"Sun Yat-sen, Yang Ch’d-ydn and the early revolutionary movement" in 
Journal of Asian Studies. 311. The North China Herald of 1 Nov. 1895, p. 745, 
col. 1-2 explains that Canton was chosen by the revolutionaries because the 
city was near the coast and its possession would afford them easy means of 
obtaining arms and ammunition, and with its wealthy population there was plenty 
of the sinews of war for future operations. Another advantage was that Canton 
had more foreign-educated men than any other city or province of China, who 
mostly wanted the opportunity to rebel against a regime which looked down 
upon this class of people.
43Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, 59$ Ch’en Shao-pai, op.cit. 95b$ Feng 
Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, 7$ Hsueh Chun-tu, op.cit. 312. See Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. 9 
in which he contends that his forced resignation had greatly displeased Sun, 
and that it had "'always rankled in his breast".
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To begin with, the conspiracy had none of the secrecy that was surely 
a prerequisite of successful revolution. Besides the premature announcement 
of their plans by Reid in the China Mail, news of an imminent uprising in 
Canton spread early in October as far as Shanghai and Tientsin; even the
44
number of men involved and their fighting capacity and armaments were known. 
This meant that both the Hong Kong government and the Chinese authorities in 
Canton were on their guard that a plot was underfoot.
Early in October, the Hong Kong Police received information that large 
shipments of firearms were going into the nearby Portuguese colony of Macao, 
from thence into China, and that the local Triads were endeavouring to engage 
recruits in the Colony. Meanwhile the Chinese officials in Canton were also 
making investigations, and on 26 October, the scheduled day of the uprising, 
five men were arrested, including Lu Hao-tung, and some letters and telegrams 
captured at the Canton Hsing Chung Hui headquarters. This caused the Hsing 
Chung Hui to postpone the insurrection by two days. On the 27th, further 
information of a suspicious character reached the Hong Kong authorities, and 
prompt action on this by the Hong Kong Police led to the frustration of the 
whole revolutionary attempt. On that day, Inspector Stanton of the Hong 
Kong Police Force learned that some four hundred coolies and secret society 
men were engaged in the Colony as "soldiers" and were to proceed to Canton
that evening on the steamer "Pow-an," there to await further instructions.
45
The men revealed that they had been recruited by Yang Ch'U-ylin and Chu Ho
44See the North China Herald of 4 Oct. 1895; and Peking and 
Tientsin Times of 19 Oct. 1895,' in which the paper scoffed at the possibility 
of a full-scale rebellion being organised.
45
In the British accounts the name appeared as Chu Ho, but it 
was probably the same man known as Chu Ch'i in other works.
44.
as government soldiers at $10 per month, and each had received $1 passage money 
for the journey to Canton. They were searched for arms, but nothing was 
found, and the Hong Kong authorities could not therefore prevent them from 
boarding the ship. Later that night, however, Inspector Stanton discovered 
that a large quantity of arms had recently been purchased at a shop in Hong 
Kong, and that Yang was again named as the person responsible. He further 
found that the arms had left in the same ship as the coolies, stored in five 
barrels labelled as cement. This information was duly relayed to the Canton 
Customs authorities through the British Consulate.
By this time, It was obvious to the revolutionaries that their plot
had completely miscarried, and they dicided to abandon all plans. The leaders
Sun Yat-sen, Ch'en Shao-pai and Cheng Shih-liang fled from Canton, while
Yang Ch'tt-yUn also left Hong Kong secretly. Meanwhile, as the "Pow-an"
arrived at Canton on the 28th, it was met by a comparatively small party of
Canton "Braves*' sent by Li Chia-cho, the Superintendent of the Shameen Contingent;
about fifty of the coolies were arrested, the rest soon dispersing among the
46crowd. In all three men, including Lu Hao-tung, were beheaded. It was 
generally considered among revolutionary contemporaries that the failure of 
the uprising was due to the betrayal of the plot by Chu Hsiang, brother of 
Chu Ch*i (Chu Ho) who fearing for his brother's safety, revealed the
Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. 10; T'ang Leang-li, The Inner History 
of the Chinese Revolution (London, 1930) 23; Sun Yat-sen, Kidnapped in London 
(Bristol, 1897) 28; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. II, 26-7; Chung-hua Min-Kuo Kai- 
Kuo ch'ien ko-ming shih I, 17-9; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. 96-96b, also given 
in HHKM I, 56-7; Chou Lu, op.cit. in HHKM, I, 225-34; the China Mail of 28 
Oct. 1895, p.3, col. 2; North China Herald of 1 Nov, 1895,p. 745, col. 1-2.
45
47conspiracy to Li Chia-cho in Canton, However, there could be no doubt that
the Hong Kong government and its energetic police force had the most to do
48with the breaking of the plot. In this, the Hong Kong Police were also
indebted to a betrayal by a coolie, So Ku, recruited for the insurrection who,
as was probably true for all the others, genuinely believed that he was to
be a government soldier in Canton. Then on the afternoon of the 17th, he
discovered the nature of the task they were to perform in Canton, and decided
to inform the Hong Kong authorities, meanwhile refusing to participate in
49
the movement any longer.
Thus fizzled out the first revolutionary attempt of Sun Yat-sen, The
50
event in itself was perhaps not significant, but in the investigations 
connected with it, the British Government discovered aspects of the revolution­
ary movement which were to have repercussions on the whole question of 
British policy toward the Chinese revolutionaries.
For instance, when the Hong Kong authorities cooperated with the 
Canton government in tracing the five barrels of firearms sent from Hong 
Kong, they were eventually found to have been lodged partly in the Chapel of 
the American Presbyterian Mission in Canton city, and partly at the house
47Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. 114-114b; Wu shou-i, op.cit. 81-7;
Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, 60-1. A defence of Chu by the Rev. Ou Feng-chih is given 
in Feng Tzu-yu, Chung-hua Min-lcuo kai-kuo ch* ien ko-ming shih I, 23-6.
48When the Colonial Office first heard of the attempted uprising 
from the Consul-General at Canton, some consternation was felt, and Chamberlain 
thought that the Hong Kong authorities ought to have known that the Colony was 
being used as headquarters for the plot, and to have informed the Canton 
authorities. Robinson was immediately asked for a report on the proceedings.
It was only when his reply came that the action of the Hong Kong government 
was made known. It was strange that Robinson did not think of furnishing an 
account of the coup before he was asked for it. See C. P. Lucas and Chamberlain 
Minutes on F.O. to C.O. of 11 Dec. 1895, in CO 129/269.
49
Robinson to C.O., 11 March, 1896, in CO 129/271.
50
Lord Salisbury's reaction on first learning of it was that 
it was "A mad plot enough, but it takes very little to upset the Chinese 
equilibrium." His minute on Brenan to F.O. of 4 Nov. 1895, in FO 17/1249.
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of a British subject by the name of Crick. Byron Brenan, (1894-1927) the British
Consul-General at Canton, felt that serious attention must be drawn to the first
fact, that Christians were implicated in the affair, and even worse, that the
Chapel of the American Mission should have been the centre of the movement in
Canton, "an unpleasant circumstance which cannot but seriously injure the
51Christian missions in this province." As for the British subject involved,
the Foreign Office discovered that he had earlier been deported from the Sandwich
Islands because of complicity in political troubles there, and that he had
lived in Canton for the past three months. During this time he had been seen
frequently in the company of Sun Yat-sen, but his part in the revolutionary
movement was not known until he left Canton suddenly after the abortive
uprising, when empty cement casks, as well as dynamite, cartridges, fuses and
52
chemicals used in the making of explosives were found hidden in his home.
He was only one example of the kind of foreign adventurers who were attracted
to the Chinese revolutionary cause, as will be seen again in later developments.
Another aspect which came to light consequent upon the Canton events
was how widespread and well-supported the movement already was in the South.
Brenan was informed by Li Chia-cho that when the plot could be sifted to the
53
bottom, many influential men and high military officials would be involved.
51Brenan to F.O. 4 Nov. 1895, FO 17/1249. See also Lu Tan-lin, 
op.cit. 111-2, where a Chinese Presbyterian Minister, the Rev. Tsou Tou-shan, 
is described as having given refuge to the revolutionaries in his bookstore- 
chapel in Canton.
52Brenan to O’Conor, 12 Nov. 1895, enclosed in Brenan to 
F.O. 18 Nov. 1895, In FO 17/1249.
Brenan to F.O. 4 Nov, 1895, ibid.
47
For this reason, the Canton officials soon rested satisfied with having fore­
stalled an attempted insurrection, and would not continue with a searching invest
54
igation for fear that "inconvenient information" would be found. This
doubtless explains the almost half-hearted way Li Chia-cho undertook the
suppression movement despite the early information relayed from Hong Kongs
for example, there was hardly a sufficient force of men to meet the steamer
as it arrived in Canton with the four hundred coolies, thus allowing most of
them to disperse. Brenan feared that should another such attempt be launched
against the government, the Viceroy of Canton, T'an Chung-lin would not have
been able to suppress it, as he did not seem to realize the gravity of the
55situation on this occasion. One plausible explanation is that T ’an was
perhaps being deceived by his subordinates, who were afraid of being held
responsible for the dangerous state of affairs.
But fears of a renewed attempt were indeed rife early in 1896. Once
56again it was the English press which gave the first warnings* Thereafter 
rumours and stories began to be widely circulated, and there were apprehensions
5Y
of another attempt during the Chung-yang festival in 1896 (15 October).
There were suspicious circumstances", anonymous warnings were sent to the 
foreign Consuls in Hong Kong in February, and in September, Dr. Knappe,
Brenan to F.O. 18 Nov. 1895, ibid
55Brenan to F.O., 4 Nov, 1895, ibid. See also Admiralty to 
F.O. of 30 Dec. 1895, in FQ 17/1256* in which the Vice-Admiral A. Buller on 
the China station, reported that there was still much uncertainty as to what 
extent the movement was really suppressed. He proposed that H.M.S, "Pigmy" 
should still be kept anchored off the Canton Settlement for the present.
56
North China Herald of 12 Feb., 1896, p.238, col. 1
57See Consul Fraser’s intelligence report, enclosed in F.O. to
C.O. of 12 Dec. 1896, in CO 129/274. Fraser proposed to apply for a gun-boat
at Canton should further disturbing information reach him.
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the German Consul, was alerted to expect a visit from Sun Yat-sen, with whom
58he was personally acquainted. Large consignments of firearms had been
leaving Hong Kong and finding their way into Canton, despite the frequent
seizures and raids made by Li Chia-cho. The Canton Viceroy was also reported
to have expressed extreme uneasiness about the situation, and repeatedly urged
the Hong Kong government for surveillance of the arms trade. In March,
he requested the extradition from Hong Kong of one of Sun’s followers, but it
59
was refused by Governor Robinson for lack of proof.
At about the same time, Consul Brenan in Canton also received reports
that Sun Yat-sen was due to return from Hawaii with a fresh supply of money
to renew his revolutionary activities. Quite unexpectedly, Sir William
Robinson promptly issued an order of banishment against Sun (and Chu Ho)
in his absence? Robinson considered "This man’s presence in the Colony so very 
60undesirable." The order was issued on 4 March, 1896, based on the 1882 
"The Banishment and Conditional Pardons Ordinance", and was to be effective 
for five years.^ Sun was in Japan when he learned of this British move
62
against him. He wrote to the Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong, J. H. S. Lockhart:
50
Canton intelligence report, enclosed in F.O. to C.O. of 16 
June, 1896, in CO 129/274, and again in F.O. to C.O. of 12 Dec. 1896, ibid
59
ibid
60
Robinson to C.O., 11 March 1896, in CO 129/271
^The ordinance is given in Sir John Carrington (ed) The 
Ordinances of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1904) I, 370-1. Acounts of the banishment 
are also given in Endacott, op.cit 227? Wu Shou-i, op.cit. 83? Lo Chia-lun, 
op.cit. I, 61-2, Lu Tan-lin, op.cit. 5. A copy of the banishment order is 
enclosed in Black to C.O. of 18 May, 1898, in 
62
His letter and Lockhart's reply are found in Black to CO. ibid
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"I was told by some good authority that the Hong Kong government 
have outlawed me on account of my attempt to emancipate my diserable 
countrymen from the cruelty of the Tartar yoke. I had asked many 
of my English friends in London whether this is the case. They said 
such is not an English law and usage. But my Chinese friends in Hong 
Kong answered the question in affirmative. Will you be kind enough to 
tell me whether it is true or not? If it is the case I will appeal 
it to the English public and the civilized world."
Lockhart's reply, dated 4 October, 1897:
In reply to your letter, undated, I am directed to inform you that 
this government has no intention of allowing the British colony of 
Hong Kong to be used as an asylum for persons engaged in plots and 
dangerous conspiracies against a friendly neighbouring Empire, and 
that in view of the part taken by you in such transactions, which you 
euphemistically term in your letter "emancipating my miserable countrymen 
from the cruelty of the Tartar Yoke" you will be arrested if you land 
in this Colony under an order of banishment issued against you in 1896.
Surprising as it was, Robinson's precipitate move in banishing the 
two men could not be seen in the light of a swing to a friendlier attitude 
towards the Chinese government on his part. On the contrary, seeing that 
Sun and Chu's complicity in the Canton coup was so obvious, and that the 
question of their surrender was bound to be taken up by the Chinese authorities, 
he decided to forestall them by taking action first, and to win the gratitude 
of the Canton Viceroy to boot. As far as the extradition arrangements between 
Hong Kong and Canton were concerned, Robinson remained firm in his stand that 
no assistance was to be given to the Chinese government without some 
corresponding privilege in return.
Shortly after this, the Canton Viceroy T'an Chung-lin attempted to 
include sedition among the offences for which the extradition of Chinese 
from Hong Kong might be arranged. In a private note to the new British
63Extradition relations between Hong Kong and the Chinese 
government were based on article 21 of the Treaty of Tientsin, 1858, which were 
subsequently amended in 1889 to become the "Chinese Extradition Ordinance, 
Ordinance 7 of 1889". See Carrington, op.cit. I, 658-67.
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Consul-General at Canton* E.H. Fraser* (1859-1922) dated 11 March, 1896, the
Viceroy stated:^
"...Hong Kong and Macao afford refuges for criminals. When Sun Wen 
and Yang Chu Yan had absconded to Hong Kong, your Majesty’s servants 
asked the British Consul to assist in their capture promising a big 
reward as recompense for their extradition. But the Consul deliberately 
prevaricated, declaring that by foreign law no one to be beheaded could 
be given up and asking Your Majesty's servant to declare what penalty 
they would be sentenced to. Your Majesty's servant replied that it was
impossible to fix the sentence before the criminal was put on trial
and the evidence taken.
Soon after, news came that Sun Wen had fled to Nagasaki, and the 
matter was dropped.
Kwangtung has since the execution of Lu Hao-tung and two others on 7 
November been tranquil, and rumours have also ceased. For the past 
few months nothing has been heard of seditious assemblies in Hong 
Kong and Macao. Yet revolutions always come when most unlooked for, and 
the only other course is to see that the Civil and Military authorities 
take precautions as opportunity offers."
Fraser seemed to regard the Viceroy’s appeal with a certain amount
of sympathy, suggesting to Robinson that the extradition law as it stood
engendered much ill-feeling between the British and the Chinese officials,
considering that sedition was regarded by the Chinese as the most heinous
of crimes against the Emperor, and he felt that a refusal to conciliate them
by extraditing anti-dynastic conspirators would surely be regarded as a
65
proof of unfriendly feelings on Britain’s part. Robinson however, refused 
to take the conciliatory line suggested by Fraser. He pointed out that it
U,
was a principal of English law that extradition should not be granted for
64Fraser to MacDonald, 25 April, 1896, enclosed in Robinson to 
C.O. of 7 1896 (Confidential) CO 129/372, On 1 November, 1895, the
Chinese government had requested the extradition of five men involved in the 
Canton coup, but Robinson had refused the application because the offence alleged 
against the men was of a political nature. See Brenan to F.O. of 18 Nov.
1895, in FQ 17/1249.
65
Fraser to MacDonald, 9 April, 1896, in Robinson to C.O. of 
7 July, 1896, CO. 129/372.
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political offences. Robinson deprecated making concessions to the Chinese 
government without a substantial "quid pro quo" being exacted from them in 
return, reiterating again his stand that in his experience any free grant of 
favours to the Chinese government would be regarded only as a sign of
weakness. The "Quid pro quo" he had in mind was the extension of the
66boundaries of Hong Kong. It is interesting that the British Minister at
Peking during this time was Sir Claude MacDonald, a man very much of Robinson's
67
way of thinking when it came to dealing with the Chinese, and MacDonald
68readily endorsed Robinson's suggestion.
Reactions from the British government at home however, were very 
69
different. C. P. Lucas, an Undersecretary at the Colonial Office, thought
that it was "objectionable" to suggest that political offenders should be
extradited to the Chinese on condition that Hong Kong should be given more
territory. His view was shared by an official at the Foreign Office, who
was surprised that either Robinson or MacDonald should have raised such a
question in the first place. Lord Salisbury, Prime Minister and Foreign
Secretary, on the other hand, perhaps troubled by the knowledge that Hong
Kong had become a centre of Chinese revolutionary activities, declared:
"I have no scruples in the matter at all. It would be a capital bargain
e ’
for us to get more territory and to lose a few of the scoundrally leaders 
of secret societies who harbour in Hong Kong. But it might raise a Parliamentary 
row or foreign complications, and should therefore, be considered from the 
point of view of expedience alone."
Robinson to MacDonald, 1 June, 1896, (confidential) enclosed 
in Robinson to C.O. of 7 July, 1896, ibid. His hopes were realised in 1898 
when the New Territories were leased from the Chinese government.
67See Chapter III 
68MacDonald to Robinson, 17 June, 1896 (confidential) enclosed 
in Robinson to CO of July 7, 1896, ibid.
69The following Minutes from C. P. Lucas, Wingfield, Lord 
Salisbury and Chamberlain are all attached to Robinson's despatch, ibid.
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To this came a strong protest from Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary,
"It would be monstrous to hand over political prisoners to any one - most
of all the Chinese, who would crucify them or cut them in pieces. We want
and must have more territory, but I would rather go to war with China for
it than agree to such a bargain." In the end, Chamberlain's views held,
and Robinson was told of the "grave objections" to his proposals, which
70
could not be entertained under whatever conditions. The acquisition of an
71extension to the Colony had thus to wait till the general "scramble" of 1898,
But it is worthy of note that in 1896, Lond Salisbury had put on record even 
momentarily, an aaggressive attitude towards the question. Such an energetic 
stand would not be seen again in his subsequent handling of the Chinese revo­
lutionaries.
It has been seen that in 1895 Sun Yat-sen's position in the Hsing
Chung Hui and as a revolutionary leader had not amounted to much. The
abortive attempt on Canton had brought his name to the attention of the
72
British government; but it was in 1896 and his kidnapping by the Chinese 
Legation in London that caused the British government to be directly involved 
in his activities, and as a consequence Sun gained the necessary prestige and
'n”-"™™—  .’
C.O. to Robinson, 4 Sept. 1896, in CO 129/274.
71See F.O. Correspondance of 1895-99 on the question of the exten­
sion of Hong Kong. Also see China Association, Annual Report 1898-9., Appendix 
F, "Extension of Hong Kong"; North China Herald of 3 Dec, 1897, p. 1028, col. 2; 
and leading article in the Times of 5 April, 1899, p.7, col, 2-3.
72
In 1895, Brenan described him as "a person of some intelligence, 
and well known in Hong Kong. He professed to be a Christian, but the missionaries 
with whom he had to do doubted his sincerity. He had studied medicine under 
English doctors in Hong Kong and took much interest in western science," 
in Brenan to F.O., 18 Nov. 1895, FQ 17/1249. A correspondent in the Times 
of 24 Oct. 1896, p.6, col. 2-3 asserted that Sun had guided the revolutionary 
movement from within the yamen of the Provincial Treasurer, showing that Sun 
was therefore "no ordinary obscure conspirator."
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publicity to boost his role in the Hsing Chung Hui organization as well as to
make him into an internationally known Chinese revolutionary.
After the failure of the Canton attempt, Sun sought refuge in Japan,
73and in Yokohama established a branch of the Hsing Chung Hui. He then left
Japan in the spring of 1896 and travelled to Hawaii and the United States, where
he established contact with the Triads among the Chinese communities and
74tried to preach revolution to them. His activities in America, however, were
watched closely by agents of the Manchu government, who were still determined
to bring him to justice. Accordingly, when he left America for England in
September 1896, this information was telegraphed to the Chinese Minister in
75London, Kung Chao-ydan. Thus from the day of his arrival in London, Sun's 
movements were vigilantly spied on by detectives in the employ of the Chinese 
Legation, Finally, in a reckless move, the Legation attempted to capture and 
smuggle him back to China for execution. The dramatic event lasted from 11 
to 23 October, and had it not been for the prompt interference of the British 
Foreign Office, the venture would undoubtedly have succeeded.
On the morning of the 11th, Sun was walking near the Legation quarters in 
Portland Place when he was accosted by a Chinese from his native district of 
Canton. Sun' was engaged in conversation, during which he was half-persuaded 
and half-forced to enter the Legation. Once inside, the door was locked and 
Sun was led upstairs and confined in a room. Later he was visited by Sir 
Halliday Macartney, the English Councillor at the Legation, and Teng ch'in-ch'i,
73Sun's activities in Japan are given m  M. B. Jansen, op.cit.
1625 Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch'iao ko-minq kai-kuo shih 42s Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I,
63-4; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. 96b-97; Sun Yat-sen, Fundamentals of National 
Reconstruction (Taipei, 1953) 28,
74Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, 65.
75Macartney to Sanderson, in Sanderson's Memo to F.O. of 22 Oct.
1896, FO 17/1718; also see Wu Shou-i. o p . cit. 92-100; Lo Chia-lun. op.cit. I, 66-7.
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76an offical interpreter;, and told of the fate awaiting him. From his
prisoner's room Sun tried throwing weighted messages through the window and
bribing the servants. In the end he succeeded in gaining the sympathy of the
English housekeeper at the Legation, Mrs. George Cole, and through her the
77campaign for Sun’s rescue was initiated.
In this, he also owed his life to two of his English friends from his
university days. Dr. James Cantlie had been Sun’s teacher at the Hong Kong
College of Medicine, and had shown interest in his medical as well as political
activities. In Hawaii in March 1896, he had met Sun and given him his London
address, to which Sun had accordingly reported after his arrival in London.
After this they were in constant contact, and Cantlie had already noticed
78Sun’s long absence from his lodgings. Dr. Patrick Manson was also a
79practitioner and teacher at the Hong Kong College of Medicine..
This was according to Sun's statement of 23 Oct. 1896, in 
FO 17/1718; also in Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, 67-8; Sun Yat-sen, Kidnapped in 
London 40-61; A reliable account of the whole kidnapping incident is compiled 
by Lo Chia-lun, Chuna-shan hsien-shena Lun-tun pei-nan shih-liao K’ao-ting 
(Shanghai 1930). Sir Halliday Macartney came out to China in 1860 with his 
regiment, and began a life-long connection with China. In 1862 he resigned 
from the army to join the Chinese service, having become closely attached to 
Li Hung-chang. He was appointed secretary with the first Chinese Embassy 
to England in 1877. He never returned to China, but remained in Europe helping 
to organize the diplomatic relations of the Chinese government. From 1877-1906 
he was first secretary, and then councillor and English secretary to the Chinese 
Legation in London. See D. Boulger, The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney (London 
& New York, 1908).
77Sun Yat-sen described in detail his frame of mind during his
imprisonment in a letter to the Rev. Ou Feng-chih, in Lu Tan-lin, op.cit. 101-3.
78Dr. Cantlie's regard for Sun is described in N. Cantlie and 
G, Seaver, Sir James Cantlie (London, 1939) 97* ”... Of some twenty-four men 
who presented themselves I was most attracted by Sun. Himself a Christian 
and the son of a Christian, he at once arrested my attention by his gentleness 
of character, his earnestness in study, and by his behaviour as a gentleman
in College and in private life. He was the model and the example to the other
members of the classes, and then as throughout his whole career, he attracted 
by his personality both teachers and fellow-students....”
^See P. H. Manson-Bahr and A. Vi. Alcock, The Life and VJork 
of Sir Patrick Manson, (London, 1927); and Sir Ronald Ross, Memories of Sir 
Patrick Manson (London, 1930) for his work as a specialist in tropical medicine.
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On the night of 17 October, Mrs. Cole dropped an unsigned note in 
the letter-box of Dr. Cantlie, informing him of Sun's plight. The note
"There is a friend of yours imprisoned in the Chinese Legation here, 
since last Sunday. They intend sending him out to China, where it 
is certain'they will hang him. It is very sad for the poor man, and 
unless something is done at once he will be taken away and no one will 
know it. I dare not sign my name, but this is the truth, so believe what
I say* Whatever you do must be done at once or it will be too late. His
name, I believe, is Lin Yen Sen."
Alarmed, Cantlie contacted Manson, and together they decided on the course
of action. The next day, which was a Sunday, Cantlie went to see Sir
Halliday Macartney at his home, but was told he was out of town for six months.
On Monday, Cantlie went to the Foreign Office and communicated a letter
containing three cards sent to him since the 17th by Sun through the good
81
services of Mrs. Cole;
"I was kidnapped into the Chinese Legation on Sunday and shall be 
smuggled out from England to China for death. Pray rescue me quick."
"A ship is already charter (sic) by the Chinese Legation for the service 
to take me to China and I shall be locked up all the way, without
communication to anybody. Oh, woe to me!"
"I was pulled into the Chinese Legation by two China men outside the street 
near the door on Sunday 11 October. Before I got in they each held a hand 
on my side urging me to go in to have a talk with them. When I got in they
locked the front door and force (sic) me to go up stair (sic) and put me
in a room and locked me up since that day.
They intend to smuggle me out of England if they can,otherwise murder 
me by some way in the Legation,
I was born in Hong Kong and went back the interior of China about 4 or 5 
years of age, as legally a British subject. Can you get me out by that?"
The Foreign Office was now faced with an unprecedented situation.
On the one hand. Sun Yat-sen was after all a declared rebel against the Chinese
............ ' gQ
Cantlie and Seaver, op.cit. 103.
^Cantlie to Sanderson of 19 Oct. 1896, in FO 17/1718; see also
J. Cantlie and C. S. Jones, Sun Yat-sen and the awakening of China (London,
1912) 60-3; Sun Yat-sen, 62-106.
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government, whose claim to British citizenship was soon proved to be false.
On the other hand, if the circumstances were as Cantlie described, the matter
was a grave one. What the Foreign Office feared was the possibility of a
great public outcry if the event became known, and if it was found that though
informed, the government had done nothing to stop what was obviously an
83
illegal proceeding. This aspect was particularly imminent, as Cantlie's
letter contained a veiled threat. "If the legation continues to deny Sun's
presence, I see no other way of bring ing the matter home than to hand the facts
84
to the press for publication." A decision was thus made by Francis Bertie 
and J. A. Campbell, Assistant Under-secretary and Under-secretary respectively 
at the Foreign Office, to station a detective outside the Chinese Legation in 
case they attempted to move Sun or get him out of the country; meanwhile, to 
have a "discreet police officer" speak with George Cole, porter at the Legation,
To this Lord Salisbury telegraphed his approval from his country home at Hatfield.
By the next day, Sun's presence and his confinement in the Legation 
was confirmed as a result of the police officer’s investigations. Bertie decided
that it was a "scandal" and that the British government could "scarcely let
86the matter go on." Sir Thomas Sanderson, (1841-1923), Permanent Under­
secretary, also felt that Sir Halliday should be summoned to the Foreign Office
to be warned of the consequences of such an abuse of diplomatic privilege,
a-
10
which could result in the delivery of the Chinese Minister of his passport and
87
even criminal proceedings against Macartney himself. Lord Salisbury however,
*82
Sanderson Memorandum to Salisbury, 22 Oct 1896, FQ 17/1718.
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Bertie to Home Office, 19 Oct. 1896 (pressing) ibid.
84Cantlie to F.O. 19 Oct. 1896, ibid.
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Bertie Minutes of 19 Oct. 1896, ibid.
86
Sanderson Minutes of 20 October, 1896, FQ 800/1.
8^ibid.
85
57
strongly opposed Foreign Office intervention- He felt that the police should 
continue to keep the Legation watched, to prevent anyone being transported
against his will. "But beyond this we have no interest. I do not think it
88
is our business to advise Sir Halliday Macartney,'1 This reluctance to
become involved was representative of Lord Salisbury’s stand throughout this
kidnapping incidents it was part of his over-all policy of caution and even
89diffidence which was so frequently a criticism of his administration.
After much insistence from the other officials in the British government, who
felt that the Chinese Legation’s violation of British territor^^sintagrity
could not be tolerated, Salisbury sanctioned a strong demand for Sun’s release.
Even then, he was reluctant to follow this with a protest to the Peking
government, as was expected of him.
Meanwhile, pressure was increasing on the Foreign Office to take immediate
action. On 21 October, Inspector F. Jarvis of the Metropolitan Police had an
interview with McGregor of the "Glen Line" steamers, and the latter stated
that they had been approached by the Chinese Legation respecting the transport
of a lunatic to China. But their steamer "Glen-fang" had been delayed and
90
could not sail till mid-November, so the negotiations had fallen through.
On 22 October, Sanderson discovered that the two doctors had sent a letter to
the London Times office containing a full account of the incident, which was
provisionally withheld from publication pending action by the government. He
feared that "if the affair is published there may be a considerable scandal,
91particularly if we have done nothing." From the Home Office came information
^Salisbury Minutes, ibid.
8^Supra Chapter I.
90 /Murdock to Sanderson, 24 Oct. 1896, FQ 17/1718.
91Sanderson Memo to Salisbury, 22 October, 1896, ibid.
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that on the same day the two doctors had made an application for a writ
of habeas corpus to the High Court, requiring the Chinese Legation to
bring up a Chinese subject alleged to be illegally detained at the Chinese
Legation, The affidavits by the two doctors were found to be genuine, and
the Home Office urged Lord Salisbury to take action and secure the release of 
92Sun Yat-sen. Also on the 22nd, and despite Salisbury's previous injunctions 
against it, Sanderson and Bertie arranged an interview with Macartney, who was 
found to have been inside the Chinese Legation all this time. Macartney was 
reminded of the seriousness of the situation, and urged to release Sun immediately.
r
Macartney projfestinated, saying that they were awaiting instructions from the 
~93
Tsungli-yamen.
Only then, when matters seemed to have reached a deadlock did Salisbury
agree to step in, and sent a formal note demanding Sun's release to the Chinese 
94
Minister;
"The detention of this man against his will in the Chinese Legation is, 
in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, an infraction of English law 
which is not covered by, and is an abuse of, the diplomatic privilege 
accorded to a foreign representative. I have therefore, the honour to 
request that Sun Yat-sen may be at once released."
This must have come as a surprise to Macartney, who was perhaps
in the best position to recognise that so long as Lord Salisbury did not
come out with an official ultimatum, there was hope of the Chinese Legation
Judge E. Digby (Home Office) to F.O. 22 Oct. 1896, (confidential 
and pressing) ibid. and Judge R. S. Wright (High Court) to F.O., 23 Oct, 1896, 
(confidential) ibid.
93
Sanderson Memo, 23 Oct. 1896, ibid.
94
F*0. to Kung Ta-jen, 22 Oct. 1896, ibid.
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being able to delay and perhaps get Sun out of the country. But with this
notice being served he realized that the Chinese government must step down
to avoid a serious Anglo-Chinese crisis. Accordingly, at a second meeting
with Sanderson on 23 October, Macartney declared that he was going to
liberate Sun on his own responsibility, and then telegraph the Tsungli-
yamen that he was doing so. However, the extent to which he was free to
act entirely on his own could be gauged, when he was made to follow this with
the request that the British government should give an assurance that Sun
should be vigilantly watched should he return to Hong Kong and attempt to
organize treasonable conspiracies in China again. The fact of Hong Kong
being the constant headquarters of revolutionaries was once more emphasized.
Sanderson refused to promise anything: certainly not as a condition for
95Sun's release. By this demand, Macartney was in fact only testing the
ground for a formal application from the Chinese Minister which came a few 
96days later: That afternoon, he called at the Foreign Office with the
97information that the Chinese Minister was releasing Sun Yat-sen immediately.
It was thus a diplomatic triumph for the Foreign Office and a defeat
for the Chinese government, accomplished without undue strain on the
relations between the two countries. Yet had it not been for the urgency 
—
Sanderson Memo, 23 Oct. 1896, ibid.
^Chinese Minister Kung to F.O., 26 Oct, 1896, FQ 17/1286.
^Sanderson Memo, 23 Oct. 1896, in FQ 17/1718: See also the 
Times of 23 Oct. 1896? London and China Express of 30 Oct. 1896, and North 
China Herald of 30 October, 1896, for accounts of his release.
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attached to the matter by Foreign Office officials such as Bertie and
Sanderson, Britain’s handling of the situation would have shown much more
lack of leadership and determination than it had. Even so, Lord Salisbury
had his doubts. He admitted that 1 all had gone very well," but "I have
a lingering doubt as to Webster’ s law - but as we have accepted it, we must
go through with it, and make a protest at Peking. Perhaps we might link it
98on to the Burmese negotiations.” Thus even when the Chinese Government had
given in so readily to his intercession on Sun's behalf, Salisbury still did
not feel confident enough to make his protest to Peking a matter of importance
in itself. It was true that during most of the negotiations in this Sun
case, he was at Hatfield, and the fact of his physical presence away from
the centre of the storm might have caused his somewhat indifferent attitude.
When he did decide to instruct Sir Claude MacDonald in the matter., the latter
was asked not to make a communication to the Tsungli-yamen unless they brought
up the matter. Then he was to point out that the action of the Chinese
Minister in London was a gross abuse of the privilege enjoyed by a foreign
representative, which would not be tolerated in any European capital, and of
which Her Majesty’s Government had a grave reason to complain. Perhaps to soften
the blow a little, Salisbury then added that if necessary, MacDonald was
authorised to promise that it was the wish of the British government do do
what was consitutionally in their power to discourage and prevent conspiracies on
99British territory directed against the Chinese governor or its officers.
^Salisbury Minutes, 23 Oct. 1896, in FQ 800/1. By Webster's 
law he probably referred to Sidney Webster, in his Extradition - the right to 
demand it; the enlargement of its jurisdiction, and the improvement of its 
methodsHSew York, 1890). See J. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign 
Policy (London. 1964) 132, for an account of the Burmese negotiations,
" f .O. to MacDonald, 26 Oct. 1896, In FQ 17/1718.
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On the other hand, and on the same day that MacDonald was sent his
vaguely-worded instructions, the Chinese Minister in London delivered a note
to the Foreign Office, making very definite demands that the British
authorities of Hong Kong should prevent the Colony being made a base of secret
society and other anti-dynastic movements
"The proximity of Hong Kong to the mainland making the island an especially 
advantageous station whence these movements can be directed and a convenient 
place of retreat and refuge for the conspirators and other evilly disposed 
persons in case of the discovery of miscarrige (sic) of their machinations,
I have the honour to request Your Lordship to be so kind as to cause the 
local authorities to exercise for the present, special vigilance over any 
persons known or supposed to belong to these illegal organizations."
The Foreign Office felt that "If this is intended as a retort in connection
101
with the Sun incident, it is feeble." In their reply, they reminded
Kung of the important role Hong Kong had played in the discovery of the Canton
plot in 189b, and that the governor had banished two of the ring-leaders on
102
his own initiative.
Mow that the Chinese government had shown a disposition to renew this
question of Hong Kong as a revolutionary base, Sanderson felt that on their
part the British government must also pursue further their protest at
Peking regarding the kidnapping case, Sanderson pointed out that this was
the most desirable in view of the fact that Sir Halliday Macartney had
approached him some weeks before Sun’s arrival in London to enquire whether
a Chinese subject who had escaped to England could be surrendered on demand
for trial and punishment in China under the Extradition clause in the
Convention of March 1894, with Burma and Tibet. Sanderson had told him
103that it was plainly not possible. Sanderson now suggested a "very
104strong remonstrance to the Chinese Government." This was endorsed by
100Kung to F.O., 26 Oct. 1896, in FQ 17/1718.
^^F.O. minutes on above,
102
F.O. to Kung, 31 Oct. 1896, ibid.
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Sanderson Memo, 22 Oct. 1896, FO 17/1718.
104.. .. ibid.
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Lord Salisbury; 1 We must protest to prevent any modification in our
105international rights exercising against us by inference from our default."
But he made it clear that personally he was just as indifferent to the incident 
as he had been at its outset, "...otherwise the matter affects our interests 
very little. Consequently MacDonald was again instructed., this time
a
with a more definite message to convey to the Tsungli-yamen. He was to
107represent to the Chinese government:
"that in the absence of any treaty stipulation giving the Chinese
representatives in England extraterritorial jurisdication over Chinese 
subjects, the detention in the Legation of one even though undoubtedly 
a subject of China, is a serious abuse of the privileges and immunities 
granted to Foreign Representatives. Her Majesty’s Government feel that 
if such acts were persisted in or repeated, it would justify the use
of whatever measures necessary for the release of the captive, and to
demand the immediate departure of the persons responsible. They trust 
therefore, that the Chinese government will give strict instructions 
to the Minister in London to abstain carefully from any acts of the 
kind in future."
When this message was duly delivered, MacDonald noted that there
was no attempt on the part of the yamen to defend the action of the Chinese
Legation,thus suggesting that the whole incident must have arisen out
of an over-enthusiasm on the part of Kung Chao-yhan in the exercise of
his duties, encouraged perhaps by Sir Halliday Macartney. In a private
conversation with MacDonald, even Li Hung-chang seemed anxious to know if
109Lord Salisbury considered Macartney to blame for the kidnapping. •
In fact, in a final analysis of the drama, it was indeed Macartney 
who came under the heaviest fire. He laid himself open to suspicion from
105Salisbury minutes, 18 Nov. 1896, ibid.
^ ^ ibid.
107F.O. to MacDonald, 16 Dec. 1896, ibid.
■^MacDonald to F.O. 9 Mar. 1897,ibid.
109ibid. MacDonald had told him that there was nothing to 
indicate such. But in Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 18-20, it is clear that 
Macartney was responsible for the hiring of a detective to tail Sun from 
the day he arrived in London, and it was to Macartney and not to the Chinese 
Legation that the detective made his reports.
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the beginning,, when Dr. Cantlie tried to see him, and was told that he was
away. Yet it was soon revealed by the Legation staff that he had been indoors
all the time, and that he had given instructions to his servants that he would
110be at home to nobody. His account of how Sun came to be taken into the 
Legation also differed substantially from the information which reached the 
British government. He insisted that Sun had entered the building voluntarily 
on Saturday, 10 October, with the intention of spying on the Legation. After 
a brief conversation with a Cantonese on the staff, he left, and they then dis­
covered that some sheets of a Chinese translation being prepared for Macartney
111were missing. So when Sun came again the next day, the 11th, he was detained.
The most inculpating factor against Macartney’s story was, of course, the fact
that he had made enquiries and been informed that the extradition of a criminal
from England to China could not be granted. Sir Thomas Sanderson felt that
it was plainly Macartney’s duty to inform the Chinese Minister that he could
not be a party to such illegal proceedings, and if they had persisted, he
must resign and inform the Foreign Office of what was taking place. Even Lord
112
Salisbury agreed that his part in it was "a very ugly story." In general, 
it was observed that Macartney had failed to offer any lucid explanation of 
the object of detaining Sun, if it was not to smuggle him illegally out of 
the country. If he had known that extradition was impossible, he should have
110Cantlie to F.O. 19 Oct. 1896, FQ 17/1718.
111His account as told to Sanderson, in Sanderson memo of 23 
Oct. 1896, ibid; The North China Herald of 4 Dec. 1896, p.971, also carries a 
statement from Macartney. See the Times of 26 Oct. 1896, p.8 col. 4 where 
in a letter he attacked the press for believing Sun’s version of the story 
and not his. Cantlie and Seaver, op.cit. 101, assert that on that morning 
Sun was on his way to church with the Cantlie family. See also Boulger, op.cit. 
466-7 for a defence of Macartney.
112
Sanderson Minutes, 24 Oct. 1896, in FQ 800/1.
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applied for a warrant for the man's arrest and proceed against him in the
ordinary way. The public outcry was strongest when it was found that an
Englishman should have been a party to, if not the prime-mover, in this
113high-handed proceeding.
As for Sun Yat-sen, the incident afforded him fame and popularity
among most of the English-speaking countries. The publicity made him into
a professional revolutionary, and he was quick to capitalize on it by
releasing a statement to the English press in which he reaffirmed his
114intentions of delivering his country from oppressions
"Will you kindly express through your columns my keen appreciation of the 
action of the British government in effecting my release from the Chinese 
Legation. I have also to thank the press generally for their timely help 
and sympathy. If anything were needed to convince me of the generous 
public spirit which pervades Great Britain, and the love of justice which 
distinguishes its people, the recent acts of the last few days have 
conclusively done so. Knowing and feeling more keenly than ever what 
a Constitutional Government and an enlightened people mean, I am 
prompted still more actively to pursue the cause of advancement, education 
and civilization in my own well-beloved but oppressed country."
If Sun did not openly ask for British help in his revolutionary cause in this
statement, he did so in an article written soon after this in the London
Fortnightly Review. In it, having asserted that nothing would do for China
but the complete overthrow of the Manchu regime, he made it clear that he
113
North China Herald, 11 Dec. 1896, p. 1012, col. 3; London 
and China Express 30 Oct. 1896, p. 91b, col. 2; See Boulger, op.cit. 468-9 where 
in defending Macartney's actions, he points out the penalties of service 
in a foreign government, particularly that of China? and the unworthiness of 
Sun Yat-sen for the stir made on his behalf by public opinion. In the 
House of Commons, it was announced that official responsibility must rest 
with the Chinese Legation, in FQ 17/1718 and reported in the London and 
China Express of 19 Feb. 1897, p. 163, col. 2.
114His letter appeared in the Times on 26 Oct. 1896, p. 8 
col. 4? the London and China Express on 30 Oct. 1896, p. 918, col. 2;
See also Sun Yat-sen, Kidnapped in London 133; Ch'en Hsiung, op.cit. 266.
Sun was also reinstated as chairman of the Hong Kong Hsing Chung Hui shortly 
after this.
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hoped to be able to depend on the cooperation of England in the achievement 
of his object. He was careful to point out that events in China were capable
115
of producing "serious European complications."
Meanwhile^ the publicity attached to Sun revived the question of his
banishment from Hong Kong. It was little noticed when first put into effect
in 1896; but now when Britain had so clearly defended its policy of protecting
Chinese political refugees on British soil from the Chinese government,
questions began to be raised as to the inconsistency of first driving him out
of a Crown colony, only to shelter him again in England. The outcry was
raised by a British soldier, Roland Mulkern, Secretary of the Friends of
116
China Society, who wrote to the London Standard;
"The government of the Crown Colony of Hong Kong has banished Sun Yat-sen 
from the island, and has assumed the right to hand over political offenders 
to the tender mercy of the Tartar government of China. This is surely 
foreign to the spirit in which political offenders seek refuge in Britain, 
and as the laws of the Crown Colonies are identical with British laws and 
acts, it would seem that the Hong Kong government has acted unconstitutionally."
This was echoed by another London daily; "If Sun had rights as a political
117
refugee in England, does he lose those rights in an English Crown Colony?"
This press campaign inevitably led to questions being asked In the
House of Commons. Mr. M. Davitt (Mayo,S) wanted to know the specific grounds
for Sun’s banishment in 1896, the offence he was charged with, if there was
any act against the laws of the Colony, arid whether the decree of banishment
118was going to be revoked. On receiving notice of these questions, the Colonial 
~™ ^
The article was written in conjuction with a Mr. Edwin Collins. 
"China’s present and future; the Reform Party’s plea for British benevolent 
neutrality" in Fortnightly Review, LXI, N.S. (1897) 424-40.
116His article was reprinted in the Evening News on 11 Jan. 1898, 
and seen in FQ 17/1718; also in London and China Express of 14 Jan. 1898, p. 40, 
col. 2, Sun’s friendship with Mulkern is given in Lin Tzu-hsdn, Kuo-fu hsdeh- 
shou yd Hsi-fang wen hua (Taipei 1953) 141.
117Quoted in London and China Express of 14 Jan, 1898, ibid.
118Parliamentary Debates LVI, April 1898, 219; the questions 
are also in CO 129/286 and in trimslation in Wu Shou-i, op.cit. 84-6.
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Office found that in fact they had little specific knowledge of the circumstances
of Sun's exile. Aside from mentioning that he had banished Sun and Chu Ho in
his despatch of 11 March, 1896, Robinson gave no account of the terms of the
order, nor was there a statement of the grounds on which it was issued. It
was a most unsatisfactory proceeding, and for sheer lack of information the
Colonial authorities began to doubt if the suspicions of Sun being involved
i-n a CQUP against Canton were justified. There was some confusion as to
119whether the order should now be revoked. In the end, Chamberlain decided
that they had better ask Hong Kong for a complete explanation; meanwhile
the House was supplied with a brief answer that "Sun Yat-sen left Hong Kong
in 189b, at a time when information had reached the Colonial government that
he was implicated in certain proceedings against the Chinese authorities in
Canton. Hearing that he was likely to return, the Governor in Council issued
an order of banishment against him. He was not charged with, or convicted of,
an offence against the laws of the Colony. I am not aware whether the order
is still In force, or whether an application has been made for its revocation,
120
but I will cause inquiries to be made."
These proceedings in the British Parliament were not unnoticed by
the Chinese Legation. Soon after the debates were published, the new Chinese
121
Minister, Lo Feng~lu called at the Foreign Office, and referring to the
"y
Johnson Minutes on Parliamentary questions, CO. 129/286.
120Chamberlain Minutes, ibid; Parliamentary Debates, ibid;
C.O. to O.A.G. Hong Kong, 12 April, 1898, In CO 129/286.
"^Lo became Chinese Minister in May, 1897. His appointment 
was greeted with enthusiasm in England, in that he was known to have had 
considerable experience in dealing with foreigners, spoke several European 
languages fluently, and was a protege of Li Hung-chang. See accounts of him 
in Sir Valentine Chirol, Fifty Years in a Changing World, (London 1927)
186-7; the Worth China Herald of 11 Dec. 1896, p. 997, col. 2-3; Bertie Memo,
26 Nov, 1896^ in FQ 17/1290,""and MacDonald to F.O. 2 Dec. 1896, in FQ 17/1278.
Lo did not seem to get on very well however, with Sir Halliday Macartney;
See Boulger, op.cit. 472-3.
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question of Sun’s banishment, expressed the hope that no attempt would be made
122to revoke the order. This request was passed on to the Colonial Officials
who were unable to commit themselves by any sort of promise until they have
123
had more information from Hong Kong. However, when Hong Kong's reply did
arrive, it contained only correspondence between Sun and the Colonial
Secretary early in 1897, together with the fact of the banishment order
being of five years' duration, and that there had been no application for 
124
its revocation. " By this time, Robinson had left the Colony, and the
Officer Administering the Government could not be expected to know much
more about the incident thaft what his predecessor had left on files.
Responsibility for the confused state of things must therefore, still be
traced to Robinson,
This lack of information did not dispel the Colonial Office belief
that the only incriminating fact against Sun was his own statement in his
letter, regarding the emancipation of his countrymen from the Tartar yoke.
125
They were not yet convinced of his guilt in the 1890 Canton coup.
Accordingly there was again some difficulty in meeting the challenge posed by 
Mr. Davitt in a series of questions in the House on 14 July, 1898. Davitt re­
quired to know of the promised information from Hong Kong, whether the Chinese 
government had desired the expulsion of Sun, and if their request had been 
complied with, whether it was doen with the sanction of the Colonial Office,
and finally suggesting that since no breach had been made against British
126law, the order should be withdrawn. The reaction of the Colonial Office 
  Y22
F.O, to C.O. 26 April 1898, (confidential) in CO 129/277.
123
C.O.Minutes on above.
124
Black to C.O. 18 May, 1898, in CO 129/282,
125
C.O. Minutes on above.
126
Parliamentary Debates LXII, 765 and in CO 129/286.
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to this demonstrated again the extent to which the government at home could
sometimes become dangerously ignorant about the motives and policies of its
distant colonial administrators. Johnson, an Undersecretary, summed up the 
127
dilemmas
"I do not see how these questions can be very satisfactorily answered, 
since the whole proceedings were very loose; and the Banishment Ordinance 
No. 8 of 1882 under which this man was banished is of a most arbitrary 
character, which might rouse much criticism if its contents were known 
to some members of the House of-Commons. The Order of Banishment does
not specify the real grounds on which Sun Yat-sen was banished."
It was at first suggested that in reply to the questions regarding a
Chinese application for Sun's expulsion, it might be explained that Hong Kong's
doing so was in deference to the Chinese government's view that Sun's presence
128in the Colony was dangerous to the peace of Canton. This however, met with
Chamberlain's opposition, who finally drafted what he termed a "safe" reply
"No application was made by the Chinese government for his banishment,
and he left the colony prior to the issue of the order. I see no reason
to interfere with the temporary prohibition of his residence in Hong Kong."
130The Chinese Minister was accordingly informed of Chamberlain's decision,
131and in a "sweet letter" to the Foreign Office Lo expressed his thanks for
this "renewed proof of the friendly disposition of Her Majesty’s Government
towards China, and (I desire to) express the hope that during the currency of
the Order no application will be entertained having for its object the return
132of this notorious creator of sedition to Hong Kong..."
127Johnson Minutes on the Parliamentary questions, ibid.
128.v. ,ibid.
129Chamberlain Minutes, ibid.
F.O. to Lo Feng-lu, 25 July, 1898, FQ 17/1718.
131
Remark of Fiddian at F.O., ibid.
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On such an apparently satisfactory note ended Sun Yat-sen’s first direct 
encounter with British government policy. It was surely not Britain’s intention 
to offer unlimited protection for all Chinese political refugees on British 
territory, whether at home or in the Colonies; and it certainly could not be 
regarded as a sign of approval for their movements. Lord Salisbury would have 
been the first to reject this assumption. Nevertheless, British prestige and 
the responsible observance of international law had to be upheld. For these 
considerations, Sun Yat-sen found himself official and personal champions 
during 1895-1898. In 1898 however, a reform movement of a different kind 
erupted in China, and Sun Yat-sen was temporarily forgotten as British 
attention turned to events concerning K'ang Yu-wei and the constitutional 
reformers.
CHAPTER III
THE REFORM MOVEMENT OF 1898
The reform movement in China which was to culminate in the dramatic 
"Hundred Days" of 1898 had its beginnings as early as jfri 1895. That was 
the fateful year of China's defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War. 
Hitherto, China1s foreign wars and their results had affected the Empire but
little. This time, however, when defeat came at the hands of a former
vassal-state, traditionally regarded as culturally China's inferior, it was 
a shattering blow to the pride and complacency of the scholar-official class, 
and they determined to urge that the government should undertake reforms.
Thus began a general movement among the educated section of the population. 
The outstanding personality among them was the Cantonese scholar K'ang Yu-wei 
(1858-1927).
1<* ang had received a classical education which eventually won for 
him the coveted degree of chin-shih. His interests, - however, extended to the
reading of the works of a wide range of European and Japanese liberals from
which he was to derive inspiration for his later reform ideas. In 1887, at 
the age of twenty-nine, K*ang journeyed to South and Central China, and at 
one point passed through Hong Kong. He was much impressed by the orderli­
ness and efficiency of the British-administered Colony, and the experience 
also helped to shape his ideas for administrative reforms in China. In 
1888 K'ang was in Peking for an examination. He was so distressed by the 
corruption and disorganisation of the central government system, as compared 
with that of the British Colony, that he drafted and presented a petition 
to the throne. He urged the need for reforms in China, and attributed the
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growing strength of Japan to the Meiji reorganisation* His petition was 
ridiculed, and not presented to the Emperor. Disillusioned, K* ang returned 
to Canton, where he began to operate a school to spread reform ideas among 
the young. ^
By 1895, with news of the defeat at the hands of Japan, K'ang was 
not the only intelligent Chinese who felt that the effort to press for 
reforms should be seriously taken up. When it was known that the Chinese 
Government was arranging to make peace with the Japanese, there was a stir 
among the many chu-i en who were in Peking for the chin-shih examinations.
A number of memorials urging immediate reforms were submitted by various 
scholars, but to no avail. Then K'ang conceived the idea of writing a 
memorial and having it jointly signed by several others; in this endeavour 
K'ang was aided by his fellow provincial Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873-1929) who 
had also come for the examinations.2 They obtained over one hundred names 
for this.
An excellent treatment of K'ang Yu-wei and his life is 
done by his maternal grandson, Lo Jung-pang, K'ang Yu-wei. a Biography 
and a Symposium (Arizona, 1967); see also K'ang Yu-wei, Nan-hai K1ang 
Hsien-sheng tzu-pien nien-p'u (Peking 1958) I, 7b-9b, also given in Chien 
Po-tsan. et. al. (ed) Wu-hsh pien-fa (Shanghai 1953), hereafter quoted as 
WHPF, IV, 107-120; M. E. Tsur, "K'ang Yu-wei" in Hankow Club Collected 
Papers. University of Hong Kong Library, XXXIX (1915); R. Howard,
"K* ang Yu-wei, his intellectual background and early thought," in A. F. 
Wright (ed) Confucian Personalities (Stanford, 1962) 294-316; M. E. 
Cameron, The Reform Movement in China. 1898-1912 (Stanford 1931) 23-4; 
Hsiao Kung-chttan, "The case for constitutional monarchy; K'ang Yu-wei*s 
plan for the democratization of China" Monumenta Serica. XXIV (1965)
2
For accounts of Liang Ch*i-ch*ao, see J. R. Levenson, 
Liang Chti-chtao and the Mind of Modern China (Cambridge, Mass. 1953) 
15-33; Yang Fu-li, "Liang Ch'i-ch'ao nien-pu" in WHPF IV, 171-8; C. Y. 
Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West. 1872-1 949~~(n. Carolina 1966) 
212-228; Chang Peng-ylian, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao yCt Ching-chi ko-ming (Taiwan. 
1964) 47-78; Ting Wen-chiang, Liana Jen-kung Hsien-shena nien-p'u ch*ana- 
pien ch1 n-lcaa (Taiwan 1959) 23-30
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Three Hunan scholars also found some tens of names to put on their memorials
and together with K'ang they went again to the Censors' vamen asking them to
submit the memorials for them. This move was further followed by scholars
3
from other provinces doing the same. Having waited for some days and 
seeing no report of their memorials in the Peking Gazette, they decided to 
combine their efforts into one grand petition from all the provinces, to 
protest against the forthcoming treaty, urge the transfer of the capital, 
and ask for urgent reform measures. This was the Wan Yen Shu (Ten Thousand 
Word Letter) and K'ang was selected to draft the document. It claimed to 
have twelve hundred signatures, though the actual names given in the document 
totalled only six hundred and four.4 As the treaty with Japan was to be 
ratified at Chefoo on 8 May, they decided to present the memorial at the 
Censorate on 4 May. In actual fact, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was ratified
on 2 May, and the memorialists thus failed to make their protest in time.
This grand memorial met the same fate as all the other previous onesi the 
Censors disapproved of its radical tone, and the petition was consequently 
ignored.^
Disappointed by the obstacles in the way of working through offi­
cial channels, K'ang then turned to a literary campaign to spread reform 
ideas. With a number of other scholars and young officials, he decided to
 ' " ........"3
They were from Kwangtung, Fukien, Szechwan, Kiangsi, Kueichou,
Kiangsu, Hupeh, Shensi, Kansu, Kwangsi, Chihli, Shantung, Shansi and Honan.
4See the North China Herald of 6 Dec. 1895, p. 949, col.
1-3*
5Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Wu-hsU cheng-pien chi (Yokohama 1899)
1-2, also given in WHPF I, 249; Wu Tse, K'ang Yu-wei vh Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 
(Shanghai 1948) 9-13; Wen Ching, The Chinese Crisis from Within (London 
1901) 51-54; M. E. Cameron, op. cit. 26; Wang Ch' i-chti (ed) " K'ang Yu-wei 
tsou-i erh-shih-chiu p'ien" in WHPF II, 123-269, giving 29 of the memo­
rials K'ang had submitted to the throne.
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recruit the support of the enlightened, educated classes. Their first
step was to form study societies, (hsheh-t1ana) which ostensibly aimed
at the promotion of learning, but in reality became reform societies with
political objectives.
In September, 189b, the Ch'ianq-hsheh Hui (known as the Hanlin
Society to foreigners) was founded in Peking, under the leadership of K'ang
Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and the Hanlin academicians Wen T*ing-shih and
6Chang Hsiao-ch,ien. Soon after this, Chang, representing the Society, 
paid a visit to Sir Nicholas O'Conor, (1843-1908) the British Minister at 
Peking. O'Conor had been the British Representative since 1892 and had 
witnessed the steady increase of inefficiency and corruption in the Ch'ing 
government, so that China's defeat by Japan in 1895 was in his eyes to a 
large extent inevitable. He had also become convinced that the only salva­
tion for China was immediate and thorough-going reforms. When Chang came 
to see O'Conor, he brought along a copy of the Society's Manifesto, setting
7
forth their aims and activities, and he assured the Minister that the
moment was opportune for a movement of the kind, because "men like himself
(Chang) had begun to realise that the system, which condemned them to
spend their best years of life in the attainment of knowledge which rather
unfitted than qualified them for the discharge of their duties to the State,
8
ought to be superseded by something more practical. " The purpose of his
£
See Wang Chti-ch'ang "Yen Fu teng-jen chuan-chi" in WHPF 
IV, 83-4; Wang Ch'i-chti (ed) "Ch* iang Hstieh Hui chi ch'i-ta hstleh-hui" 
in WHPF IV, 373-478.
7
The Manifesto is found in Wang Ch'i-chli op. cit. in 
WHPF IV, 384-94. See also K'ang's statement for the society in S. Y.
Teng and J. K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West (Cambridge, Mass.
1961) 152-3
80'Conor to F. 0. 23 Oct. 1895, FQ 17/1239 .
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visit was to seek the support of the British Legation in the movement, and
more specifically, to ask Sir Nicholas to speak well of the Society to the
Ministers of the Tsungli-vamen, particularly to Weng T'ung-ho (1830-1904),
tutor of the Emperor.^ O'Conor promised to do his best.
"My visitor did not, I confess, strike me as being imbued with the 
fervours of a born reformer, but of the thorough earnestness of 
himself and his companions there can be no doubt, and the movement is 
chiefly remarkable as being the first and only spontaneous one of its 
kind that has, so far as I know, ever been originated amongst the 
official classes in any part of the Empire."10
In fact, a week later, when O' Conor paid his farewell visit to 
the Tsungli-vamen prior to his transfer to St. Petersburg, he not only 
spoke to them of the need of reform, but did so in very strong language. 
Both Li Hung-chang (1823-1901)^  and Weng T'ung-ho had previously urged 
O'Conor to impress on Prince Kung, (i-hsin) (1832-1898), President of the 
yamen, the necessity of serious reforms in the public administration of 
China. So when he had an interview with Prince Kung on 31 October, O'Conor
For accounts of Weng, see Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, op. cit. 2, 
also given in WHPF I, 250; A. W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing 
Period (Washington 1944) II, 860-1; R. F. Johnston, Twilight in the 
Forbidden City (London 1934) 22-3; Hsiao Kung-ch'Uan, "Weng T'ung-ho 
and the Reform Movement of 1898" in Tsing-hua Journal of Chinese Studies
I, 2 (1957) 111-246. Sir N. O'Conor also gives an account of Weng in 
FQ 17/1239 O'Conor to F. 0. of 23 Oct. 1895; and FQ 17/1335 MacDonald 
to F. 0. of 18 June 1898 contains an account of his career leading to 
his dismissal from office in 1898.
10 ,
O'Conor to F. 0. 23 Oct. 1895, in FQ 17/1239
■^Li was then a Grand Secretary. See Hummel, op. cit. I, 
464-71; Lo Erh-kang, Hsiang-chttn Hsin-chih (Changsha 1917) 37-75;
L. C. Arlington, Through the Dragon* s Eves (London 1931) 22-4; S. 
Spector, Lj Hung-chang and the Huai Army (Seattle, Wash. 1964) 259-65.
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had one pressing topic on his mind, and he was almost passionate in his
„ . 12 expression of its
"I excused myself for the frankness of my language by the fact that 
this was my last opportunity for striving to influence them, and by 
the strength of my conviction that unless they acted promptly and 
with energy, the Empire was doomed. I told the Prince the main burden 
of the responsibility lay with him, and future generations looking 
back on what may prove to be the last days of the Dynasty and Empire 
would single him out as the man who might have saved his country if 
he used his opportunities. Nothing could possibly excuse the failure 
on his part to lay before the Emperor the dangers of the situation, 
and not only to do so once or twice, but persevere if needful, for 
weeks and months, until His Majesty is thoroughly awakened to the 
gravity of the crisis."
And agains
"It had been hoped that the war would rouse her from her stupor, but 
all such expectations were so far disappointed. If she still refused 
to bestir herself, I ventured to prophesy that within very few years, 
the Dynasty would fall, and carry with it Prince Kung and all those 
now in power. If he felt himself too old or in too weak health to 
undertake the task of reform, let him frankly tell his Sovereign so 
and invite the appointment of others, but he could not free himself 
from the responsibility for the catastrophe that was coming if he 
retained his position without taking action."
After this, it was no wonder that the yamen Ministers had little to say
in reply, and seemed "disinclined to enter upon a discussion of what I had
A A .fl 3 said ...
Nevertheless, O'Conor left China in an optimistic frame of mind, 
and felt that even if he had not been able to witness the inauguration of 
any serious reforms, he had at least done his part well, of leaving the 
Chinese Government with the conviction that England was sincerely
The quotations are in O'Conor to P.O., 30 Oct. 1895,
Compare this with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in WHPF I, 268, where he 
reports that when O'Conor spoke of the weakness of China's armed forces and 
their need of reform, Prince Kung's reply was that the Chinese army was only 
for the purpose of keeping internal peace and not for national defence. An 
account of this interview is also given by Sir John Jordon, "Some Chinese
I have Known" in Nineteenth Century and After Vol. 88, (Dec. 1923) 945-9.
130*Conor to F.O., 30 Oct. 1895,
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friendly to them and anxious to aid in their regeneration. It can be
seen that* at this juncture, the British Legation was under the impression
that the formation of the Ch1iang-hstibh Hui and a number of other study
societies in Peking and elsewhere was the first manifestation of a real,
nation-wide reform movement, initiated by enlightened government officials,
and supported by most of the literate population. This sentiment was
shared by the Representatives of the other Powers in Peking, who had written
warm panegyrics to their governments upon what appeared to be a promising
undertaking. The Japanese Minister, Baron Hayashi, was particularly 
15enthusiastic. The North China Herald* however, was more cautious in its 
appreciation of these activities: "...though it would be unwise to be too
sure that the movement is deep and permanent; that those who are directing 
it are practical and not visionary in their aims.. *1'
After the departure of O'Conor, the British Legation at Peking 
was left in the charge of William N. Beauclerk. Secretary of the Legation 
since 1890. It was therefore to him that two members of the "Hanlin 
Society" came to ensure that they continued to enjoy the sympathy and 
support of the Legation in their movement. Beauclerk was left with an 
impression of the"crude and primitive notions with which they are entering 
upon their self-imposed task. They hardly appeared to have grasped the 
gigantic nature of the work of the reform of the Chinese Empire, nor did 
they quite seem to know how and where to begin. However, they did ask
140’Conor to F. 0., 3 Nov. 1895, FQ 17/l240
15As reported by Beauclerk to F. Q., 24 Jan. 1896,
FQ 17/1275
16
North China Herald of 22 Nov. 1895 p. 851, col. 1-3, 
a special article.
17
Beauclerk to F. 0. 26 Nov. 1895, FQ 17/1240
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for practical assistance in the way of some European books with which to 
form a library, where the translated works were to serve for the diffusion 
of modern knowledge and science, and the education of the Chinese in Western
modes of- thought and methods of progress. They intended to pay for these
h
boo^s in advance, but Beauclerk offered a number as a free gift from the
18
British Government. He enclosed a list of his suggestions*
Fawcett's Political Economy 
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations
Taswell-Langmead1s Constitutional History of England 
Stephen's History of the Criminal Law
Professor Bain's works (Probably Professor Alexander Bain,
Professor of Logic at the University of Aberdeen.)
Works of John Stuart Mill 
Lewes' History of Philosophy 
Ganot's Natural Philosophy 
Modern History from 1517 to 1874 
Wallace's Darwinism
It was all very promising moral support for reforms in China, but when it 
came to direct involvement in their programmes, the Foreign Office endeav­
oured to be certain of the bona fides of the Society and its relations 
to the Chinese Government. Accordingly, Beauclerk was instructed to sub­
mit further information on the management and prospects of the Society
19
before carrying out the presentation of books.
By this time, ill-fortune had befallen the Ch'ianj-hsbeh Hui.
On 22 January, 1896, a raid was made upon the premises of the Society, 
as a consequence of charges brought against it by a Censor, Yang Ch'ung-i. 
The accusations were that the Society was a combination to raise money, 
tended to mislead men, and was an injury to the government. The Censor 
urged that the club be closed and the members handed over to the Board of
i e T,.AIbid.
■^FO to Beauclerk, 4 Feb. 1896, ibid.
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Punishment. But Prince Kung favoured only the first suggestion and using 
his influence at Court, the Prince had the Society prohibited, but no arrests 
were made. The real reason for the suppression of the Society, which at
this time enjoyed the patronage of such high officials as Chang Chih-tung
on
and Ylian Shih-k'ai, which published a number of journals, and had a 
flourishing branch in Shanghai, was doubtless attributable to the antag­
onism of the older, conservative officials, who stood against any 
innovations. It was also suggested that some of the younger reformers 
had spoken of the movement as the germ of a Parliamentary system, which was 
of course deemed an offence by the existing government. Another incrimi­
nating feature was that its membership was limited to the Chinese, while
the Manchus were excluded as not possessing the requisite amount of
21scholarship and progressiveness.
The closing of the Society did not curb the reform movement, as
other societies soon began to appear, now ranging from Peking to Canton
22and along the Yangtse areas. Nevertheless the disappointment expressed
by the foreign Legations in Peking as well as the English press at its
untimely end seemed to exceed by far their confidence in the undertaking
at its institution. This supposedly signified "the hopelessness of the
23
whole thing. Reform is poisoned at its source ... " and the Imperial
90Chang was Viceroy at Wuchang, and Yhan trainer and 
commander of the New Army at Tientsin.
^Peking and Tientsin Times, 1 Feb. 1896, p. 398, col. 2-3, 
leading article. Beauclerk to FO, 24 Jan. 1896, in FQ 17/1275.
22Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Ch1iang-hsheh Hui feng-chin-hou chih 
hsheh-hui hsheh-t'ang pao-kuan" in WHPF IV, 395-6, gives a list of the 
establishments in various provinces.
^North China Herald 12 Feb. 1896, p. 233-4, col. 1-3, 
leading article.
Censors were blamed for the stifling of progress. "Sir N. O'Conor is 
reported to have expressed his opinion that there would be no real reform 
in China until all the Censors had their heads taken off. Sir Nicholas 
hit the nail on the head...."^ In the final analysis, it was even sug­
gested that China’s regeneration might well not be possible, unless under 
05
foreign tutelage.
Yet as far as Great Britain was concerned, the newly-appointed
Minister to Peking shared none of his predecessor's patience or sympathy 
26
with reformers. It was, after all, very often the personal sentiments 
of its representatives in China which really formulated British policy 
towards the Chinese reform movement.
Sir Claude MacDonald (1852-1915) began his official career in tfee 
Scottish from which he retired in March 1896. His experiences,
however, were entirely centered around Africa. After the departure of 
O'Conor from Peking in November, 1895, there was a long period of silence 
from the Foreign Office as to who his successor was likely to be. And 
when it was finally announced, in January 1896, that Sir Claude MacDonald
9 A
Peking and Tientsin Times 8 Aug. 1896, p. 90, col. 4-5
^5North China Herald 26 Feb. 1897, p. 334, col. 2-3
^T. Richard to G. N. Curzon, 31 July, 1896, in FQ 
17/1289 states "(Sir N. O'Conor) would have been the grand man to foster 
it (the reform movement) had he not been needed elsewhere. His counsel 
and sympathy were always an inspiration to us." See also T. Richard, 
Forty-five Years in China (New York, 1916) 266, also given in WHPF III, 
565: "I went to Tientsin in order to meet the British Minister Tsir C.
MacDonald) who was coming back from Pei-tai-ho. I pleaded with him to do 
his utmost to save the Emperor and the lives of the captured Reformers. 
But he was already prejudiced against them, his attitude being quite un­
like that of his predecessor Sir Nicholas O'Conor. His prejudice rested 
largely on ignorance, for I subsequently learnt that he told a friend 
that before his return from Pei-tai-ho he had never heard of K'ang 
Yu-wei."
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was to be appointed, there were expressions of surprise and disappointment 
from China as well as at home in England. It was long understood that 
the delay in the announcement of the appointment of a new minister was 
due to Lord Salisbury's desire of finding a man with exceptional qualities, 
experienced and capable of dealing with Far Eastern situations. Now some­
one outside the Diplomatic Service was chosen, one ''whose record so far 
as it is known to the public, does not suggest absolute confidence. His 
services have hitherto been employed in Africa, and he has still to make 
his reputation as a diplomatist...."^ In the House of Commons, the Foreign 
Office was strongly criticised for an unwise choice, and an explanation
demanded from the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs.^
On the other hand, it was also felt that perhaps it was well to
"get out of the old groove" in appointing a completely different type
of man to Peking. "A certain amount of peremptoriness will be by no
means amiss at Peking.... The dancing-master part of Chinese diplomacy
is easily picked up, and Sir Claude MacDonald may be trusted for the rest."^
And from another source? "There will now, we should hope, be no
mealy-mouthedness in the dealings of our Legation with the Tsungli- 
30
yamen." In fact, from those who saw good in the appointment, the 
chief characteristic of Sir Claude which impressed them was that he was 
a man of action and capacity, alert, earnest and energetic.. His treatment
~27
The Times 13 Jan. 1896, p. 9, col. 4-5, leading article.
nQ
Parliamentary Debates, 3 July, 1896; North China Herald 
21 Aug. 1896, p. 304-5, col. 1-3.
29Pall Mall and St. James magazines reprinted in London 
and China Express 17 Jan. 1896, p. 63, col. 1-2.
30
North China Herald 17 Jan. 1896, p. 76, col. 2-3, See 
also Sir Meyrick Hewlett, Forty Years in China (London 1943) 5-6
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of later events will prove that they were more than justified.
From the beginning Sir Claude MacDonald proved to be a real
departure from the usual Ministers from Britain. He arrived in Peking on
22 April, 1896, and assumed charge of the Legation. Immediately, he found
cause for conflict with the Tsungli-vamen. He had presented his credentials
‘the vamen on 7 May, and on the 11th he called there again a-sking to see
Prince Kung or Prince Ch'ing (l-K*uang) (1776-1820) the Presidents. As
they were not present at the time, MacDonald refused to leave with the
other Ministers the communication he wished to transmit. The Ministers
were offended. The matter was reported to the Chinese Minister in London,
who made representations to the Foreign Office, with the complaint that
it was not customary for foreign representatives to insist on seeing any
one particular member of the yamen, as they were all equal, unless prior
notification was given in writing. The Foreign Office had no defence for
MacDonald, and though the matter was not pursued further it did give a
bad beginning to the relations between the British Legation under MacDonald
31and the government of Peking.
Within three months of his assuming office, MacDonald had already
decided that the British Government had made a mistake in judging the
Chinese by European standards. In the negotiations of the "Andrews1
Case" whereby compensation was claimed by a British merchant from the
39Canton Provincial Government for a breach of faith, ^ his suggestion of a 
line of policy wasi "Unless they are made to smart for it, we shall never
3^See Memorandum by F. Bertie, 14 May 1896, FQ 17/1288 
3^See F. Q. correspondence Feb.-July, 1896, FQ 17/1275-
1278
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make headway in this country, and shall lose such way as we now have,"
and again, "We shall never do any good in this country until we show the gov*?
erning body very plainly that we have it in our power to punish any act of
discourtesy with another and greater act of discourtesy, amounting if
33necessary to force." At the slightest provocation, it was often 
MacDonald's practice to apply for a landing party from a British ship to 
reinforce his diplomatic endeavours. On the occasion of the Canton dif­
ficulties, the Foreign Office refused his request for an army to seize 
the likin office and the city until the claims were paid in full and an 
apology made. Fortunately these measures were thought by the government
at home to be too drastic, and would give a dangerous precedant to other 
34
Powers.
Such was the personality of the man representing British policy 
in China as events in the capital moved rapidly towards the summer of 1898. 
Following the closure of the Ch'iang-hsbeh Hui, a host of other study 
societies were founded| a common feature was that they provided useful 
platforms for the eager reformers to broadcast their gospel of learning 
from the West and applying this knowledge to a reformed Chinese adminis­
tration. Among the successors to the Ch*iang-hsheh Hui* more notable 
were the Shih-Wu Hsheh-t* ang (College of Current Affairs) in Hunan, and 
the Pao-kuo Hui (National Protection Society) in Peking. The Shih-Wu 
College began giving lectures in November, 1897, under Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's 
direction, and it was significant that the Provincial Governor Ch'en
^MacDonald to F. 0. (Bertie) 22 July 1896, FQ- 17/1278. 
to which Lord Salisbury minuted, "An acute attack of morbus consularis."
34 /
F. 0. tel. to MacDonald, 21 July 1896, FQ 17/1279
83
Pao-chen permitted his name to be associated with the College, together
35
with the Acting Judicial Commissioner Huang Tsun-hsien. The Pao-kuo Hui
was started in Peking on 12 April, 1898, under the personal management of
K1ang Yu-wei, who seized the occasion of Germany's occupation of Kiao-chow
3\
to propagate his slogan that national salvation was now an urgent matter.
Besides these societies, the scholar-reformers also launched a 
press campaign as the best means of bringing home to the literate popula­
tion the dangers threatening their nation. Among these publications were 
the Shih-Wu Pao (The Needs of the Times), a ten-day pamphlet published 
from 9 August, 1896, in Shanghai, and the Kuo-Wen Pao (National News) 
published in Tientsin from 26 December 1897. The former employed a staff 
of forty writers under the direction of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and its 
circulation in 1898 was estimated at ten thousand copies throughout all 
the provinces. A notable feature about it was that it had as its patron 
the Wuchang Viceroy Chang Chih-tung, whose financial contributions really
Yang Fu-li, op.cit. in WHPF IV, 171-81; Yu Ping-ch'i,
"Huang Tsun-hsien nien-p'u" in WHPF IV, 185-7; Hu Ssu-ching "Ch'en 
Pao-chen" in WHPF IV, 79-80; Ting Wen-chiang, op.cit. 50-2.
^K' ang Yu-wei, op. cit. in WHPF IV, 143-4, Wang Ch'i-chft, 
op. cit. in 'WHPF IV, 396-402, 416-9. The North China Herald 16 May,
1898, p. 854-5, col. 3, 1, gives a popular account of the origin of the 
Kiao-chow incident; A squad of German soldiers having made their way to 
Kaomi, a town adjacent to Kiao-chow, some of them entered the Temple of 
Confucius, broke off an arm of the Sage, and carried it away as a 
trophy destined to figure in a Berlin museum. This was more than Chinese 
pride would stand. The story was industriously circulated among the 
scholars of the Empire assembled for the Metropolitan examinations.
Rushing together, they announced that their religion was in danger,
not from foreign missionaries, but from the vandalism of German soldiers ....
84
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kept the paper going. On 26 July, 1898, an Imperial Edict made this
newspaper an official concern, and on 12 September, 1898, another Edict
directed that a similar journal should be published in Peking in connection
38with the Shanghai Shih-Wu Pao.
The Kuo-Wen Pao was also published every ten days, and was managed 
by Yen Fu (1853-1921), a director at a recently established Naval Academy, 
who was noted for his translations of European works into Chinese. It 
was no wonder that the Kuo-Wen Pao soon acquired a reputation for the high 
quality of its articles, which were mainly taken from the European and 
Japanese press, and for its critical yet accurate observations on politics. 
In fact, due to some of its remarks on the policy and successes of the 
Russians, early in 1898, which reflected somewhat on the value of the 
services rendered to their country by some of the Imperial advisers, an 
Edict was issued on 3 May, demanding a full Investigation of the journal,
Chang was particularly sought after as their champion by 
the reformers, because of the early innovations he had initiated in the 
provinces he had administered, Kwangtung and Kwangsi, Hunan and Hupeh.
In 1898, he published a reform treatise Ch1 lian-hsheh P’ien (Exhortation 
to Learning) which was used by the reformers as a sort of party platform. 
See A. W. Hummel, op.cit. I, 28-9; Wu Tse op.cit. 21; Lin Mousheng,
Men and Ideas (New York 1942) 97; Wen Ching, op.cit. 22, 219; M. E. 
Cameron, “The Public Career of Chang Chih-tung“ in Pacific Historical 
Review VII (1938) 187-210; C. Y. Wang, op,cit. 52-3.
38 . . / NThe Edicts are given in Lin Shu-hui (ed) “Shang-yllt 
san-i-liu tiao“ in WHPF II, 44, 87-8. See also R* S. Britton, The 
Chinese Periodical Press (Shanghai 1933) 91-4; Ko Kung-chen, Chung-kuo 
Pao-hstteh Shih (shanghai 1931) 123-4; The Times 19 July, 1898, 4, col. 
1-2; MacDonald to F. 0., 19 Sept. 1898, FQ 1771336.
39'Yen Fu*s considerable contributions to China’s 
understanding of the West is discussed in B. Schwartz, In Search of 
Wealth and Power, Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge, Mass. 1964) 237-47;
C. Y. Wang, op.cit. 195-212.
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40and as a result it stopped publication soon after.
It was obvious that the scholar-reformers would not have under­
taken these journalistic feats unaided, for few were thoroughly conversant 
with Western languages and cultures. In this respect they owed much to 
the enthusiastic support, moral as well as practical, given to their move­
ment by the foreign missionaries. The most well-known, and the one 
working closest with the reformers, was the English Baptist Missionary 
Timothy Richard^(1845-1919) He came to China in 1870, and in 1887 
established the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Know­
ledge Among the Chinese (Kuang-hsheh Hui) In 1890-1 he was invited by 
Li Hung-chang to edit the Shih Pao, a foreign-controlled newspaper at
Tientsin, and this in the hands of Richard became an organ to publicise
41his own views on reforming China. Richard was also energetic m  seeking
personal contact with minor officials in Peking, many of whom became
leaders in the 1898 movement. In 1895, for example, he had meetings with
Chang Chih-tung at Nanking on 5 and 17 February? at Peking with Li Hung-
chang on 17 and 23 September? Sun Chia-nai on 12 October? K'ang Yu-wei
on 17 October? Weng T'ung-ho on 26 October? Prince Kung and others of the
Tsungli-vamen on 30 October. His constant plea with all these men was
China's need to reform, and he certainly gave the reformers the impression_ —
Ko Kung-chen, op.cit. 139-40, 145-6? Britton, op.cit.
97; The Times 19 July, 1898, p. 4, col. 2? the Edict is in Lin Shu-hui, 
op.cit. in WHPF II, 15.
41
See Ko Kung-chen, op.cit. 77, for the origins of the
Shih Pao.
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that British aid was theirs for the asking. This conviction would be 
an important influence on the subsequent activities of K*ang Yu-wei.
Another missionary active in helping to propagate education in 
China was the American Presbyterian, Gilbert Reid. In the summer of 1897, 
Reid conceived of a plan to set up an International Institute in Peking, 
which was to consist of a large auditorium, a library and reading room, 
a museum, classrooms, and a reception halls it was to be an intellectual 
centre for the spread of Western enlightenment amongst the Chinese. It 
was an admirable undertaking; the only drawback was the lack of funds for 
such an ambitious project, and after an outburst of approval and encour­
agement from foreigners both inside and outside ^  China, it gradually 
• 43faded into oblivion. This in fact was characteristic of foreign, and 
especially missionary, attitudes towards reform in Chinas all that was 
needed was to instil Western "learning1 into the Chinese mind, and the
T. Richard, op.cit* 244-8, 256-9, also in WHPF IV, 553; see 
also T. Richard to Curzon, 31 July, 1896, FQ 17/1289; E. Soothill,
Timothy Richard of China (London 1924) 174-304; Paul Cohen, "Missionary 
Approaches: Hudson Taylor and Timothy Richard" in Harvard University,
Papers on China XI, (1957) 29-62; Wang Shu-huai, Wai-jen yti Wu-hsti 
pien-fa (Taiwan 1965) 26-62; Lu Tan-lin, in Ko-ming shih-t* an (Nanking 
1947) 163-7, discusses the influence of the Society on the revolution­
aries; see also C. Y. Ch*en, "Liang ChPi-ch'ao's Missionary Education; 
a Case Study of Missionary Influence on the Reformers" in Harvard 
University, Papers on China XVI (1962) 66-125
43Accounts of the activities of the Institute are found 
in D. MacGillivray (ed). A Century of Protestant -Missions in China. 1807- 
1907 (Shanghai 1907) 550; K. S. Latourette, A History of Christian 
Missions in China (London 1929) 602-3; Wang Shu-huai, op.cit. 57-9; 
the China Association, Annual Report 1898-9 Appendix M, "Proposed 
International Institute at Peking," in which approval for the scheme 
was expressed; see also the North China Herald 23 July, 1897, p. 645, 
col. 2; Reid*s early evangelistic efforts are discussed in Irwin T.
Hyatt, "Protestant Missions in China" in K. C. Liu (ed) American 
Missionaries in China (Cambridge, Mass. 1966) 112-4.
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next step, a regenerated and enlightened nation, would follow quite 
naturally, with all the wonders of Western science, political methods and 
economic theories fitting in comfortably within the traditional Chinese 
framework of society# Officially, of course, European sentiments did 
not run along such idealistic lines; in point of fact, the activities of 
the missionaries were more of a hindrance than an advantage as far as 
diplomatic relations with the Chinese Government were concerned. We 
need not go into the numerous cases of conflict caused by missionaries 
interfering in lawsuits on behalf of their converts, which punctuated the 
whole of the history of missions in China#44 As it was rather unkindly 
pointed outs4^
"Legations are naturally conservative; they do not like trouble; they 
like things to go on quietly, they want to stand upon the ancient 
ways, and not be worried with innovations# Two-thirds of the cases 
that disturb the calm of the Legations come from the missionaries, 
and as a class, they are therefore like a red rag to some of the 
Legations; and the fact that reformers were in many cases pupils of 
missionaries, getting their knowledge and their inspiration from 
missionary sources, helped to dispose official Peking to look coldly 
on the new light."
This was largely true of the British Government.
Both the Legation at Peking and the Foreign Office in London had 
had a long succession of communications from Timothy Richard, invariably 
seeking official support for one or the other of his schemes of propagating 
reform in China# Now in August, 1897, he launched a "Society for Aiding 
China to Fall in with the Right Principles of Universal Progress#" In 
44
See Paul A# Cohen, China and Christianity# the Missionary 
Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignisnu 1860-1870 (Cambridge, 
Mass, 1963) Chapters 3-5; Edmund S. Wehrle, Britain, China and the 
Antimissionary Riots 1891-1900 (Minneapolis, 1966) 19-44
North China Herald 28 Nov. 1898, p. 985-6, col. 2-3,
leading article.
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presenting the Foreign Office with its prospectus, he suggested three
ways in which Great Britain could help "Young China"
"1. Instead of apparently a merely national policy which Western 
nations have adopted in China* resulting in setting their respec­
tive interests diametrically opposed to one another, let a universal 
policy be adopted in which the national and universal coincide.
2. When the next revision of the tariff with China takes place*, grant
a certain rise* in the tariff, not on condition but so that a percentage 
of the customs revenue may be devoted to modern education. The effect 
of this will be to send many, who shall be the future leaders in 
China, to England for education, where they will form many friends 
in this country, as modern education in the Chinese mind is mainly 
connected with education in England? and this will increase with the 
increase of trade.
3. A grant of ffil,000 worth of suitable apparatus for lectures to 
the Reform Society in Peking would be very serviceable."
Richard emphasized the political importance of these measuress "It 
would be well if England that has the most of the foreign trade in 
China, should not be behind any in her sympathy with Young China." He 
pointed out that at the present juncture, Great Britain alone stood in 
the good grace of the Chinese government? it was an opportunity not to 
be lost. Arguments of this nature were obviously nothing new to the 
Foreign Office, which was used to the tactics of missionaries in general, 
and Timothy Richard in particular. The reaction was characteristics
G. N. Curzon, Under-secretary of State at the Foreign Office, minuteds 
"Here is a letter from the cracked missionary.... His positive sug­
gestions (1) (2) and (3) will give you a measure of his capacity to 
advise." And Agains "This inculcation comes from the mad mullah who
4b /Richard to Curzon, 4 Aug., 1897, FQ 17/1330s also see
Brenan to F. 0., 26 Sept., 1898. FQ 17/1718* in which he described Richard
as "an intriguing English Protestant Missionary in Peking, who seems
to have been giving K'ang and his following very bad advice."
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interviewed me..."
Yet it must not be concluded that Great Britain was entirely 
disinterested in the efforts at reform in China. On the contrary, she was 
just as hopeful as other Powers concerned with China to see the Chinese 
Government regain sufficient strength and administrative efficiency at 
least to afford security for their commercial enterprises, of which 
Britain had by far the predominant share. Britain was equally eager to 
see China able to defend herself from the territorial ambitions of any 
aggressive Power, who would thus encroach upon the special position of 
the British trader in China* Hence by virtue of selfish commercial inter- 
ests as well as high moral principles, Britain could not isolate herself 
from the stirrings of reform in China in the years after the Sino-Japanese 
War. It was true that the British Government had little confidence in 
the activities of the scholar-reformers, and did not take their study 
societies and newspapers very seriously. It did not seem that they could 
achieve much by such methods. But when the Emperor of China began to take 
the lead in the movement, as he did in the summer of 1898, then it was a 
different matter.
The Emperor Kuang-hsh (Tsai-t'ien) (1871-1908) was eventually 
presented with the fifth attempt of K*ang Yu-wei to memoralize the Throne, 
through the actions of his supporters in Peking, Yang Shen-hsiu, (a 
Censor), Yang Jui, (a member of the Grand Secretariat), and Hsh Chih- 
ching, (a sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat).^ In this petition,
^Curzon Minutes on Richard to Curzon, 4 Aug. 1, 1897,
FQ 17/1330
48For their biographies, see "K'ang Yu-wei teng-jen chuan- 
ch’i" in WHPF IV, 59-60, 64-8, 78; Li Chien-nung (trans* Teng and Ingalls)
The Political History of China (New York 1956) 152-3, refutes the theory 
that K’ang was introduced to the Emperor’s notice by Weng T'ung-ho. Compare 
with Ho Ping-ti, "Weng T'ung-ho and the Hundred Days of Reform" in Far 
Eastern Quarterly X (Feb. 1951) 125-35
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besides urging a national policy of reform, K'ang also begged the Emperor
to take as models the reforming rulers the Meiji Emperor of Japan and
Peter the Great of Russia. He offered his personal services should a
49reform programme be contemplated. By then, K'ang had already been
made a second class assistant-secretary on the Board of Works, and after
reading this last petition of his, the Emperor ordered that he be summoned
to a meeting at the Tsunqli-yamen to have his ideas discussed. This took
SO
place on 24 January, 1898. From then on, with K'ang being given increasing
responsibility, and the Emperor becoming more enthusiastic, the reform
movement gathered momentum.
The first series of Edicts in January-February 1898, aiming at the
changes of the perfunctory habits of Chinese officials, insisted on the
-tkc.
encouragement of capable and energetic men and/dismissal of the incompe- 
51tent. These decrees took the British Legation by some surprise, as Sir
Claude did not think that it was customary for the chief officers of the
central government to be admonished in the terms of Imperial Decrees.^
The Foreign Office at home, seemed happier about the news: "They are 
waking up!"^
By June, the movement reached its climax, and from 11 June to 
19 September, roughly a span of one hundred days, decrees were daily
^The petition is given in full in Wang Ch'i-chh (ed) 
fK'ang Yu-wei tsou-i erh-shih-chiu pien‘*in WHPF II, 188-97; K'ang 
Yu-wei, op.cit. I, 15b-16; also Wu Tse, op.cit. 14*
^The meeting is related in Lo Jung-pang, op. cit. 83-85.
51The Edicts are given in Lin Shu-hui, op.cit. in WHPF
II, 7-10.
^MacDonald to F. 0., 5 Feb. 1898, in FQ 17/1333.
53F. Bertie, minute on the above, ibid.
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issued announcing comprehensive changes in all aspects of the administration
54as well as in foreign relations. What particularly impressed the British
observers in these measures was the frank admission by the Emperor of
weakness and inefficiency in the workings of the central and provincial
governments! this knowledge, they felt, augured well for the cause of reform.^
On the other hand, as the succession of "paper reforms" reached
heady heights. Sir Claude MacDonald began to express serious doubts
whether the tradition-bound Chinese bureaucracy could really be moved by
these strange innovations that the Emperor desired to impose on it. When a
decree of 12 June proposed to send members of the imperial family abroad
for the purposes of advancement of commerce and extension of intercourse
with foreigners, MacDonald regarded it a "startling" measure, since hitherto
the movements of the Imperial Clans had been for political reasons closely 
56circumscribed. A decree of 23 June directed radical changes in the
obligatory subjects at the competitive examinations! MacDonald felt that
the change, having been made so suddenly, constituted an injustice to those
who have been preparing for the examinations under the present conditions,
and he feared it would lead to considerable discontent among the group of
57intending scholars. When it was proposed, by Edict of 28 June, to est­
ablish a College or University at Peking, MacDonald wanted to know exactly
^4See the Edicts in Lin Shu-hui, op.cit. in WHPF II,
17-99. Also collected in The Times of 17 Oct., 1898, p. 13-4, col. 6; 
and 31 Oct., 1898, p.3, col. 1-3.
^See The Times* 3 June 1898, p. 10, col. 15 North China 
Herald, 19 Sept. 1898, p. 544, col. 2-3.
^MacDonald to F. 0. 18 June 1898, FQ 17/1335.
i=)7
MacDonald to F. 0. ibid., 9 July 1898*
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what courses of study they intended; he thought a new university would be
likely to clash with the already existing government college, the Tung Wen 
58Kuan. By a decree of 5 July, the Emperor expressed his dissatisfaction
with the bondage of ancient customs which prevented China from progressing
along foreign lines, and on 30 AUgUSt, he decided to abolish several
important posts and a host of minor ones, both in the capital and in the
provinces* ftll this seemed "revolutionary" to MacDonald, and he felt that
it was impossible to be sanguine about the prospects for these plans. He
59could see few signs of their taking practical effect.
By this time, of course, the undue haste and lack of a sense of 
balance manifested by the Emperor was recognised by the Foreign Office. Far 
from "waking up" properly, the Chinese Government seemed to be rushing into 
an internal disaster as conservative resentment towards the hasty changes 
began to be intensified. In an edict of 12 September, calling on the 
attention of the people to the advantages of Western methods, Emperor 
Kuang-hsti urged his subjects to know that they "could depend on their prince," 
and appealed to them to make China powerful by working for reform with 
"united m i n d s . B y  the time report of this reached the Foreign Office, 
the reform movement had collapsed and the Emperor had become only a 
"broken reed" *1 on whom the Chinese people could hardly depend.
The reforming Emperor had failed to estimate the strength of 
conservative opposition against his innovations. On 21 September, the
^MacDonald to F. 0. ibid.
^MacDonald to F. 0. 2 Sept. 1898, FQ 17/1336.
^MacDonald to F. 0. 17 Sept. 1898, ibid.
61F. A. Campbell1s Minute, ibid.
93
Empress-Dowager Tz'u-hsi (1835-1908), strengthened by the support of Jung-Lu, 
then Governor-General of Chihli, and Yhan Shih-k'ai in command of the New 
Army, announced that she was taking over control of the government. The 
Emperor was virtually forced to abdicate, and decrees reversing all his
At this turn of events, the British Government found itself directly
involved in the aftermath of the reform movement. Even though the British 
had little hope of the Emperor's and K’ang's measures being immediately put 
into practice, there existed a certain degree of sympathy with and satis­
faction at the fact that it was after all a hopeful departure from their 
experience of a backward, unprogressive Chinese nation. Even Sir Claude 
admitted that the Emperor's reforming decrees "did go further than anything
previously emanating from the sovereign of China in their recognition of
63the need of taking examples from foreign nations." Now when the 
Empress-Dowager, upon her resuming control of the government, began a 
widespread programme of persecution of the erstwhile reformers, the British 
Government felt that they could not stand idly by. It must be noted 
however that what transpired was no definite point of policy directed from
reprinted Peking 1954) gives his interpretation of the causes for the 
failure of the movement; K'ang Yu-wei*s version is given in bo Jung-pang, 
op.cit. 121-7; see also Ch'en Ch'iao, "Wu-hstt cheng-pien shih fan- 
pien-fa jen-wu chih cheng-ch*ih ssu-hsiang" in Yen-ching Hsheh-pao 25 
(Peking 1939); Wu Tse, "Wu-hsti cheng-pien ytt hsin-chiu t'ang-cheng" in 
Chung-kuo Chien-she VI (Sept. 1948) 42-5; North China Herald 3 Oct.
1898, p. 625, col. 1-3; Bax-Ironside to F. 0., 15 April 1899, FQ
in which an eye-witness account of the coup is written by J. 
B. Eames; the role of Ylian Shih-k'ai as a "traitor" in the reform 
movement is expounded in Norman D. Palmer, "Makers of modern Chinas 
the strong man, Yllan Shih-k'ai" in Current History, XV (Sept. 1948) 
150-1; Ch'en Po-ta, Ch* ieh-kuo ta-tao YtSan Shih-k1 ai (Peking 1949) 
1-4; K. Ch'en, "Yhan Shih-k'ai and the Coup d'etat of 1898 in China" 
in Pacific Historical Review VI (1937) 181-7.
6 2reform measures began to appear. It was the end of the "Hundred Days."
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Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in Wu-hsh cheng-pien chi (Japan 1899,
^MacDonald to FO, 9 July 1898,
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the Foreign Office, and the British Government was to be criticised 
for this from many sides; but out of the personal sentiments towards the 
reformers of some of its administrators in China, the British Government 
found that it had taken on the task of protecting the reform leader K'ang 
Yu-wei from the vengeance of the Empress-Dowager.
For the moment, Sir Claude MacDonald in Peking had just achieved
a notable diplomatic feat in indirectly causing the dismissal Li Hung-
chang (decreed on 7 September, 1898), from the Tsungli-yamen. British
interests in China had long been in conflict with those of Russia in the
field of concession-hunting, and Li had early shown himself to have been
ready to propitiate Russia's demands at the risk of antagonising Great
Britain. The climax came during the negotiations for a loan regarding
the construction of the Shan-hai-kuan-Newchwang Railway, and MacDonald
had found occasion during an interview on 3 September at the yamen, to
deliver a scathing attack against Li Hung-chang, and to his person, for his
64obstructive policy in all things concerning British interests in China.
64MacDonald tel. to F.O., 8 Sept. 1898, FQ 17/l341, and 
confidential despatch, 14 Sept. 1898, FQ 17/1336; the edict of dis­
missal is seen in Lin Shu-hui, op.cit. in WHPF II, 77. S. F. Wright, in 
Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast 1950) asserts that Li's dismissal 
was not altogether unexpected, since he was regarded as primarily being
responsible for China's defeat at the hands of Japan in 1895 and generally
suspected of being in Russia's pay. In a letter to Campbell at the F.O.
written by Sir Robert Hart, 25 Sept. 1898 (p. 717-8) "I fear it is the
pro-Russian party that is winning, and that the deposition (almost) of the 
Emperor is Pavloff's reply to Li's expulsion from the varoen*" A. I.
Pavlov was the charge d’affaire of the Russian Legation. Sir John 
Jordon's impressions of Li are recorded, in "Some Chinese I have known." 
Nineteenth Century and After Vol. 88 (Dec. 1920); 949-5CU "He was 
intensely conceited, spoke a villainous dialect, and was altogether a 
difficult person to handle. This was doubtless largely due to the fact 
that he was not a persona grata in the British Legation in those days, 
nor with the British communities in China, who had the discernment to see 
that his policy, with all its cleverness, was likely to overreach itself 
in the end..." See W. L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York 
1935) 396-682, for some of Li's policies.
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The fact that Li's dismissal came a few days later was generally regarded
as a triumph of British diplomacy against Russia, and a reassertion of
* 65British prestige in China.
Now, when the reaction to the reform movement occurred, and the
/ f
Empress-Dowager, whose protege Li was known to have been, was in control, 
there was immediate suspicion that Russia must have had a hand in the 
coup d*etat, and that it was her means of retaliating against the British. 
No evidence of this could be found, and it was at best only a popular
£\fi\rumour among those concerned with pushing British influence in China. 
Nevertheless on 21 September, 1898, when the house of Chang Yin-huan, a 
Vice-President of the Board of Revenue, was searched for the presence of 
K'ang Yu-wei, and Chang subsequently arrested for his support of the re- 
formers, MadDonald decided that he must assert himself once again. It 
was also known that LI and Chang were deadly enemies. The British were 
on especially good terms with Chang Yin-huan, who represented China at the 
jubilee celebrations of Queen Victoria in London in 1897, and whose
67
financial policies had always appeared "enlightened" in English eyes.
It became known that he was due to be executed on 26 September, and
See London and China Express of 9 Sept. 1898, p. 785, 
col. 2? North China Herald of 23 Sept, 1898, p. 829, col. 1-2? and the 
Peking and Tientsin Times of 24 Sept. 1898, p. 119, col. 2-3, in a 
leading article which argues that the Empress-Dowager effected the coup 
mainly because of the dismissal of Li, her favourite statesman, S.
Spector, in his study of Li, op. cit. 265-6, makes no mention of the 
British role in the dismissal of Li Hung-chang.
The Times, 26 Nov. 1898, p. 11, col. 3-4, leading article; 
North China Herald 26 Sept. 1898, p. 569-70, col. 2-3, leading article, and 
3 Oct. 1898, p. 625, col. 1-3, In MacDonald tel. to F.O., 11 Oct. 1898,
FO 17/1341, he assured the Foreign Office that there was "No reason to 
suspect foreign influence."
/ fj
The Times 23 Nov. 1898, p. 11, col. 4, and 26 Nov. 1898, 
p. 6, col. 3-4, where glowing accounts are given of his career; MacDonald 
to F.O. 28 Sept. 1898, FO 17/1336.
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MacDonald concluding that Li Hung-chang must have been the instigator of
this move, immediately addressed a letter to him, pointing out "the horror
with which such sudden executions is regarded by all Western nations, and
the bad effect the secret and hasty condemnation of an official of Chang's
rank, who was so well-known in Europe, would produce," and he urged Li to
68
try and prevent the executions. As a result of this intervention, Chang
was not summarily punished, but banished instead to Chinese Turkestan (by
Edict of 29 September) where he died in 1900 during the Boxer troubles.
MacDonald's action was warmly approved by the Foreign Office and the 
69English press.
It was next K'ang Yu-wei's turn to enjoy British intervention on 
his behalf. Action was Initiated by the Acting Consul in Shanghai, Byron 
Brenan, who facilitated K'ang's flight from Peking after the failure of 
the reform movement. Subsequently the British Colonial administrators in 
Hong Kong and Singapore were to afford him exceptional protective measures 
when he found shelter in these colonies. Having done that, however, the 
British came under fire from three sources? from the Chinese Government 
for harbouring one who to them was a gross traitor and criminal; from 
certain European Powers who felt that Britain was interfering in the 
internal affairs of China; and from the sympathetic English press who 
thought that Britain had not gone far enough if she was to demonstrate 
that she was a supporter of reform in China. The situation was complicated 
~-68
MacDonald to F.O., 28 Sept. 1898, ibid.
69
London and China Express 23 Sept. 1898, p. 829, col.
1-2; North China Herald 26 Sept. 1898, p. 569-70, col. 2-3; F.O. 
to MacDonald, 23 Nov. 1898, FO 17/1332. s "I approve representations 
which you made to Li Hung-chang on behalf of Chang Yin-huan...."
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on the one hand by the energetic attempts of the Empress-Dowager to effect
the capture of K'ang and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and any other reformers, by
whatever means available, often quite ruthless; and on the other by the
well-publicised campaign of K'ang Yu-wei, who having got free of his
captors, sought British help in ousting the Empress-Dowager and restoring
the Emperor to power, using as his chief argument that if Britain did not
step in soon, Russia would. The formation of his Pao-huang Tang (Protect
70Emperor Society) was for this purpose.
The first person who made it possible for K ’ang to escape when
the "Hundred Days" was over was the Emperor himself. In an order sent to
71
K'ang through Yang Jui on 16 September, the Emperor saids
"I, the Emperor, think that in times as dangerous and difficult as the 
present, China can only be saved by the adoption of Western methods, 
and that Western methods can only be adopted if the conservative, staunch 
old officers be dismissed, but in this the Empress Dowager does not 
agree with me.
I have represented this to her many times, but she only becomes 
the more angry. At present my seat is not secure. I hope that 
you and the others of the same way of thinking will quickly and 
secretly contrive a means of assistance. I am very anxious and ill 
at ease."
On the 18th, another secret letter was given to K ’ang, this 
time in urgent toness
See "Pao Huang Tang" in Hu Ssu-ching (ed) "Kuo-wen 
Pei-ch'eng" in WHPF IV, 278-9; Tseng Yu-hao, op.cit. 61; M. E. 
Cameron, The Reform Movement in China (New York 1931) 183; Wu Tse, 
"Pao Huang Tang yh K 'ang-Liang Lu-hsien" in Chunq-kuo Chien She 
VII, 1 (Oct. 1948) 44-7; J. Schrecker, "Pao Kuo Hui, a reform society 
of 1898" in Harvard University, Papers on China XIV (Dec. i960).
71The two Edicts are seen in Su Ch'i-chu "Ch1ing-t1ing 
Wu-shh chao-pien chi" in WHPF I, 343-4; Tso Shun-sheng (ed) Chunq-kuo 
chin-pai nien shih-chih-liao ch'i-pien (Shanghai 1933) II, 421-2; See 
also A. H. Smith China in Convulsion (New York 1901), 148s Brenan to 
F.O., Sept. 1898, FQ 17/1718; The Times 7 Oct. 1898, P. 3, col. 1; 
London and China Express 7 Oct. 1898, p. 867, col. 1-2.
98
"X now send you to manage an official newspaper. I have causes of 
deep distress from which there is no escape - deeper than writing can 
express. You had better go quickly. Iknow your affection for me.
Look out for your own safety. Use greater endeavours in the cause 
of good government. Such is my hope.1'
Even then, K'ang hesitated to leave; but when he heard that the 
Empress-Dowager was returning to the Palace, he realized that it spelt the 
end of the movement. The Empress was back on 19th September. On the same 
day, K*ang went to see Timothy Richard, who helped to put him on a train 
to Tientsin, from whence he boarded a British steamer, the "Chungking" 
bound for Hong Kong via Shanghai. Meanwhile, Richard telegraphed the 
news to the British authorities at Shanghai. On 23 September, Brenan 
received a Note from the Shanghai taotai informing him that he had 
secret instructions to arrest K1ang Yu-wei upon his arrival in Shanghai.
The taotai told Brenan that Kfang was accused of having given His Majesty 
certain drugs which proved fatal. The taotai thereupon requested that 
all British ships arriving from Tientsin should be searched for the 
fugitive. While Brenan was yet awaiting instructions as to what answer 
he was to give, a British steamer, the "El Dorado" arrived, and it was 
stopped by a Chinese launch and searched. This was done without the 
warrant of the British authorities, and it so irked Brenan that he decided 
to take matters into his own hands. He protested to the taotai for this 
act of illegality, meanw/hile having made up his mind that when the 
"Chungking" arrived, it would not be subjected to a search. The Chinese 
police and detectives at Shanghai were in a high state of excitement, 
knowing that the reformer was bound to arrive soon, and that they would 
get the reward of $2,000 offered for his capture by the Empress Dowager 
on 23 September. Acting on his own initiative, MacDonald being absent
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from Peking, Brenan then formulated a plan to protect the Chinese reformer 
from his would-be captors* It happened that the "Chungking1s" wharf was 
in the French Settlement, and this made it difficult to protect. So Brenan 
decided to intercept the steamer outside Wusung, and put K1ang on to another 
vessel* Early on the 24th, Brenan accepted the services of the Times 
correspondent in Shanghai, J* 0. P. Bland, and sent him on a launch 
which intercepted the "Chungking". The Shanghai taotai had given Brenan 
a photograph of K'ang for identification, and with this Bland managed to 
find the reformer, and removed him to the P* & 0* liner "Ballaarat", with 
a British man-of-war, the "Esk" as convoy. Under heavy guard, the "Ballaarat" 
remained in Wusung until the 27th, when it sailed off for Hong Kong, still
72
under convoy. Thus did K'ang Yu-wei owe his life to the British authorities.
Henry Cockburn, the Chinese Secretary at the Legation in Peking, 
happened to be travelling on the same ship from Shanghai to Hong Kong, 
so that during the voyage he managed to elicit from K1ang information 
regarding affairs in China, which was of a nature not generally known to 
the British Government. The British Consul-General at Shanghai, Sir 
Frederick S. A. Bourne (1854-1940) also had an interview with K*ang when 
the vessel was lying at Wusung, and from their reports the Foreign Office 
was able to conclude that, though Britain was responsible for saving the 
life of K'ang Yu-wei, it was too much to ask that she should fall in with
K'ang Yu-wei, op.cit. 26b; Soothill, op.cit. 240; E.
MacGregor (Commander-in-chief, H. M. Ships, China) to F.O., 30 Nov. 1898,
in FO 17/1718; The Times 24 Sept. 1898, p. 5, col. 2; Lo Jung-pang, 
op.cit. 127-31; Wang Shu-huai, op.cit. 179-86. J.O.P. Bland (1863-1945) 
joined the Chinese Imperial Maritimes Customs in 1883, and was for two 
years private secretary to Sir Robert Hart. In 1896 he became Secretary 
to the Municipality for the Foreign Settlements in Shanghai. He was 
■the Times correspondent at Shanghai 1897-1907; at Peking 1907-1910. See 
Cyril Pearl, Morrison of Peking (Australia, 1967) 139.
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his grandiose plans for restoring the Emperor by means of British assistance.
During his conversation with Bourne on board the "Ballaarat" on 25
September, K’ang suggested that "two hundred British troops (l) (sic) would
be sufficient to reinstate him (the Emperor) for which he and the whole
of China would be ever grateful to England." After the meeting Bourne felt
that K’ang "had evidently been carried away by enthusiasm for Western methods
and stuffed up with nonsense by Timothy Richard. But I am convinced that
K’ang had committed no crime, and the reinstallation of the Empress is a
73retrograde step, and to the advantage of Russia." During the interviews
with Cockburn when they travelled together to Hong Kong, K'ang gave the
latter rather incredible reports of the illtreatment of the Emperor by
the Empress-Dowager, of the relations among the high officials, and lastly
of the immoral character of the Empress-Dowager. Cockburn summed up his
74impressions of the reformer:!
"I think he is an enthusiast who can see no obstacles in the way of 
directly producing any results the Emperor pleases to will. He seems 
to me the stamp of a man in England who takes up some question, such 
as abstinence from alcohol, or vegetarianism, and is fully persuaded 
that an Act of Parliament prohibiting the use of alcohol will at once 
stop all drinking. He has no conceptions at all of the difficulties 
in the way of moving men out of the grooves of habit. His belief 
that the Chinese will readily change their dress is an illustration 
of this frame of mind. He seems to be a good Chinese scholar and 
have learnt of foreign countries what can be learnt from books 
imperfectly understood...
^Enclosed in Brenan to F*G*, 26 Sept. 1898, FO 17/1718.
74Cockburn's notes of his conversation with K'ang, en- 
closed in MacDonald's private letter to F. Bertie, 15 Oct. 1898, FQ 17/1336; 
see also MacDonald to F.O. 13 Oct. 1898, ibid, in which he largely agreed 
with Cockburn's views of the reformer. In a letter to Sir Halliday 
Macartney, dated October, 1898, a Chinese correspondent wrotes "This 
man (K'ang) is a very shallow and not deserving the fame he has gained."
D. Boulger, The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney (New York 1908) 470.
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The picture he draws of the Emperor is not without some pathos - pathos 
which always attaches to a man of good intentions for whom circumstances 
are too strong. I think it is fairly evident the Emperor got carried 
away by visions of a new China, renovated by his hands, and like K'ang 
and the others did not see or understand the difficulties in his path ... 
They move him- , I imagine, much as an agitator at home moved the mobs 
the mob believes the day is coming under which a pint pot shall hold a 
quart. The Emperor’s visions of the future are higher doubtless, and 
less selfish, but hardly less impractical ... "
These observations were not calculated to raise K'ang's standing 
in the eyes of the British Government. However, from the Colonial Office 
came defence of K’ang. Major-General W. Black, administering the govern­
ment of Hong Kong during the absence of a governor, sent in a confidential 
despatch after meeting both K'ang and Cockburn in Hong Kong, and evidently 
having seen the latter's notes of his conversations with the reformer.
Black suggested that Cockburn "has formed too contemptuous an estimate
75
of K'ang*s projects of reform."
"I have little doubt that if the Emperor's plans had been laid more 
wisely and boldly, and if he summoned a regiment of soldiers true 
to him to the palace before acting, he would have been beforehand 
with the Empress-Dowager, and have turned the tables on her. Though 
some of his schemes, such as the reform in dress, were absurd and 
impractical, some were more wise and reasonable, and no one can deny 
that there is plenty of scope for reform."
The Foreign Office however had reasons for disagreeing. "But 
it is just the fact that some of the proposed reforms were absurd and
impractical, and that no force was provided beforehand to ensure success,.
76
that made Mr. Cockburn form his contemptuous opinion of K'ang Yu-wei."
From another authoritative source came a further condemnation of 
K'ang's activities. Sir Claude MacDonald informed the Foreign Office
75W. Black to C.O., 8 Oct. 1898, CO 129/285.
F.O. Minutes on C.O* to F.O., (confidential) of 11 
Nov. 1898, FQ 17/1364.
/  0
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that "I consider that the cause of true reform in China has been much 
injured by the injudicious conduct of K'ang and his f r i e n d s . H e  also 
had reason to fear that the failure of the reform movement would have 
repercussions on Sino-foreign relations for he had learnt that the reaction 
of the Empress-Dowager’s government was now to look with suspicion on all 
officials who had dealings with foreigners. The Manchus evidently con- 
sidered that foreigners were responsible for K*ang's views, and conse-
78
quently distrusted all those who had associated in any way with foreigners.
It will be seen that MacDonald's apprehensions were justified.
Whatever their opinion of the reformer, the British now found him
on their hands. On arrival at Hong Kong on 30 September, he was met by
government officers and offered accommodation at the police barracks as
being the safest from assassination.This generous treatment did not
escape the notice of K*ang*s followers, and on 2 October, a tribute of
gratitude from his fellow provincials in Shanghai was addressed to the
North China Daily News. The communication included a sheet of letter paper
with the words: 1 We, the people of Kwangtung province, crave permission
to express our deep gratitude to their Excellencies the Consuls and the
Admiral of the Great Empire of Great Britain for their great kindness to 
80
us." A few days later, K'ang moved from the police barracks to stay 
with his friends, where he remained for two months*
77MacDonald to F.O., 13 Oct. 1898, FQ 17/1336.
78ibid.
79W. Black to C.O., 8 Oct. 1898, CO 129/285; The China
Mail of 30 Sept. 1898, P. 3, col. 2-4; Lord C. Beresford, op.cit.
196-9; P. Landon, "An Interview with K'ang Yu-wei" in China Mail 7 
Oct. 1898, p. 3, col. 1-6; Mei Ying, "Wu-hsli cheng-pien chen-wen" 
in Jen-wen Yheh-k'an VII, 10 (Dec. 1936) 1-6.
^North China Herald 3 Oct. 1898, p. 647, col. 2.
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Meanwhileg conditions in Peking continued to remain uncertain, 
and rumours of all sorts reached the outside world® They were given wide 
publicity in the English press, and an epitome of the more sensational 
ones was reported in the Peking and Tientsin Times of 8 October, 1898'.^
An interesting survey of the situation came for Bredon (later Sir Robert), 
deputy Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs® He found that the 
situation was generally accepted by everybody in I eking® The Manchus 
were everywhere ascendant as far as important official posts were con­
cerned 9 and this would mean little chance of future progress in the 
administration. He felt that Jung-lu (the man whom the reformers blamed 
most for the coup d'etat) was rather more pro-English than his colleagues, 
and observed that the Chinese suspicion and distrust of Russia seemed to 
be growing9 while a willingness to accept English help on conditions, was 
a sentiment coming to the front, A very high authority had told him 
recentlys "China would have put herself absolutely under English guidance
any time during the last twenty years in return for a guarantee against the
82
aggression of other nations." Bredon personally felt that at that 
juncture, the Chinese government might offer to put itself under British
O 1
Peking and Tientsin Times 8 Oct® 1898, p. 128, col. 2.
Some of the rumours included stories of the Emperor effecting his 
escape from the Palace, disguised as K'ang Yu-wei's servant, and that he 
had now gone to Hong Kong % a British guard being sent to Peking 
(in connection with the attack on foreigners) was in reality the first 
of some 2,000 troops which it was intended to send to the capital in 
detachments\ Admiral Seymour (of Britain) had been ordered to seize all 
the Chinese vessels and the Customs Houses if the recent demands made by 
the British Government of the Tsungli-yamen were not compiled with? and, 
finally, Li Hung-chang and the Empress-Dowager were reported to have 
been married and on their way to Tientsin. The Russian Minister was 
supposed to be jubilant.
^Bredon to Bertie (private) of 26 Dec* 18985
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tutelage, in return for something between an alliance and a protectorate; 
on the other hand, Bredon was not certain if the British Government would 
want to shoulder the responsibility “ ... but there is always one con­
solation here - it is not only the unexpected but the apparently impossible
83
that often happensJ“ Even so, Bredon*s far-fetched proposal did not 
seem to have been taken seriously by the authorities in London. Sir 
Claude MacDonald in fact, has long been of the opinion that though de­
moralised, the Chinese Government would still be too arrogant to want to 
follow foreign advice, let alone foreign tutelage. “With the fatalism 
of the Oriental, they will prefer to bow to the storm if it must come,
rather than voluntarily put themselves under the control of any foreigners,
84however friendly. They do not believe in our alleged motives .... “
The seeming hopelessness of the Chinese state after the reform
fiasco also drew the attention of the former Japanese Prime Minister,
Marquis Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909), a leading foroe in the Meiji Restoration,
who visited China in September, 1898. It was generally believed that his
mission was an attempt to further the reform movement in China, he being
85a source of inspiration for K'ang and many of the other reformers. Now
83ibid. K’ang Yu-wei, of course, was a staunch advocate 
of friendship with and reliance on Great Britain. See his references to 
the trustworthiness of the British in Lo Jung-pang, op.cit. 81-2, 128.
84 ,
MacDonald to P.O., 28 Oct. 1898, FQ 17/1337.
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K’ang Yu-wei had been keenly interested in the Meiji 
reforms in Japan since 1886, when he wrote to Chang Chih-tung to propose 
a programme of translating Japanese works. The arrival of Ito in Peking 
was therefore viewed with much hope and enthusiasm by K'ang and the 
other reformers. Japan, of course, was soon to s:&rve as an important 
asylum for all the fleeing reformers from China. See Richard C.
Howard, “Japan's Role in the Reform Program of K'ang Yu-wei" in Lo 
Jung-pang, op.cit. 280-302; M.B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen 
(Cambridge, Mass. 1954) 74-77; Wang Shu-huai, op.cit. 157-204. A 
typical reformer's impression of Ito is written by T. Richard, “The 
late Prince Ito" in The Chinese Recorder XL (Nov. 1909) 640-1.
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that the reactionaries were back in power, Ito admitted that he despaired
of progress in China* In Peking, he had found no statesman, no man willing
86to take responsibility, no one standing conspicuously above his fellows.
While in Peking, Ito was granted an audience with the Emperor on 20 September*
Kuang-hsfl intended it to be a discussion of reform methods for China; but
the Empress-Dowager had already returned to the capital and insisted on
being present at the interview, hidden behind a screen and unknown to the
visitor* It was no wonder therefore that the Emperor could only touch upon
general topics with Ito, and it further added to the disappointment of the
Japanese statesman. To the British, it was felt that if real confidence
had been established between the two Oriental countries, and the interview
between the Emperor and Ito conducted more cordially without the restraining
87influence of the Empress-Dowager, better things might have been hoped for.
By this time, all British hopes, missionary or otherwise, for rapid moderni­
zation in China were dashed ? K’ang Yu-wei alone seemed to be undiscouraged, 
and continued canvassing energetically for British aid in restoring the 
Emperor.
The position of the Emperor Kuang-hsti was one of the difficulties 
facing the British Government after the coup d’etat. Since the return of the 
Empress-Dowager, he was practically a prisoner in the Palace. As the 
excitement subsided, and the Chinese capital settled back into its 
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See The Times of 26 Nov. 1898, p. 11, col. 6, for reports of 
an interview with the Marquis.
87
Bax-Ironside to F.O*, 28 Mar, 1899, FQ 17/1373; and 15 
April, 1899, ibid, containing J.B. Barnes' account of the interview. Part 
of the conversation between the Emperor and Ito is given in S.Y. Teng 
and J.K. Fairbank, op*cit. 179-180? and in Chang Lu-tzu (trans.)
"Wu-hsd cheng-pien ti tang-shih" in WHPF III, 569-70.
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‘'pristine, lethargic, know-nothing condition" foreign observers were
generally agreed that although the Emperor's measures were too radical and 
premature, there was no doubting his genuine desire for reform. The Emperor 
and his party must have been blinded by enthusiasm; or, as it was often felt, 
perhaps the Emperor had sensed impending danger, and had rushed his reform 
schemes with a recklessness impelled by the realization that his time was 
short. "Deficient though he may have been in judgment and knowledge of 
the world, the Emperor had intelligence enough to perceive that drastic reform, 
reform that should go to the root of things, is the only remedy for the decay
on
that is everywhere apparent." So when rumours began reaching the outside
world that the Empress intended doing away with him, or even that he was
already dead by the time the Empress assumed control, even the most impartial
observer felt that this could not be tolerated. It was urged that the Manchu
Government should not be allowed to "hoodwink" the world for days on end,
and the North China Daily News demanded that the foreign Ambassadors in
Peking should strive to know the truth, to determine whether the man to whom
90they were commissioned was still alive.
In this respect Sir Claude MacDonald had indeed not been idle. On
3 October, 1898, he telegraphed confidentially to the Foreign Office, relating
a report he had from fairly reliable authority that the Emperor was to be
put to death in a few days time by the Empress-Dowager. He desired instruct
91
tions on a line of action if the rumour proved to be true. The reply
OO
Peking and Tientsin Times 1 Oct. 1898, p. 123, col. 2.
89
The Times of Nov. 1898, p. 7, col. 1-2; See also the 
North China Herald of 10 Oct. 1898, p. 669, col. 1-3, p. 670, col. 1.
90
Peking and Tientsin Times 24 Sept. 1898, p. 119, col. 2-3, 
leading article; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, in WHPF I, 255-6, 305-7, where he 
describes the treatment of the Emperor by the Empress-Dowager; see also 
Shinshu Nakakufci, Man-Ch1ina hsien-shih mi-mi, shih (Shanghai n.d.) 7b-8b.
^MacDonald tel* to F.O., 13 Oct. 1898
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drafted and telegraphed to MacDonald was at the instance of Lord Salisbury 
92
himsel fs
"A joint representation by the foreign representatives of the very 
dangerous impression which would be produced by the assassination of 
the Emperor seems only expedient. It would be important in that case 
that other Powers should act in entire accord with us, and Russia should 
seem to take the initiative. We are suspect after having shielded the 
principal culprit from arrest."
Salisbury's policy of caution was not without grounds. The action of 
the British Government in the reform coup had indeed come under strong fire, 
at least from one eloquent direction. The Cologne Gazette on 4 October 
launched a fierce attack against the British Government for having interfered 
in the internal affairs of China in supporting K'ang Yu-wei, and the English 
missionaries for having aided the reformers, especially in the two Kwang 
provinces. Because it was believed the British had sought and obtained the 
degradation of Li Hung-chang, the consequence was that the Palace and 
Government in Peking became alarmed, and had resort to "a measure not un­
common in Eastern lands - a Palace revolution," and thus the responsibility for
93the whole coup d1etat was neatly laid at the door of the British government.
However, anxiety regarding the uncertain situation of the Emperor was shared
94
by all the other Foreign Powers interested in China whether critical of
92F.O. tel, to MacDonald, 14 Oct. 1898, 17/1339.
9^The Times of 4 Oct. 1898, p. 3, col. 1, from their Berlin
correspondent. In its leader, p. 7, col. 3-4, the paper defends the 
Government as having upheld its principle of never interfering in the 
internal affairs of other states, though British sympathies as a free and 
progressive people were naturally with reform. Giving santuary to K'ang 
was consistent with its policy which led to the.sheltering of German 
refugees of both parties in London just after the events of 1848, and 
also of French Royalists, Imperialists and Republicans when they were 
exiles during the last century. The Editorial made it clear that if 
K'ang had carried out a moderate scheme of reforms, they would doubtless 
have been good for China, and therefore also good for China's chief 
customer. As it was, K'ang did not seem to have possessed any of the
practical qualities that go to make a successful statesman* to say nothing
of a successful reformer.
94MacDonald tel. F.O., 14 Oct. 1898, FQ 17/1341.
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British policy or not, and it was due to MacDonald's initiative that the
matter was made clear for them once and for all. Acting on his instructions,
he made no official statement to the Tsunqli-yamen; but being aware of the
wild rumours floating about, Prince Ch'ing assured MacDonald on 15 October,
that they were not true, that the Emperor was enjoying better health than
usual, and then confidentially asked MacDonald's advice as to the best means
of quieting the agitation. This was an opening not often proffered? MacDonald
made the bold suggestion that the Emperor should be examined by a foreign
physician, whose certificate on the state of his health would then have a
very reassuring effect. Inwardly though, MacDonald felt there was little
95
chance of his advice being followed.
But he was surprised on the 17th to receive actual enquiries 
from the Prince and some ministers of the yamen as to the foreign doctors 
resident in Peking. Unfortunately the British Legation doctor was away on 
home leave, so MacDonald recommended the French physician, M. Detheve. The 
Emperor was duly visited on the 18th, in the presence of the Empress-Dowager, 
and a medical bulletin made out by the Frenchman. MacDonald then took the 
initiative again and suggested to the Tsunqli-yamen that the bulletin 
should be officially communicated to the doyen of the Diplomatic Body, as 
this would place the affair on record, and make it public. His advice 
was again immediately put into effect. This unusual departure from tra­
dition, in which the person of the Emperor was directly involved, was 
perhaps a small yet significant manifestation of the extent of British 
influence in Peking, fostered no doubt by the energetic and straightforward 
diplomacy of Sir Claude MacDonald. He himself observed that "The Chinese 
high officials, and I think I may say, the Empress-Dowager, have shown 
9 5
MacDonald tel of 16 October 1898, ibid.
in this matter considerable eagerness to propitiate foreign opinion."
This was not to say that the Empress-Dowager had now embarked on
enlightened policy with regard to her government of the country, one
which the foreign Powers hoped to see* On the contrary, having put to
death six of the reformers directly involved in the "Hundred Days" move-
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ment on 28 September, 1898, she began an intensive search for all the
others who had fled her grasp, and who were mostly enjoying foreign
protection either in the British colonies adjacent to China, or in the
foreign settlement at Shanghai- In particular, she desired the capture
of the leaders K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao by whatever means she
could* In trying to effect this, she ran up against the traditional
98British principle of protecting political refugees under her flag, the 
more so since having participated in K*ang's flight in September, the 
British Government could not now hand him over without causing an outcry 
among the many sympathisers of reform in and out of China. As it was, 
much anxiety was voiced as to what the British now proposed to do, Peking 
being once more in the control of unprogressive reactionaries* A manifes 
tation of a clear conception of policy, and the energy and firmness with 
which to pursue it was generally desired? it was agreed that "the 
government seems to have taken a strong line with regard to sheltering
96[viacDonald to F.O., 28 Oct. 1898, FQ 17/1337, and tel,
of 29 Oct- 1898, FQ 17/1341- An account of the doctor's visit is seen
in Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, op.- cit* Chapter 3, chuan 2, also in WHPF I, 263-6? 
Wang Shu-huai op* cit. 212-7.
97Their biographies are given in "K'ang Yu-wei teng-jen
chuan-ch'i" in WHPF IV, 49-73? the six included K1ang's brother K'ang
Kuang-jen.
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An important precedent had been established in the case 
of Wang T'ao, a journalist accused of betraying the Ch'ing Government 
during the Taiping Rebellion, who was assisted by the British in escaping 
from Shanghai to Hong Kong in October 1862* See Paul A. Cohen, HWang 
T'ao's perspective on a Changing World" in A* Feuerwerker, et- al. (ed) 
Approaches to Modern Chinese History (California 1967) 135-
110
K'ang Yu-wei, and we may hope that it is indicable of its resolve at this
,, QQ
time. y'
The sheltering of K'ang by the British was doubtlessly a constant
source of irritation to the Empress-Dowager. It was suggested that her ire
was redoubled considering the part accredited to the British Government in
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bringing about the dismissal of Li Hung-chang early in September, 1898.
The situation was not made easier by the fact that everywhere he travelled,
K'ang and his colleagues were loud in their demands for British aid in
overthrowing the Empress-Dowager. On 31 October, 1898, a petition signed
by a number of scholar-literati was handed in to the British Consul-General
at Shanghai, urging that a telegram be sent to the Foreign Office asking
for active British assistance in restoring the Emperor, and suggesting
that while the conservatives at Peking looked to Russia for support, the
101
reformers placed their reliance on Great Britain. Then in November, 
the Officer Administering the Government in Hong Kong, W. Black, also 
received a petition, this time signed by the gentry of Kwangsi, again 
asking for his cooperations he should telegraph to the Foreign Office 
to take steps in protecting the reformers and reinstating the Emperor.
They based their pleas on the friendship existing between China and 
Britain, and the fact that Britain had proved sympathetic towards European 
revolutions in the past. A few days later, Black received a letter from 
K'ang Yu-wei himself, much along the same lines? but including an attack 
on the person of the Empress-Dowager, as well as suggesting that troops
London and China Express 30 Sept. 1898, p. 845, col. 2,
leading article.
“^ London and China Express 23 Sept. 1898, p. 829, col. 1-2.
^ ^ London and China Express 30 Dec. 1898, p. 3, col. 1-2,
Ill
102 „ t103
be dispatched to restore the Emperor. To all these 'quaint effusions'
the British Government deigned to pay no notice.
From Hong Kong? K'ang Yu-wei went in November 1898 to Japan? and
immediately an edict was issued on 5 December? with special instructions
104
to the Chinese Minister in Japan to watch out for him. From Japan.,
K'ang journeyed to England and Canada. In both places? he gave long and 
detailed public addresses? stressing repeatedly the responsibility of Great 
Britain in "saving" the Emperor. He arrived in England in June 1899? and 
made it public that his avowed purpose was to induce the British Govern­
ment to help him. He criticised the British Government for their lack of 
knowledge regarding conditions in China? and insisted that it was in 
Britain's own interests to interfere in China? as the "Emperor spelt friend­
ship for England and reform? and the regime of the Empress spelt Russian 
influence and reaction." It only needed a decisive intimation by a foreign
power to the Tsungli-vamen., he claimed? and the Emperor might be reseated 
105
on the throne. In Canada? where he established a branch of his Pao-
XG 6
huang Tang in July? 1899? he was again reported as saying?
"he considered Britain the best possible friend and protector of China? 
but although acknowledging his indebtness personally for their help in
102 ,
W. Black to C.O.? 17 Nov. 1898? CO 129/286, and C-0*
to F.Q., 17/1398. The petition is also published in the Times of 25 April
1899? p. 6? col. 2-3.
103A term used by Fiddian at the F-0. in a minute on C.O. 
to F.O. 6 Jan. 1899, FQ 17/1398.
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The Edict is seen in "Shang-yh san-i-liu t'iao" in
WHPF II? 112.
105
The Times? 8 June 1899? p. 10? col. 1$ London and China 
Express 16 June 1899? p. 444? col. 1-2.
An interview with K'ang in Canada by Mr. Archibald 
Little, an enterprising businessman working in China? reported in the 
North China Herald of 25 dept. 1899? p. 631? col. 1-3. K'ang struck 
Little as being "the best informed Chinese I have ever met." His travels 
are documented in Lo Jung-pang? op.cit. 178-82*
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escaping? he complained bitterly of the apathy of our officials 
generally .... Had Britain understood the facts? and had the British 
Minister in Peking been properly informed upon what was going on in 
the Palace? which he certainly was not, he might have held out a 
helping hand and without risk to himself? have saved the young 
Emperor ...."
While K'ang criticised the British Government for its lack of 
knowledge of Chinese affairs? he himself was perhaps equally guilty of 
ignorances in view of England's world-wide responsibilities and of the 
contingencies involved? ther© could be no doubt that Britain had little 
intention of meddling in the affairs of China? however much the British 
would wish to see China reformed, and however much K'ang and his colleagues 
demanded it. The difficulties of offering him safe residence in the 
British colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore were to cause trouble enough, 
as will be seen in the next chapter.
Yet despite his irresponsible utterances, K'ang Yu-wei and the 
movement he represented did seem to win a considerable amount of public 
sympathy abroad. This was enhanced of course? by reports everywhere of 
the reactionary conditions in Peking under the administration of the 
Manchu conservatives, and of the Empress-Dowager's ruthless attempts to 
persecute all those who had any association with the reform movement. 
Admittedly the British Government need have no concern with the internal 
conditions of China? the Court intrigues, the plots and counter-plots 
which mark the frequent struggles for mastery within the Palace. So 
long as British treaty rights were respected, and the trader allowed a 
fair field for his enterprise? the British Government would deem to be 
satisfied. Yet Britain's experience in China ha^ shown that the internal 
conditions of the government in China never failed to react on foreign 
trade, and it had often been found necessary that the observance of
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existing treaties depended largely upon the political pressure brought to 
bear on the Chinese authorities. For this reason, the British had long 
been interested in movements promoting liberal reform and domestic con- 
solidation, and had always worked for the strengthening of China from 
within. Hence the importance of maintaining British influence in Peking. 
And hence the dissatisfaction felt when it seemed to many that the Foreign 
Office had now abandoned this principle with regard to the retrograde 
regime of the Empress-Dowager, and that it condoned her practice of 
steadily replacing Chinese officials by Manchus in all the important 
political posts of the Empire. It was also known that the foreign 
Legations now found renewed difficulty in dealing with the central govern­
ment, for the powerful advisers surrounding the throne tended to prevent 
true details of the Empire's international relations from reaching the 
highest authority. As a consequence the Palace was led to believe that 
all foreigners were to be distrusted without distinction of nationality.
No improvements could thus be made in such circumstances, there being no
1(
one of sufficient power to proclaim the disagreeable truth to the throne.
This emergence of an anti-foreign feeling in Peking was one of
the consequences of the coup that Sir Claude MacDonald had feared, and
he was to see it take actual form. On 30 September, 1898, a number of
foreigners, including a Mr. Mortimore of the British Legation, were
108attacked in the southern city of Peking by a street crowd.
10?The Times of 26 Nov. 1898, p. 11, col. 3-4, leading 
article? Bax-Ironside to F.O., 17 April, 1899, FQ 17/1373 and 29 May 
1899, FQ 17/1374, in which fte reports that there were 62 Viceroys, 
Governors, Treasurers and Judges of the 18 provinces and the New 
Dominions. 24 of the posts were held by Manchus, whereas before the 
coup only 13 of them were so occupied.
1 08
MacDonald tel. F.O. 1 Oct. 1898, FQ 17/1341.
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The incident itself was unimportant, but it was generally believed that 
during the unrest following the execution of the six reformers, the
common people supposed that their deaths were ordered by the Empress-Dowager
because they had had dealings with foreigners, and it was therefore
considered safe to insult foreigners in every possible way. So great was
the anxiety felt by the foreign Legations about the incident that the
Diplomatic Body agreed to send for their Legation guards, despite the
entreaties of the Tsunqli-yamen that the presence of these guards would
109
only serve to excite popular feeling. The guards were withdrawn after
some three weeks; but the incident was another set-back to the improved
diplomatic relations with the Chinese Government that MacDonald sought
110to secure during his tenure of office.
In the main, the British Government was not generally regarded as 
having done well through the reform crisis of 1898. It was unfortunate 
that during the few crucial days when the coup d’etat took place, Sir 
Claude MacDonald was away from Peking on a visit to Pei-ta Ho, where the 
British fleet was assembled. This afforded Jung-lu an opportunity to 
circulate a report that the British were going to seize the forts at 
Talcu and then march by way of Tientsin on Peking, To meet this supposed
109MacDonald to F.O., 11 Oct. 1898, FQ 17/1336,
110
In relation to the bringing up of Legation guards, there 
was another suspicious incident which led MacDonald to believe that the 
Chinese Government was attempting to play off one Legation against another.
A report was circulated that it was due entirely to MacDonald’s initiative 
that the guards were sent for, and that the Russian Charge d'Affaires, M. 
Pavlov, was alleged to have expressed his opinion that he was personally 
averse to the measure, and had thought it a great mistake. This was 
completely opposed to Pavlov's views at the meetings of the Diplomatic 
Body, and MacDonald hastened to question him about it. The Russian denied 
having made any statement of the kind, and MacDonald was inclined to 
believe him. See MacDonald to F.O, 12 Oct. 1898, ibid.
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emergency, Jung-lu had General Nieh Shih-ch’eng, a commander under Li Hung-
chang, bring up five thousand men from his camp at Lutai, and this was
111
done in a single night to demonstrate the urgency of the matter* Thus
unknowingly, the British Minister seemed to have facilitated the cause
of the reactionaries against the reformers* The absence of MacDonald at
such an important moment thus became the focal point of criticism directed
against the British Government for their handling of the situation. It
was suggested that the foreign representatives at Peking, and the British
in particular, had no inkling of the events brewing in China, and that
Sir Claude was alleged to have admitted that he had never heard of K'ang
112Yu-wei until his escape. As a consequence of lack of information, the 
Foreign Office was accused of having "no policy" in China as far as the 
reform movement was concerned. Lord Salisbury was charged with "criminal 
inaction" and his "incapacity or cowardice" had accomplished a blow to 
British prestige and caused the British Government to remain the laughing­
stock of other nations. According to the North China Herald, this was 
especially unforgiveable in view of the fact that the British had for 
years taken the lead in urging on the Chinese the claims of enlighten­
ment and progress, and had endeavoured to convince them that only by the 
introduction of reforms could the integrity and independence of China, 
which were the rallying points of British policy in the Far East, be 
preserved. And now they seemed to have turned around and condoned the 
retrograde administration of the Empress-Dowager, which was a support of
"^Contained in J*B. Eames1 account of the c o u p  d’etat, 
in Bax-Ironside to F.O., 15 April 1899, FQ 17/1373*
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North China Herald 14 Nov. 1898, p. 890, col. 1-3, 
leading article. See note 26.
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113"barbarism" in preference to "reform".
The same charges, though voiced in less violent language* were
reflected in a debate in the House of Commons on 9 June* 1899. dir E.
Sassoon* (member for Hythe), deplored the government's countenance given
to the usurpation of the throne by the Empress-Dowager. It was suggested
that MacDonald should have dissociated himself from the rest of the
Diplomatic Body* and thus abstained from acknowledging the "machinations
of an oligarchy mainly composed of corrupt and besotted reactionaries.
file. Moon (St. Pancras) also expressed his regret that the Legation was
not better informed of the events taking place in China* an absence of
which have now endangered British credit in allowing the coup to take
lib
place* instead of supporting the reform party.
It was certainly true that the British Legation, and even more 
so, the Foreign Office in London, had little expected that the reform 
decrees which began appearing in January 1898 would so rapidly lead to a 
show-down between the two contending forces in Peking. When the early 
edicts were published* British official reaction was one of satisfaction 
and a placid wait-and-see attitude. It was a good beginning* they felt| 
they expected the movement to spread over a period of time before the 
practical effects would be apparent. They did not realize the urgency 
which caused the Emperor to rush through his decrees while the Empress- 
Dowager was still away from Peking. Then, it was also a fact that Sir
~^3North China Herald, 7 Nov. 1898, p. 841, col. 2-3* leading 
article. Also see the same paper of 17 Oct. 1898, p. 715-6, col. 1-3, and
24 Oct. 1898* p. 763, col. 3, 764, col. 1-2? The Times of 30 Sept. 1898,
p. 7* col. 4, leading article.
^ ^Parliamentary Debates LXXII, 9 June 1899* 824-5.
11 Parliamentary Debates LXXII, 9 June 1899, 824-5,
842? Times 10 June 1899, pp. 8-9.
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Claude MacDonald had not taken the movement very seriously to heart, as his
despatches of the period show. It was perhaps an exaggeration to say that
he had not heard of K'ang* s name before September, 1898; but undoubtedly
he had little sympathy to spare for K'ang and his followers after they had
116become outlaws of the Chinese Government. In a speech at a dinner
party, giving his account of the coup. Sir Claude insisted that K'ang was
only an enthusiastic dreamer, who believed that the whole of the Chinese
Empire could be reformed by edicts; he stressed the fact that the Empress-
Dowager' s eagerness to capture K'ang was not so much for his reform
activities, but for the fact that he had plotted to do away with her, and
so he was a true rebel in the eyes of the Chinese Government. MacDonald
felt that the Empress, a clever woman, and by no means opposed to reforms,
simply stepped in and managed affairs when the Emperor was unable to do 
117
so. This was a lenient attitude to take towards the reactionary tri­
umph, one which not many foreigners at the time would share with MacDonald.
At another reception given in his honour by the China Association 
in London, on 28 September, 1899, MacDonald, defending his handling of 
the crisis, now blamed both the British Government at home for lack of 
support, and the pessimistic tone of public opinion in England. British 
influence in China had not really suffered as much as was often alleged, 
he claimed, because of the occurrence of the reform coup d'etat. As for 
his personal attitudes, he once again demonstrated that he had always
1 1 f \
Lo Jung-pang, op,cit. 255-6, claims that MacDonald was 
at first favourable toward the reform movement, but his views changed 
drastically after the coup d1etat.
117
London and China Express 23 Dec. 1898, p. 1076, col. 2.
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desired a forceful policy in China. Citing as example the question of
piracy on the West River, he had suggested to the Tsunqli-yamen that
"hanging an officials the higher the better - 1 mean the higher the official ■
118a Viceroy for choice, was the best and only way." This was fairly typical
of Sir Claude MacDonald and in line with what he felt towards British
participation in the reforms of China. Taking the Chinese Army for instance,
he was certain that the minute the British had helped them to reorganise it,
119
they would "kick us all out of China, lock stock and barrel." Whatever
changes Britain desired could, according to MacDonald, "only be brought about
120
by horse, foot and artillery, and that's the long and the short of it."
It was perhaps fortunate that Lord Salisbury was in charge of the
ye
Foreign Office in London, who on many occasions/managed to counterbalance 
MacDonald's militant policies with realism and caution. Britain's handling 
of the reform movement of 1898 has.been variously charged with timidity, 
excessive interference in Chinese affairs, loss of prestige for Britain, 
or lack of support for the reformers. Nevertheless the crisis was tided 
over without undue strain on the relatively smooth relations between China 
and Britain during this period of the "Scramble for concessions." The 
repercussions of the reform movement, however, continued to influence 
Britain's policies in China, especially as they affected Colonial policies 
in Hong Kong and Singapore, where the fugitive reformers sought asylum.
118
Peking and Tientsin Times 11 Nov. 1899, supplement col.
2-3; and The Times 29 Sept. 1899, p. 7, col. 3-4, leader.
^^MacDonald to Bertie (private) of 3 Feb. 1899, FQ 17/1372. 
120ibid* British aid in the reform of the Chinese military 
was a favoured platform of Lord Charles Beresford, (1846—1919) who visited 
China on a special mission at the request of the Associated Chambers of 
Commerce of Britain in 1898-99. See C. Beresford, The Break-up of China 
(London 1899); on this occasion, MacDonald*s views appeared to have pre­
vailed at the Foreign Offices someone minuted, "C.B. has wind in the head."
CHAPTER IV
THE ABORTIVE UPRISINGS OF 1900-3 AND BRITISH COLONIAL ATTITUDES
1900 was the year of the Boxer Rebellion which ravaged the Northern 
1provinces of China, Both the reformers of K'ang Yu-wei1s group and Sun 
Yat-sen's revolutionaries sought to use the opportunity presented., when the 
attention of the Manchu government was drawn to activities in the North, to 
make a bid for insurrection in Central and Southern China. There were thus 
two separate movements in that year, the reformers rising in Hankow,, and the 
revolutionaries in Waichow in Kwangtung. Prior to this, there had been some 
attempts at cooperation between the two movements, with the revolutionaries 
taking the initiative nearly every time, and K'ang Yu-wei persistently 
holding aloof. When these overtures for amalgamation failed to yield 
practicable results, the two camps then decided to strike out each for its 
own cause.
As early as 1895, Sun Yat-sen had hoped to gain the friendship of 
K'ang Yu-wei. K'ang was teaching in Canton, and Sun having heard of his 
reform ideas, sent word to the scholar that he wanted to meet him. K'ang 
replied that he was willing only if Sun applied formally to become a pupil 
of his. This haughty attitude thus prevented the two Chinese leaders from
1
Some recent studies of the Boxer Movement include Chien 
Po-tsan, et. al. (ed) I-ho T'uan (Shanghai 1953) 4 vols.j Tai Hsuan-chih,
I-ho T'uan yen-chiu (Taiwan 1963)5 J. Ch'en, "The Nature and Characterisitic 
of the Boxer Movement," in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, XXIII, Pt. 2, 287-308; V. W. Purcell, The Boxer Uprising, a Back­
ground Study (Cambridge 1963) ; see also Sir Claude MacDonald, "Some Personal 
Reminiscences of the Siege of the Peking Legations in 1900", a speech made 
on 25 March 1914 to the Royal United Service Institution, in Journal of the 
Royal United Service Institution LIX, (August 1914) 1-45 (by courtesy of Mrs 
J. Fahie of Suffolk, England.)
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exchanging references on that occasion. Meanwhile, in Hong Kong, Hsieh 
Tsuan-t’ai was also trying to form an alliance with the reformers through 
K'ang Kuang-jen (1867-1898), brother of K'ang Yu-wei, and seemed to have some 
sort of success. They became firm friends, and by September, 1897, K'ang 
Kuang-jen promised to broach the subject of cooperation to his brother. He 
felt that "we should get the superior men of both parties together and hold a 
conference. We desire to see a peaceful revolution for the good of the Empire 
and its millions . . . "  But it must be remembered that Yang Ch'ti-ydn was 
still chairman of the Hsinq Chung Hui at that time, and K ’ang and Hsieh were 
contemplating cooperation without provision for the role of Sun Yat-sen. There­
fore it was not surprising that K'ang Kuang-jen stated from the beginnings 
"Men like Sun Yat-sen frighten me— we cannot combine with such reckless men." 
K'ang then left for Shanghai, and on 8 November, 1897, informed Hsieh by
letter that he had spoken to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who seemed to favour the idea 
4of cooperation.
At the same time, however, an incident in Japan began to widen the 
gap between the two groups again. By 1897 the Chinese community in Japan 
had increased considerably, and Feng Chin-ju, chairman of the Hsinq Chung Hui 
in Japan, decided to establish a Chinese college at Yokohama. No doubt still 
hoping to win the friendship of the reformers, Sun Yat-sen approached them for
2 Hao Yen-p'ing, "The abortive cooperation between Reformers 
and Revolutionaries, 1895-1900" in Harvard University, Papers on China XV 
(1961) 94.
3
Tse Tsan-tai (Hsieh Tsuan-t'ai) The Chinese Republic - Secret 
History of the Revolution (Hong Kong 1924) 12.
ibid
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help in securing teachers for the college. K'ang sent his close follower
Hsd Chin to administer the college, and in no time managed to transform it
into a centre of reform propaganda. The name of the school was changed from
5
its original "Chunq-hsi" to "Ta-tunq1 and the climax came in October, 1898 
after K'ang had arrived in Japan, when notices of "Do not admit Sun Wen" 
were posted in the school premises.^
The issue was also revived in Hong Kong when K'ang and some of his 
disciples were given refuge after the Hundred Days1' Reform Movement. The 
revolutionaries calculated that with the failure of his movement, and his 
personal status reduced to that of a political refugee, K'ang would be more 
susceptible to the idea of a revolution first and reforms after. Ch'en 
Shao-pai made several attempts to see K'ang, all to no avail. K'ang
K*ang's Ta-t’ung Shu (One-world Philosophy) was published 
at about the same time.
Accounts of these early attempts at cooperation are given 
in Hao Yen-p'Ing, op. cit. 93-4; Tse Tsan-tai, op. cit. 10-12; Ch'en Shao- 
pai, "Hsing Chung Hui ko-ming shih-yao" in Ch'en Te-ydn, (ed) Ch'en Shao-pao 
hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu (Canton 1934?) 101-101b, 104b-105; also seen in HHKM
I, 53-54; Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao
(Taipei, 1958) I, 78-79; Wang Ch'i-chtt (ed) "Ching-shih ta-hsdeh-t1ang chi 
ch'i-t'a hsdeh-t'ang" in WHPF IV, 517-520; Chih Kuei, "Ch'ing-tai K'ang-Liang 
wei-hsin ydn-tung yd ko-ming-t'ang chih kuan-hsi chi ying-hsiang" in Chien- 
kuo Ydeh-k1 an IX, 2 (August 1933) 5; Chang Peng-ydan, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao yd 
Ch'ing-chi ko-ming (Taiwan, 1964) 136-7; Chi Ping-feng, Ch'inq-mo ko-ming 
yd chdn-hsien ti lun-Ch'eng (Taiwan, 1966) 37-45 Lo Jung-pang, in K * ang 
Yu-wei, a Biography and a Symposium (Arizona 1967) 147-8 however, offers 
evidence that it would have been inconsistent with K*ang's behaviour and 
aims at that stage to reject cooperation with the revolutionaries, and 
also that the chief contact man between the two groups, Ch'en Ch'ien-ch'iu, 
died in February 1895, so that accounts of the frequent liaison between 
the two groups after this date would have to be reexamined. There is reason 
for Lo's scepticism, as most works dealing with the subject were written 
by men sympathetic to Sun's cause. On the other hand, until there Is 
conclusive evidence to the contrary, there is no doubting K'ang Kuang-jen's 
friendship with Hsieh Tsuan-t'ai.
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remained disdainful of the revolutionaries. He remained stubbornly loyal to
the Emperor Kuang-hstt, and explained that personal gratitude to the Emperor
7prevented him from joining any movement harmful to his person.
After this there was no more the revolutionaries could do. Cooperation
O
with the reformers seemed impossible as long as K'ang remained their leader.
Yang Ch'd-ydn summed up the situations^
"Hong's (K'ang's) party are too proud and jealous of our 
Chinese-English scholars. They don't like to have the same rank 
as us; they always aspire to governing us or want us all to submit 
to them...It has all been a game of selfish political chess and 
scheming to become top dog.'"
The failure of the reformers and revolutionaries to work together was based
much on the social and ideological differences between Sun Yat-sen and K'ang
Yu-wei. K'ang, a renowned classical scholar and minor official who had
enjoyed the rare distinction of submitting memorials directly to the throne,
was emotionally attached to the person of Emperor Kuang-hsO. He therefore
logically looked down upon the anti-Manchu rebel Sun Yat-sen, with his
Western medical education and secret society following. Sun considered
himself one of "Four Brigands," while K'ang saw himself a "saint." Sun's
7
Ch'en Shao-pai, op. cit. 101-101b, 108b-109; Miyazaki To- 
razo (trans. Chung-kuo yen-chiu-she) San-shih-san-nien lo-hua meng (Tokyo,
1943) 58-655 M. B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen(Carnbridge. Mass.
1954) 76-77; Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih (Changsha 1939) I, 73-5; Chih 
Kuei, op« cit. 7-8; the China Mail of 20 October, 1898, p. 3, col. 1.
8
After K ’ang left Japan for his American and European tour, 
Liang Ch'i-ch’ao was frequently seen in the company of the revolutionaries, 
and preparations were actually made for the amalgamation of the two groups, 
with Sun as the President of the federation and Liang Vice-President. When 
news of this reached K'ang, he immediately sent Liang to Hawaii to form a 
branch of the Pao-huang Tang. This was meant to wrench Liang away from 
revolutionary influences in Japan, and it was effective. See Hao Yen- 
p 'ing, op. cit. 100-101; Feng Tzu-yu, op. cit. II, 31-5; Chih Kuei, op. cit. 8.
9
Yang's letter of 6 June, 1899, in Tse Tsan-tai, op. cit. 14-5.
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republicanism stood opposed to K'ang's constitutional monarchism, and neither 
was prepared to give up his political ideal.^ K ‘ang‘s dislike of Sun was to 
lead to an unfortunate incident in the summer of 1900.
Meanwhile, the Chinese government under the direction of the Empress- 
Dowager continued to view both reformers and revolutionaries as criminals 
detrimental to the peace of the Empire, and was unceasing in its efforts to 
procure their capture and punishment. To do so, it required the cooperation 
of the British Government which had custody over the offenders who had fled 
to the Colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore. Britain's traditional policy, 
however, was one of protection for political refugees in her jurisdiction.
This policy was adamantly adhered to by her colonial administrators, especially 
Sir Henry Blake (1838-1918) Governor of Hong Kong.
Blake became Governor in November, 1898, and from the first demon­
strated that he had his own ideas for the running of affairs in the Colony, 
in a manner that he thought correct, even though it should run counter to 
Colonial Office policies.'*'’1’ An example of his strong-mindedness was seen 
when soon after he became Governor, he was involved in the difficulties
Accounts of the basic differences between the two camps 
can be seen in Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien chenq-chih she (Taiwan, 
1957) I, 173-4^ Wu Tse, K'ang Yu-wei yh Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (Shanghai, 1948) 16, 
89; Hsiao Kung-ch'(ian, Chung-kuo chenq-chih ssu-hsiang shih (Shanghai, 1946) 
700-2, 734-5; Lo Chia-lun, Ko-rning Wen-hsien (Taiwan, 1953-64) III, 291-2;
R. Scalapino and H. Schiffrin, "Early Socialist Currents in the Chinese 
Revolutionary Movements Sun-Yat-sen versus Liang Ch'i-ch'ao" in Journal of 
Asian Studies, XVIII, 3 (May 1959) 321-342.
11 He won his first contest with the Colonial Office by refusing 
to go out to Hong Kong in the summer of 1898 because of its heat, using such 
persuasive reasoning that Chamberlain agreed to his plans, even to the extent 
of giving him half salary for six months prior to his taking up his post. 
Chamberlain realized, "I have no doubt the arrangement will be attacked in the 
House of Commons— but the circumstances are special," See Chamberlain Minutes 
on Blake to C.O. 20 Feb. 1898, C.O. 129/288. See also correspondence and 
minutes on Blake to C.O. 5 Feb. 1898, and C.O. to Blake 5 Apr. 1898, ibid.
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connected with Britain's taking over of the New Territories opposite the 
12island, in the face of violent and often unreasoned opposition from the
local population. In a hasty attempt to settle differences with the Canton
authorities, Blake suddenly paid a visit to the Viceroy T'an Chung-lin in
April, 1899, with neither authority nor sanction from the Colonial Office,
who were informed only after the incident was over. Even worse, his venture
did nothing to stop the disturbances then prevailing, and from his acting
over the head of the British Consul-General in Canton, through whom he was
supposed to communicate with the Canton government, dated his uneasy relations
with B. C. G. Scott, (1846-1929). This would cause much unpleasantness in
future questions with regard to the activities of the Chinese revolutionaries.
Now Blake was severely censured by both the government at home and the local
13population for this inauspicious start of his administration.
12 This was part of Britain's share in the general "Scramble 
for Concessions" of 1898. See F. 0. Correspondence in F.O. 17/1362-1365; 
Appendix F. "Extension of Hong Kong" in China Association, Annual Report, 
1898-1899; C. Collins, Public Administration in Hong Kong (London, 1952)
134-6; G. B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (London, 1958) 260-9; the 
Hong Kong Hansard 4 Oct. 1899; Hong Kong Sessional Papers, 1899, 585-8.
1 3
C.O. minutes on Blake's telegram of 1 Apr. 1899, C.O.
129/290 and on his despatch of 7 Apr. 1899 (confidential) ibid; see also 
an extract of North China Daily News, 20 Apr. 1899, enclosed in Bax-Ironside 
to F.O., 1 May 1899, FQ~T7/l374r^hich described the incident; "The initial 
mistake, and a very grave one, was made when the Governor... posted off to 
Canton to ask the Viceroy to afford military protection to the delimiting 
party. In the first place, if the Governor had any communication to make 
to the Viceroy, custom demands that he should make it through the Consul 
at Canton; it is entirely infra dig, as well as being contrary to well- 
founded practices, for the Governor who is the Queen's rre-pres-enta:tave, 'to go up 
in a torpedo-boat to interview the Chinese Viceroy, and it must lead to 
complications when the matter comes to the notice of the British Minister.
Then, considering the ample force of which the Governor has disposal at 
Hong Kong, it was an unpardonable display of weakness for him to ask for 
Chinese military protection..."
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On the other hand, throughout the period of his term of office,
Blake was on extremely good terms with the Chinese population of the Colony, 
and especially those factions which aspired to reformist and sometimes revolu­
tionary ideals* Blake was known for his "genuine interest in the places with 
which he has been identified,and this was amply borne out in Hong Kong*
In January, 1902, when he was due to go on leave, he was presented with an 
address from the Chinese community of the Colony signed by one thousand two 
hundred of the local leaders, and submitted to him by Ho Ch'i. In his speech,
Ho stressed the fact that during his administration Blake had "completely won
the admiration, esteem and confidence of every section of the Chinese com- 
15munity." The climax of their respect for Blake came in March, 1903, some 
eighteen months before the end of his term of office, when the Chinese 
community, again led by Ho Ch'i, presented a petition asking for an extension 
of his term for another six years. The petition was not welcomed at the Colonial 
Offices it was found that many points of detail in the document relating to 
Blake's achievements in the colony were open to criticism, and at any rate it 
was premature to consider his extension at that juncture. It was not referred
to again, and Blake left the colony in November, 1904, by which time he was
14
London and China Express, 28 Oct. 1898, p. 98, col. 1-2
15
China Mail. 2 Jan. 1902, p. 4, col. 6-7, also enclosed in
Blake to C.O. 3 Jan, 1902, in CO 129/310. The Hong Kong Telegraph of 3 Jan.
1902 remarked that Blake had sometimes been criticised by people who thought 
that he gave way too much to the Chinese at the expense of the European 
community.
16
Fiddian Minute on Blake to C.O., 31 Mar. 1903,
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17nearly sixty-five years old.
But Blake’s friendship with the Chinese of Hong Kong, and especially
with Ho Ch’i, who at this time was in close contact with many of the Hsing
Chung Hui leaders, was to have its effect on the course of revolutionary
history, and in particular on the attempted uprising in 1900. In this respect,
it is also important to note Blake's close relationship with Li Hung-chang,
18after the latter was appointed Viceroy at Canton in December, 1899* On his 
way to Canton, Li passed through Hong Kong, and the two administrators had a 
lengthy meeting on 15 January, 1900. Having agreed to do all he could to 
cooperate with the British government in such outstanding problems as piracy, 
the New Territories and the opium question, Li referred to the Governor and 
himself as being colleagues and associates, and said that "all things between 
them could be settled by cordial cooperation, and that it would never be
17
As a final gesture of goodwill, the Chinese community 
lavished expensive gifts on Blake and Lady Blake during a farewell presenta­
tion. Blake regarded the gifts as merely an exchange of courtesies between 
himself and his Chinese friends, and accepted them5 the Colonial Office, however, 
thought that their presentation conflicted with Colonial Regulations, and felt 
that Blake should either have returned them.,surrendered them to the Treasury, 
or asked the Secretary of State for special permission for keeping them. "In 
any case he is to blame for not taking this course but leaving us to hear of 
the matter through the press." See Stubbs Minute on Blake to C.O. 1 Feb. 1904, 
CO 129/322
18 When MacDonald, who was supposedly instrumental in causing 
Li's dismissal from the Tsungli-yamen in 1898, telegraphed the news of the 
appointment, Campbell at the Foreign Office commented, "Li Hung-chang is always 
being sent on some mission, probably to get rid of him from Peking" Campbell 
minute on MacDonald tel. 20 Dec. 1899, FQ 17/1381; this view is also seen in
S. Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army (Seattle, 1964) 266-7; the London
and China Express however, regarded.it as a "belated recognition" of the fact 
that Li seemed to be the only man capable of handling the international and 
domestic problems inherent in the southern viceroyalty. See London and China 
Express of 29 Dec. 1899, p. 982, col. 1-2. Even the educated Cantonese of the 
region who were supposed to bear him no good will, were forced to agree that 
he was the right man in the right place; MacDonald to F.O, 16 Mar. 1900,
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19necessary to refer matters to the yamen or to the British Minister". To this
20Blake replied that he "desired nothing better." So a tacit agreement for
independent action in the South was thus arrived at between Blake and Li, and
this was to encourage both in devising schemes for rallying the revolutionaries
in an unusual movement during the Boxer turmoils that were to come.
For the moment, Blake was more immediately concerned with upholding
the right of the British Colony to afford shelter to political refugees. It
will be remembered that after the 1898 coup, K'ang Yu-wei travelled abroad,
everywhere making tactless statements invoking British aid in restoring the
Emperor Kuang-hsd to power. On 28 October, 1899, he left Japan for Hong Kong
again. On 6 December, the Chinese Minister in London, Lo Feng-lu, presented
a Note to the Foreign Office requesting the expulsion of K ’ang from Hong Kong,
and protesting that the colony was fast becoming a pied-a-terre for Chinese
malcontents plotting against the Dynasty. Lo also suggested that since both
the United States and Japanese governments had lately refused asylum for K ’ang,
21the British should do likewise, as they had done in the case of Sun Yat-sen.
On this latter point, however, the Foreign Office observed that no analogy 
could be drawn between the two mens "The cases are not at all the same. Sun
was a plotter against the existing regime at Peking, but K ’ang was the confidant
19 Memo of the interview in MacDonald to F.O. 6 Feb. 1900,
FQ 17/1411 and also Blake to C.O. 19 Jan. 1900 (confidential) CO 129/297
20
Blake to C.O. ibids Hamilton of the Colonial Office observed 
that Li's suggestion to Blake "shows how much he thinks of the yamen.'" ibid
21 Lo Feng-lu to F.O. 6 Dec. 1899, FO 17/1718
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22and trusted adviser of the existing government, viz. The Emperor." It was
also discovered that the Japanese government had in fact reversed their
earlier decision, and shortly before K'ang's arrival resolved to allow him to
23land in that country, and even afforded him police protection. Armed with 
this knowledge and the fact that the United States discouraged Chinese immigra­
tion in principle and not for the immigrants' political views, the British
24government thought that the Chinese request was "one of extreme delicacy,"
and which could not be complied with without substantial proof that by giving
in to the Chinese government, there was no danger of infringing the British
tradition of granting asylum and protection to political refugees. It was
25decided to solicit the views of Sir Henry Blake first. In point of fact,
the Colonial Office was uncertain whether K'ang was now fomenting rebellion
against the Dynasty, as the Chinese Note claimed, or merely working for con-
26stitutional reforms.
Blake telegraphed back that he objected to the banishment of K'ang
from the Colony, since he had lived "a most retired life," and had done
27nothing to justify any action against him. Thus enlightened, the Colonial
22 Campbell Minutes on above, ibid
23
Satow to P.O., 31 Dec. 1899, enclosed in F.O. to C.O., 12 
Dec. 1899, CO 129/295i Lo Jung-pang, op. cit. 182.
24
F.O. to MacDonald, 13 Dec, 1899, FO 17/1371
25
ibid? and C.O. tel. to Blake, 16 Dec. 1899, in FO 17/1718.
26
See Fiddian's Note to Lucas, in F.O. to C.O. 15 Dec. 1899 
(immediate) in CO 129/295
27
Blake tel. C.O. 17 Dec. CO 129/294
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Office was satisfied that the Chinese demand was "excessive," and that the
Banishment Ordinance is "intended for us to get rid of undesirable and dangerous
aliens, not to hand over inoffensive political refugees to foreign governments.
K ’ang would certainly be executed if he ever got into the clutches of the 
29Empress-Dowager." The Foreign Office was informed of this line of reasoning,
30and the Chinese Minister was duly advised.
The matter would have ended there, had it not been for an impatient
move by the Empress-Dowager in her pursuit of K'ang Yu-wei. On the 20th
December, the day before Lo Feng-lu received a negative answer to his request,
a decree was issued commanding the capture of K'ang and Liang Ch'i-ch’ao,
31offering rewards for their arrest or assassination. Sir Claude MacDonald
had learned from a confidential source in Peking that the Empress-Dowager was
much incensed at the refuge given to the reformers by the British government,
and that Li Hung-chang's appointment to Canton could be interpreted as affording
32him an opportunity of arresting them. When news of this decree reached Blake, 
he was most irritated, and desired to protest strongly against this incentive
28
Fiddian Minutes on above, ibid
29 H. F. W. Minutes on above, ibid
30 C.O. to F.O. 21 Dec. 1899, FO 17/1718
31
The decree is found in WHPF II, 115-6, and translated in 
MacDonald to F.O. 22 Dec. 1899 (Confidential) FO 17/1718
32
MacDonald to F.O. 22 Dec. ibid. Sir Henry Blake also reported 
that he had received Information that a proposal was made to Li while the latter
was in Hong Kong by some Chinese officials who offered to procure the assassina­
tion of K'ang in accordance with this decree, and that Li had apparently ordered
them not to attempt to interfere with K'ang while enjoying British protection.
See Blake to C.O. 19 Jan. 1900 (confidential) CO 129/297; also the London and 
China Express of 9 Mar. 1900, p. 185 col. 2
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to assassinate in a British colony* 33
"It entails serious expense or abandonment of our duty to insure safety 
of law-abiding visitors and safety of person. It may be more than 
coincidence that edict synchronises with Li Hung Chang's appointment 
to be Viceroy of Canton. I shall take every means to secure K'ang's 
safety."
Chamberlain agreed with Blake, and it now fell upon the Foreign Office 
to deliver the necessary protest to the Chinese government. At first Blake's 
ire seemed to have pervaded the Foreign Office, and Francis Bertie began 
drafting a telegram to MacDonald, "Inform Chinese government that if the offer 
results in assassination or kidnapping of that individual they will be held
34responsible by HMG. You should do your best to obtain withdrawal of the offer."
Lord Salisbury, however, with his customary caution, intervened? "It hardly
35seems our business," he declared. This restraining influence had its effect, 
and Bertie on reflection decided that "It is hard on the Chinese government 
that we should allow Hong Kong to be made by a Chinese so-called rebel the 
basis for intrigues against the Peking Government... It is perhaps better to 
please the Chinese Government in this case than Sir Henry Blake."
It:was now necessary to convince the Colonial authorities of this stand, 
and the Foreign Office resorted to a lengthy explanation that the proximity of 
Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland gave great facilities for the preparation in 
Hong Kong of insurrectionary movements in China, and that K'ang's presence would
33
°° Blake tel. to C.O. 25 Dec. 1899,
34
Bertie Minutes, 26 Dec., on C.O. to F.O. 26 Dec. 1899
(pressing) FO,17/1718
35 r .Salisbury Minutes on above, ibid
36 Bertie Memo, ibid
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undoubtedly be looked upon by the Tsungli-yamen as a serious grievance and 
as an unfriendly act on the part of Great Britain. Moreover, it was argued 
that if Her Majesty's Government permitted K'ang to stay in Hong Kong, the 
agents of some Foreign Powers at Peking would not lose the opportunity of 
impressing upon the Chinese Government that Britain was encouraging a sediti­
ous movement. The Foreign Office, therefore, suggested that K'ang should be
induced to depart for Singapore or elsewhere, where his personal safety could
37be more easily secured. The fact that the Foreign Office proposed his 
removal to Singapore, which was still British territory, suggested that the 
Government was not averse to harbouring K'ang Yu-wei in principle, as long as 
he was far enough removed from Chinese territory to avoid risks of unpleasant 
incidents.
Yet the Colonial Office was not wholly satisfied with this line of
reasoning. They were willing to persuade K'ang to move from Hong Kong, but
insisted on the Foreign Office making a protest against the decree of 20
38December, which was tantamount to inciting murder in a British colony.
Salisbury having made it clear, however, that he was unwilling to interfere
with the issue of decrees by the Chinese Government, the Foreign Office was
disinclined to listen to the frequent reminders from the Colonial Office about 
39this protest.
37
F.O. to C.O. 29 Dec. 1899 (immediate and confidential)
CO 129/295.
38 C.O. to F.O. 2 Jan. 1900, FO 17/1718t this view was parti­
cularly strongly held by C, P. Lucas and Johnson, though Chamberlain personally 
felt that the Chinese government "had good reason to object to our harbouring 
almost in their territory a conspirator whom they think dangerous and we ought 
to put some pressure on K ’ang to go." ibid.
39
C.O. to F.O. 11 Jan. 1900 (confidential) FO 17/1718. and 
again C.O. to F.O, 29 Jan. 1900 (confidential) ibid. The C.O. feeling was 
"they seem to want to shelve the matter." Stubbs minutes, ibid.
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40By this time, K'ang was ready to leave Hong Kong for Singapore,
where he was expected on 31 January, 1900. The Acting Governor, Sir Frank
/ \ 41Swettenham (1850-1946) telegraphed for instructions. Here the lack of a
real guiding hand as to policy from the Foreign Office was evident. Whereas
K ’ang was encouraged to leave for Singapore while he was in Hong Kong, now that
he was due at Singapore, the Foreign Office desired him to move on to some-
42where else again, this time Ceylon being suggested. The British Government
could not refuse him asylum in principle, yet in practice he and the movement
he represented did not seem important enough to warrant a quarrel with the
Chinese Government, an inevitable consequence if the British continued to
shelter him. This was the dilemma apparent to the Foreign Office, though the
Colonial authorities, following the lead of their men on the spot, failed to
appreciate it. Once again they urged the Foreign Office to protest against 
43
the decree. Finally, wearied of the constant reminders, Salisbury gave
instructions for a telegram to MacDonald to protest against the practice
44complained of, but without any threat.” On the other hand, neither was 
the Chinese Government satisfied to hear that K'ang had left Hong Kong only to
40 Blake tel. C.O. 10 Jan. 1900, CO 129/297.
4  ^Swettenham tel. C.O. 28 Jan. 1900, FO 17/1718. Swettenham
was then Resident-General of the Federated Malay States, and was appointed 
Governor of the Straits Settlements in 1901. He was known for his fluency 
in the Malay language and his efforts in the material development of the
Federation. See his autobiography, Footprints in Malaya (London, 1942),
and a history, British Malaya (London, 1906).
42 F.O, to C.O., 30 Jan. 1900, FO 17/1718.
43 /
C.O. to F.O. (pressing) 1 Feb. 1900, ibid.
44 See F.O. tel. MacDonald, 5 Feb. 1900, ibid, which was much 
corrected by Salisbury himself before it went out.
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reside in yet another British colony, and Lo Feng-lu again pressed for his 
45expulsion- Salisbury, somewhat softened perhaps by the constant flow of
despatches from the Colonial Office, now indicated that K'ang was not to be
46interfered with, "unless he was guilty of illegal acts."
K'ang Yu-wei was thus given similar protection by the Singapore
government as he had enjoyed in Hong Kong, with one differences whereas
Blake was only too willing to continue affording him asylum for as long as
K'ang wanted, Swettenham did not share his sympathies for the reformer.
47He soon devised a plan to get rid of K'ang secretly from the colony. It
was only a timely telegram from the Colonial Office that no further pressure
48should be put on K'ang to leave, which put a stop to Swettenham's plans.
Up to this time, British policy, such as it was, had been largely 
directed by the stipulations of the Colonial Office. There had been no real 
guidance from an experienced observer of the Chinese situation. Now Sir Claude 
MacDonald in Peking contributed his views, and indicated how far Britain 
should go in exerting itself on behalf of K'ang Yu-wei. MacDonald reported 
that on 14 February, 1900, another decree had appeared for the capture of 
K'ang, dead or alive. The reward offered amounted to one hundred thousand
45
Lo Feng-lu to F.O., 7 Feb. 1900, ibid.
46 Salisbury Minutes on above, ibid.
47
His plan was to smuggle K'ang on board his ship when he was 
going on a short journey to Penang, passing him off as his servant? and then 
leaving the Reformer, with the Viceroy's consent, at the Andaman Settlement, 
where no person was allowed to land without leave. He thought that K'ang 
would then be perfectly safe and it was cheaper to give him an allowance than 
keeping sixteen men guarding him at a cost of $200 a month. See Swettenham to 
C.O. 24 Feb. 1900 (private) CO 273/256. The Andcrpan Islands, part of the 
republic of India, was then used by the Indian Government as a convict colony. 
Transportation only ceased in 1921.
48
C.O. tel. Swettenham, 23 Feb. 1900, ibid.
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49taels, nearly E15,000. He therefore pointed out in plain languages "I
may urge till all's blue and the Chinese government will certainly not rescind
50an Imperial decree," and now it was a question of two decrees. "With matters
such as they are in South Africa, I don’t suppose HMG want another row on their
hands all on account of a visionary Chinaman, who according to the laws of
51China is a double distilled traitor..." In a second despatch he gave an
account of an interview with Li Hung-chang, who informed him that as long as
the Empress Dowager remained in power, no official in the government would
dare suggest that an Imperial decree be withdrawn. MacDonald thus concluded
that "In my opinion nothing short of a concentration of the Fleet, followed
by actively hostile measures would suffice to obtain considerations for a
52request that the offer of reward Should be withdrawn."
The Foreign Office was now fully cognisant of the implications of the 
situation. It was clear that Britain wanted no war with China over the protec­
tion of K'ang Yu-wei, and it was felt that "MacDonald had saved us from a
difficult impasse Into which the insistence of the Colonial Office would have 
53led us." Previous instructions to MacDonald demanding the withdrawal of the
54
decrees were suspended, and K'ang was to be allowed to remain in Singapore 
if he wished, but no further pressure need be put on him to leave if he was
49
The decree is found in WHPF II, 117j also see the Times of 
3 Mar., 1900, p. 8 col. 1; Lo Jung-pang, op. cit. 261.
50
MacDonald to F.O. (private) 15 Feb. 1900, FO 17/1718.
51 ibid. The reference to South Africa was of course to the 
Boer War then raging.
MacDonald to F.O. 16 Feb. 1900 (confidential) ibid.
53
Campbell Minutes on above, ibid.
54
F.O. tel. MacDonald, 22 Feb. 1900, ibid.
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55unwilling. It is interesting to note the confidence with which the Foreign
Office now handled the reminders from the Colonial Office in regard to this
question. On 10 March, Swettenham telegraphed that the Chinese authorities
56
had offered new rewards for the heads of K’ang and Liang, and the Colonial
Office again suggested that MacDonald should warn the Chinese government of
the gravely culpable character of their action, and that serious consequences
might ensue if the proclamations led to the assassination of these refugees 
57
on British soil. Campbell immediately decided, "I cannot think that any
useful result is likely to follow from our giving a warning in the sense
suggested, but for the satisfaction of the Colonial O f f i c e . T h i s  was
echoed by Bertie, "It does not seem to be of much use to fix the responsibility
on the Chinese Government unless we are prepared to punish them and that
59contingency had better be avoided for the present." Lord Salisbury him­
self drafted the reply to the Colonial Office: "I am still averse to uttering 
a threat to which effect cannot be given, at least, at present."
The whole episode of British colonial policy and K'ang Yu-wei served 
to emphasize the confusion among British policy-makers as to the political
intentions of the reformer after the 1898 fiasco. There were rumours prevalent
61
that he was working up a rebellion against the Manchu rulers, and that he had 
55
F.O. to C.O. 22 Feb. 1900, (secret and immediate) ibid.
5f~>
Swettenham tel. C.O. 10 Mar. 1900, CO. 273/256.
57
C.O. to F.O. 13 Mar. 1900, (secret and Immediate) ibid.
58 Campbell minutes on above, ibid.
59 Bertie Minutes, ibid.
^  F.O. to C.O. 15 Mar. 1900, (immediate and confidential) ibid.
^  See Swettenham tel. C.O. 29 Mar. 1900, FO 17/1718, and despatch 
of 29 March 1900 (secret) ibid.
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62
been abducted by Chinese spies and taken to Canton. K ’ang himself did
63not help matters by giving interviews to the press freely and openly,, thus
frustrating both Blake’s and Swettenham1s attempts to protect him from possible
assassins. The confusion was to be intensified when between July and October
of 1900, both reformers and revolutionaries began preparations for insurrections,
and there was again talk of the two camps joining forces.
One of the factors which provoked the militant faction among the
reformers to decide on an insurrection was the condition of things in Peking,
especially the treatment of the Emperor Kuang-hsU by the Empress-Dowager and
her advisers. MacDonald had early heard that the imperial succession was soon
to be decided on;^4 the decree appointing an Heir to the throne really appeared
65on 25 January,1900. The immediate reaction to this move from foreign obser­
vers was that the deposition of the Emperor was now a certainty, and there was
66much condemnation for the instigators of such a step. The English press gave 
62 See the Times, 30 Mar. 1900, p. 5, col. 1, and Hansard LXXXI, 
797 and 901 Blake tel. CO 1 Apr. 1900, CO 129/298.
A O
In the Times, 10 Feb. 1900, p. 8 col. 1, and 23 June 1900,
p. 13, col. 65 London and China Express, 16 Mar. 1900, p. 207-8; and the Times
of 10 Dec. 1900, p. 6 col 1.
^  Secret clause in his tel. to F.O. 14 Jan. 1900, FO 17/1718.
A^\
MacDonald tel. F.O. 25 Jan. 1900, FO. 17/1418 and Lo Feng-lu 
to F.O. 2 Apr. 1900, FO 17/1435 transmitting the text of the decree. P'u-chtin, 
son of Prince Tuan (Tsai-i) was made heir apparent and the legitimate successor 
of the T'ung-shih emperor instead of Kuang-hsth Prince Tuan was one of the 
Empress-Dowager’s favourites at Court.
66
See MacDonald to F.O. 31 Jan. 1900, FO 17/1411. The London
and China Express, 2 Feb. 1900, p. 89-90 sums up the reactions of the various
European Powers; the North China Daily Mews had also published a telegram, 
repeated in the London and China Express of 9 Mar. 1900, which asserted that 
some Wuchang officials had also petitioned against the edict, which move was 
denied by the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung. See MacDonald to F.O. 28 Apr. 1900,
FO 17/1412.
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wide support and publicity to a petition sent to Peking by one thousand two
hundred representatives of the Shanghai Chinese merchants and gentry asking
for the revocation of the decree, and the incident gained importance when the
leader of the petition, Cheng Lien-shan, was arrested at Macao in February at
the instance of the Chinese government on trumped-up charges of embezzling 
6 V
government funds• From the Chinese communities in Singapore and Washington
came also petitions requesting the British Minister at Peking to protect the 
68Emperor's life* Even in the House of Commons questions were asked of the
government as to why it had not seen fit to interfere in China and inaugurate
an era of reform by strengthening the Emperor Kuang-hsh in his position. The
China Association too, urged that Britain should exert herself to stop the
continual persecution of the reform party, whose "offence appears to consist
in the adoption of progressive views which Foreigners have long been trying to
70instil into their minds." The Shanghai Branch of the Association had more 
specific causes for complaint, including the issue of barbarous edicts meant 
for the pursuit of men with progressive ideas in the Foreign Settlement, and 
the persistent lack of faith demonstrated by the Chinese government regarding 
their promises of enlightened reforms. There was a general conviction that
^  The Times 27 Jan. 1900, p. 7 col. 6, and 28 Feb. 1900, p.5 
col, 65 London and China Express 9 Mar. 1900, 184-5$ See also the China Asso­
ciation Annual Report. 1900-1901% and R. Gundry (Hon. Secretary) to Bertie, 12 
Apr. 1900 (private) in FO 17/1438, in which he urged the British Government to 
intervene by approaching the Portuguese Government to prevent Cheng's 
extradition.
68
C.O. to F.O. 2 Feb. 1900, FO 17/1437 and Chinese Merchants 
in Seattle, Washington, to H. M. Edward VII, 24 Jan. 1901, in FO 17/1500.
69
Hansard LXXXI, 30 Mar. 1900, p. 863, 867-70, 886-7.
70
China Association to F.O., 10 May 1900, FO 17/1439. and 
Appendix A of Annual Report, 1900-1901.
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the reform movement, as they interpreted it, was already too deep-seated to be
71overcome by repressive measures against individuals. Amidst such an atmos­
phere of protests all round, it seemed that Sir Claude MacDonald was the only 
person who viewed the situation in its proper perspective, and attached to it 
no other interpretation than it deserved. He blamed the Shanghai foreign 
press for fostering erroneous impressions of the consequences of the edict,
and reassured the British government at home that in Peking the whole affair
72was carried through with the greatest ease and order.
Nevertheless, an opportunity was presented to K ’ang and the reformerss
the Emperor's position appeared threatened and public opinion in the Yangtze
seemed favourable. The leader in the movement for an insurrection was T'ang
Ts'ai-ch'ang, who had been introduced to Sun Yat-sen and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao
during the negotiations for cooperation in 1895. T'ang was also a friend of
the Hunanese Ko-lao secret society chief P'i Yung-nien, who probably did much
73to encourage him in the advantages of working through active rebellions.
K'ang Yu-wei meanwhile also approved of T'ang's plans, despite his open con­
demnation of revolutionary tactics. One of his purposes in visiting Singapore 
in 1900 had been to enlist financial assistance for T'ang from the overseas
71
The Shanghai Committee to MacDonald, 26 Mar. 1900, enclosed 
in Gundry to Campbell 3 May 1900 (private) FO 17/1439.
79
^  MacDonald to F.O. 15 Feb. 1900, FO 17/1411.
73 For accounts of T'ang, see "T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang teng-jen 
chuan-chi" in WHPF IV, 89-90? Hao Yen-p'ing, op. cit. 99, 106; Tse Tsan tai, 
op. cit. 20; Chang Nan-hsien, Hu-peh ko-ming chih-chih lu (Chungking 1945)
22-3. Accounts of P'i are given in M. B. Jansen op. cit. 65; Ku Yen-shih, 
Chung-kuo mi-mi she-hui shih (Shanghai 1927) 76-8; Feng Tzu-yu, op. cit. I,
109; Miyazaki Torazo, op. cit. 73-5.
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Chinese.74 Perhaps Yang Ch'li-yhn had correctly observed in June 1899 that
K'ang*s party refused to work with the revolutionaries only because of rivalry
for leadership. T ’ang1s attempt now proved that the reformers were not averse
to employing revolutionary means when it seemed expedient.
T*ang proposed to raise the rebellion in Hankow, and the initial
plans were made in 1899 in Japan. Then in Shanghai early in 1900 he organised
75
Tzu-li Hui (independent Society) as headquarters for his movement. When
the furore over the appointment of an Heir to the throne swept Shanghai, a body
of reformers approached the Acting British Consul-General at Shanghai, Pelham
Warren (1845-1923) to receive a deputation from them. Warren refused, and
they subsequently sent in a written communication, stating that unless the
Emperor was restored to the throne, they were prepared to stir up the secret
societies throughout the country with the object of compelling the Foreign
Powers to interfere. This immediately gave Warren the impression that the
reformers were going to raise an insurrection together with Sun Yat-sen and
76the Yangtze secret societies. A few days later, Timothy Richard saw Warren 
and showed him a letter he had received, supposedly from a "Reform Society"
74 Lo Jung-pang, op. cit. 184-6? M. E. Tsur, "K'ang Yu-wei" 
in Hankow Club Collected Papers (University of Hong Kong) XXXIX, 5; Hao 
Yen-p’ing, op. cit. 105-7? Swettenham however, believed that T ’ang did not 
have the authority or sympathy of K'ang Yu-wei in his movement, and that 
K'ang regarded him as being actuated by personal motives. Swettenham was 
probably misinformed: Swettenham to C.O, 23 Jan. 1901, enclosed in C.O. to
F.O. (secret) 25 Feb. 1901, FO 17/1718.
75 The Society is described in "K'ang Yu-wei wei-k'an k'ao" in 
WHPF I, 425-432? Chang Nan-hsien, op. cit. 19-21; E. J, Smythe, "The Tzu-li 
Hui, some Chinese and their rebellions" in Harvard University, Papers on 
China XII, 51-68? Chang Huang-ch'i, "Chi Tzu-li Hui" in HHKM I, 253-7? Liu 
K'un-i, Liu K'un-i i-chi (Peking 1959) V, 2269, 2271-2.
Warren to F.O. 30 Aug. 1900, FO 17/1425., and Warren to 
MacDonald 29 Jan, enclosed in MacDonald to F.O. 15 Feb, 1900, FO 17/1411.
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(probably the Tzu-li Hui) again threatening rebellion if Great Britain did
not interfere. Warren did not attach much importance to the threats, but
concluded that "if the party does set to work to stir up rebellion in the
provinces there is no doubt the members of the disaffected and of the secret
77
societies will be quite ready to join in."
Warren's fears that a movement of some extent was being hatched
were further substantiated when in July he was presented with an official
78Manifesto sent by the "Chinese National Association," signed by its leaders
79Jung Hung and Yen Fu. The Manifesto urged that the Powers should interfere 
to depose the Empress-Dowager and reinstate the Emperor Kuang-hsd, that the 
new government of China should then be a constitutional Empire based on the 
British Constitution, and that a host of judicial, military and political 
reforms would be promulgated. In a personal telegram to the Acting Consul- 
General, Jung and Yen also suggested that Britain should take the lead in
77 Warren to MacDonald, 29 Jan. 1900, ibid.
78 This was the English name for the Shanghai branch of the 
Ch1iang-hsdeh Hui after 1898. It is sometimes called the "Deliberative 
Association of China," see E. H. Worthy, "Yung Wing in America" in Pacific 
Historical Review, XXXIV, 3 (Aug. 1965) 284.
79 Jung Hung (Yung Wing) was best-known as the pioneer of the 
Educational Mission to the United States in 1872. He played a minor role 
during the 1898 Reform Movement, and fled to Shanghai after the coup, where 
he promoted the Ch1iang-hsdeh Hui in the International Settlement. At this 
time, he was known to the British authorities as a prominent negotiator for 
the Tien-tsin Chinkiang railway Concession, "a very well informed, but quite 
unpractical man, full of visionary ideas." See Warren to F.O. 20 Aug. 1900, 
(confidential) FO 17/1445; E. H. Worthy, op. cit. 284; Shu Hsin-ch'eng, 
Chin-tai Chung-kuo liu-hsdeh shih (Shanghai, 1927) 2-7; Lo Hsing-lin, The 
Role of Hong Kong in the Cultural Exchange between East and West (Tokyo 
1963), 121-2. ~
Yen Fu was prominent during the 1898 Reform Movement. See Chapter III.
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80negotiating for reforms with the Chinese government, presumably in connection 
with the Boxer settlements. But there is reason to believe that the Tzu-li Hui 
and the "Chinese National Association" were acting independently of each other, 
though both groups campaigned for British support for their activities at about 
the same time. There was no talk of rebellion from the "National Association" 
at this juncture; yet Jung Hung was to play an important role in the 1903 
attempt at insurrection engineered by some revolutionaries in Hong Kong. This 
fluidity of loyalties contributed to the difficulties confronting the British 
government when dealing with the events of 1900-3.
In the meantime, the Tzu-li Hui began its operations. On 9 August,
1900, an advance battalion of rebels sought to rise in Ta-t’ung, in Wuhu,
but was quickly suppressed by the Chinese authorities, which resulted in
numerous arrests and executions. This early fiasco, combined with the lack of
funds, faulty organization and the leakage of information, led to the complete
wash-out of the Hankow attempt by the end of the month. When the rebels, many
of whom were Ko-lao Hui members, were arrested at Ta-t'ung, incriminating
evidence was found on their persons, including firearms, flags, the Society
81
membership lists and proclamations written in both Chinese and English.
This supplied the Yangtze Viceroys Chang Chih-tung and Liu Kun-i with valuable
80 Both documents are enclosed in Warren to F.O. 20 Aug. 1900 
(confidential) FO 17/1445.
81 See the Proclamation in "K'ang Yu-wei wei-k'an k'ao" in WHPF
I, 425-32, and the English version in Fraser to Warren of 23 Aug. 1900, enclosed 
in Warren to F.O. 30 Aug.1900, FO 17/1425. The North China Herald of 29 Aug. 
1900, p. 438, col. 2-5, described the event as "reformers... playing at rebel­
lion in an amateur sort of way, and had never realized what it all meant...The 
whole affair is pitiable in the extreme..."
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intelligence. On the evening of 21 August, the taotai at Shanghai on the
Viceroy's instructions requested Warren to back two warrants for the arrest
of some men in the Settlement. Warren complied, and as a result a raid was
made on the headquarters of the Tzu-li Hui. Forty men were arrested, and more
documents and firearms were found in the houses searched. Sixteen of the
82leaders were later beheaded, including T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang.
The successful frustration of the Hankow uprising was thus due mainly
to the cooperation of the British authorities. At first Warren seemed fairly
sympathetic towards the reform movement in Shanghai. When he discovered that
the "Chinese National Association" included among its membership a number of
prominent local officials and Hanlins, he felt that "the desire for better
government, and the conviction that this can only come by copying Western
83
methods, is not wholly undeserving of recognition or sympathy." However,
just at this time, Sir Henry Blake telegraphed from Hong Kong a suggestion
that "... it would be prudent to convey to Kang and Sun an assurance that if
they abstain from active operation HMG will, in the negotiations for the
settlement of the present crisis, consider and press for any fair and reason-
84
able reforms that the people may demand," to which the Foreign Office replied 
in haste that he was not to give promises of the kind. Thus it was understandable
82 Accounts of the rising are seen in the Times 25 Aug. 1900, 
p. 3 col. 2$ Chang Nan-hsien, op. cit. 19-21; Warren tel. F.O. 28 Aug. 1900 
FO 17/1425; Fraser to Warren 23 Aug. 1900, in Warren to F.O. 30 Aug. 1900, 
ibid; Chang Huang-*ch'i, op. cit. in HHKM I, 253-98; Li Hung-chang, Li Wen- 
chunq Kunq ch'dan-chi (1908) "Tien Kao" chilan 25, p. 49b; Ku Kung Tang-an kuan, 
"T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang Han-kow ch'i-i Ch’ing-fang tang-an" in HHKM I, 258-279;
China Mail of 24 Oct. 1900, p. 3 col. 1-2; Lo Jung-pang, op. cit. 186-8.
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Warren to F.O. 20 Aug. 1900 (confidential) FO 17/1445.
84
Blake tel. C.O. 18 Aug. 1899, CO 129/300.
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that Warren suddenly received instructions that Chinese agitators should
85
not receive asylum in British Consulates in the Yangtze; the authorities
at home probably wanted to avert his becoming too sympathetic too. This was
especially true when the Consul at Nanking seemed to give some credit to a
86
rumour that the reformers enjoyed Britain.’s support. By helping to suppress
the movement, Warren thus acted on the conviction that even supposing the
movement was really one of "reform," and that it had no connection with the
Boxer outrages, "The overthrow of the constituted authority would let loose
upon us all the disorderly rabble of the three cities; and the present
authorities who have hitherto striven to maintain order here, are to be
preferred to the self-constituted government of high sounding aims but of
87
doubtful experience and ability." Such a policy won for him the gratitude
88of the Chinese authorities of the Yangtze, but Warren was criticised by the 
pro-reform English press for putting Chang Chih-tung "on the scent of this 
shadowy conspiracy" and indirectly leading to the "reign of terror" which
89followed, as the Viceroy sought to capture all men involved in the attempt.
One interesting aspect which came to light during the events was the 
revelation to the authorities, both Chinese and British, that the Hankow 
rising was perpetrated with the help of a considerable number of Japanese in 
China, who helped the rebels to smuggle arms and ammunition into the Yangtze.
85
J F.O. tel. Warren, 29 Aug. 1900, FO 17/1425.
86
Sundiers tel. Warren (very secret) in Warren tel. F.O. 29
Aug. 1900, ibid.
87
Warren to F.O. 30 Aug. 1900, FO 17/1425.
88
Reported by Fraser, in Fraser to Warren, 23 Aug. 1900, ibid.
89
North China Herald 29 Aug. 1900, p. 427 and p. 435-6. The 
Times of 10 Sept. 1900, p. 3 col. 5, however, felt that the Viceroy's measures 
were not unnecessarily severe.
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It was found that the steamer "Yayeyama" left suddenly a few days before the
rising, that the Japanese Consul in Shanghai was loath to deal severely with
a Japanese arrested in the raid on 21 August, and that the names of Japanese
supporters were found among the captured lists of rebels. The Chinese author™
ities accused the Japanese government of complicity in the plot, and Warren
90was asked to approach the Japanese Consul about it. The Japanese government
91denied all knowledge of the conspiracy, but in an interview which the Acting
British Minister in Tokyo had with Count Aoki, the Foreign Minister, the latter
admitted that it was a difficult matter keeping watch over all the Japanese 
92
in China. In actual fact, though the number of Japanese active in the 
revolutionary movement in China was not unduly large, Japan was becoming the 
most important training ground for the progressive ideas with which a for­
midable proportion of the young Chinese reformers and revolutionaries were 
93armed.
In its effects, the Hankow rising was to act to the advantage of the 
Hsing Chung Hui in their preparations for insurrection in the South. P'i 
Yung-nien and his secret society following catered to both camps, and the 
Japanese sympathisers also helped the revolutionaries in obtaining arms from 
abroad, so that both the Chinese and British authorities in these areas were
^  Sundiers tel. Warren (very secret) in Warren tel. F.O. 19 
Aug. 1900, FQ 17/1425; Fraser to Warren, 24 Aug. 1900, ^confidential) ibid.
See also North China Herald of 29 Aug. 1900, p. 436, and the Times of 10 Sept. 
1900, p. 3 col. 5.
91
Campbell Minutes on Fraser to Warren, 24 Aug. 1900, FO 17/1425.
92
Whitehead to F.O., 8 Sept. 1900 (confidential) in C.O. to 
F.O. 26 Nov. 1900, CO 129/302.
93
See Chapter V.
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often misled as to the activities of the reformers and the revolutionaries.
There was a great deal of uncertainty regarding the movements of Sun Yat-sen,
and K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and even Sir Henry Blake was led to
94believe that K'ang was soon to begin a rising again in Waichow,
There was no mistaking the fact, however, that both K'ang and Liang 
had again fled to the safety of Hong Kong just before the Hankow disaster, 
and the Chinese government once more sought to effect their arrest. The 
Chinese Minister called at the Foreign Office and delivered a Note from Li 
Hung-chang, in which Li accused the two reformers of calling themselves 
"National Protectors" but who in reality were rebelling against the government 
for their own evil purposes. He supplied a list of seven names as being the 
leaders in Hong Kong (including the name of Jung Hung) and urged that the
95
governments of Hong Kong and Singapore- should be instructed to arrest them.
The Foreign Office would not promise to comply with his request without proof
of these men having broken the laws of the Colonies, but suggested that the
Colonial authorities should be told to prevent the fomenting of insurrections
96
in British Colonies. This served to satisfy the Chinese government for a
time, but the matter was revived in January, 1901, with another Note delivered
to the Foreign Office, this time containing a longer list of K'ang and Liang's
97accomplices whom the Chinese government wished to apprehend. The Colonial
Q4
Blake tel. C.O. 3 Sept. 1900, CO 129/300. See also a "Reform 
Document" he received, enclosed in Blake to C.O. 24 Sept. 1900, in CO 129/301.
95
Li Hung-chang to Lo Feng-lu, 6 Sept. 1900, in Lo to F.O.
7 Sept. 1900, FO 17/1446.
96 F.O. to C.O. 10 Sept. 1900, CO 129/302.
97
Lo Feng-lu to F.O. , 12 Jan. 1901, FO 17/1718.
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98
governors were accordingly asked for reports on the situation, and their
replies illustrated that even months after the events of 1900, the British
authorities were yet uninformed as to the real instigators behind the Hankow
incidents. Sir Henry Blake refused to believe that Jung Hung or P ’i Yung-
nien (both their names were on the second list) were involved in agitations
against the Chinese government, himself being a good friend of Jung's. He
did concede however, that "the whole Chinese population above the coolie class
99are, so far as I can learn, in sympathy with the reformers." He was
extremely annoyed at the Chinese requests for the extradition of men who,
"contrasting the insecurity of person and property in China with the security
enjoyed in this Colony, most heartily desired to see the Chinese system
c h a n g e d . B y  this time, of course, certain events had transpired which
would justify Blake's attitude to a large extent.
Sir Frank Swettenham, meanwhile, erroneously asserted that the
Hankow attempt had nothing to do with K'ang or Liang, but should rather be
attributed to Sun Yat-sen and the secret societies. He believed that Sun
raised the insurrection when he failed to gain K'ang's cooperation for an
amalgamated m o v e m e n t . O n  receipt of these reports, the Foreign Office
ho
then informed Lo Feng-lu that there was on in progress in both Colonies
^  C.O. tels. to Blake and Swettenham, 21 Jan. 1901, CO 129/308.
Blake to C.O. 12 Mar. 1901, (confidential) ibid. 
Swettenham to C.O., 23 Jan. 1901 (secret) in CO 273/367.
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102at the moment. How wrong the British government was would soon be seen.
It was just at this time that the Hsing Chung Hui revolutionaries 
were actively preparing for their insurrection In South China. As in 1895, 
they chose Hong Kong as their operational headquarters, and by doing so, 
found themselves drawn into the unusual situation, albeit for a brief period 
only, of being courted both by Li Hung-Ghang and Sir Henry Blake to partici­
pate in a separatist movement in the South. Here the close relations earlier 
established between Li and Blake undoubtedly came into play.
By the end of June, 1900, when the Boxer rebellion in the North 
culminated in the siege of the foreign Legations in Peking, the Court
103decided to recall LI Hung-chang to handle the tricky international situation. 
This was viewed with some alarm by the British government, especially its 
representatives in Hong Kong and Canton, who felt that Li's presence was the 
only means of preventing the Boxer troubles from spreading Southwards. The 
Officer Administering the Government in Hong Kong, Major-General Gascoigne, 
believed that Li could hardly accomplish anything in Peking, whereas his 
authority in Canton was of the utmost importance in maintaining the peace of 
South China, and he suggested that Li should be made to remain in the South.^4 
His suggestion was carried a step further when Li asked for a safe passage 
through Hong Kong waters for his body-guard when they had to tranship at the
102
F.O. to Lo Feng-lu, 1 Feb. 1901. The Foreign Office was 
prevented from supplying Lo with all the information in the two despatches by 
an injunction from the Colonial Office that' they were not to 'Igive away” the 
refugees. See Lucas Minute on Swettenham’s of 23 Jan. 1901, in CO 273/267. 
and C.O. to F.O. 25 Feb. 1901, (secret) in FO 17/1718.
103 Li Hung-chang, op. cit. "Tien Kao", chdan 22, p. 26b,
chlian 23, p,*„53b.
104 Gascoigne tel. C.O. 20 June, 1900, CO 129/299.
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105Colony, on their way to Shanghai. Gascoigne observed,
"I believe still that it is desirable to induce him to remain at 
Canton. By his asking it may be that he wishes to be refused^ but 
refusal might make an enemy of a man whom I consider friendly.”
It was obvious that Britain could not force Li to remain if he was determined
to go, but the Foreign Office decided that the Consul-General at Canton should
do his utmost, confidentially, to ’'recommend” to Li that he remain at his post,
and to say that Her Majesty’s ships would be ready to afford him any support
in their p o w e r . S c o t t  on his part had already initiated attempts to
107
persuade Li not to go. At the same time, Lord Salisbury also spoke to Lo
Feng-lu, in guarded language, that though Li must be the best judge of the
situation, Her Majesty's Government would be "sorry if his life should be in
108danger” by his going North.
At this juncture Li himself suddenly decided to postpone going North,
109pending further orders from Peking. Li was probably awaiting further 
development of the situation, since he had confided to Scott that his mission 
to Peking would have been absolutely futile unless the Chinese government 
were prepared beforehand to follow his a d v i c e . I t  was during this short
105 Gasgoigne tel. 21 June, 1900, ibid.
106 F.O. tel. Scott, 22 June, 1900, FO 17/1422.
107
Scott tel. F.O. 24 June, 1900, ibid and Scott to F.O. 5 
July, 1900, ibid, reporting his two interviews with Li on 23 June and 3 July.
108 MacDonald( 22 June, 1900, FO 17/1410, and F.O. tel.
Scott, 22 June, 1900, FO 17/1422.
10^ Gascoigne tel. C.O., 27 June 1900, CO 129/199, and Scott tel. 
F.O. 25 June, 1900, FO 17/1422.
Scott tel. F.O. 24 June, 1900, ibid.
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interim period that Li Hung-chang devised an unusual scheme in which he sought
the cooperation of the Chinese reformers and revolutionaries. The plan was
not carried to its logical conclusion before Li changed his mind again, but
it was sufficient to suggest that at a time when his own future and that of
the Chinese Court seemed so much in the balance, Li was tempted to use the
revolutionaries in a bid for personal power should the worst happen in Peking.
It can also be seen that he was encouraged by the prospects of such a plan
because of his friendship with Sir Henry Blake, who in turn was known to have
111some influence among the Hong Kong revolutionaries.
Li therefore communicated with Sun Yat-sen, who was then in Japan, 
inviting him to a meeting in Canton when they would arrange to raise a joint 
force to march on Peking. They would fight the Boxers and remove the Emperor 
and Empress-Dowager from the reactionary party. If the Emperor and Empress- 
Dowager were dead by then, Li was prepared to establish the two Kwang as a
separate principality with the assistance of Sun and the revolutionaries. Li
professed to be willing to adopt a programme of moderate reform, and if invited,
to keep order as temporary head of the Chinese government until the Powers would
112agree to a new sovereign. At the same time, Li made it possible for Sir 
Henry Blake to have advance knowledge of his plans by offering the post of
111 M. B. Jansen, op. cit. 89-90 gives a number of theories 
for Li's motives in this; See alsoyJung-pang, op. cit. 265-6; S. Spector,
Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army (Seattle, Washington 1964) 267-8; the Straits 
Free Press of 2 Aug. 1900, in FO 17/1718, Claims that it was due to "the 
characteristic Chinese policy of buying over troublesome enemies." Sir Henry 
Blake, however, recognised the fact that "His Excellency has his ambitions 
and assuming the worst has happened in Peking, he will be prepared to come 
forward as a candidate for any position for which he can secure the support 
of the Powers," Blake to C.O, 6 July, 1900, (confidential) in CO 129/300.
112 M. B. Jansen, op. cit. 86; Ch'en Chun-sheng, "Keng-tzu 
Hui-chou chi'i-i chi" in HHKM I, 235-7 Straits Free Press of 2 Aug. 1900, in 
FQ 17/1718; Blake to C.O. 6 July, 1900 (confidential) in CO 129/300, and Blake 
tel. C.O. 13 July, 1900, ibid.
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head of police in Canton to a certain Mr, Ts'at. (Tsoi), until recently employed
by Blake in the New Territories, Ts’ai was summoned to Canton, told of Li's
113ambitions, and duly reported everything to Blake on his return. On the other 
hand, upon receipt of Li's invitation, the revolutionaries in Hong Kong, on the 
initiative of Ho Ch'i, also drafted a petition to Blake. The document sought 
to make clear the programme of the revolutionaries, and appealed to the British 
government for help, or a least neutrality, in the event of military action.
The stage was now set for Blake to bring the two parties to what he hoped would 
be a real partnership.
Sun Yat-sen, however, did not trust Li Hung-chang enough to risk his 
neck by going to Canton for the interview, so a meeting was arranged between 
the revolutionaries and Li's deputy, Liu Hslleh-hsOn, in Hong Kong. As Sun was 
still under the 1896 Banishment order against him, he remained on board the 
"Nippon Maru" when it arrived on 18 June, sending his Japanese friends Miyazaki
113 Memorandum of Ts’ai’s interview with Li, in Blake to C.O.
6 July 1900, ibid;, Blake's reaction to this was favourable from the starts 
"I think that having regard to the present state of the North, such a move­
ment is very probable and that we ought to be prepared to look after our 
interests not only on the Yangtze but also on the West River," Blake tel. C.O. 
July, 1900, ibid. From the Foreign Office came the remark, "The Governor is 
a firm believer in Li Hung-chang," F.O. Minutes on Blake to C.O. of 6 July, 
1900 (confidential) ibid. Li also revealed his ambitions to Sir John Lister- 
Kaye, groom™in- waiting to King Edward VII, through his secretary Tseng Kwang- 
chuen. Lister-Kaye now urged that the British Government should give it full 
support. See Lister-Kaye to Bertie, 25 Aug. 1900 (private) in FO 17/1445.
Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary (Taiwan, 
1953) p. 196; M. B. Jansen, op. cit. 86-91; Lo Hsiang-lin, Kuo-fu chih ta- 
hsheh shih-tai (Taiwan, 1954) 82; Kuo-fu yh Ou-Mei chih yu-hao (Taiwan, 1951) 
86-91; Feng Tzu-yu, op. cit. I, 77, IV, 92-6; Lo Chia-lun, op. cit. I, 92-3; 
Ch'en Shao-pai, op. cit. 109b; Chou Lu, Chunq-kuo Kuo-min-t'anq shih-kao 
(Shanghai, 1938) I, 34-5; T*ang Chen-ch'u 7 ~Ku o -TiT"shu-hsin hshan-chi rfaipei, 
1952) 18-21; Ku Yen-shih, op. cit. 149-52. The original petition in English 
could not be found among the official archives.
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Torazo, Uchida Ryohei and Kiyofuji Koshichiro to the meeting with Liu.
Subsequently it was decided that since Li had wished it to be a united move­
ment, they should also enlist K'ang's group of reformers in the project. The 
relations between reformers and revolutionaries had become much strained by 
1900, it was truei but the prospect of an attempt to shake off Manchu rule, 
at least in the South, and with the active support of the Canton Viceroy, had 
appealed sufficiently to the revolutionaries to try and seek K'ang's cooperation 
once more. The three Japanese were thus sent to see K'ang in Singapore, while 
Sun sailed on to Saigon.
Unfortunately, K'ang Yu-wei was still intractable with regard to working 
with the revolutionaries. On 5 July, as soon as he heard of the arrival of the 
Japanese with the specific purpose of meeting him, K'ang informed the Singapore 
police, suggesting that they were assassins out to gain rewards offered for his
capture. He also claimed that he had received warning letters and telegrams
117about the three Japanese. Accordingly, Miyazaki and Kiyofuji were arrested 
by special order of the Governor on 6 July (Uchida had returned suddenly to 
Hong Kong). On being searched, a sharp Japanese sword was found on each, and 
more than $27,000 in foreign currency between the two. Swettenham deemed this
115
Miyazaki had long known Sun Yat-sen and been his constant 
colleague in his revolutionary activities. Uchida was a politician with rightist 
inclinations, and Kiyofuji, a political agitator, was drawn into the Chinese 
revolutionary movement through the influence of Udhida.
116 ^  Hung-chang, op. cit. "Tien Kao" chdan 22, p. 26b; M. B. 
Jansen, op. cit. 87-8; Feng Tzu-yu, op. cit. IV, 96.
117
Swettenham to C.O. 26 July, 1900. CO 273/257. This seemed 
rather unfair, as Miyazaki was the same Japanese who helped K'ang escape to 
Japan in 1898, and offered him hospitality there. This was asserted in Miyazaki's 
statement on being arrested. Lo Jung-pang, op. cit. 265-8, however, gives cred­
ence to K'ang's theory regarding the motives of the Japanese, based on the fact 
that Liu Hsdeh-hstin bore a personal grudge against the reformers, and thus it 
was possible that some money found on Miyazaki could have been paid him by Liu 
to carry out the assassination of K'ang.
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sufficiently incriminating evidence that they constituted a threat to public
peace in Singapore. On 9 July, Sun Yat-sen arrived in Singapore, to explain
that the money belonged to himself, and that the real purpose of the Japanese
in visiting Singapore was to seek K'ang's cooperation "about present Chinese 
118matters." Nonetheless, Swettenham was convinced that should K'ang refuse
to work with them, it was their purpose "to proceed to any lengths to prevent
119
him interfering with their schemes." Therefore, on 11 July, the two Japanese
120were banished from Singapore for five years, though it was felt at the
121Colonial Office that Swettenham had acted in a rather high-handed manner.
It certainly helped to end all hopes of cooperation between the reformers and 
revolutionaries.
Sun and his Japanese friends then left Singapore for Hong Kong. Mean­
while, on 12 July, Li received a further Imperial edict urging his return to 
the North. By now the situation in Peking had become desperate, and Li was 
appointed plenipotentiary to negotiate with the Powers. This was the authority
that LI had been waiting for, and he decided to take up his responsibilities
122in Peking, leaving Canton on the 17th. It has been contended that in reality 
118 Sun's statement, enclosed in Swettenham to C.O. 26 July,
1900, ibid.
119
Swettenham to C.O., 26 July, ibid.
120 ibid, and Swettenham Memo, of 12 July, 1900, enclosed in 
Swettenham to C.O. 26 July, ibid. See also Wang Gung-wu, "Sun Yat-sen and 
Singapore" in Journal of the South Seas Society, XV (Dec. 1959) 57-8; Miyazaki
Torazo, op. cit. 78-89; Chih Kuei, op. cit. 8-9; "A Reminiscence from Singapore"
in the Hong Kong Daily Press, 9 Nov. 1911, p. 3 col. 5.
121
Stubbs Minutes on Swettenham to C.O. 26 July 1900, CO 273/257.
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Scott tel, F.O. 13 July, 1900, FO 17/1422; C. Tan, op. cit.
124; Li Hung-chang, op. cit. "Tien Kao" chdan 24, p. 26.
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Li had neither the determination, courage nor military strength to realize
123his scheme for the independence of the South. Nevertheless Sir Henry Blake
had not given up hope. He now saw a chance of bringing Sun and Li to a personal
confrontation under his aegis. On the one hand, Blake asked for instructions
that when Sun arrived in Hong Kong, he should be empowered to waive the 1896
124
Banishment order against him and allow Sun to land. His wording was such
as to imply that Sun was returning to the Colony with the approval of Li Hung- 
125chang, and his request was granted, with a warning against Sun’s conspira-
126torial activities. On the other hand, Blake also requested permission that
when Li was due to pass through the Colony on 18 July on his way to Shanghai,
he should be detained in Hong Kong until further instructions from London. Li
had also been appointed to his old post as Viceroy of Chihli on the 17th, and
Blake now sought to justify his request by the argument: "His appointment must
have been by Prince Tuan, who has usurped the government. Shall we recognise
127this and allow him to proceed?" Blake felt that Li's position was "difficult1 
and that he "may not object to pressure being put on him to remain" in the South 
Although the British Government still wished that Li should not go North
123 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Li Hung-chang" in Yin-ping-shih ho-chi 
(Shanghai, 1936) XVIII, 70.
124 Blake tel. C.O. 13 July, 1900, 129/300.
125 This was the Impression of Lucas at the Colonial Office, see 
Lucas Minutes on above, ibid.
126 C.O. tel. Blake, 17 July, 1900, CO 129/302.
127
Blake tel. C.O. 17 July, 1900, CO 129/300.
1 9R
Blake tel. C.O. 14 July, 1900, ibid.
129
See F.O. tel. Scott, 14 July 1900, FO 17/1422: Warren tel.
F.O. 14 July, 1900, FO 17/1427. and Campbell's Minutes: "There seems to be a
concurrence of opinion that Li is very much better where he is, and suggestions 
even made that he be detained by force."
128
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130it was also clear that they could not force him to remain. Accordingly,
Li passed through the Colony briefly on the morning of 18 July, and though he
met with Blake, there was little the Governor could do once Li's mind had been
131made up, and he had abandoned the idea of aligning with the revolutionaries.
On their part, the Chinese revolutionaries never really expected Li1s 
proposition to be carried out,- for at this time they were completing their plans 
for the Waichow rising. Meetings were held on board the "Saao Nlaru" which 
brought Sun and the Japanese into Hong Kong on 17 July, 1900, and their objec­
tive was again to capture Canton. But the 1895 experience had taught the Hsinq 
Chung Hui that it would have been wiser not to start the attempt in the city, 
but to seize the maritime area first and then march inward. The goal of the 
1900 rising was thus to be the city of Waichow, about one hundred miles East 
of Canton. The governor-general of Formosa, Kodama Gentaro, had earlier sent
an emissary to Sun Yat-sen promising material support if a serious situation
132
should arise in the South of China. The final plans were therefore that 
Sun should proceed to Formosa via Japan, where he was to prepare reinforcements
and wait till the rising had started before returning to the South. The direc­
tion of activities in Hong Kong and Waichow was left in the hands of Cheng Shih- 
liang, assisted by the three Japanese, Yang Ch'U-ydn, Li Ch'i-t'ang and Ch’en 
Shao-pai were to remain in Hong Kong to recruit financial and military aid.
On 20 July Sun returned to Japan on board the same vessel to purchase
130 C.O. tel. Blake, 17 July, 1900, CO 129/300 and F.O. tel.
Warren 14 July 1900, FO 17/1426.
131 . <
Blake to C.O. 19 July 1900, CO 129/300. See also China Mail
of 18 July 1900, p. 2 col. 5-7.
132 Kodama's sympathies for Sun Yat-sen and his movement, and 
the reasons for them, is dealt with in M. B. Jansen, op. cit. 94-99.
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fire-arms. Gheng Shih-liang also left for Waichow, together with Huang Fu,
an important Triad leader who rallied enormous support for the rising. Shih
Chien-ju, a recent member of the Hsinq Chung Hui, Teng Yin-nan and others
left for Canton. By August 1900, preparations were practically complete, and
Cheng Shih-liang had assembled about six hundred men from the secret societies
of Kwangtung. The operation was to be directed from San-chou-t'ien, a coastal
133area. Everything was ready for the final outbreak.
From the first, Blake seemed to have considerable knowledge of the
activities of the revolutionaries. He had seen "some Chinese gentlemen who are
134deeply interested in the Reform Movement," and known in great detail their
plans for the uprising, especially from an American supporter of the movement,
135the military strategist Homer Lea. But instead of putting a stop to these
conspiracies, Blake sought to help them achieve by peaceful means and with the
136cooperation of the British government, what they aimed ati
133 M. B. Jansen, op. cit. 92-4| Miyazaki Torazo, op. cit. 91—35 
Ch'en Shao-pai, op. cit. 91-1105 T'ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese 
Revolution (London 1930) 30-2; Tse Tsan-tai, op. cit. 19; Ch’en Ch’un-sheng, 
op. cit. in HHKM I, 253; Chou Lu, op. cit. Ill, 664-5.
134
Blake to C.O. 3 Aug. 1900, (confidential) CO 129/300.
135 Lea was a young and wealthy hunch-back who took an unusual 
interest in the Chinese reform and revolutionary movements. He met K'ang Yu- 
wei in Canton in 1898, and in 1900 in Hong Kong made the acquaintance of Sun 
Yat-sen. From then on he became Sun’s "Chief of Staff" and styled himself 
"General." Among other things, he tried to raise an army in California for 
the Chinese Revolution. He returned to China with Sun in 1911. See his book 
"The Valor of Ignorance"(New York, 1924) and the Introduction by Clare Boothe, 
p. 8-31; a review of the book by Col. J. E. Edmonds is in Alston's Memo, of 9 
April, 1910, in FO 371/870. Sun described his meeting with Lea in "My Reminis- 
censes" in the Strand Magazine XLIII (Mar. 1912) 301-7. See also C. Glick,
Double Ten (New York, 1945) 26-248.
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"1 suggested that instead of creating disturbances, the leaders might 
prepare a numerously signed petition to the Powers showing clearly the 
reforms they demand, and stating that they took this course impelled by 
the desire to avoid any action that would embarrass the Powers in the 
present crisis in the hope that when the ultimate arrangements are being 
made, their demands will be insisted upon and conceded without loss of 
life and property, and the general derangement that must follow an armed 
rebellion."
And again, he suggested that if they abstained from operations, Britain would
help them to secure their demands at the Boxer negotiations and that he should
137
be empowered to make the revolutionaries such a promise. The British
government could hardly be expected to concur with his proposals, which would
place it in an awkward position with regard to the Chinese government, not to
say international relations, if the question of Blake's promises were to be
brought up at the Boxer settlements. Blake was therefore firmly instructed
to put a stop to all insurrectionary actions in Hong Kong, and deport all 
138
agitators. With these directions, there was little else Blake could do for 
the revolutionary party, though he continued to show a marked sympathy for the 
movement even after the uprising.
The Waichow rising began on 5 October, 1900, and there were initial 
successes for the revolutionaries. The whole maritime area between Waichow and 
Siu-yang was occupied. Cheng Shih-liang then delayed action because of the 
shortage of arms, and waited for reinforcements to come from Sun Yat-sen. At 
this juncture, Ch’en T ’ing-wai, who had earlier been suspected of treason during 
the 1895 Canton rising, and Yang Ch'd-ydn suddenly began negotiations with the 
Chinese government concerning the possibility of surrender in return for 
official posts and monetary reward. The two had acted without authority from 
the Hsing Chung Hui, and though nothing came of the negotiations, Yang was to
137
Blake tel. C.O. 18 Aug. 1900, ibid.
138
C.O. tel. Blake, 26 Aug. 1900 (secret) CO 129/302.
bring sufficient attention upon himself to become the object of vengeance
for the Canton authorities. Meanwhile Sun was desperately sending messages
to Miyazaki to hurry the shipments of ammunition. It was only then that Sun
discovered he had been cheated by a Japanese merchant in the purchase of arms.
A further disappointment came when the Japanese government underwent a change
of ministers, and the new Cabinet of Ito Hirobumi refused to support the Chinese
revolutionaries. Orders had been given to the Governor of Formosa that the
export of arms from Japan into Formosa and the recruiting of Japanese officers
in the Chinese revolutionary army were to be prohibited. Sun himself was to
139
be expelled from Formosa. These were severe blows to the revolutionaries,
and they became the primary causes of the failure of the rising. By 22 October,
140the rebel forces had to disband, and the rising was ended.
139 Sun was content with the theory that Kodama supported his 
movement while Ito did not, hence the change of attitude among the Japanese.
But the internal political scene in Japan had much more to do with it. See 
M. B. Jansen, op. cit. 97-104.
140 For the military operations of the rising, see Chou Lu, 
op. cit. Ill, 664-6; Lo Chia-lun, op. cit. I, 98-101. The success of the rebels 
was favourably reported in the China Mail of 4 Oct. 1900 p. 2 col. 7, and 15 Oct. 
1900, p. 3 col. 1, and on 18 Oct. 1900, a translation of the manifesto issued 
by the revolutionaries was also given, called a "Patriotic Document." See Ch’en 
Shao-pai, op. cit. 1lOb-llib, also in HHKM I, 68-70; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, op. cit. 
in HHKM I,‘”236-241; Blake tel. C.O. 8 Oct. 1900 CO 129/301, and Blake to C.O.
12 Oct. 1900, ibid. His despatch of 26 Oct. 1900, ibid gives the manifesto of 
the rebels, and of 21 Nov. 1900 (confidential) gives an account of the proceed­
ings from a secret society participant. The Times of 16 Oct.1900, p. 3 col. 2 
claimed that the movement was a concerted move by Sun Yat-sen, K ’ang Yu-wei 
and the local Triads. Scott’s account of the rising, 21 Dec. 1900, in FO 17/1422 
made light of the' whole incident: "During its course nearly every statement
that appeared on the subject was false, or greatly exaggerated. It was never 
In the least formidable, and the Chinese in Canton treated the subject, when 
they could be induced to speak of it, with absolute indifference." This was 
perhaps an exaggeration in itself.
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It is interesting to note Blake's attitudes during the course of these
events, as they serve to shed light on his later policies when the uprising led
to consequences which directly affected the interests of Hong Kong. In mid-
October, at the height of the clashes between the revolutionaries and the
Imperial troops, Blake received an application from Admiral Ho Ch'ang-ch’ing,
in charge of the Bogue Forts, for permission to move his troops through Hong
Kong territory, as this would greatly facilitate his task of dispersing the
rebels. Blake refused to comply, characteristically giving his answer before
consulting with the Colonial Office. He argued that if the British Government
141pursued a policy of non-interference in the revolt, then:
"... the granting of permission to Chinese troops to use our territory 
in their operations may in future produce friction in the event of the 
success of the rebellion, as such permission would be accepted as 
support of the Chinese government against the rebels, and possibly 
result in the abandonment of the policy which the rebels have apparent­
ly pursued up to the present of abstaining from attacks on foreigners.
On the other hand, the Chinese government may consider a refusal to be 
unfriendly. Still, to give permission would be to depart from settled 
international principles ..."
142
Chamberlain was ready to approve Blake's reasoning, but from the Foreign
Office came the argument: "We urge Chinese Governors to suppress rebellion
and impress upon them their responsibility. We should therefore give them the
143
facilities to carry out our wishes." Blake was thus told to let the Chinese 
144
troops pass. From this dates probably Blake's unveiled animosity towards
141 Blake tel. C.O. 14 Oct. 1899, 129/301.
142 Chamberlain Minutes on above, ibid.
143 ,Bertie Minutes,- ibid.
144
C.O. tel. Blake, 17 Oct. 1900, ibid.
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Admiral Ho. Blake reflected later that though he adopted an attitude of
absolute neutrality during the rising, he found the rebels "behaved very well
145
while the rising lasted. We may want them yet."
Soon after this there was a similar incident, when the Acting Viceroy
at Canton, Te Shou, asked if he might purchase additional arms from Hong Kong
for use against the revolutionaries. This time Blake approached the government
at home first before replying; but he did point out that the Chinese could
146easily obtain their arms from the arsenals at Foochow or Shanghai. Blake's
147
views were sustained on this occasion.
Thus, even though the Waichow rising was another dismal failure for the
Chinese revolutionaries, through the medium of Sir Henry Blake's reports, the
British government at home was made to see a side of the revolutionary movement
148
not usually available to it. He averred that:
"... it is impossible for those who see at close quarters the results of
the present system to avoid sympathising with their groping after some 
amelioration in their position, where the forms of justice are prostituted 
to licensed cupidity, where every yamen is a torture chamber, and even 
light offences are punished with a ferocity regulated by the ability of 
the accused to bribe the officials ..."
and agains
"One cannot live within a morning's journey of such an Inferno without 
feeling some pity for people who having seen different systems on their 
borders, have begun to yearn for some advance involving the principles 
of justice and mercy."
Blake did not seem to be the only observer who urged that the Powers, and
especially Great Britain, should exert themselves in helping China find her
145
Blake to Satow, 29 Dec. 1900,
146
Blake tel. C.O. 25 Oct. 1900, CO 129/301.
147
F.O. tel. Satow, 30 Oct.
(confidential) in
148 The extracts are from his despatch to C.O. of 26 Oct. 1900
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own salvation.. The North China Herald blamed the Foreign Office for its
inactivity during the reform movement of 1898, which it claimed was the real
cause of the present rebellion, "It is to be hoped that we shall not be induced
to assist the government in repressing it, and thus help to fix the corrupt yoke
of the Manchus, whose misgovernment is the cause of these risings, on the neck
149of China for another term of years." At home, the Ldndon^and China Express
too, voiced its complaints " ... and the worst feature is that so far the
British government shows no signs of any activity, or that it is prepared to
take that leading position in the settlement of the Chinese question which the
ISOpreponderance of our interests in China entitles it to assume."
On the other hand, it was to Blake's credit that because of his remark­
able sympathy for the Chinese people, he launched a successful campaign against 
an undesirable practice in the Chinese judicial system and its extradition 
agreements with the British government. His attention, already drawn to the 
anomalies of the system, was particularly arrested by the case of the revolution 
ary Shih Chien-ju. Shih had been sent to Canton to prepare for the capture of 
the city in connection with the Waichow rising. While waiting for news, Shih 
conceived of a plan to start a disturbance in Canton, and thus distract the 
attention of the authorities from the activities at Waichow. He decided to 
blow up the yamen of the Acting Viceroy Te Shou with several hundred pounds of 
dynamite. With the help of a chemist Yang Hsiang-fu, a preacher of the American 
Presbyterian Mission Liu Chin-chou, and another Christian Sung Shao-tung, who 
hired a house for Shih's use, the plot was carried out on 28 October, 1900, 
when Shih planted the explosives at the yamen. Not hearing the explosion at
149
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150
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the expected time, Shih returned to investigate, re-set the dynamite, and then
stayed till the yamen exploded. He was thus caught on the spot, and was executed
151on 9 November by order of the Acting Viceroy, who escaped unharmed. The main
point of controversy about his trial was a confession Shih allegedly made which
implicated a number of Chinese in Hong Kong in the revolutionary movement, and
that Yang Ch'h-yOn was said to be the instigator of the Canton yamen plot. The
Canton government now requested the extradition of Yang, which Blake refused on
the grounds that it was based on information in Shih's confession, extracted 
152under torture. The elimination of torture applied to Chinese prisoners, at 
least to those extradited from Hong Kong, thus became the focal point of Blake's 
humanitarian campaign.
As early as in August, 1899, the Chinese Minister in London had com­
plained to the Foreign Office that it was increasingly difficult to obtain the 
extradition of Chinese criminals from Hong Kong owing to the obstructive policy 
of the Hong Kong government. He charged that though the extradition arrange­
ments were based on Article XXI of the Treaty of Tientsin, 1858, which made no 
distinction between political and non-political offences, the Hong Kong author­
ities had now given it an "erroneous construction" by interpreting it in the 
light of the Acts of 1870 and 1873, which discriminated between the two kinds 
of crimes. He pointed to the "danger of allowing Chinese criminal fugitives 
in Hong Kong to abuse the technicalities of British law in order to thwart
151
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153the requisitions of the Chinese government for their surrender." From
Hong Kong Blake retorted that he was not aware of irregularities in the working
of the Chinese Extradition Ordinance, and Chamberlain agreed that alterations
154of the present system were undesirable. Even Lord Salisbury felt that the
"cruel punishments inflicted by the Chinese made the execution of the extradi-
155tion laws very difficult."
Soon after this, a series of cases arose in which pirates and robbers
were extradited from Hong Kong, tortured in Chinese prisons, had confessions
extracted from them, and then executed; by the time of the Shih Chien-ju case,
Blake had decided that this condition of things should not be continued. He
therefore refused to hand over any man from Hong Kong in the future, unless a
British official would be allowed at the trial to ensure that no torture was
156applied to the prisoner. To obtain such a condition, Blake needed the 
cooperation of the British Consulate at Canton to argue the case with the 
Chinese authorities there. Unfortunately, Scott the Consul-General was dis­
inclined to see matters in the same light as the Hong Kong government. It was 
not unreasonable to expect that Scott, being closer to the workings of the 
Chinese government in Canton, probably realized the difficulties of effecting 
such a departure from their traditional judicial practices. Nevertheless, he 
did exhibit a marked unwillingness to exert himself in this direction from the
153
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very beginning. He argued that despite all promises to the contrary, torture 
could still be exercised in the privacy of Chinese prisons, that he must do 
his duty to assist the Chinese in getting their criminals, and finally apolo­
gising for his divergence of opinion, he thought the matter had better be left
157to the British Minister in Peking.
In Peking, Sir Ernest Satow (1843-1929) had succeeded Sir Claude
MacDonald as Minister in October, 1900. Satow had served five years as Minister
in Japan and was widely admired for his scholarship and understanding of the
Oriental character. His going out to Peking was personally recommended by
Lord Salisbury, who thought "the situation required the presence of someone
158with more coolness ... more experience and authority" for the difficult 
task of negotiating the Boxer terms with the Chinese government. His appoint­
ment was therefore generally commended, and he was felt to be "without doubt
159
just the man for the position." In this respect, he also proved to be the 
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right person to cooperate with Blake in putting pressure on the Canton govern­
ment to comply with the reform initiated by the Hong Kong authorities. When 
appealed to, Satow immediately ruled that "a Consular or Colonial official 
should attend every hearing, including the final one at which sentence is
pronounced. That would, it appears to me, furnish the desired guarantee (that
no torture is used)"*^ All Scott's objections were thus overruled, and the 
Consul-General in fact found the Canton Viceroy quite easily persuaded "to 
give the arrangement a trial.
Blake was immensely satisfied with his achievement. When thanking Satow
162for his support, he reflected!
"Some of my people here cannot understand why I should care whether
a Chinaman is tortured or not, but in the case of a surrendered
prisoner, I feel that every turn of the screw or shock of the wedge 
was inflicted through the folds of the British flag ... "
And again, to the Colonial Office:’*'^
"The miseries of China are largely due to the custom of insisting
upon a confession before execution, regardless of evidence produced.
To extract a confession, torture is applied which results in a crushing 
mass of injustice. There are many forces in China today making for a 
change in the horrible system, and I cherish the hope that the action 
of the Hong Kong government in breaking down the custom in cases of 
extradition may hasten the coming of a change in this respect, that 
every well-wisher of China and of humanity must hail with satisfaction."
Having gone so far through Blake, the Colonial Office now took up the
challenge, and sought to extend the temporary arrangments between Hong Kong and
160 Satow1s views enclosed in Lockhart to Scott, 2 May 1901,
CO 129/305.
161 Blake to C.O. 31 May, 1901 ibid.
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Canton to all Chinese criminals extradited from British territory to China
(therefore including Wei-hai-wei) and to have the rule made permanent."^4 Once
again Satow supported the move, and negotiations were quickly completed with
165the Viceroy at Canton and the Governor at Shantung. Blake's sense of
achievement was therefore increased two-fold. Campbell reflected: "Sir Henry
Blake is quite satisfied - a rare occurrence."
One unfortunate sequel to the story, however, was the fact that though
Blake had never got on well with the Consul-General at Canton from the start,
this lack of mutual understanding was now brought out into the open during the
foregoing negotiations. It was made worse by the circumstance of Blake and
Satow working so much in agreement, and jointly bringing pressure to bear on
Scott. Blake complained in undisguised tones: " ... with every respect for
Mr. Scott's anxiety not to venture outside the beaten path in the interests of
necessity, I cannot help feeling that if Mr. Warren or Mr. Fraser were either
of them in his place, there would not be the slightest difficulty in the matter ..
I have felt throughout that with a Consul anxious to secure it locally, the
matter might have been quietly arranged without any necessity for correspondence 
16*7with Peking ... " Scott soon asked for permission for'leave, in August 1901,
168with the intention of retiring soon after. When R. Tower of the Peking 
Legation was sent on a tour of the Yangtze ports and the South, he reported:
164 This was C.O. to F.O. 26 July, 1901, CO 129/305.
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"I believe the Consul-General at Canton is thoroughly inefficient ..., lack
of cooperation with Governor of Hong Kong and general weakness in dealing with
169British interests have been conspicuous,” and again, "B. C, G, Scott is
neither in touch with the Consuls in two Kwang provinces, nor is he on decent
terms with Sir Henry Blake. Add to this, he is a laughing stock of the members
of the British community who are able to find humour in a situation which in-
volves a disregard of British interests, at the time like the present when
other nations, particularly the French, are represented by a strong man with
170strong methods ... ” James Scott (1850-1920) until recently Consul at Swatow, 
was appointed to Canton to replace B. C, G. Scott in 1902,
It will be remembered that soon after the capture of Shih Chien-ju in 
1900, the Canton Viceroy applied for the extradition of Yang Ch'5-ytin from Hong 
Kong, based on a sentence in Shih’s confession: "I first made acquaintances
with Yang Chu Yun in the 8th moon of this year he seeing that I was in earnest
171appointed me as General Director for Canton but gave me no credentials." (sic)
The application was refused by Blake, because aside from its being obtained
under torture, the only statement in it regarding some money sent to the Hong
Kong and Shanghai Bank at Shameen, which could be verified, was found to be 
172untrue. This being the case, the Acting Viceroy Te Shou, who was determined
169 Tower tel. Satow, 6 June, 1901, PRO 30/33, 7/7.
Tower tel. Satow, 7 June, 1901, ibid.
171 A copy of the confession is enclosed in Scott to Lockhart,
31 Dec. 1900, CO 129/305.
172 Blake engaged the cooperation of the General Manager of the 
Bank, Sir Thomas Jackson, who searched the books for the past two years, and 
found that no money had ever been remitted to any Chinese in Shameen. See 
Blake to C.O. 31 May 1901, ibid.
168
to wreak vengeance on the revolutionaries, now instigated two crimes to be 
committed in Hong Kong which grossly violated the territorial integrity of the 
Colony, and which makes it easier to understand Sir Henry Blake's mounting 
annoyance at the methods of the Canton authorities throughout this period.
He would not, perhaps, have been so sympathetic towards the Chinese revolution­
aries had the Chinese government not driven him in this direction by their 
ruthless and often ill-advised attempts to suppress the growth of the revolu­
tionary movement.
Blake refused the extradition application on 8 January, 1901, and on
10 January, Yang Ch'tt-yOn was murdered by a gang of four assassins while he
was holding an evening class at his home in Hong Kong. The assassins escaped
in the subsequent confusion, and the crime caused a considerable sensation in 
173
the Colony. Before he died in hospital the next morning, Yang made a state- 
174
ment:
"I, Yeung Kui Wan, knowing that I am seriously ill and not likely to 
recover, make the following statement:
When I was teaching at the English school, 52 Gage Street, 
during explaining the business and then came in very quietly and shot
me four times. X mean the murderer. I do not know him. X know the
Chinese government send him down from Canton and everything to be done.
I hope English government will do me a justice. That is all.” (sic)
Acting on this, the Hong Kong government made extensive investigations
and managed to arrest one of the gang, Wu Lao-san (Ng Lo Sam). Though the facts
pointed to the crime being committed by order of the Acting Viceroy Te Shou, the
evidence was not strong enough for Wu’s conviction. Blake therefore suggested
173
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that Wu be banished from the Colony, and a demand made to the Canton govern­
ment for an explanation and a sum of $20,000 paid as reparation for Yang's 
175family. His claims, however, were not favourably received by the Colonial 
Office or the Consul-General at Canton. The Colonial Office approved his ban­
ishment of Wu, but felt that "the proposal to base a claim against the Chinese
government on this very nebulous evidence seems to me to border on the ridicu- 
1 76lous." Scott in Canton, too, made a careful study of the evidence, and
concluded that though Wu was obviously implicated in the crime, there was no
concrete proof of his being connected with the Canton officials. One was
forced to the view that the Chinese authorities secretly connived at the crime,
but Scott felt it was "only a moral conviction and ... it cannot, unsupported
by clear and independent evidence, constitute the sole basis for diplomatic
177action in demanding an explanation and reparation." The case was thus 
shelved.
In the meantime, Hsieh Tsuan-t'ai, Li Chi-t'ang and a number of other
revolutionaries in Hong Kong rallied the support of Jung Hung and Hung Ch'tian-fu,
a relative of Hung Hsiu-ch'dan and veteran of the Taiping rebellion, and
decided to raise another insurrection in Canton. The attempt, however, was
178independent, and neither the Hsing Chung Hui nor Sun Yat-sen was involved.
They began planning in September, 1901, and Hung brought in large numbers of 
secret society adherents. The conspirators called their movement the T 'ai-p1ing
176 Stubbs Minutes on above, ibid.
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178 Hsieh had denounced revolutionary activities after the 1895 
failure, but the death of his close friend Yang Ch'tt-ydn must have stirred him 
deeply.
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Shun-t'ien Kuo (Peaceful Heavenly Kingdom) and if the attempt was successful, 
they aimed to establish a provisional government under the presidency of Jung 
Hung. The intention was to move on 28 January, 1903, it being the eve of the 
Chinese Hew Year, and all government officials would be gathered for a cere­
mony in the Wan Shou Rung, just outside the city. The revolutionaries thus
intended to blow up the Wan Shou Palace and seize the artillery, while the
179rebel forces would march in from five directions.
The Hong Kong government, however, had got wind* of their plans since
22 January. On 25 January, a raid was made on their headquarters and eight
men were arrested on a charge of fitting out a military expedition against a 
180friendly power. The information was relayed to Canton, and on the 28th, 
several cargo boats loaded with military equipment were seized, and some 
twenty-five men arrested. The leaders, however, had all escaped and the attempt
i  ^ + 181fizzled out.
In the history of the Chinese revolutionary movement, this 1903 
attempt on Canton was probably one of the least significant, in that it was
179 See Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Jen-yin Hung Ch'han-fu Kuang-chou 
chd-i chi" in HHKM I, 315-8; Tse Tsan-tai, op. cit. 1620-3; Lo Hsiang-lin,
"Jung Hung yd Chung-kuo hsin-wen-hua yOn-tung chih ch'i-fa" in Hsin Ya Hsdeh 
Pao I, 1 (Feb. 1956); Chou Lu, op. cit. Ill, 674-5; China Mail 28 Jan. 1903, 
p. 4 col. 6; Ku-lung tang-an kuan, "Hung Ch'han-fu ch’i-i tanq-an" in HHKM,
I, 322-30.
180 When Blake telegraphed home this information, the Colonial 
Office refused to believe him. See C.O. Minutes on Blake tel. of 26 Jan. 1903 
(secret) CO 129/316; "Sir Henry Blake's secret information does not always 
prove to be accurate."
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more in the nature of a Triad uprising than a political revolt. Yet Sir 
Henry Blake and other contemporary observers seemed to credit it with more 
importance than it warranted. Blake, informed of the meticulous preparations 
the revolutionaries had made in the way of uniforms, arms, flags and procla­
mations, reported "This takes the movement out of the category of a mere dash
on Canton for the purpose of plunder, and would indicate an intention to carry
182out a more or less military operation,1' and later, "This movement, origin­
ally reported as a Triad movement having for its object the assassination of
the officials in Canton, ... is I how think a reform movement, pure and 
183simple ... " The Times described " ... foreign missionaries and well-
informed local Chinese appear to regard success as within the bounds of
possibility, believing that the organization is more complete than is usual
184
with things Chinese." And the China Mail correspondent, asking a Chinese 
in Canton "How many Cantonese dislike the Manchus?" received the reply, "Out 
of every ten, eleven hate them."'*'8^
There is also much talk of German intrigue in the movement, for the 
fact that much of the revolutionaries' military equipment was stored in the 
premises of the Berlin Mission in Canton, and the compradore of the German 
firm of Pustan and Co. had been the medium for the purchase of arms. It was 
also discovered that many of those arrested in Canton were converts of the 
German Missionaires. Blake had even more definite proofi he was informed
182 Blake to C.O. 29 Jan. 1903, (confidential) CO 129/316.
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mthat if the movement was successful, Germany would pose as the "Protector" of 
the separate South China, and have a quid pro quo. "This accounts for a state­
ment of the German Consul at Canton that he was worked to death, though at the 
time (ten days ago) I know that he could not be busied with trade matters.
The German Admiral who is in harbour, declined an invitation to dinner here, 
as he is going to Canton today. I wonder if he too, is cognizant of the plot ...
Despite such suspicions, however, Blake came to regret somewhat the part 
played by the Hong Kong government in frustrating this movement. The men 
arrested in Hong Kong were soon discharged on lack of evidence to convict, and 
Blake even blamed the police for being "precipitous in making the arrests with­
out solid grounds, but there is not a superfluity of brains in the force, and
187caution is a rare virtue, especially in police dealings with China." He
also felt that the new Consul-General in Canton had relayed too much information
regarding the plot than was absolutely necessary. "We are not called upon to
act as the police of China. I see that his zeal has carried him beyond his 
188discretion." The action of both the Hong Kong police and James Scott was 
strenuously defended by the Colonial Office, though C. P. Lucas, to whom Blake 
confided his private feelings, seemed confused by Blake's attitudes, and con­
cluded, "The worst of it is that all these movements are national movements, 
and in supporting the Chinese government we are running counter to a great
Blake to Lucas, 31 Jan. 1903, (private) CO 129/316. See 
also Ducat to F.O. 8 Feb. 1903, FO 17/1616, Scott to F.O. 14 Feb. 1903, FO 17/ 
1608, and 16 Apr. 1903, ibid in which he reported that the German Consul, 
accompanied by a deputy appointed by the Viceroy, searched in vain at the Berlin 
Mission for further signs of revolutionary activity.
Blake to Lucas, 31 Jan. 1903, (private) CO 129/316.
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amount of patriotic feeling.
Yet the Chinese government at Canton was much annoyed at such "patriotic
feelings" and the news of the release of the revolutionaries arrested in Hong
190Kong was received with surprise. In London, Chang Te-yi had succeeded Lo
Feng-lu as Chinese Minister in November 1901, and Chang now protested to the
Foreign Office against this action of the Hong Kong government', urging at the
192same time the expulsion of the men involved. This Note was accepted at the
Colonial Office with mixed feelings; Fiddes felt that the Chinese protest was
not without reason, as the banishment of Sun Yat-sen had set a precedent for
such circumstances. Lucas however, suggested that "There Is another side to
these banishments. The Chinese hope by persuading the Hong Kong government to
banish, to get men into their powers, and they may be not conspirators in the 
193ordinary sense." By the time Blake's reply to the Note reached London,
however, another political murder had been perpetrated In Hong Kong, similar
to the Yang Ch'h-yOn case, which came as a direct result of the 1903 rising.
Blake was therefore armed with a counter-charge against the Chinese government
"While this government will perform its duty in preventing the colony 
from being made a base of operations against Canton, the result of 
which would be injurious to our trade which must suffer from any 
serious disturbance, the assassination of persons in Hong Kong who 
may be obnoxious to the Chinese government is intolerable. This is 
the second case that has been reported ... There is no doubt this 
murder was also arranged by the Cantonese authorities, and if the 
evidence warrants it, I shall demand satisfaction for the gross vio­
lation of our territory."
189 Lucas Minutes, ibid.
China Mail 9 Feb. 1903, p. 5 col. 3
See Tower to F.O. 14 Nov. 1901, FO 17/1480 for an account
of Chang's career.
192
^  Chang Ta-jen to F.O., 26 Feb. 1903, FO 17/1611.
Lucas Minutes, ibid.
Blake to F.O. , 30 Apr. 1903, (confidential) CO 129/317.
174
It transpired that the authorities in Canton had offered an award of 
$30,000 for the capture of Hung Ch'han-fu and $20,000 for his assassination.
This was enough to instigate another brutal murder in Hong Kong. On 8 March, 
a man named Chang Cho-t’ing (Cheung Cho-ting) rented a flat in Hong Kong. On 
12 March, he went to Canton, where he became friendly with a pedlar called 
Wu Liu (Ng Luic), who bore some resenblance to Hung Ch'ttan-fu. Chang had told 
Wu that he could find employment for him in Hong Kong. Wu accordingly went 
to see Chang at his flat on 16 March. On 25 March, Chang engaged an under­
taker's launch, and with the help of coolies removed a dead body from his house. 
The undertaker’s launch was later met outside Hong Kong harbour by a Chinese 
gunboat, and they proceeded to Tai-p‘ing, the headquarters of Admiral Ho 
Ch’ang-ch'ing, where the body was taken out. Chang had evidently murdered 
Wu Liu, and now claimed the body to be that of Hung Ch'han-fu. Chang was
subsequently rewarded $20,000. Meanwhile, Hung was alive and had left Hong
195Kong on 31 March for Singapore.
When the crime was discovered. Sir Henry Blake was quick to see that
the action of the Chinese gunboat left no doubt of Admiral Ho's complicity in
the plot. The evidence against Chang was also very strong, but there being no
extradition treaty with China, and the involvment of the Chinese officials in
the act making it undesirable to follow the usual course of bringing the offender
to trial in a Chinese court, Blake now urged that a special case be made, and
196have Chang handed over for trial in Hong Kong. To this Chamberlain added 
the further demand that the action of Admiral Ho and other officials implicated 
should be the subject of special representations to the Imperial government,
195 Ch’en Ch'dn-sheng, op. cit. in HHKM I, 318-9; Blake to C.O.
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197with a view to their severe punishment. Satow accordingly addressed the
198
Peking government in the sense suggested, and it was to the credit of the
Chinese government that the incident was quickly brought to a conclusion by
the removal of Admiral Ho from office, the cashiering of all minor officials
who received rewards or otherwise connived at the crime, the execution of
Chang in Canton in the presence of an officer from the British Consulate,
and finally a letter of apology from the Viceroy to the Hong Kong government
199for the infringement of the Colony's territory. The case was thus considered 
satisfactorily settled.
In this instance, it was not without reason that Chinese compliance 
with the British demands should be so readily given, for at about the same 
time the Yang Ch'li-yttn murder case was being re-opened, and the Chinese govern­
ment must have realized that Great Britain could hardly be expected not to view 
with extreme seriousness the occurrence of a second crime which again violated 
the sovereignty of Hong Kong.
In 1903, one of Yang's assassins returned to the Colony, and was promptly 
arrested on 5 April. At his trial on 20-21 May, after which he was sentenced 
to death, the political character and official complications of the case were
197 C.O. to F.0. 5 Oct. 1903, FQ 17/1718.
198
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F.O. Minutes on Satow to F.O., 10 Sept. 1904, ibid: "We have
got full satisfaction."
Hung meanwhile had died a natural death on 7 December, 1903, and was generally 
hailed as a true patriot for the cause of reform in China. See "The Passing 
of a Patriot" In the China Mail of 15 Dec.1903, p. 5 col. 2; and "Death and 
Burial of a Noted Rebel" in the North China Herald of 18 Dec. 1903, p. 1275, 
col. 3.
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revealed, and strong feelings of indignation were again aroused on all sides.
It was found that the four assassins had actually been hired by the Acting
Viceroy Te Shou. The murder had been organised by the Chief of Police at
Canton, Li Chia-chu, Yang Ch'ing-Ch'i, captain of a Chinese gunboat, had
acted as intermediary between Canton and the four "braves" in Hong Kong.
They had at first tried to kidnap Yang, but when this proved difficult,
assassination had been resorted to. For completing the plot, the gang had
been rewarded $2,000 each with buttons of the fifth official rank. The actual
assassin, however, had already been executed on 25 September, 1901, by the
Canton authorities. It was not known whether this had been to appease British
colonial indignation, or merely a means to silence an instrument who proved
troublesome to the Canton officials.
In any event, the British government was now urged to take immediate
action in order to enforce the lesson that British territory could not be
201invaded with impunity by emissaries of the Chinese government. Even the
209Colonial Office admitted that "The Governor does well to be angry." Blake 
demanded that despite the non-existence of an extradition treaty with China, 
the other three men involved in the crime should be tried in Hong Kong, that
201
See the Times of 22 May 1903, p. 3 col. 1; China Mail of 22 
May 1903, p. 4 col. 2, leading article? Hong Kong Daily Press of 22 May, 1903, 
and North China Herald of 28 May 1903, p. 1033 col. 2-3, which complained that 
"successive governors of Hong Kong have been too complaisant, much too ready 
to believe the smiling assurances of friendship which the Chinese authorities 
at Canton have been wont to indulge ... ” The China Association, in a letter 
to the F.O, of 3 July, 1903, FQ 17/1718 showed that in the trial, "we have a 
clear instance of Cantonese officials to execute vengeance on a Chinese refugee 
in British territory. There was no possible justification for this high-handed 
proceeding, and even the plea of ignorance of international law cannot be 
admitted."
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Fiddes Minutes on May to Lucas, 23 May 1903, (private) in
CO 192/317.
both Te Shou and Li Chia-chu should be cashiered, and that compensation of
903
$50,000 should be paid to Yang's family. The Foreign Office admitted that
it was true Hong Kong had become a sort of Alsatia for the lowest criminals
of Southern China, but " ... however little chance there may be of a success-
204ful issue, it seems we ought to make an effort." On the other hand, the
question of asking for the surrender of a fugitive criminal from a state with
which Britain had no treaty involved a principle of some importance, and it was
felt, "if there is no extradition treaty with China, extradition is a bad word
205to use, and seems to invite a refusal." The issue was thus debated for
some time until a decision was forced on the Foreign Office by the eruption of
206*the Su-pao case in Shanghai. By August the British government decided that 
because they had recently refused to hand over the two journalists in the Su-pao 
case, it was altogether inopportune for the British Minister to make a represen­
tation to the Chinese government as Blake desired; the reply of the Chinese
907government to such an application at this juncture "would be unanswerable."
It was thus another case of colonial desires giving way to the wider commitments
of the Foreign Office.
In the end, the Foreign Office agreed to Blake's demands that pressure
be put on the Imperial government to cashier the Canton officials responsible,
208and pay the compensation to Yang's family, although Lord Lansdowne, (1845-1927) 
903
Blake to C.O. 19 June 1903 (confidential) ibid.
204 Campbell Minutes on C.O. to F.O.. 31 July, 1903, FQ 17/1718.
205 C.O. Minutes on Blake to C.O. 19 June, 1903, CO 129/317.
2^  See Chapter V.
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F.O. to C.O. 19 Aug. 1903, CO 129/321. Satow's views were 
found to be in entire harmony with the Foreign Office. Satow tel. of 21 Sept. 
1903, FQ 17/1718.
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who had succeeded Lord Salisbury as Foreign Secretary in November, 1900, felt
that "it will be difficult to get satisfaction, as the Chinese government
probably quite approves of what was done, both as regards the murder and the
209
reward of the murderer." By this time, however, the former Acting Viceroy
Te Shou had already died (on 5 January, 1904) and it would be difficult to
prove to the present Viceroy the justice of a claim for compensation. Satow
210thus concluded that there was no point carrying on the case. The Colonial
Office also agreed that "It would be very much better not to prosecute than to
211
prosecute and fail." By this time, too, Sir Henry Blake had left the admini­
stration of the Colony, and his successor, Sir Matthew Nathan (1862-1939) also 
felt that no further steps should be taken against the Chinese government beyond 
suggesting to Satow that, if the opportunity should arise, he was to bring the 
facts of Yang's case to the notice of the central government, and warn that it
should discourage any attempt of the Chinese provincial authorities to violate
212British territorial rights in the future.
It can thus be seen that the revolutionary events of 1900-1903 had taxed 
the attitudes and policies of the British Colonial Office on a variety of diffi­
cult situations. It was not easy to maintain a consistency in reactions? on 
the one hand, the Colonial authorities had to abide by the guidelines indicated
209 Lansdowne Minutes on above, ibid.
210 Satow to F.O., 10 May 1904, ibid.
211 F.O. Minutes on above, ibid.
212 Nathan to C.O. 17 Nov. 1904 (confidential) CO 129/324. There 
was even a feeling at the Colonial Office at this time that Yang was a notorious 
rebel anyway, and "he deserved his fate, and the only point to complain of was 
the violation of British territory. In the circumstances, I think that was 
almost excusable." C.O. Minutes, ibid.
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by such men-on-the-spot as Sir Henry Blake, and on the other to appreciate
the wider responsibilities with which the Foreign Office was usually burdened.
Yet Sir Henry Blake had served his government wells through his great interest
in the promotion of reform among the Chinese people of South China, he had
supplied his chiefs with much intimate knowledge and understanding of local
opinion which was not again experienced with his successors.
As for the revolutionaries, the Waichow rising had marked the end of
the usefulness of the Hsinq Chung Hui. After this date revolutionary events
tended to move away from its bases in South China and spread wider into the
mainland and out into South-east Asia. There was also no more talk of
cooperation with the reformers. K'ang Yu-wei had strenuously disclaimed all
connection with the revolutionaries! "His (Sun’s) object and mine are as far
213apart as East from West." Now the revolutionaries turned to a bigger and 
better organization in the T'unq Menq Hui. while the reformers saw some of 
their ideas incorporated in the reforms initiated by the Manchu throne.
213
K'ang Yu-wei to Blake, 1 Nov. 1900, in Blake to C.O. 12 
March, 1901 (confidential) CO 129/304. See also the China Mail of 24 Oct. 
1900, p. 3 col. 2; Times of 25 Oct. 1900, p. 5 col. 3, and Swettenham to F.O.
1 Nov. 1900, FQ 17/1718.
CHAPTER V
STUDENT NATIONALISM AND THE T'UNG MENG HUI
The years between 1901 and 1905, culminating in the founding of the
revolutionary T'unq Menq Hui in Japan, was a transitional period in the history
of the Chinese revolution. The failure of the Waichow rising really marked
the end of the Hsing Chung Hui as an active force and it is noteworthy that
no new members were recruited to it after 1901.  ^ Morale was low, and some of
the most prominent among the early revolutionary leaders decided to abandon
the cause altogether. Hsieh Tsuan-t'ai joined the staff of an English
newspaper in Hong Kong and refused to have anything more to do with the move- 
2
ment. Miyazaki Torazo the enthusiastic Japanese sympathiser also became 
disspirited by the events of 1900 and particularly the inability of the refor­
mers and revolutionaries to cooperate. He retired from further revolutionary 
activities to write his autobiography, in which he felt he had made nothing 
of his life, only a "Thirty-three Years' Dream." Sun Yat-sen and K'ang Yu-wei 
were both travelling abroad, away from the Chinese scene.
The situation was thus conclusive to the emergence of a new force to 
keep alive the revolutionary movement, and the period saw the involvement of 
the student classes in anti-dynastic activities. It was paradoxical that the 
situation was largely brought into being by the Manchu dynasty itself, when
 ^Feng Tzu-yu, "Hsing Chung Hui hui-ydan jen-ming shih-chi k'ao" 
in Lo Chia-lun (ed) Ko-ming Wen-hsien (Taiwan, 1953-6) III, 331-72.
2
Tse Tsan-tai, The Chinese Republic, Secret History of the 
Revolution (Hong Kong, 1924) 23; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t1anq shih-k1ao 
(Shanghai, 1938) IV, 1229.
3 -
Miyazaki Torazo, (Trans. Chung-kuo Yen-chlu She) San-shih-san
nien lo-hua menq (Tokyo, 1943) 111; M. B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen,
(Cambridge, Mass. 1954) 112..
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the government in September 1901 decided to initiate a programme of educational
reforms, and encouraged the provincial authorities to send students abroad for
4
study. All expenses were to be met by provincial funds. As a logical con­
sequence, Japan soon became the most popular "foreign" country to which students 
were sent. Japan was conveniently close to China, it was relatively inexpensive, 
and there was an affinity between the living conditions and customs of the two 
countries. In effect, Tokyo became the centre for a "short cut" course to 
European and American education and civilization.
The number of Chinese students in Japan increased tremendously during 
1902-1906,^ and abuses in the system soon became apparent. Unscrupulous 
Japanese took advantage of the educational boom and set up schools of all sorts 
and descriptions; tuition and diplomas were freely bought and sold; the prices 
of food and other commodities rose in Tokyo; overcrowding in boarding houses 
led to ill feeling between Japanese hosts and Chinese students; worst of all 
many Chinese went to Japan merely for the name of being a returned student, 
and a large percentage stayed no more than a few months, to return home with 
only the merest smattering of Western knowledge acquired at best only second-
4
The edict of 17 September, 1901, is discussed in H. S. Galt, 
"Oriental and Occidental Elements in China's Modern Educational System" in 
The Chinese Social and Political Science Review. XII, (1928), 639-41; H. E. 
King, "The Educational System of China as recently reconstructed" in United 
States Bureau of Education Bulletin No. 15, (1911) 92-5; R. F. Hacket,
"Chinese Students in Japan, 1900-1910" in Harvard University, Papers on China,
III, (1949) 137-8; Y. C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West (N. Carolina. 
1966) 53-5.
^See H. S. Galt, op. cit. 627-8; V. K. Ting, "Chinese Students" 
in The Westminster Review, Vol. 169, (1908) 49-50; W. W. Yen, "Chinese Students 
in Japan" in East of Asia Magazine IV, (1905) 194-5; R. F. Hackett, op. cit. 
138-9; Shu Hsin-ch’eng, Liu Hsdeh Shih, (Shanghai, 1927) 46-52; Kiang Wen-lan, 
The Chinese Student Movement (New York. 1948) 14-47.
b Reliable statistics are given in H. S. Galt, op. cit. 643-5; 
R. F. Hackett, op. cit. 141-2.
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hand from Japanese instructors.7 Yet these conditons produced in the overseas 
student the first stirrings of a national feeling, a sentiment which undoubtedly 
grew out of the need for self-protection and as a reaction against the diffi­
culties of life in Japan. On the other hand, the wonders of Western civilization 
as manifest in the modern institutions of Japan were not lost on them and this 
prompted the growth of a sense of dissatisfaction with the indifference towards 
institutional reforms displayed by the Manchu government at home. The student 
abroad gradually came to the conviction that he had a purpose and a duty to 
perform towards his country, and influenced by the spirit of militarism which 
permeated the new learning, his thinking drew close to the radicalism promoted 
by the expelled reformers and revolutionaries who had found refuge in Japan.
It was therefore no surprise to find that the Chinese students in 
Japan increasingly interested themselves in the political questions of the day. 
They formed a vocal body of critics of the reigning dynasty in China. In the 
early years the students in Japan had no formal organization other than small 
provincial clubs composed of men from the same provinces. By 1903 however, 
all the groups had amalgamated into a proper Chinese Students' Union with 
headquarters in Tokyo? this was to become the social as well as political 
centre of student life in Japan. Membership increased and its activities 
included the publication of journals reflecting the new trends in political 
thought. The women students in Tokyo even organized themselves into a Red
The abuses in the system are discussed In P. Reinsch, 
Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East, (Boston, 1911) 217;
J. 0. P. Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in China (Philadelphia, 
1912) 83-5; H, F. MacNair, The Chinese Abroad, (Shanghai, 1924) 242-5; T. 
F. Millard, The New Far Bast (New York, 1906) 263-4; V. K. Ting, op. cit. 
50-2; J. M, Clinton, "Chinese Students in Japan" in Chinese Recorder and 
Missionary Journal XL, 10, (1909) 570; M. T. Z. Tyau, "The hope of China's 
future" in Contemporary Review vol. 100, (1911) 825.
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8
Cross Association in 1903.
Even before then, however, the students in Japan had already involved 
themselves in political activities of one kind or another, albeit of a sporadic 
nature. In the winter of 1901, a rumour was circulated that the Manchu govern­
ment was considering leasing Kwangtung province to France. The Cantonese 
students in Japan immediately organized a protest movement, the Kuanq-tunq
Tu-li Hsieh-hui (Kwangtung Independence Association) led by Feng Tzu-yu, Cheng
g
Kuang-kung and Li Tzu-chung. This was followed by a movement initiated by
Chang Ping-lin, a scholar-reformer who had joined the revolutionary camp after
10
the failure of T'ang Ts'ai-ch*ang's rising in 1900. On 26 April 1902, Chang 
aimed to arouse student patriotism by organizing a meeting to mark the 242nd 
anniversary of the Manchu invasion of China,^ and wrote a long and stirring 
manifesto for the occasion, which was widely circulated among the students 
in Japan. The Chinese Minister in Japan, Ts'ai Chhn, intervened to ban the 
movement before the proposed meeting was held. In the end, a modified ceremony
g
See R. F. Hackett, op. cit. 144-6; the Times, 13 Aug. 1903, 
p. 2, col. 4-5; North China Herald 16 Mar. 1906, p. 569-70, leading article;
W. W. Yen, op. cit. 195; See also Y. C. Wang, op. cit. 233-5, where he gives 
some reasons for the anti-Manchu sentiments of the students.
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Feng Tzu-yu, op. cit. I, 146, Hua-ch'iao ko-ming kai-kuo shih 
(Chung-king, 1946) 46; Hstleh Chhn-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution 
(Stanford, 1961) 35.
Accounts of Chang are seen in Hsli Shou-shang, Chang Ping-lin 
(Chung-king, 1945); Shen T ’ing-kuo, Chi Chang T^i-yen hsien-shenqTshanqhai, 
1946); T'ang Tsou-pei, Min-kuo minq-.jen hsiao-ch’uan (Hong Kong, 1953) 20-2; 
Hsiao Kung-ch'han, Chung-kuo Chenq-shih ssu-hsianq shih (Shanghai, 1946-8) II, 
453-77; H. Boorman (ed) Biographical Dictionary of Republican China (New York, 
1967-) I 92-8.
11 It was on this day, 19th day of the 3rd lunar moon, that the 
last Ming Emperor hanged himself.
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took place in Hong Kong, attended by revolutionary delegates from Canton and 
12Macao. A sequel to the incident was the widespread belief among the students 
that the Chinese Minister had secretly warned the Chinese government against 
sending students to Japan where revolutionary ideas were prevalent. Much 
excitement was generated among the student body, and though the Minister denied
the allegation, relations between him and the Chinese community in his charge
•  ^ 13remained uneasy.
This again gave rise to an unpleasant incident in August, 1902. When
the Chinese Minister refused to endorse the application of some private students
to a Japanese government military academy, a number of youths proceeded to the
Legation, and a scuffle developed which eventually led to the deportation of
14the two student leaders Wu Chih-hui and Sun Su-fang from Japan. On this
occasion, both the Japanese press and the London Times came out on the side of
the students, and it was felt that the Minister had acted unduly harshly. " ...
It is therefore much to be regretted that a movement which is so promising
15
should encounter any difficulties.1' These sympathetic reactions served only 
to enhance the feelings of righteousness on the part of the overseas students,
and were responsible, at least in part, for the increasing defiance with which
12 Feng Tzu-yu, op. cit. 46-7, Ko-minq i-shih I, 84$ Lo Chia-lun 
(ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chunq-shan hsien-shenq nien-p'u ch’u-kao (Taipei, 1958) I, 109™ 
10? Feng Tzu-yu, "Chang T'ai-yen yU Chih-na wang-kuo chih-nien-hui" in HHKM I, 
497-502.
13
See the Times of 9 Apr, 1902, p. 5, col. 2, and 30 Apr. 1902,
p. 5 col. 2$ R. F. Hackett, op. cit. 151-2.
14
See Hackett, op. cit. 152$ Chiang Wei-ch’iao, "Chung-kuo Chiao- 
yh-hui chih hui-i" in HHKM I, 485-6$ also discussed in the Times 6 Aug. 1902, 
p. 3 col. 1, and 9 Aug. 1902, p. 5 col. 1.
15
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they regarded the authorities*
These student activities, often impulsively perpetrated andtiby and large 
ineffectual, were undertaken with enthusiasm and what appeared to be a real 
sense of national consciousness. When subjected to the influences of revolu- 
tionary propaganda, these movements therefore became integral parts of the 
Chinese revolution. This was evident when the first graduates returned home 
to China, where for obvious reasons they chose to continue their rebellious 
activities from the confines of the International Settlement in Shanghai. By 
the beginning of the 20th century this Settlement had unwittingly developed 
characteristics which were favourable for the dissemination of radical political 
thought throughout the Central provinces of China. The Municipal Council which 
controlled the affairs of the residents, both Chinese and foreign, was largely 
dominated by merchants, of whom the majority was British. The Settlement had 
established its own judiciary, the Mixed Court, and it adhered to a policy of 
jealously guarding its toleration for the political convictions of its inhabi- 
tants, its freedom of speech and press, and the right of granting asylum to 
political refugees.Shanghai thus displaced such earlier centres as Hong 
Kong and Singapore as a breeding ground for anti-Manchu.activities, where the 
progressive student class found much sympathy for their talk of radical/moves 
on the part of the Chinese government. The students1 aspirations were all the 
more appealing when they suggested that the Manchu rulers in their weakness, 
were ready to sacrifice China's prestige and integrity to the selfish purpose 
of retaining power in the Empire. To foreign observers, and the British in
X 6
These characteristics of the Shanghai Settlement are discussed 
in A. M. Kotenev, Shanghai, its Mixed Court and Council (Shanghai, 1925) 107;
M. Elvin, "The Mixed Court of the International Settlement at Shanghai (until 
1911)" in Harvard University, Papers on China XVII, (1963) 131-59.
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particular, this was viewed as the real beginning of Chinese nationalism.
" ... There is more in Young China than the Babu clerk and the missionary
school student, and even these possess and exercise throughout the country an
influence which is generally unappreciated ... for with reason certain recent
manifestations of the existence of the Reform Party and of its patriotic senti-
17ments have come as a surprise to many.1' And again, " ... the youthful party,
however they may be pooh-poohed by foreign wisecracks who don’t understand
18them, ... are taken very seriously by their own people who dd."
Whatever may be said of the driving forces behind the student activities 
of this period, whether motivated by truly nationalistic sentiments or merely 
indulging in political agitation, the pattern of their protest movements in 
Japan was now repeated in Shanghai. In November, 1902, when the authorities 
of the Nan-yanq Kunq-hsheh (Nan-yang Public School) forbade its students to 
engage in political discussions, a mass withdrawal from the school was staged, 
and this was followed by the establishment of the Ai-kuo Hsheh-she (Patriotic 
School) by the students themselves in Shanghai.^ Early in 1903, when a local 
rebellion in Kwangsi and the Yunnan-Kweichow areas, which had been raging for 
some time due to economic stress, became uncontrollable, a rumour was circulated 
that the Kwangsi Governor, Wang Chih-ch'un, was on the point of negotiating 
with the French government in Indo-China for the introduction of French troops
17
Times 13 Aug. 1903, p. 2 col. 4-5.
1 8
North China Herald 25 Sept. 1903, p. 638 col. 1-3.
19
Feng Tzu-yu, "Chung-kuo chiao-yh hui yO Ai-kuo hsheh-she" in 
HHKM. I, 481-2? Times 13 Aug. p. 2 col. 5.
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20and for a loan of French money to quell the rebellion. The news caused a
furore among the Cantonese student population, which saw in the Governor's
action a threat to the independence of the two Kwang provinces. Accordingly
a mass meeting was convened on 22 April, at a private park frequented by the
Chinese (who were barred from public parks in the Foreign Settlement) known
as Chang Su-ho's Gardens. It was decided that telegrams should be despatched
to the government at Peking urging the removal of Wang from office. They
expanded the incident into crisis proportions and talked of the dangers of
a partition of the Chinese Empire itself. A telegram was also received from
Tokyo announcing that all the Kwangtung and Kwangsi students there had already
sent a telegram to the Wai-wu Pu at Peking, asking for the dismissal of 
21
Governor Wang. The foreign community observed: "The earnest and grave
demeanour of those who attended the meeting augurs well for the statement
that the fires of patriotism and devotion to country still burn within the
22breasts of all serious-minded Chinese."
A few days later there was another opportunity for student agitation, 
when Russian activities in Manchuria became recognised as a possible threat 
to the integrity of the Chinese Empire in the North. A public meeting was 
again held at Chang's Gardens in Shanghai on 27 April, 1903, and after stirring 
_  _ _
The Governor had assumed office in June 1902, with a boastful 
declaration that he would be able to deal quickly and effectively with the 
rebellion. But by January 1903, he did not seem to have had much success, 
and the move to rally French assistance was creditable, though he made a point 
of denying the rumours. See the China Mail 20 Jan. 1903, p. 5 col. 4, and 
North China Herald 4 June 1903, p. 1096, col. 2-3. He was removed from office 
in July 1903, with the rebellion still in progress.
21
Feng Tzu-yu, op. cit. 489? North China Herald 30 Apr. 1903, 
p. 8 col. 5; Times 13 Aug. 1903, p. 2 col. 4.
22
North China Herald 30 Apr. 1903, p. 836 col. 2.
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speeches by some leaders, telegrams were sent to the various Powers represented
in China, urging their intervention to prevent Russia absorbing Manchuria. The
British government, under the direction of Lord Lansdowne, would do no more
23than "simply acknowledge the receipt" of the appeals from these self-
appointed guardians of Chinese territorial integrity. From .the students in
Tokyo too, came energetic support for the movement. They formed themselves
into the ChU-Q 1-yunq Tui (Student Volunteer Corp to Resist the Russians) in
May 1903, with a programme of daily military drill;and strict regulations. The
Chinese Minister in Japan quickly had the Association suppressed, and what had
begun merely as a patriotic movement was now forced to be revolutionary. The
result was the formation of a secret revolutionary military organization, the
ChUn-kuo-min Chiao-yh Hui (National Military Education Society) which managed
to survive because of care in keeping knowledge of its existance from both the
Chinese and Japanese authorities. The members received thorough military
training, including the plotting of rebellions, terrorist activities and the
use of propaganda. On graduation, they were sent home to China for practical 
24experience.
23
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One of the first to give dramatic expression to this growing militant- 
terrorist trend among the student nationalists was the Hunanese, Wan Fu-hua.
In their search for a ’'cause” to which their immediate energies could be 
directed, the students seem to have concentrated their venom against the 
Kwangtung Governor Wang Chih-ch'un. His inability to suppress effectively 
the Kwangsi rebellion had placed him in a particularly vulnerable position.
While the students repeatedly publicised his failings, Wang in retaliation
made much of their allegedly seditious and revolutionary activities in Shanghai
25 /and Japan. The climax came on 19 November, 1904 (Wang had already been
dismissed from the governorship in July 1903) when Wan attempted to assassinate
Wang Chih-ch'un in Shanghai. His shot missed its target, and Wan was instantly 
26captured. Wan's amateurish and badly-timed act was not insignificant! it 
marked the beginning of a change in the nature of student activities of this 
period, from the convocation of public meetings and sending of telegraphic 
appeals, to the actual perpetration of terrorist attempts against those Manchu 
dignitaries who tried to curb their radicalism. Their nationalism became 
increasingly tainted with violent anti-Manchu sentiments, and they became more 
and more identified with the militant faction of the revolutionary movement.
This development is best seen in the changing tones of the voluminous
publications which emanated from the returned students at this time. The
25 North China Herald 4 June 1903, p. 1096 col. 2-3, and Times
9 July 1903, p. 5 col. 4.
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See Chou Lu, op. cit. Ill, 678-9; Hslieh Chhn-tu, op. cit.
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in Satow to F.O. 9 Mar. 1905, FQ 17/1671.
One interesting aspect in connection with this was the fact that Russia 
immediately saw in the assassination attempt the influence of Japanese intrigues, 
because Wan was a returned student from Japan, and the Russians accused the 
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literature was mainly published in Tokyo and the Foreign Settlement in Shanghai, 
but was also distributed in many provinces in the interior of China. As their 
criticism of the reigning dynasty became more outspoken and daring, there were 
attempts, harsh but not necessarily effective, by the Chinese authorities to 
suppress this literary campaign. Libraries were confiscated, printing presses
were closed, editors and public speakers were arrested and threatening proclama-
27tions were issued. This eventually led to the eruption of the Su-pao case, 
in which the British authorities in the Shanghai Settlement were brought in 
direct contact with the student revolutionary movement.
The Su-pao (Kiangsu Journal) was a daily paper printed and published 
in the Foreign Settlement, with a circulation of about one thousand in 1903.
It was started in 1896, had gradually become a reformist organ critical of the 
Manchu regime by 1902, and in June 1903, when Chang Shih-chao became its editor, 
was outspokenly revolutionary, advocating the expulsion of the Manchus and often 
libellously attacking the private lives of Manchu officials. It was clear that 
it survived so long only because of the special conditions of freedom and 
protection which existed in the Foreign Settlement, though even foreigners 
expected that prosecution of the radicals would not long be delayed. This 
came early in June, 1903. On the instructions of the Treaty Commissioner Lu 
Hai-huan, the governor of Soochbw En-shou tried to issue proclamations for the 
arrest of a number of students for their public meetings, which were deemed of
27
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a libellous character. The Municipal Council however* refused to have the
28
proclamations posted. This attitude of the Council, which was more concerned 
with guarding its independence of action in the affairs of the Settlement than 
with cooperating with the Chinese government in weeding out its enemies, was 
to be seen again in the events that follow. Mainly because of this, it was 
difficult for the British government at home to formulate a definite policy 
with regard to the student agitation in the Settlement. Caught between the 
recalcitrance of the merchants who dominated the Municipal Council and the 
appeals for cooperation from the Chinese government, Britain's response to 
’ttie Su-pao case was characterized by indecision and uncertainty.
Failing to obtain the desired arrests by proclamation, the Chinese 
government now resorted to legal action against the Su-pao writers in a bid 
to supress the student movement once and for all. This was unprecedented 
as the Chinese government had never in its history had cause to sue its 
subjects. In the end, mainly due to the part played by the British govern­
ment in the proceedings, the Chinese authorities with great loss of prestige 
emerged more the victims than the victors of the contest.
M I t
On 26 June, the Shanghai taotai Yuan Shu-hsun approached the Consular 
Body with a warrant for the arrest of six Su-pao writers. He agreed to their 
trial in the Mixed Court with the customary foreign Assessor present, and also 
to any subsequent punishment meted out to be sustained in the Settlement. On 
this understanding a warrant was issued on 29 June for the arrest of Chang
En-shou's action was often interpreted as a move instigated by 
Wang Chih-ch'un to wreak vengeance on the critics of his poor handling of the 
Kwangsi rebellion, but the nature of the recent Su-pao articles would have 
warranted such a step anyway. See Chang Huang-chi, J,Su-pao an shihiu" in 
HHKM I, 372| North China Herald 31 July 1903, p. 226 col. 1$ Times 13 July 
1903, p.5 col. 4, and 23 July p.5 col.4.
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Ping-lin, Tsou Jung and four others. They were charged with various crimes
of sedition, to which only Chang and Tsou pleaded guilty, and the hearing
29was fixed for 21 July.
On the 20th however, came the first major set-back of the case. Wei
Kuang-t'ao, the Nanking Viceroy, suddenly repudiated the agreement made between
taotai and the Consuls. He now demanded that the two who pleaded guilty
30should be handed over to the Chinese authorities for summary punishment.
The Consular Body, led by Britain’s Sir Pelham Warren, (1845-1923) would not 
give way, and the whole matter was referred to the Diplomatic Corps at Peking. 
The dilemma which confronted the British government was at once apparent.
While it was fully recognised that the articles of the Su-pao were outrageously 
seditious and often violent in tone, and while the French and Russian Ministers 
in Peking made it clear that they supported Viceroy Wei's demands, it was also 
equally evident that the Shangai Municipality was determined to abide by the 
rules of procedure in such cases under which, they contended, criminals could 
not be removed from the Settlement except after trial and conviction. This
29 For accounts of Tsou Jung, see Ch'en Hsti-lu, Tsou Jung yO 
Ch'en T'ien-hua ti ssu-hsienq (Shanghai 1957) 1-36; Tu Ch’eng-hsiang, Tsou 
Jung ch'uan (Taipei 1952)5 see also Townley to F.O. 30 July 1903 (confidential) 
FO 17/1599s North China Herald 3 July 1903, p. 10 col. 3, 17 July p. 162 col.
I5 Times 13 July 1903, p. 5 col. 4.
30 It was generally believed that Viceroy Wei was placed in an 
untenable position by pressure from the anti-Hunanese group in Peking, headed 
by Chang Chih-tung, who obviously bore a grudge against him when Wei was ap­
pointed Viceroy at Nanking instead of himself, and who would make much capital 
against him if he failed to have the Su-pao men beheaded. Wei was allegedly 
offering money in every direction to procure support for the Chinese claim for 
extraditions see Townley to Campbell, 13 Aug. 1903 (private) FQ 17/1599;
London and China Bxpress 14 Aug. 1903, p. 634 col. 1-2; Townley to F.O. 21 Jan. 
1903 (confidential) FQ 17/1596; Times 23 July p. 5 col. 4.
A summary of Wei’s character and capabilities is given in Townley to F.O. 20 
Feb. 1903, (confidential) in FQ 17/1596.
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31
had been approved by the Diplomatic Body on 28 June, 1902. Thus from the 
start Britain's attitude had to be one of compromises "The main point is 
arranging any compromise to satisfy the Municipality who have the whole of
32the executive power in their hands, and to avoid the necessity of coercion."
This position was arrived at after Walter B. Townley (1863-1945), the British
Charge d!Affaires at Peking, suggested that surrendering the prisoners was
bound to lead to considerable disorders at Shanchai, and it would probably
33necessitate the landing of an armed force to effect such a surrender. The 
British authorities must also consider the fact that Chang and Tsou pleaded 
guilty at the preliminary hearing only under the belief that they would be 
tried and punished by the Mixed Court.^
The British share of the negotiations was now left in Townley*s hands,
and in this connection it is interesting to note some private expressions of
his attitudes during this time. On one occasion he suspected that the French
and Russian representatives at Peking went out of their way to oppose the
31 This principle is defended in the Times of 23 July 1903, p.
5 col. 4, which felt that the Su-pao defendants had become tools in a game,
"in which the entire forces of conservative officialdom are consolidated to 
prevent the expression of public opinion on political questions." But there 
is reason to believe that the agreement was originally meant to apply only 
to judicial disputes between the French and International Settlements, and not 
to the Chinese government. See W. W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests 
in China (Baltimore 1927) I, 528; Kotenev, op. cit. 113-4. Even the Foreign 
Office was left in doubt regarding the validity of this arguments F.O. tel. 
Townley, 8 Aug. 1902, FO 17/1602.
Langley minutes on Townley tel. F.O. 25 July 1903, FO 17/1603.
33
Townley tel. F.O. 25 July 1903, ibid.
Townley was Secretary of the Legation in 1901, and because Charge from 1902-3; 
he was then Councillor for a year. He had ambitions of succeeding Satow as ' 
Minister in 1906. See C. Pearl Morrison of Peking (Australia 1967) 143-4, 170.
Townley tel. F.O. 28 July, ibid, and 30 July (confidential)
FO 17/1599.
194
British position
"pour embeter les Anglais for various reasons .., the French because 
of his deep-seated aversion to the Municipal Council that rules the 
International Settlement, and the Russian partly because he cannot 
help himself when an occasion offers but must let loose his anti- 
English sentiments, and partly because he likes to pose as the 
champion of the Ch'ing dynast^whilst he is busy dispossessing them 
of their ancestral homes ..."
On another occasion Townley confessed that with all the information at his
disposal he was convinced that the accused were not guilty "and can easily
be proved so in a fair court ..." With a sympathetic Townley in Peking,
the intransigent Municipality in Shanghai, and loud pleas for fair play for
the Su-pao men in the English press both in China and at home, it was not
surprising that the situation was extremely delicate as far as London was
concerned.
Lord Lansdowne was in two minds about the British stands he felt 
that the Chinese government was not entitled to expect a change in judicial 
procedure since the practice of trial and punishment in the Mixed Court had 
existed so long without being challenged, (which did not seem to be a morally 
and legally justifiable view), and on the other hand, if the Chinese govern­
ment agreed to letting Chang and Tsou withdraw their pleas of guilt (which 
in Chinese practices would lead to their immediate execution) and institute
another fair hearing for them, he was not adverse to surrendering them, on
37condition that no torture would be used on them at any time. Lansdowne 
turned to the Parliamentary Law Officers for consultation. Their conclusion,
35
Townley to Campbell, 30 July (private) ibid.
36
Townley to Satow, 8 Aug. 1903, PRO 30/33, 7/9. Again 
stated in Townley to Campbell, 13 Aug. (private) FO 17/1599.
37
F.O, to H. M, Attorney General and Solicitor General, 29 
July, 1903, (immediate) FO 17/1619.
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which came on 4 August, was to stand solidly behind the taotai1s original
agreement, and they urged the Foreign Office to refuse the delivery of the
. . 38two prisoners.
Just at this time, an incident occurred which served to strengthen
the British position considerably, both in the government's conviction of
having made a correct decision, and in proving the righteousness of that
decision to the rest of the world. On 31 July, a journalist Shen Chin, who
had taken part in the 1900 T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang uprising and who had subsequently
returned to Peking to propagate revolution, was arrested and cruelly beaten
39to aeath by order of the Empress Dowager. The event caused an uproar when
news of it reached the outside world5 from every side came condemnation of
the methods of the Manchu government, and sympathy for the nationalist-
40reformist movement. But more important still, there were widespread clamours
that Britain should stand firm in her refusal to surrender the two Su-pao men.
"It is presumable that a similar fate awaits the Shanghai reformers ... if
they are handed over to Chinese justice."^ "The affair has created an intense
feeling among the foreign community and has aroused a strong sentiment against
42surrendering the Shanghai reformers to Chinese jurisdiction." "It is such 
an outrage on all feelings of humanity that it seems desirable at the present
Report of Law Officers, 4 Aug. 1903, ibid.
39
See Huang Chung-huang, "Shen Chin" in HHKM I, 284-307; and 
reprinted from Che-kiang Ch'ao, "Lun Shen Chin tsan-ssu shih" in HHKM I, SOS- 
12.
40
North China Herald 31 July 1903, p. 236 col. 3; Times 3 Aug. 
p. 3 col. 4, 7 Aug. p. 3 col. 6.
41
Townley tel. F.O. 3 Aug. FO 17/1603.
42 Times 3 Aug. p. 3 col. 4.
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moment that the truth should be known . ..." And in the House of Commons some
members wanted to know if after this incident the British consulate in Shanghai
4 4
would not be instructed to refuse the surrender of Chang and Tsou. The
Reverend C. P. Sanderson also wrote" ... I beg leave to express the earnest
hope that His Majesty will not permit the Reformers to be surrendered to the
45
Chinese government. Every man in England will support them."
At this point Lansdowne was forced to make an official announcement 
46of British policy. In a statement in the House of Commons he admitted that
■the Su-pao articles "were of a most violent and incendiary description." But,
"two of the men pleaded guilty, and we consider that we are morally 
bound, in consequence of the circumstances under which that plea was 
taken, to insist that the pledge that was given by a Chinese official
should be carried out .... We do not think the case is one in which the
opinion of the Majority of the Consular Body ought necessarily to prevail."
This was significant, as Lansdowne was now committed to stand by his declaration
even if Consular opinion of the other Powers, which was then in a state of
considerable confusion, should come out in opposition; a stand the British
government would perhaps not have taken had the Shen Chin case not helped to
enhance th£ir position.
There was certainly much difficulty in obtaining unanimous support for
British policy from the other Powers at Shanghai and Peking, Townley reported
that the Diplomatic Corps were so wearied by the disagreements that they
4 3
North China Herald 14 August p. 345, col. 1.
44
Parliamentary Debates, 4 August 1903, vol. 126, pp. 1439-40.
45 /
C. P. Sanderson to F.O. 6 Aug, 1903* FO 17/1619. Two days
later he threatened, "Am rousing public attention re Chinese reformers", ibid.
46
For the following quotations, see, Parliamentary Debates,
13 Aug 1903, Vol. 127 p. 1123-4; also given in translation in HHKM I, 383-4; 
similar instructions had been telegraphed to Townley, 5 Aug, FO 17/1602. See 
also Kotenev, op.cit. 109-13; London and China Express 7 Aug, p. 617 col. 1 
leader, which supports the policy. "We are fully persuaded that the decision 
is indisputable from the point of view of human justice, and the success of 
the Reform movement ...."
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47contemplated returning the entire matter to the hands of the Consuls at Shanghai.
Acting Consul Mansfield in Shanghai reported that only three or four of the
Consuls could be expected to vote with him in favour of maintaining the
48
agreement with the Taotai. From the Chinese side came a reminder through
the Legation in London that it was a purely Chinese case involving Chinese
journalists on the one side and the Chinese government on the other, and
49that Britain "had no locus standi in the matter." To further increase pressure
on Britain the Viceroy at Nanking now made it known that he would denounce the
Taotai and cause him to lose his head if the prisoners were not surrendered.
50
soon. Matters had thus reached a deadlock. The Foreign Office decided that 
the easiest way out was to approach the French government, so far the strongest
51 52
opponent of British policy, and hope to persuade them to change their minds.
Meanwhile, Lansdowne suggested privately to Townley that should there be any
danger to the prisoners, Britain was ready to arrange for them to escape to
Hong Kong, and also if trouble should arise in Shanghai, the Admiral was
53
to send up a gun boat. To such ill-advised schemes was the British government
Townley tel. F.CL 8 Aug. FO 17/1603. Lansdowne found this 
suggestion completely inadmissable, and demanded "What reason is there for 
supposing that a majority of the Consular Body at Shanghai have the right of 
overruling the Council or giving them orders?" It was clear that by now 
Lansdowne was fully committed to standing by the Council's decision. See 
F.O. tel. Townley, 8 Aug, FO 17/1602.
48Townley tel. 13 Aug FO 17/1603.
49Chinese Minister's interview with Lansdowne, in F.O. to townely,
12 Aug FQ 17/1595.
"^Townely tel. F.O. 13 Aug. 17/1603. Townley and his colleagues 
considered this as the "last card" from the Chinese authorities, and at least 
the Taotai "is worth all the other vauriens put together," See Townley to Campbell,
13 Aug. 1903, (private) FQ 17/1599.
51
The French Minister at Peking, Dubail, was a former Shanghai 
Consul General who entertained a deep-seated aversion to the Municipal Council, 
and who therefore saw in the non-surrender of the prisoners a victory for the 
Council at the expense of the Consuls. See Townley's privatenote attached to 
his telegram of 13 Aug. 1903, FQ 17/1603.
52
Campbell minutes on the above, ibid.
^Private clause in F.O. tel. Townley, 12 Aug. 1903, FO 17/1602.
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prepared to resort in their determination to prevent the Chinese government
from prosecuting two leading revolutionaries. Fortunately Townley was more
realistic than the government at home, and warned that "Escape of prisoners
54would cause great outcry."
Just at this critical juncture, Sir Ernest Satow passed through
Shanghai on his way to resume his administration in Peking. The Shanghai
Taotai seized the opportunity of approaching him personally with a new plan
to resolve the difficulty, namely that a Chinese official holding wide judicial
powers, say, the Shanghai magistrate, should sit with the Mixed Court magistrate
to try the case along the lines of his earlier agreement, provided that neither
55perpetual imprisonment nor the death penalty be imposed. This was probably
the Taotai's snatching at any straw to save himself, but it did offer a basis
for more hopeful negotiations. The plan was regarded "very satisfactory" by
56the Foreign Office, and by 16 August the French government had succumbed to
57the combined pressure of London and Satow in Peking, Viceroy Wei now remained
58the only intransigent party. On 30 August, he again demanded from the
Consular Body the unconditional surrender of the prisoners. This was refused,
and the Consuls retaliated by threatening to release the prisoners, who could
not be detained in custody indefinitely, unless the Viceroy would agree 
-  —
Townley tel. F.O. 13 August FO 17/1603.
55Telegram from Shanghai, in Townley tel. F.O. 16 August ibid 
Satow to Lansdowne, 10 Sept. 1903 (Private) FO 800/119*
56 / Lansdowne minutes on Townley's telegram of 16 Aug. FQ 17/1603.
57
Satow to F.O. 19 Sept. 1903 (very conf.) FO 17/1600; Satow 
to Lansdowne, 24 Sept. (private) FO 800/119.
58Prince Ch'ing had promised Satow to telegraph the Viceroy with 
regard to the Taotai1s new proposal, but the promise did not seem to have 
been carried out. See Satow to F.O. 19 Sept. 1903, (very conf. ) FQ 17/1600, 
and telegram of 14 Oct. FO 17/1603.
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59immediately to the Taotai's plan. This was as near blackmail as diplomacy 
could go, and yet it was endorsed heartily both by the British Foreign Office 
and the London Times.60
It was clearly time for the Chinese government to climb down. On 18
November, Wei Kuang-t'ao agreed to the trial of the Su-pao men in the Mixed
61Court and to appointing an officer to sit with the Magistrate. The trial 
finally ended on 7 December, with four of the accused acquitted, and Chang
62
and Tsou, because of their admission of guilt, sentenced to life imprisonment.
The British Assessor B. Giles protested that this was too heavy a penalty.
Two or three years imprisonment, he thought, would have been sufficient. The
63verdict was thus declared null and void. The British Consul-General at 
Shanghai, Sir Pelham Warren3 tried at first to persuade Wei to reduce the sentences, 
arguing that it was far more dignified for the Chinese government to treat the
64prisoners as "misguided fools whose utterances could not injure the government.”
59
Satow tel. F.O. 14 Oct. ibid, and Goodnow to Wei, 31 Oct. 1903, 
in Satow to F.O. 16 Nov. F0 17/1601.
^See Lansdowne, Campbell and Langley minutes on Satow's telegram 
of 14 Oct. FO 17/1603,* the Times 7 Nov. 1903, p. 7, col. 4.
61Warren tel. F.O. 18 Nov. 1903, FO 17/1608,
62
Accounts of the trial are given in the Times 7 Dec. 1903, p. 5 
col. 5; 17 Dec. p. 5 col. 3; North China Herald 11 Dec. 1903; Satow to F.O.
17 Dec. FO 17/1601; Chang Huang-chi, "Su-pao an shih-lu" in HHKM I, 384-5; Chang 
Ping-lin, "Yh Wu Chih-hui t'an Su-pao an shd in HHKM I, 398-400.
A ^
Giles, to Warren, 8 Dec. 1903, in Satow to F.O. 17 Dec. ibid;
Satow to Lansdowne, 17 Dec (Private) FO 800/119.
For the second time, the British position in this case had no legal basis, as 
it was again by virtue of practice rather than written agreement that the Assessor's 
concurrence was deemed necessary to cases in which only Chinese subjects were 
concerned. Even Satow admitted this, see Satow to F.O. 27 Jan. 1904, FO 17/1637.
A f
Satow tel. F.O. 27 Jan 1904, FO 17/1641. On his part, Satow also 
tried to persuade Prince Ch'ing. See Satow to F.O. 11 Dec. 1904, FO 17/1636.
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When Wei still refused, the Consular Body resorted again to the tested expedient
of threats; if a satisfactory judgment was not delivered by 26 May, the prisoners
65would be released.
The Chinese government, having captured and tried the anti-dynastic 
journalists, now had to eat its own words and drastically reduce the punishments 
set out for them. On 20 May new sentences were pronounced: three year's imprison­
ment for Chang and two for Tsou, both with hard labour; and to date from the 
day of arrest. On release both were to be banished from the Foreign Settlement 
The case was thus concluded to the satisfaction mainly of the British government, 
and Sir Walter Langley at the Foreign Office justified its strong-arm tactics 
by the observation: "The Consular Body evidently considered that the case had
dragged on long enough and made use of an argument which the Chinese government 
could understand .
Having wrested the Su-pao defendants from Chinese custody, the British 
government soon recognised the difficulty of disposing of them when they have 
served their sentences. Warren was of the opinion that the easiest plan was 
to transfer them by a British steamer to Hong Kong, where he felt they would 
be safe. It needed little observation to realize that Hong Kong would in
fact have been the least suitable place to deposit the two journalists much 
wanted by the Chinese government; this was pointed out by the Hong Kong
Governor, Sir Matthew Nathan (1861-1939):^
■ ■
u Satow to F.O. 23 Mar 1904, FO 17/1636.
66Satow tel. F.O. 23 May 1904, FO 17/1641.
^Langley minutes on Satow's of 31 May 1904, FO 17/1637.
68
Warren to Satow, 7 June 1904, in Satow to F.O. 14 June, 1904, ibid.
69
 ^ Nathan to Chamberlain, 29 Sept. 1904, in C.O, to F.O. 10 Nov.
Sir Matthew Nathan became Governor of Hong Kong in July 1904, and the reputation 
of his energetic and progressive administration in the Gold Coast preceded him.
He proved a popular governor, and in 1907 was transferred to Natal. See accounts
of him in the London and China Express. 1 July 1904, and China Mail, 19 July 
1904, in both leading articles.
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" .... Apart from the fact that the experience of the past shows that such 
persons would not be safe here without some measure of police protection 
entailing expense upon the government, it appears to me their presence at 
Hong Kong would certainly be misconstrued by the Chinese authorities in 
the neighbouring provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and would tend to 
impair those harmonious relations which it is clearly to the interests 
of the Colony to maintain.
Hong Kong lies too close to Canton, seat of the government of the two 
provinces referred to, and is too intimately connected with it, commercially 
and by the daily flow of human intercourse, to be used without risk of 
grave complications as a place of residence of men whose avowed object 
is to alter the existing form of government in China, and whose residence 
at Hong Kong would give them special facilities for working towards that end.”
70
Nathan suggested that the Foreign Office should try the Straits Settlements,
When consulted. Sir John Anderson, Governor of the Straits, made it clear
that he would reluctantly accept the two men only if the British government
"have no means of disposing of them ... provided all the expenses of their
maintenance, and watching and safe-guarding them are borne by His Majesty's
71Government and no expense is thrown on the Straits Settlements." The Foreign
Office was thus left to resolve their dilemma without much hope of cooperation
from the Colonial authorities. The Colonial Office attitude was clear.* "The
tranquility of the Chinese in the Straits Settlements and Hong Kong is of more
importance than the lives of two so-called reformers. As a matter of fact,
they would stand a very good chance of being assassinated in Singapore as
72K'ang Yu-wei nearly was ...." The Foreign Office admitted, "This is rather 
73awkward,” while fully recognising that the two men must be disposed of
somewhere else other than in China. Finally the situation resolved itself:
Nathan to Chamberlain, ibid.
^Anderson to Luttelton, 29 Dec. 1904 (conf) in C.O. to F.O,
27 Jan. 1905, FO 17/1686. J
72Just Minutes on F.O. to C.O. 23 Nov. 1904, FO 17/1657.
7^Langley minutes on C.O. to F.O. 10 Nov. 1904, ibid.
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74Tsou Jung died in prison on 3 April, 1905, and Chang Ping-lin on his release
75
on 29 June, 1906, was taken by revolutionary comrades to Japan.
It was undoubtedly true that the Su-pao case involved much more than a
story of trial and judgment. The Chinese government in apprehending the Su-pao
journalists sought to make an example of them and curb the growth of a form of
student nationalism which was becoming increasingly a threat to the dynasty?
yet in its efforts to bring this about it ran counter to the imperialistic ten-
decies of the Shanghai foreign authorities, and in the end brought only
humiliation upon itself. On the other hand, the Municipality and the Consular
Body of Shanghai took the line they did, less out of moral or legal convictions,
than a desire to reassert their right of independent actions vis-a-vis the Settlement.
And because the Municipal Council was British-dominated, the outcome of the
case made Britain appear to be not only a sympathiser, but in the eyes of some, an
outright supporter of the revolutionary movement. Both consequences were unfortunate.
The difficulties of the Chinese case was of course complicated by the
undercurrents of rivalry between such men as Chang Chih-tung and the Nanking
Viceroy Wei Kuang-t'ao, so that the Su-pao defendants sometimes appeared to be
76
merely pawns in a political game between conservatism and progress. Yet there
were also marked failings on the part of some British observers, including
the Acting Consul-General at Shanghai, to understand fully the implications 
of the seditious articles published in the Su-pao. Mansfield regarded 
them as "mere childish ravings of ill-balanced and ignorant minds.... 
their authors I believe would be the last people to take any active part in 
carrying out the doctrines they preach . This was echoed by the
y4
Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, 1241 relates that there had been some 
suspicion that Tsou was poisoned by Manchu agents, but in Hsueh Chun-tu. op.cit.
39, no proof could be found by the committee set up by Huang Hsing in mid- 
April to investigate the cause of Tsou's death. See also Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I,
83-4; Ching Mei-chiu, "Tsui An" in HHKM II, 246.
^°Satow to F.O. 9 Mar. 1905, FO 17/1636; Chang Huanq-ch'i, op.cit. 
in HHKM I, 384-5.   ~ ----
7 A
North China Herald 31 July 1903, p. 225 col. 1 See also Townley 
to Campbell, 13 Aug. (private) FO 17/1599 Times 23 July 1903, p. 5 col. 4.
"^Mansfield to Townley, 10 July 1903, in Townley to F.O. 30 July
(conf) ibid.
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North China Herald; "Their childish vapourings would be sufficient proof of
their insignificance to any government less ignorant than that which rules at 
7R
Peking . ..." The general conclusion was that "the Chinese government has
displayed an amount of energy not to say vindictiveness worthy of a better 
79cause." These impressions were mistaken, of course. Both Tsou and Chang
were highly influential among intellectual circles in China and abroad, Tsou
Jung was the author of the widely-read tract Ko-ming Chtiri (Revolutionary
Army) which was "probably the most violent and outspoken attack on the Manchus
80
ever written by a Chinese." Chang Ping-lin was a scholar of considerable 
renown and became editor of the revolutionary Min-pao (People’s Journal) 
in 1906.
Leaving aside the issue of moral justification, one important development 
of the whole Su-pao proceedings was to encourage rather than muzzle the growth 
of revolutionary sentiment throughout the Yangtze area, after this manifestation 
of the weakness of the Manchu dynasty in its failure to prosecute the Su-pao 
writers. Student criticism of the regime became bolder both in the press and 
on the platform, and soon even the promise of constitutional reforms from the 
government failed to satisfy their radical aspirations.
It is a singular feature of Chinese history that at the time when the 
Manchu dynasty finally decided to offset the charges of lethargy and conservatism 
against it by launching epoch-making constitutional reforms, the anti-Manchu 
movement also reached a landmark on its organizational front in the founding
78North China Herald 31 July 1903, p. 226 col. 1.
79
Londonand China Express, 14 Aug. 1903, p. 634, col. 1.
80HsUeh ChUn-tu, op. cit. 14; The text of the Ko-ming Chun can 
be found in Chou Lu, op.cit. II, 419-35. A translation by J. Lust is 
forthcoming.
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of the T'ung Meng Hui (Alliance Society, or United League), This came about
mainly through the initiative of Sun Yat-sen, who saw that the extension of
revolutionary activities had resulted in the mushrooming of small anti-
dynastic societies in China and abroad. Some of these included the Hua Hsing
Hui (Society for the Resurrection of China) formed by Huang Hsing in Hunan,
1903$ the Jih Chih Hui (Society of Daily Knowledge) in Hupeh, 1904; and the
Erh-shih Shih-chi chih Chih-na (China in the 20th Century Society) in Japan,
81
1905. At the same time, the original Hsing Chung Hui had begun to decline
in affectiveness owing to the repeated failures of its uprisings and the
financial difficulties that ensued. It was felt by Sun that a revolutionary
league to unite the activities of all these different societies was necessary
to direct future movements.
In the winter of 1904, Sun Yat-sen was invited to visit Brussels by
two Hunanese overseas students, Chu Ho-chung and Ho Tzu-ts’ai. They arranged
meetings for Sun with other Chinese students in Brussels, who all displayed
enthusiasm for the revolutionary programme Sun preached. At the end of his
visit, Sun suggested that an oath of allegiance be taken from all those
present, as means of ensuring fraternity and unity. From Brussels Sun then
travelled to Berlin and Paris, where similar alliances were made with Chinese
student groups, and the same oath was taken. This was the beginning of the
82T'ung Meng Hui, and Brussels was to remain its European Headquarters.
^For Accounts of these societies, See Chou Lu, op.cit. IV,
1448; Feng Tzu-yu, "Kuang Fu Hui" in HHKM I, 515-9; Chang Nan-hsien, "Jih-chih 
Hui shih-mo" ibid I, 555-71; Chang Kuo-kan, Hsin-hai Ko-ming shih-liao 
(Shanghai 1958) 1-16s J. Fass, "Revolutionary Activity in the province of Hupeh" 
in Anchiv Orientalni XXVIII (i960), 128-9.
Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u 
ch1u-kao I, 140-4; Chu Ho-chung, "Ou-chou T’ung Meng Hui chi-shih" in Lo Chia- 
lun (ed) Ko-ming Wen-hsien II, 254-60; Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming I-shih, II, 132-41.
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In July 1905 Sun Yat-sen returned to Japan, welcomed by hundreds of
students at Yokohama. On 28 July he was introduced to Huang Hsing, and the
two agreed to amalgamate their followers to form a new revolutionary organization.
A conference was accordingly held on 30 July in Tokyo, at which leading members
°f the Hua Hsing Hui and Hsing Chung Hui were present. They chose the name
Chung-kuo Ko-ming T'ung-menq Hui for the new organization, (generally known
83
as T'ung Meng Hui.) The party programme was determined, oaths of allegiance
were taken (similar to that used by Sun in Europe) and, a set of regulations
was drawn up. The formal founding of the Society was proclaimed on 20 August,
84
1905. A mass meeting was held on that day, at which representatives from
seventeen of the eighteen provinces attended, as well as number of Japanese
sympathisers. Elections were held, and Sun Yat-sen was unanimously made
President of the Society. Huang Hsing was elected Deputy, and some Japanese,
Including Miyazaki Torazo, were accepted as members. It was decided that
85branches of the League were to be established in China and abroad.
Thus was formed the T'ung Meng Hui which would coordinate the activities 
of all the Chinese revolutionaries inside and outside of China and sustain 
their efforts until the final success In 1911. In Its organization and discipline, 
the T'ung Meng Hui surpassed all previous revolutionary societies, and . 
its membership, ranging from students to business men, militarists
“ """"""" Q3
Japanese influence on the Chinese revolutionary society was 
evident, as the characters T'ung Meng Hui had been the Chinese name of the 
Japanese society Kokumin Domeikai, established in September, 1900, to resist 
the Russian threat in Northern Asia. See M. B. Jansen, op.cit. 107-10;
Liu K'un-i, Liu K'un-i i'chi (Peking 1959) V, 2284-5.
84There appears to be some confusion regarding this date, but 
see Teng Mu-han, "Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui ch'eng-li shih-jeh k'ao" in ko~
Feng Tzu-yu, "Chi Chung-kuo T ’ung Meng Hui," in Ko-ming 
Jen-hslen II, 148; Ko-ming Wen-hslen II, 158-217 gives a complete list of T'ung 
Meng Hui members, and II, 238-242 gives the set of regulations. See also Hsti 
Yung-ying, "Dimensions of China's Unity" in Pacific Affairs. XV, 3 (1942) 302-3 
in which an interesting comparison is made between the basic planks formulated 
by Sun Yat-sen for the T’ung Meng Hui and those of Chu Ytian-chang, the founder 
of the Ming dynasty. This^the author suggests, proves that Chinese nationalism 
had its roots in China's own past, and was influenced only superficially by 
the impact of the West.
;’:3-
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to secret society agents, increased tremendously in the first few years of 
86its existence. An official organ for propaganda was soon set up, at first
by taking over the Erh-shih shih-chi chih Chih-na magazine which had already
been operated in Japan. When this was banned by the Japanese government, late
in August, the T’ung Meng Hui set up its own journal, the Min Pao (Peoples’
Journal) the first issue of which appeared on 26 November, 1905, This was
a highly successful p^ldodical, and included among its editorial staff such
brilliant writers as Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, and Chang Ping-1in after his
87
release from prison in 1906.
As the revolutionary movement progressed, the general agitation in the 
Empire was not lost on the Manchu rulers. As early as 1901, when the Court 
was still in Sian-fu, their refuge during the Boxer troubles, the Empress- 
Dowager had already decided that some measure of institutional reform along 
Western lines was necessary, if only to pacify the more radical among her critics. 
In a remarkable edict of 29 January 1901, she condemned the existing system 
of government, the corruption among the officials, and commanded the Viceroys,
Governors, and other high officials to submit opinions as to how the Empire*s
88administration might be improved. It was an unusual admission of incompetence, 
yet the edict did not seem to evoke much response. Even the London Times
T'ang Leang-li, Inner History of the Chinese Revolution 
(London 1930) 49-53 gives detailed accounts of the T’ung Meng Hui organization, 
composition and financial system. The Society is also discussed in North 
China Herald of 1 Dec. 1905, 474 col. 1-3, and in Jordan to F.O. 7 Jan, 1907,
(very c'on'f. ) in FO 371/223.
87For the Min Pao, see Man Hau, "T'ung Meng Hui shih-tai Mxn 
Pao shih-mo chi" in Ko-ming Wen-hsien II, 218-38$ Hu Han-min, "Min Pao chih 
lu-ta chu-i" in HHKM II, 261-70$ and an account in the North China. Herald 
of 19 Jan 1906, 126-7.
88The edict is discussed in S. Chu, Reformer in Modern China,
Chang Chien (New York, 1965) 59$ the Times of 7 Feb. 1901, p. 5 col. 1-2, 
and 14 Feb. p. 5 col. 4.
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observed that having regard to the previous promises of reform from the Court,
89
the main object of the present utternace was "to throw dust in foreign eyes".
It was not until 1905, when a commission of five high officials was appointed
to travel abroad for the specific purpose of learning about constitutional
government, that the Manchu attempt at constitutional reform was taken seriously.
On 7 July, 1905, the Commissioners were appointed, under the leadership
of Duke Tsai-tse. Many motives have been attributed to the Empress—Dowager
for this progressive move. At least as a matter of expediency, it was a
genuine attempt at modernization, especially after the example set by Japan
when as a modernized state, she defeated the autocratic Russian Empire in the 
901904-5 war. As for British reactions. Sir Ernest Satow in Peking was
impressed by Na T’ung's assurance that the Commission was but the first step
to a series of projected investigations of the political systems of the West,
91and that it was considered "the germ of a constitution" for China. When Satow
0A*'
learned that a visit to England was on the itine^r of the Commissioners, he 
did not hesitate to suggest that it was worthwhile showing them "some attention" 
as he considered the move "a sign that China is waking up. ^ Jhe Commissioners 
would have thus Started off in an atmosphere of optimism and goodwill, but for 
an unfortunate incident.
89Times 7 Feb. 1901, p. 5 col. 2.
90The Japanese press generally welcomed the project as herald 
of an era of reform in China. See the Times 22 July 1905, p. 5 col. 4. Other 
analyses of the Empress-Dowager1s motives are seen in J. R. Levenson, Confucian 
China and its Modern Fate (London 1958-65) II, 7-10; W. Levi, Modern China's 
Foreign Policy (Minneapolis 1953) 92-3; E-tu Zen Sun, "The Chinese Constitutional 
Mission of 1905-1906" in Journal of Modern History XXIV, 3, (1952) 251-2; Huang 
Kung-chieh and Wu Ching-hsiang, Chung-kuo Cheng-hsien Shih (Shanghai 1937) I, 
10-1; Ts'ang Fu "Li-hsien yOn-tung chih ©hin-hsing" in HHKM IV, 3-9.
91Satow to F.O. 26 July 1905 (conf.) FQ 17/1672. The London 
and China Express of 6 April 1906, p. 264 col. 1-2 also expressed optimism.
Q2
Satow to Lansdowne 10 Aug. 1905 (private) FQ 800/120.
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On 24 September, 1905, as the party was about to board a train in 
Peking on their journey abroad, a crudely-devised bomb was thrown at the 
Commissioners by an impulsive young revolutionary, Wu Ytteh, Two of the
93Commissioners were slightly injured, but Wu himself was instantly killed.
His only immediate achievement was to postpone the depai'ture of the Commissioners 
till December. Yet Wu's attempt was yet another manifestation of the growing 
terrorist tendencies among the student radicals. It also served to cause con­
siderable confusion both among the Chinese officials and foreign government 
representatives at Peking as to Wu's motive, since it was generally recognised 
that the Court's constitutional reform programme was meant chiefly to placate 
the young radicals in the country. There was speculation that the deed was 
perpetrated by the conservatives who were against innovations? by the anti-dynastic
followers of Sun Yat-sen? or by anti-foreign officials who resisted the need
94
to learn from the West. In one respect, however, Wu's martyrdom was not 
perhaps entirely in vain. The bomb incident revealed the cowardice and 
disorganization among the Chinese officials and guards in Peking, which indirectly 
furthered the revolutionary cause, in morale at least. There were accounts 
of the Chinese officials who "showed the white feather ... and the guard of
honour took to flight - the crowd of Chinese officials on the platform disappeared
9 5  9 5
like magic." A description of the aftermath readsi
93
For accounts of Wu Ytieh and his assassination attempt, see 
"Lieh-shih Wu-Ytieh chtin i-chien shu" in HHKM II, 432-7. The North China Herald 
of 3 Nov. 1905 p. 286 col. 1-3 translates an article in a contemporary Hankow 
native newspaper, which eulogized Wu as a man of wisdom, sagacity, and courage, 
and concluded that he did the country a service by eliminating (sic) the five 
Commissioners at the start, as they would not have been able to achieve anything 
anyway. See also Satow to F.O. 5 Oct. 1905, FQ 17/1673, and his diary entry 
for 24 Sept. 1905, PRO 30/33, 16/8
94Conflicting analyses of the situation can be seen in North 
China Herald 29 Sept. 1905, p. 705 col. 2-3, p. 733, col. 2\ London and 
China Express 29 Sept. p. 758, col. 1, leading article, Satow to F.O. 6 Oct, 
ibid, and Satow to Lansdowne, 5 Oct (private) FO 800/120.
9^Satow to Lansdowne, ibid.
^From a private letter reprinted in IlodJa^hijaa^Haiald 6 Oct. 
1905, p.25 col.3.
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",.. there seems to be a regular panic in Peking, and the wildest 
reports are accepted as true by the more timid and credulous ...
The fear of reprisals seems to have pervaded the atmosphere of Peking 
during the last few days, so that everyone is on the qui vive and panic 
lurks alike within the Imperial Palaces as inside the more unpretentious 
dwelling places of the various Ministers of State and subordinate members 
of the great Boards.”
Ylian Shih-k'ai for one attached much importance to the incident, and went so
far as to request the cooperation of the Hong Kong government for assistance
97in tracing the men responsible for the outrage. Much was also read into
the sudden return of the Court from the Summer Palace in October, three weeks
in advance of the arranged date. "They are all thoroughly frightened,1 reported 
98
Satow.
After this brief interlude, the Commissioners finally left on 11 December,
with replacements for the two injured envoys. The mission travelled in two
groups, one visiting Japan, England, France and Belgium, and the other the
United States and the German Empire. On their return in July and August of
1906, a number of Imperial decrees were promulgated upon their recommendations
for practical steps to be taken in the reform of the government. On 26 August,
Prince Ch’un, brother of the Emperor, was ordered to head a committee for the
examination of the Commissioners’ memorials. On 1 and 2 September, edicts promised
the eventual adoption of constitutional government as well as the appointment
of officials for supervising the reorganization of the government machinery.
99On 13 August 1907, a Bureau for Constitutional Planning was established,
97Nathan to Satow, 1 Oct. 1905 (private) PRO 30/33 9/17.-
98Satow to Lansdowne, 19 Oct. (private) FQ 800/120. See also 
Satow tel. F.O. 9 Oct (secret) in FO 17/1675.
99These measures are discussed in E-tu Zen Sun, op.cit. 265-6;
Chang Peng-ydan Liang Ch'i-ch’ao yti, Ch'ing-chi ko-ming (Taiwan, 1964)
183-4; S. Chu, op.cit. 64; Ts'ang Fu, op,cit. in HHKM IV, 5-6; and "Li-hsien 
chih-wen" ibid. 17-20.
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News of these progressive measures was received with approval from the foreign
press^00 and Sir John Jordan, (1852-1925) the new British Minister in Peking,
reported that the edicts were welcomed throughout the country and celebrations
101were held by the officials, the gentry and the people at large.
Yet before long, as the novelty of the Imperial pronouncements wore
off, and the immediate results turned out to be a mere reshuffling of government 
ministries, the superficiality of the Manchu constitutional movement was 
recognised. For one thing, the now famed Commissioners in their hurried
journey could only have grasped the faintest impression of all the new technical
appliances and political institutions paraded before their eyes. It dawned 
upon intelligent observers that perhaps China, unlike Japan, was not quite ready 
for constitutional government in the form it was proposed to adopt. Only a
Times 3 Sept, 1906, p, 7 col. 2-3 leading article; London 
and China Express 7 Sept. 1906 p. 675-6. The Times of 15 Sept. p. 5 col. 2 
gives an account of the 14 members of the deliberative committee, and hopefully 
suggests that although mostly of the conservative clique, they were sure to 
recognise the signs of the times and concede much in principle.
101Jordan to F.O. 21 Feb. 1908, FO 371/425.
Jordan had joined the China Consular Service in 1876 as a student interpreter 
in Peking, and by the time he became Minister in September 1906, he had acquired 
deep knowledge of all things Chinese, and his appointment was viewed from all 
sides with unqualified satisfaction. He soon fulfilled all the expectations 
made of him. The North China Herald of 4 Jan. 1907 p. 29 col. 2 commented;
"With an intimate knowledge of China and her affairs, he combines a broad-minded 
and sympathetic grasp of British interests in the Far Hast in all their variety 
and ramifications ...” Arnold Robertson of the Peking Legation in a letter 
(private) to the Foreign Office, F0 371/233; "1 hope it is fully realized at
home what a splendid Minister we have here. He is worth the whole of the rest 
of his colleagues put together, and is universally liked and respected. It is 
a genuine pleasure to work under him." Other testimonials to Jordan's popularity 
and efficiency can be seen in P. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (London 
1922) p. 51, C. A. Middleton-Smith, The British in' China (London 1920) p. 88-9;
C. Pearl, Morrison of Peking (Australia 1967) 192. See also Lau Kit-ching,
"Sir John Jordan and the Affairs in China, 1906-1916, with special reference 
to the 1911 Revolution and Yhan Shih-k'ai," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University 
of London, 1967.
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small percentage of the population knew what a constitution was, and until the 
official mentality could be reformed, no thorough-going changes would be possible.
As the North China Herald pointed out, there could be detected in China three 
groups interested in the constitutional movements the intelligent and genuine 
reformers, those who were using the reform cry for their own personal ends,
102
and the majority of the country who had little appreciation of the word "reform"
In a final review, the conclusion was increasingly apparent as the government
103soon reverted to its old reactionary ways, that constitutional government 
as advocated by the Ch’ing dynasty was meant to attain goals other than those 
of genuine political reforms to ward off revolutionary tendencies, divert the 
attention of the radicals, to centralize the Manchu hold over the country, and 
perhaps to impress the outside world that the dynasty was able to reorganize 
its own house when it so desired. These impressions were soon obvious to the 
Britons interested in the affairs of China, and the initial enthusiasm for the 
Manchu "awakening" soon gave way to scepticism and disappointment. The British 
government was warned to tread cautiously and not take too much to heart the 
promises of the Manchu Court, nor to apply to China the analogy of Japan and 
her modernization movement. When Sir John Jordan recounted the insignificant 
reforms so far undertaken as a result of the constitutional programme, the 
Foreign Office was forced to observe: "If no more than this Is to come out
North China Herald 21 Sept. 1906, p. 673-4, leading article.
Other discussions are found in "li-hsien chi-wen" in HHKM IV, 13-7; W. Levi, 
op.cit. 93-4; E-tu Zen Sun, op.cit. 265-7; London and China Express 25 0ct„i907, 
p. 810 - col. 1-2, 24 Aug. 1906, p. 642-3.
*1 no
See Jordan to F.O. 21 Feb. 1908, FQ 371/428, with an account 
of the impeachment of progressive officials in Peking, and their replacement 
with known reactionaries.
104
The North China Herald leading article of 21 Sept, 1906, p. 674 
col. 1-2; Anchibald Colquhoun's special article in London and China Express of 
28 Sept. 1906 supplement, and 5 Oct. supplement; the Times of 8 Nov. 1906, p. 5 col.2.
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of the Commissioners sent to Europe and the United States, it is a case of 
105’ridiculous mus'" Thus Britain dismissed, for the time being, interest
in the movement for political reforms, though the idea of constitutionalism
thus aroused in China was to snowball until the emergence of a constitutionalist
party which, having obtained control over some of the new political institutions
towards the end of the decade, was to become one of the forces contributing
106
to the final downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty itself.
Meanwhile, the Manchu brand of constitutionalism did not appeal to the
student revolutionaries either and they continued their agitation and anti-
dynastic activities with growing defiance. As the number of Chinese students
in Japan grew and unruliness increased, both the Chinese and Japanese governments
decided that stricter forms of control were necessary. The Chinese government
in 1903 sent a resident commissioner to Japan for the purpose of supervision,
and the Japanese government, in December 1905, promulgated a series of regulations
meant to govern the conduct of Chinese students. The students in Tokyo immediately
took offence at this latter curb on their freedom; mass meetings were held,
manifestos issued and about nine thousand students went on strike. Then when
the Japanese authorities refused to modify the regulations, a body of some eight
thousand students resolved to return home immediately to found their own school
in Shanghai. A hot-headed revolutionary from Hunan, and author of a stirring
revolutionary tract Meng-hui t’ou (Awake!) Ch" en T’ien-hua, committed suicide
107in Japan as part of the protest. Student excitement was again at a pitch,
105Campbell minutes on Jordan to FO 11 July 1907, FQ 371/224.
■^^See Chang P' eng-yban, "The Constitutionalists and the Chinese 
Revolution of 1911" unpublished paper presented at the Research Conference on 
the Chinese Revolution of 1911, New Hampshire, 1965.
107Ch’en's suicide is recounted in Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, 1265-71;
E.P. Young, op.cit. 114-46; Ts’ao ga-po, "Chfen T'ien-hua t’ou-hai” in HHKM 
II, 235-41; also see Brunner, Mond and Co. to F.O. 29 Apr. 1907, containing 
extracts from letters of their agent in Shan-ghai, FQ 371/220.
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there was talk of slavery under both Japanese and Manchu rulers, and pamphlets
were widely distributed in Japan and Shanghai. The returned students also
managed to raise the necessary funds to establish their own school in the
Foreign Settlement, the Chung-kuo Kung-hstteh (Chinese Public S c h o o l T h e s e
and other student activities were watched with apprehension by the Chinese
government as well as the foreigners in China, and to the latter the worst
element in the situation was the fact that the officials, both at the capital
and in the provinces, seemed afraid of these students. Many of the minor
local officials, especially, appeared dazzled by the supposed knowledge of the
109students and were quite unable to restrain them.
It is reasonable to believe that the British Consular officials in 
China saw the link between these student movements and the existence of 
the T'ung Meng Hui, which they often misnamed the Ko-ming Tang. ,In a lengthy
\ ] V r
despatch from Warren in Shanghai, Sir John Jordan was supplied/a translation
from the Nan-fang Pao of 15 December, 1906, containing surprisingly accurate
information regarding the organization and leadership of the T'ung Meng Hui.
The relation of radical students, army personnel and secret societies to the
110
revolutionary society was clearly established. As the Consulates were
chiefly concerned with the possibility of lawlessless and disorder, or even
xenophobia, if student nationalism went too far, a gradual disillusionment
with the new education which was responsible for these upheavals was prevalent.
The acting Consul at Changsha, B. Giles, reported to the secretary at the
111Peking Legation, L. D. Carnegie;
^^See Ching Mei-chiu, "Tsui An" in HHKM II, 242-4; Times 15
Dec. 1905, p. 6 col. 1-2; North China Herald 12 Jan. 1906, p. 50 col. 2-3.
109Reports to this effect came from Brunner, Mond and Co. to
F.O. of 29 Apr. 1907, ibid; Satow to F.O. 7 Mar 1906, FQ 371/33; North China
Herald 12 Jan. 1906, p. 51 col. 2.
110Warren to Jordan, 24 Dec. 1906, enclosed in Jordan to F.O.
7 Jan. 1907, FO 371/223.
1 U Carnegie to F.O. 3 Sept. 1906, FO 371/40.
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"There is no doubt that they (the students) have succeeded in thoroughly 
alienating the sympathy of the people throughout Hunan, and there seems 
to be a general feeling that the new learning, judged by its results, is
not a desirable acquisition, and that it would be no loss to the province
if the schools were abolished
Campbell at the Foreign Office concluded, "A good illustration of the saying
112
that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing."
And yet there were other Englishmen in China, outside o.f official
circles, who viewed the student movement in a different light. "The desire 
of the people for progress seems to be real, though not at present always well- 
informed. In the great changes we have seen in Japan it was the government
113that led the pople; in China it Is the people who are urging the government
The London Times also observed:" There are genuine aspirations and excellent
intentions stirring among wide circles In the Chinese ... there is the dawning
of a national sense for which while it develops itself wisely we at any rate
114
can have nothing but sympathy ..."
Thus far, student nationalism had only been expressed in sporadic spells
of harassment against the government. In 1905 and 1908 however, two incidents
demonstrated that given a cause, the students and merchants of China were capable
of much cohesive behaviour.
In 1905 the merchants with full backing from the student body, staged
a boycott against American products. It was the first time that Chinese
national feeling became a mass-based political movement, and it displayed a
unity among the people never before seen. The occasion for this upheaval was
the United States Immigration Laws, Since the summer of 1904 negotiations had
been in progress to replace the 1894 Exclusion Treaty by which the American
—  _  .
Campbell minutes on above, ibid.
11 3
North China Herald, 6 April 1906, p. 264 col. 2.
114Times 3 Sept. 1906, p. 7 col. 3, leading article.
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government had the right to prohibit for ten years the immigration of Chinese
labour. In practice the Treaty had given way to various abuses, and in
August 1904 and March 1905 the Chinese government had drafted new treaties which
would revise the existing conditions. The drafts were not accepted, and when
the nature of these negotiations became known, the restrictive proposals of
the United States government were much resented, especially by those Chinese
who had personal acquaintance with the United States. The merchants and
students in the ^ lajor ports and cities now took up the issue and demanded that
the Exclusion Laws be repealed rather than revised. As a means of enforcing
115their demands, they decided to utilize the boycott as a political weapon.
On 10 May 1905, a meeting of merchants and notables took place in the
Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, when a boycott of American goods
was decided upon. This decision was telegraphed to various merchant guilds
at twenty-two other treaty ports, and similar meetings were convened throughout
the month in other areas. In June, the native newspapers in Peking declined
advertisements of American goods and published letters and telegraphs from all
X X(3parts of China urging the central government to stand firm in the matter.
At the same time, a petition was sent by the Chinese students of the Anglo-
Chinese College at Foochow, through the American Consul to the President of
the United States, containing suggestions as to how the question could best 
117be settled. On 16 July, a merchant Feng Hsia-wei committed suicide in front
For a history of the Exclusion Acts and the working of 
the system, see E, J. M. Rhoads, "Nationalism and xenophobia in Kwangtung: 
the Canton anti-American boycott and the Lienchow anti-missionary uprising" 
in Harvard University, Papers on China XVI, (1962) 154-5; Liu Yen, Ti-kuo 
chu-i ya-p' o Chung-kuo shih (Shanghai"~1927) I, 304-8J S. W. Kung, Chinese in 
American Life (Seattle 1962) 82-5; Liu Kwang-ching, Americans and Chinese(Cambridge 
Mass.”1963) 24-6; H. F. MacNair, The Chinese Abroad 79-90; C. F. Remer, A 
Study of Chinese Boycotts, (Baltimore 1933) 29-31; and Satow to F.O. 7 Mar. 1906,
FQ 371733]
■^^Chang Ts’un-wu, Chung-Mei KUng-yueh feng-ch'ao (Taiwan 1966) 43-6
Times 28 June 1905, p. 5 col. 5.
1 1 7
Satow to F.O. 7 Mar. 1905,ibid; North China Herald 6 Sept.
1907, p. 541-col. 3.
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of the American Consulate in Shanghai. His martyrdom was to lead to massive
118
demonstrations in Canton in mid-October when his remains arrived for internment.
On 20 July the active boycott began, and the mass meetings and extreme agitation
lasted till the beginning of September, when a typhoon at Shanghai destroyed
the boycott goods in most warehouses, and the boycotting merchants became
the chief sufferers. This was perhaps more effective in dampening the spirit
of agitation than the decree issued by the Chinese government on 31 August,
commanding the provincial authorities to exert themselves in suppressing 
119the movement.
The attitude of the Chinese government in this crisis was in fact open
J
to much speculation. The authorities certainly did not overexert themselves 
in trying to stem the agitation, and in one instance the Governor of Kwangtung 
Ts'en Ch'un-hsttan even urged the central government, if the United States should 
complain of the boycott, to reply that "there was no law in China to compel 
the people to buy any special quality of goods, or to raise a boycott.1 
It was also generally alleged that both Prince Ch'ing and the Empress-Dowager 
were in favour of the movement, and sought to use the commercial and student
See M. Field, "The Chinese Boycott of 1905" in Harvard University, 
Papers on China XI, (1957) 69-70; Rhoads, op.cit. 158; Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming 
i-shih I, 167, III, 230; Woo Sing-lim, The Prominent Chinese in Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong 1937) Part II, p. 8.
119Detailed accounts of the progress of the movement are given 
in M. Field, op.cit. 63-98; Rhoads, op.cit. 154-66; Remer, op.cit. 29-39;
C.O. to F.O. 21 Oct. 1905, enclosing Nathan to Lyttelton, 8 Sept. (conf)
FQ 17/1690; Chang Ts’un-wu, op.cit. 46-144.
^^Quoted in Satow to F.O. 7 Mar. 1906, FQ 371/33; See also Chang 
Ts'un-wu op.cit. 198-9 for an analysis of Ts’en's policies. Ts'en (Ch'en) 
Ch'un-hstian was a chli-jen in 1885, and subsequently filled various posts in 
Peking, Kwangtung and Kansu. He escorted the Court in its flight to Sian during 
the Boxer rebellion, and as result became one of the favourites of the Empress- 
Dowager. His appointment to Canton was welcomed by the British who saw in him 
an energetic and able minister. See the Times 20 April 1903, and Townley 
to F.O. 23 April 1903, FO 17/1598.
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elements to promote what in their own weakness they were not able to accomplish; 
a reassertion of China's place on the international scene and her determination 
to claim equality of treatment. A first-hand American observer in Hupeh 
alleged that he saw copies of official proclamations against the boycott 
at the time, and that "most of them had been posted upside-down, which was
121
sufficient hint to the populace that they were not to be taken seriously."
On the other hand, the genuine grievances of the Chinese were also
generally recognised, and American policy often came under open attack. The
British press in particular was in sympathy with the Chinese nationalists.
The London and China Express noted signs that the Washington administration
was "seriously alarmed" and that almost all the United States newspapers admitted
122
the justification for the Chinese resentment. The North China Herald
claimed that though it was not upholding the boycott, "it must be conceded
that only under very strong provocations would such devoted traders as the Chinese
are, cut off their own trade; and they would promptly resume that trade if
they could be assured that China is to be fairly treated, not merely on paper,
123
but in fact, when a new treaty is made,," The reformer K'ang Yu-wei, who
was visiting the United States at the time, also issued a critique of American
policy? "The Chinese only want fair play .... They say 'We admit all Americans,
124
why should we not insist that America should admit all physically fit Chinese?1"
J2l
Quoted from Remer, op.cit. 34. The indifference of the Chinese 
government is also discussed in S. W. Kung, op.cit. 89; MacNair, op.cit. 307-10;
M. Field, op.cit. 63, 83-6; Satow to Lansdowne, 10 Aug 1905, (private) FO 800/120. 
122
London and China Express 28 July 1905, p. 573 col. 2; in its 
11 August issue it also carried a rumour that the boycott was actually engineered 
in the United States by great capitalists, who desired an unlimited supply of 
cheap coolie labour from China. The idea was to frighten the Federal government 
by means of the boycott into yielding to the Chinese in the matter of the 
Exclusion Bill. See London and China Express of 11 Aug, 1905, p.631 col. 2 leader.
123
North China Herald 28 July 1905, p. 189 col. 3.
124
Quoted from the New York Evening Post of 26 June, 1905, in H.K. 
Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore,
1956) 2227 see also Lo Jung-pang, K’ang Yu-wei, 198-9.
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Whatever the rights and wrongs of the case, the 1905 boycott is
important because it serves as a convenient yardstick for the study of Chinese
nationalism. The movement revealed a significant degree of cooperation and
unity of purpose among the Chinese educated and middle classes, generally regarded
as the early manifestation of modern Chinese nationalism, although the actual
125
economic effects of the boycott were minimal. The students, however,
supplied the movement with its main driving force, and some of the more radical
among them saw in the immigration issue one more opportunity to expose the
weaknesses -of the Ch*ing government. These became the active agitators, and
from their ranks came the principal speakers at the numerous rallies. Sir
Ernest Satow even went so far as to suggest that Japanese influence being so
strong among the younger generation of Chinese, there was need to beware of
Japanese ambitions in China, and "we must not be under any illusion as to the
126
(Anglo-Japanese) Alliance being of an economic advantage to us."
For Great Britain indeed, the anti-American boycott proved an awkward
situation. While the English press at home and in China displayed open sympathy 
with the Chinese cause and applauded the birth of a new national spirit in that 
Empire, it was not possible for London officially to take such an humanitarian 
stand without danger of jeopardizing Anglo-American relations. In mid- 
November 1905, the United States ambassador called at the Foreign Office with
The commercial losses were only slight, though it did spotlight 
the Chinese problem and bring about some improvements in the immigration conditions. 
The Exclusion Laws were not repealed until 1943, See Remer, op.cit. 34-5; P.
Varg, Missionaries, Chinese and Diplomats (Princeton 1958) 125-8; Chang Ts'un-wu, 
op.cit. 237-42; See also Akira Iriye, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy" in 
A. Feuerwerker, et al. (ed) Approaches to Modern Chinese History (California 
1967) 216-38, in which he studies the boycotts of 1905 and 1908 as the
starting points of a real Chinese public opinion.
l26Satow to Grey, 31 Mar 1906, FQ 800/43.
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an official complaint from the Consul-General in Singapore concerning the
anti-American activities of many of the Chinese residents there. The Consul
127
desired repressive action to be taken by the Straits government. The 
Colonial Office, when consulted, was in no mood to cooperate. "Unless the 
law is infringed, I do not see that we can interfere or that we ought to do so.
The danger of offending the most important element of the population is too
128great to be lightly risked." They were clearly more interested in the
merchant classes than inecorfomiC/ddyaAt^^jre^^^herent in courting the local i
• a  ^^ .. ^ 4 ± « r» j j _______— .l. i__r* ~  r\££ 1»»•Fiddes at the Colonial Office added: "I quite agree
that we ought''not to oe"dragged into the quarrel so long as it is merely
129
between the Chinese and the United States ...." The Colonial authorities
would only ask for a report from the Straits Governor Sir John Anderson
130(1858-1918). It was soon known that Anderson was also sympathetic with the
/
Chinese resentment against the treatment of their countrymen in the United
States, and saw no need to act beyond a warning to the boycott leaders that
they would be held responsible for any outbreak of violence or intimidation
131in connection with the movement.
admitted,
These attitudes, of course, gave Satow in Peking an uneasy time. He 
132
127
F.O. to C.O. 22 Nov. (conf.) CO 273/315.
128An unsigned memorandum on above, ibid.
129
Fiddes minutes on above, ibid.
130
C.O. to F.O. 29 Nov, FO 17/1690.
131
Anderson to C.O. 26 Dec. 1905 (conf. ) CO 273/310.
132
Satow to F.O. 7 Mar. 1906, FQ 371/33 His position is 
reiterated in a Foreign Office Memo respecting the political condition of China 
during 1906-1907, in FQ 371/220.
220
"My position, when appealed to, was a delicate one. If at the 
instance of the British subjects I had protested to the Chinese 
government and provincial authorities against the boycotting of 
goods in which British subjects were interested, the result would 
probably have been the extension of the boycott to Britain also 
... to say to the Chinese agitators they must not prohibit the 
purchase of certain articles because they were not American but 
British was impossible without implicitly recognising the boycott of 
American goods as legitimate ..."
But there was an object-lesson which Satow and the other foreign 
governments interested in China learned from the events of 1905; as a result 
of this patriotic spirit' among the Chinese, there were now new forces to be 
reckoned with in their dealings with China. The boycott movement had shown 
that when.there"were broad objectives to be gained, the Chinese were willing
0 ^33
to make sacrifices, economic or otherwise, to attain their goals. The 
unity of purpose shown on this occasion was generally regarded as unprecedented 
in Chinese history; men of the North and South, of the coast and interior,
13were learning to forget their provincial prejudices and to make common cause.
In this way the 1905 boycott movement was really the forerunner of a more 
mature nationalism in the next two decades, and when this national spirit was 
so often manoeuvred by those who harboured anti-Manchu sentiments, then the 
boycott was also a step forward in the revolutionary movement.
Three years later, another popular movement of this nature occurred 
in Kwangtung, this time a boycott against Japanese goods. As will be seen, 
the years after 1905 saw a series of revolutionary uprisings organised under 
the aegis of the T’ung Meng Hui, and one of the chief sources of illegal 
armaments for the revolutionaries were unscrupulous arms-dealers in Japan.
133Remer, op.cit. p. 35 points out that the boycott is an expensive 
weapon, as it must be effective to be successful.
134This aspect was brought out in the Times of 29 July 1905, 
p. 5 col. 4 and the North China Herald of 29 Sept. 1905, p. 706 col. 1. See 
also M. Coolidge, Chinese Immigration (New York 1909) 483-4.
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The contraband goods were usually smuggled into Hong Kong or Macao, from 
whence they found their way into various points in China to be used in 
insurrections. The Chinese government was well aware of this state of affairs, 
and had repeatedly appealed to the British Colonial authorities to see that 
Hong Kong take the necessary preventive measures. On the whole the H^ng 
Kong government had been extremely cooperative, though it was sometimes difficult 
to get the Portuguese authorities at Macao to act conjointly to make the
135
prohibitive measures doubly effective. Out of this arose the "Tatsu Maru” 
incident of 1908.
On 5 February, 1908, the Japanese steamer ’’Tatsu Maru” carrying on
board some thirty cases of rifles and forty cases of ammunition, consigned by
a Japanese firm in Hong Kong to a munitions dealer in Macao, was seized by
the Canton Customs authority near Macao. These officials allegedly hauled
down the Japanese flag, entered the ship, made off with some articles on
board, and subjected the crew to gross ill-treatment. The steamer was then
136taken to Canton and detained there. The Japanese government lost no time 
in communicating with the Canton authorities, who countered that the ship was
j 35
See Nathan to C.O. 24 Mar 1905 (conf.) CO 129/328 in which 
he explains in detail the measures Hong Kong had been taking to discourage the 
arms traffic. Further correspondence between the Chinese Legation and the 
Foreign Office in London regarding this can be seen in FQ 371/228,
1 3b
Memo from the Japanese Minister 7 Mar 1908, FO 371/425; the 
Portuguese Minister to F.O. 21 Feb ibid; also see the Times 6 Mar 1908, p. 7 
col. 1 which concludes that "it is undeniably a cause of grievance for China 
that friendly powers should assist Chinese subjects to carry on a trade in 
arms of which the ultimate destination is undoubtedly Kwangtung and Kwangsi, 
where the Chinese authorities already have no light task in suppressing piracy 
and revolutionary movements.”
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on Chinese territorial waters at the time, and that the cargo was meant for 
smuggling to the revolutionaries. The Chinese government offered to release 
the ship on the following terms: an explanatory statement from the ship­
owner, the arms on board to be detained for further investigation, and an 
apology rendered for the tearing down of the Japanese flag. The terms were
not accepted, and the Chinese then suggested that the case be referred to the
137British Admiral for arbitration.
Although the Admiralty readily consented to arbitrate between the two 
138governments, both Jordan and the British Foreign Office were reluctant to
interfere, Jordan felt that "Active intervention on our part might I fear
expose us to a charge of holding the Canton government responsible for piracy,
139and at the same time encourage the importation of arms for their use,"
The Foreign Office also considered that the dispute was really between China
and Japan,, and that "it will be rather an invidious task, and I should rather
140hope it will not come up." Sir Edward Grey was even more emphatic: "It
is not a matter in which we should interfere at all, unless we do it at the
141request of both China and Japan," and again, "Better leave it alone till
142
we are asked to do anything." Nevertheless, Jordan did on 12 March
approach the Japanese Minister at the request of the Wai-wu Pu in a strictly
informal manner, and conveyed to the Japanese the Chinese terms, now modified
143to meet the Japanese half way. The Japanese government however, would not 
. „
x 'Jordan tel. F.O. 3 Mar 1908, FO 371/425.
■^Admiralty to F.O. 7 Mar 1908, ibid.
139Confidential note in Jordan tel. F.O. 25 Feb. ibid.
140F.O. minutes on Jordans1 tel. of 3 Mar. ibid.
141
Grey minutes on Admiralty to F.O. 7 Mar. ibid.
142
Grey minutes on MacDonald’s tel. of 10 Mar ibid.
^^Jordan tel. 12 Mar ibid.
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be satisfied and stipulated that they would accept a settlement only on their
terms: the Viceroy of Canton to censure the officials responsible for hauling
down the flag, and expiatory salutes to be fired by Chinese warships in the
vicinity of the "Tatsu Mam's" anchorage and in the presence of the Japanese
Consul in Canton? the immediate release of the ship? the arms and ammunition
to be purchased by the Chinese for 21,400 yen? the punishment of the guilty
officials after investigation? and finally, China to pay an indemnity for the
actual losses caused by the detention of the ship, the amount to be agreed
between the Viceroy and the Japanese Consul at Canton. The bitter pill of
these demands was sugared by the promise that in future the Japanese government
144would take effective steps to prevent the further export of arms to Macao.
This was effective at least to the extent that the British Foreign Office
regarded that "The Japanese proposal as to the latter part ( i.e. the
promise) is reasonable and Jordan was asked to do all he could unofficially
145to bring about a speedy settlement. On the other hand, the Chinese government
had obviously hoped for British support by asking for their arbitration
in the dispute, and now with this hope gone, there was no choice but to
146comply with all the Japanese demands. While Grey and the British government
prided themselves on having indirectly averted an ugly Sino-Japanese confronts- 
147tion, popular feeling in the Southern provinces was once again aroused
144 ^
MacDonald tel. F.O. 12 Mar.ibid, and F.O. tel. MacDonald,
21 Mar ibid.
145
F.O. tel. Jordan, 16 Mar ibid.
"^MacDonald tel. F.O. 17 Mar ibid.
147See MacDonald tel. of 17 March, ibid and Grey's minutes on 
Jordan's tel. of 17 Mar: "Anyhow we and Jordan get some credit from our ally,
and I hope the Chinese are giving us credit too - they have just as much 
reason as the Japanese have."
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because of the high-handed manner of the Japanese., and the supineness, as they
saw its of the Chinese government in dealing with them. It was an occasion
for another outburst of agitated national sentiment.
In protest against the "Tatsu Mam" affair, the merchants and students
of Canton and vicinity staged a boycott against Japanese goods. Support for
the movement soon spread to Hong Kong, which was now under the governorship
148
of Sir Frederick Lugard (1858-1954). The Japanese government lost no time
in approaching the British authorities with a request for cooperation in stopping
the anti-Japanese agitation both in the Colony and in Canton, apparently
the headquarters of the m o v e m e n t . W h e n  appealed to. Sir John Jordan, who
had done so much behind the scenes to bring about the very settlement against
150
which the Chinese were now protesting, quite naturally felt that:
148
Sir Frederick Lugard resigned his commision in the army 
in 1906 because he was dissatisfied with the restraints imposed on him. 
When offered the governorship of Hong Kong, he accepted reluctantly, and 
throughout his term of office never felt completely happy. He was a 
man who loved independent action, and as a Colonial Governor, he was 
intolerant of the authority exercised over him from the Colonial Office 
in London. He confessed to feeling "horribly circumscribed" and matters 
were not improved when he found that he could not get along with his 
chief assistant, the Colonial Secretary, F. H. May. Nevertheless he was 
an energetic administrator, sometimes overly so according to the Colonial . 
authorities in London, and in his handling of the boycott incident in 
Hong Kong we find yet another instance of his independent spirit coming 
in conflict with the routine of Civil Service. See the two volumes on his 
life by M. Perham, Lugard, the Years of Adventure, 1858-1898 (London,
1956) and Lugard, the Years of Authority, 1898-1945 (London, 1960).
149
MacDonald tel. 30 Apr. 1908, FO 371/425.
150
Jordan tel. 2 May 1908, ibid.
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"... with Chinese public feeling in its present state, any active 
intervention on our part might eventually react to the detriment 
of our own trade. I would suggest that it would be a friendly act 
on our part towards Japan if the Consul were instructed to point 
out to the Viceroy the desirability on general grounds, that the 
boycott should be discontinued. His representations should however, 
not savour of interference; and he might, to prove our disinterest­
edness, point out that the boycott is an actual benefit, though 
perhaps a temporary one, to British trade."
However, this diplomatic suggestion, when carried out, did not seem effective
in curbing the excitement among the Chinese merchants^/and students, and
the Viceroy at Canton seemed disinclined to interfere for fear of further
rousing popular agitation. The situation was getting out of hand, and increasingly
anti-dynastic too. A "National Disgrace Society" was formed in Canton, and
expressions such as "the country's shame" began appearing frequently in the 
151native press. On 1 and 2 November, serious rioting occurred in Hong Kong,
the work of agents sent from the "National Disgrace Society". Lugard quickly
took repressive measures, and seven ringleaders were banished from the 
152
Colony. Later when the Japanese government requested that the Hong Kong
authorities might be instructed to suppress further boycott activities, the
Colonial Office knew that only a brief reminder to Lugard would have been 
153sufficient. By the end of the year, the agitation both in Hong Kong and
151These developments were observed and reported by Jordan in 
his tel. of 6 May ibid; the British Consul-General in Canton, in Jordan tel.
14 May ibid. See also the Japanese Note to F.O. 1 Dec. 1908, CO 129/353.
152
There was some criticism of Lugard1s high-handedness in 
dealing with the situation, mainly because he acted on his own initiative 
without first consulting the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office was also 
mindful of the possibility of causing protests against Lugard’s conduct 
among the British home public. Just commented: "Sir Frederick Lugard
certainly doesn’t need inciting, and it is conceivable that he needs 
restraining." Just minutes'on F.O. to C.O. 2 Dec. 1908, also see the 
comments of Harding, Fiddes and Seely, ibid.
153C.O. tel. Lugard, 8 Dec, ibid. Lord Crewe personally drafted
an addendum to the telegraph: "You will of course, inform me beforehand if
you consider any exceptional measures necessary."
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Canton had subsided considerably. It was now a time of more direct revolution­
ary activities, and the Canton agitators had other outlets for their anti- 
dynastic zeal.
The Chinese revolutionary movement entered clearly into a new 
phase after 1905, when the T ’ung Meng Hui began to organise a series of armed 
insurrections against the Ch'ing authorities in various parts of the country. 
Revolutionary activities moved from speech-making and literary campaigns to 
actual confrontations with the agents of the government, and the students 
joined forces with segments of the army and the secret societies. Yet during 
this period of action the British government in London continued to receive 
reports from its observers in China that there was a "reform" movement in the 
Empire, and that it was worthy of support. The Su-pao case and the boycotts 
had demonstrated London’s difficulties in formulating any policy in China. 
Reform in China, especially when led by the educated classes, must certainly 
be encouraged; but If reform and national strengthening went too far, there 
was always the danger of another xenophobic outbreak. There was also the need
to placate the Chinese government as far as possible to maintain smooth
S-C?
Anglo-Chinese relations, yet not too far as to alienate the British merchants 
in the Yangtze who were in the main sympathetic to the Chinese reformers and 
revolutionaries. Thus Britain’s attitudes towards the Chinese revolutionary 
movement continued to modulate and waver until the final revolution in 1911.
CHAPTER VI
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND T'UNG MENG HUI ACTIVITIES, 1905-1911
The Kuang-hsU period
It has been seen that after the return of the Imperial Commissioners
from their fact-finding mission abroad, the Manchu Government initiated a
programme of gradual constitutional reforms. In September 1906, the
recommendations in the memorials presented by the Commissioners were
endorsed, and in November a series of changes began in ten government
departments. On 20 September 1907, the Court authorised the establishment
of national and provinicial assemblies,^ and in July 1908, the regulations
governing the organization, membership and functions of the Provincial
Councils (Tzu I ChU) and the Senate or National Assembly (Tzu Cheng YUan)
2
were promulgated. On 27 August, 1908, came the announcement of the basic 
principles of China’s Constitution, which would be granted at the end of 
nine years’ preparation.3
News of these developments was greeted with some optimism in the
British Foreign Office.4 The British seemed especially pleased that the
:
Tsai Tse, et.al. "Ch'h-shih ko-kuo ta- ch’en tsou-ch'mg 
hsllan-pu li-hsien che" in HHKM XV, 24-47; Jordan to F.O., 3 Oct. 1907, FO 371/ 
224. For other accounts of the constitutional movement, see M.E. Cameron,
The Reform Movement in China 1898-1912 (Stanford, 1931, reprinted New York,
1963) 100-135; Wu Chih-fang, Chinese Government and Politics (Shanghai 1934) 
31-55; Hu Shang-wu & Chin Ch’ung-chi, Lun Ch’ing-mo ti li-hsien yttn-tung 
(Shanghai, 1959) 22-51; H.M. Vinacke, Modern Constitutional Development in
China (Princeton, 1920) 48-93.
1
Ts'ang-fu, "Li-hsien yVjn-tung chih chin-hsing" in HHKM IV, 6-7; 
Jordan to F.O., 22 July 1908, and 19 August, 1908, FQ 37l/433.
3Ts'ang-fu, ibid, 7; H.M. Vinacke, opcit. 79-80.
4See Alston's Minutes on Jordan to F.O., 2 Sept. 1908, FO 371/433: 
"The language of these Decrees is wonderful!" and "The Chinese are quite right 
not to hurry."
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Chinese were approaching constitutionalism by a slow and cautious process.
Sir John Jordan, the Minister at Peking, was alone unenthusiastic about the
prospects of constitutional rule in China. Recognising that the Chinese
plans for constitutional government were based closely on the Japanese model,
he felt that "...the march of events in Japan can furnish no safe criterion
for a programme of radical measures in a continent such as China is, and in
any case there is no sufficient number of qualified leaders and experts
available to bring the schemes into effective execution all over the Empire
5in the time allotted." Jordan insisted that conditions in China in the 
1900’s would constitute formidable obstacles to a satisfactory transference 
to constitutional and parliamentary rule. He had seen the traditional apathy 
of the Chinese masses to matters of government, and he had noticed that the 
public did not take much interest in the announcements in the native press 
pertaining to complicated rules regarding constitutional government. In 
actual fact, since the franchise was limited to those in possession of 
considerable capital, most men of means were reluctant to make a true 
statement of their holdings fearing increased taxation or extortion from the 
officials. This, he observed, would surely result in a general reluctance 
on the part of the qualified voters, to exercise their rights. Jordan thus 
suggested to London,
^Jordan to F.O. 14 Sept. 1908, FO 371/433; this view is shared 
by H.M. Vinacke, ibid 91.
^Jordan to F.O. 24 May 1909, FO 371/634. See also Jordan to 
F.O. 23 August and 10 November, 1909, ibid; the Times of 5 February 1907, 
p.6 col. 2-3 which predicted these misgivings; and the London and China 
Express of 22 Oct. 1909, p. 805 col. 1-2. For as experienced an official as 
he was, Jordan seemed strangely unaware of the considerate and successful 
local self-government operation in the Chinese city of Shanghai. Perhaps he 
was simply not impressed. See Shang-hai T'ung-she (ed) Shanq-hai yen-chiu 
tzu-liao hsh-pien (Shanghai 1939) 143-57.
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"In the face of the apathy and suspicion existing among the masses 
of the people and the better classes, the new system may merely 
substitute for official autocracy the tyranny of the worst sort of 
gentry and the irresponsible student, with whom really representative 
men will refuse to act, and the local government will hardly benefit 
by being transferred from the hands of a removable official into the 
grasp of a permanent Tammany Hall ...”
He had obviously little confidence in the abilities of the Chinese gentry
to shoulder responsibilities as new political leaders under a reformed system.
While his judgment of this was somewhat harsh, he was soon proved to be
accurate in his implication that the new provincial councillors would become
independent of central authority, and constitute instead a powerful force of
dissent working against the policies of the government at Peking.
The Provincial Assemblies convened for the first time on 14 October,
1909. These councils were subject to considerable limitations, of course:
they could debate, recommend, argue or propose, but not dispose, execute or 
7Implement policy. To the sceptical Jordan, therefore, it was doubtful from 
the beginning if practical results could be expected of these new committees.
Added to this was the striking fact that many of the government 
officials were completely indifferent to the proceedings of the Assemblies 
in the provinces. "A Peking official of high rank, who was reminded on that 
day (14 October) by the Secretary of the (British) Legation of the ceremonies 
then taking place at all the provincial cities, confessed he had not given
Q
them a thought." This attitude was evident even In the provinces in many 
instances, and "little public interest was aroused in what seemed to be
, -— y
See Chang Peng-yhan, "Ch’ing-ch'i Tzu’i Chtt i-yttan ti 
hshan-chli ch'i ch'i chu-shen chih fen-che" in Ssu Yh Yen V,6 (Mar. 1968) 
1435-45, for an analysis of the background of the Assembly members and 
their geographical distribution.
^Quoted in Jordan to F.O. 20 Dec. 1909, FO 371/858.
230
considered an additional set of talons and teeth rather than the creation
9
of an organ for the expression of peoples' wishes." The outcome of such 
a situation, as Jordan anticipated, would be the emergence of a 20th century 
regionalism which saw the accumulation of wider powers and influence in the 
hands of enterprising and energetic provincial notables over the heads of the 
centrally-appointed local authorities. It was paradoxical that the Manchu 
government, apprehensive of the constitutional experiment, and imposing a 
franchise designed to eliminate the radicals and student classes, now found 
itself increasingly challenged by the hitherto conservative local gentry.^
The provincial councillors soon asserted themselves. In November,
1909, the representatives of fifteen different provinces formed an Association 
of Provincial Councils, and in January, 1910, the Association presented an 
appeal to Peking urging an earlier opening of parliament. This was rejected 
by the Prince Regent (in power after the death of Emperor Kuang-hsh) in a decree 
of 30 January, stipulating that 1917 would still be the date for the calling 
of a parliament. The delegates were undeterred. By July that year, ten 
different petitions had been sent in, and there was talk of withholding taxes
9
Jordan to F.O. ibid. A comprehensive report of the proceedings 
in all the important cities was written by Campbell of the British Legation 
and enclosed in Jordan's despatch. Reports are also found in the Times of 20 
Jan. 1910, p.5 col. 5-6; the London and China Express of 8 Apr. 1910, 
supplement; and Jordan's annual intelligence report, 31 Jan, 1910, FO 371/866.
10Even Liang Ch'i-ch'ao emerged from his retirement after 1898 
to play an important role in the constitutional movement and in influencing 
the thinking of the provincial gentry. See Y.C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals 
and the West, 1872-1949 (North Carolina 1966) 259-60; Chang Peng-yban, Liang 
Ch'i-ch'ao yli Ch'inq-chi ko'ming (Taiwan 1964) 312-21; Ting Wen-chiang (ed) 
Liang Jen-kung hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'anq-pien ch'u-kao (Taiwan 1959) 250-8, 
273-4, 284-5; see also E.P. Young "The Reformer as a Conspirator" in A. 
Feuerwerker, R. Murphey, M. Wright (ed) Approaches to Modern Chinese History 
(Calif. 1967) 239-67, an account of Liang's schemes against the Manchu 
Dynasty even while being an outward supporter of constitutional reforms.
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if their memorials continued to be ignored.
The final petition was presented on 7 October, 1910, Meanwhile the
National Assembly had been convened for the first time on 3 October; after
deliberations, the Assembly decided to endorse the movement for an earlier
12
parliament initiated by the provinces. The dilemma of the Central Government
when it found itself pitted against these two new organs of political influence
was apparent, and the situation brought little comfort to the British observers
in China. W.G. MaxMttller (1867-1945), Charge d'Affaires of the British
Legation, reported that in Peking something akin to panic prevailed among the
officials, most of whom were rudely awakened to the strange political climate
they found themselves in. Many were in favour of the Throne conceding to
popular demands, if only out of prudent motives. Some feared that a fresh
13refusal would even precipitate a "revolution" against the Dynasty. The
British Government realised that "to give way now must mean considerable loss
14of face to the Regent, but it looks as if he will have to." MaxMhller 
himself was certain that the clamour would subside at once if the Government 
were strong, "and had a few heads off - but the Chinese Government is not 
strong - in fact, it has never been so ridiculously weak and inefficient as
U MaxMmer to F.O. 22 July 1910, FO 371/858; the Times, 20 
Aug. 1910, p.5, col. 4-5; Ts'ang-fu ibid in HHKM IV, 8-9.
12Accounts are seen in Huang Hung-shou, "K’ai-she Tzu Cheng 
Yhan" in HHKM IV, 54-8; Times 4 Oct. 1910, p.5 col. 1-2.
13MaxM511er Telegram, 27 Oct. 1910, FO 371/858. MaxMhller 
was Military Attache at the Peking Legation in 1892, Secretary, 1894-1904, 
and became Councillor in 1909* He was employed at the Foreign Office in 
London 1902-5, and again 1911-12.
"^Campbell minutes on above, ibid; Jordan, then on home leave 
in England discussed the question with Campbell, and agreed that the Regent's 
"very weakness may encourage encroachments upon the Imperial preorgative." 
Jordan to Campbell, (private) 6 Dec. 1910, FO 350/7.
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at present. The Prince Regent is a mixture of weak nervousness and 
15
obstinacy ..."
The force of circumstances soon proved stronger than even the Regent's
will. On 25 October 1910, eighteen provincial officials telegraphed to the
Prince Regent beseeching him to declare a parliament; on 4 November, the Regent
16conceded his position by promising a Constitution in 1913 instead of 1917.
This was a triumphant step forward for the constitutionalists; but for the 
British observers the Regent's action merely indicated an undesirable weakness 
in the face of irresponsible demands from the provinces. The British, and 
Sir John Jordan in particular, had every desire to see China succeed in her 
attempts at constitutional modernization; but they could not see any wisdom 
in the recklessness with which the provincial reformers seemed to be pushing
17
these profound changes. The Foreign Office felt that,
"The dangerous experiment of yielding to popular clamour has therefore 
been made, and China in two years or so will attempt to run before she 
can walk. I don't think a Parliament will make much difference for a 
long time to come...All that will happen in 1913 will be the gathering 
together of some hundreds of needy and grasping men from the provinces 
who will seek to feather their nests on a grander scale than hitherto... 
the coolie will notice no difference."
15MaxMhller to F.O. 15 Oct. 1910, FO 371/858.
1 A
MaxMliller telegram, 5 Nov. 1910, ibid; Ts'ang-fu, ibid
in HHKM IV, 8.
^F.O. minutes on MaxMCtller to F.O. 28 Oct. 1910, FO 371/858.
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Pessimistic and defeatist as this appears, it was the prevailing British 
18reaction. Yet it is understandable. Because of Britain’s special 
position in China, and the various agents seeking increased missionary, 
commercial or political influence in that country, any movement which 
threatened to disrupt the comfortable status quo would be regarded as 
anathema by the British people and government.
China's constitutional movement meanwhile progressed. In May, 1911, 
the Grand Council was transformed into a Cabinet; but because of its strong 
Manchu representation, this led to further outcries from the provincial 
councils. At this time there was also a crisis caused by the nationalization 
of railways, and taken together the various issues created throughout the 
country an inflammable atmosphere which was ignited when the Revolution 
broke out in October, 1911.^  Undoubtedly the constitutional reforms had 
failed as a means by which the Ch’ing Dynasty hoped to placate the country 
as well as retain its hold over the administration of the Empire. In its 
proper perspective, however, the ineffectiveness of these last-minute reform 
concessions was but one of a host of factors which contributed to the wide­
spread unrest and agitation in the Empire during the last years of the 
Kuang-hah reig.n.
^The Times of 2 Nov. 1910, p. 7-8, warned that the situation 
was one of great difficulty and some danger, and in the editorial, p.11, col.
5: "We do not sympathise with the ardent appeal for a parliament without
delay, because we are convinced that it is imperative for the Chinese to 
proceed with the caution which in the past has been a salutary instinct of 
their race ... we are unable to believe that China can qualify herself to
adopt constitutional government in less than a decade ... " Reuter’s telegram
to Hardinge, 3 Feb. 1906, FO 371/27 also pointed out: "They are too impatient
to give the government's attempts at reform the trial of time, but they clamour 
for the government to accomplish immediately all which has taken Japan one-
third of a century to perform."
■^Chapter VII.
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As early as December 1905, several distinct forces had been at work
causing the disruption of society and unsettling of minds in China. The first
disturbing factor was the growing strength of near-by Japan. In 1902 she
achieved in Chinese eyes a status equal to that of a Western Power by
concluding an alliance with Great Britain. She then further demonstrated
her might by defeating the Russian Empire in the 1904-5 War. From Japan too
Chinese students were beginning to return in large numbers and they took the
lead in agitating for democracy and constitutionalism in imitation of Japan.
The 1905 boycott of American goods and the apparently conciliatory attitude
of the United States had nurtured an aggressively nationalistic spirit among
the educated Chinese. In certain circles the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902
was interpreted as a guarantee for the integrity of Chinese territory "come
what may," so that there was subsequent agitation to resist all forms of
foreign influence and aggression. Phrases such as "China for the Chinese”
20
began appearing in the radical native press. The visible degeneration of
central control over the provinces, and the corresponding assertion of
provincial independence exhibited-by the new assemblies, did not help to
improve the situation. The local gentry had by now acquired a habit of
resisting government policy when they felt it necessary to do so, and the
British noted that " ... the temper now exhibited by the Chinese towards
21
their authorities is quite new." This spirit of defiance was echoed by the 
"  20
Analyses of the situation are made in the Times. 12 Dec. 1905, 
p.5, col. 3; London and China Express. 15 Dec. 1905, p.969, col. 1-2; C. Pearl, 
Morrison of Peking (Australia 1967) 213-4. For the most recent work on the 
Alliance, see I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. (London 1966); Satow also 
gives an assessment of the Alliance with reference to China, in Satow to Grey 
(private) 31 Mar. 1906, FO 800/43.
^Campbell minutes on Scott to F.O., 24 Jan. 1906, FO 371/25.
The particular incident referred to in this despatch described the successful 
resistance of the Canton gentry to new taxes imposed by the Governor. See also 
Satow to F.O. 7 Mar. 1906, FO 371/33. and Jordan to F.O. 22 July 1907, FO 371/220. 
which reported on the situation in all the major Chinese cities.
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native press, especially in the treaty ports* Mainly penned by returned students,
articles in the newspapers now dared to publicise the shortcomings of the Manchu
22
government and in some instances openly advocate its downfall. Sir Ernest 
Satow reported, "As there is at present no press law to control or restrict 
newspaper utterances, these are often of the most intemperate character. Not
23
only foreign nations, but high Chinese officials are attacked with violence." 
These were therefore disquieting times for the British in China.
Foremost among the Powers interested in Chinese affairs, Britain desired
nothing more than to see the Manchu Dynasty succeed with their reform
programme, so that at least central control over the provinces would provide
for the uniform fulfilment of treaty provisions throughout the Empire. Britain
wanted a strong government in China, which could then be held responsible for
the protection of foreign interests in that country. Now however, even more
unsettling intelligence began reaching the British authorities that the anti-
government movement in China was growing to such proportions that the very life
of the dynasty was threatened.
The formation of the T’ung Menq Hui marked the beginning of a period
of intense activity for the Chinese revolutionaries. The general atmosphere
of unrest in the country, together with years of natural calamity and economic
stress, supplied them with unlimited opportunities for trials of strength with
the Dynasty.
— — —
At Shanghai, for example, there was the Kuo-min Jih-,iih Pao» 
(China National Daily) which continued where the Su-pao left off, under the 
nominal proprietorship of a foreigner, A. Gemell; the woman revolutionary 
Chiu Chin also published the Chung-kuo Nu-pao (Chinese Women’s Journal) in 
Shanghai; even in Tientsin there was the Ta-kung Pao (L1Impartial) by the
radical reformer Ying lien-chih; in Hong Kong the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, begun with
the Hsing Chung Hui, continued to function throughout the T'ung Meng Hui period; 
in Singapore the revolutionaries published the Tu-nan Jih-pao (Southern Journal) 
also to continue the work of the Su-pao. See R.S. Britton, The Chinese
Periodical Press (Shanghai 1933) 11-20; Ko Kung-chen, Chung-kuo Pao-hsueh Shih
(Hong Kong 1964) 152-73.
23Satow to F.O. 7 Mar. 1906, FO 371/33.
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These developments did not escape the attention of the British 
authorities in China. In the period before 1905 Britons in China tended to 
be somewhat confounded by reform movements and revolutionary acts, and to 
confuse reformers with revolutionaries. Now it was clear to them that the 
source for the greatest apprehension was an organized, concerted effort working 
for the downfall of the Ch’ing Dynasty. It has been seen that Sir John Jordan 
was aware of the establishment of the Tfung Meng Hui and its purposes. Now 
it was also known to the British authorities that disaffection had been noted 
among many provincial units of the modernized Chinese Army. From Hankow It
was observed that " ... all Chinese officers from the general down to the
most junior subaltern suspected the men and each other of being tainted with
24 25disloyalty." Even in Peking itself, one account readss
"In writing on conditions of politics in Peking at the present time, 
our correspondent recently noted a strong Chinese feeling to oust
the Dynasty. Pamphlets subversive of the Manchus are spread about
in a scarcely veiled manner, and can be obtained by all who would 
have them. There is an atmosphere about slightly charged with a kind 
of electrical feeling that something is coming..."
It must not be concluded, of course, that sources of information for 
the British Government were based solely on these alarmist reports. It was 
usually Sir John Jordan who placed the situation in a proper perspective.
For one thing, he and his Legation staff recognised that although widespread, 
the anti-dynastic movement did not seem able to undertake a full-scale
^Jordan to F.O. 4 Mar. 1907, FO 371/217. Other consular 
reports are enclosed in Jordan to F.O. 7 Jan. 1907, FO 371/223+ and Jordan 
to F.O. 3 May 1907, FO 371/220.
OPi
London and China Express, 25 Oct. 1907, p.810, col. 1-2. 
In March 1908 a series of fires broke out in Peking, which would normally 
be regarded as an annual disaster during the dry season but such was the 
atmosphere in the capital that on this occasion the fires were generally 
attributed to be the work of revolutionaries, and it has "thrown Chinese
authorities into a state of considerable alarm." North China Herald, 10
Apr. 1908, p.73, col. 1; see also the Times of 20 Apr. 1908, p.l, col. 1;
London and China Express 8 May, 1908, p.352, col. 1.
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uprising immediately. "At present, there appears to be no danger, because
as far as I can judge, there is no united action, no organization and no
capable heads. The British authorities also took heart from the fact
that the Manchu Government showed every intention of crushing the subversive
movement by whatever means necessary. A reign of terror was reportedly
instigated in the central provinces and numerous men were arrested on
suspicion of being revolutionaries. The Chinese Customs officials were
ordered to be especially vigilant in searching for smuggled arms and 
27
ammunition.
Yet these repressive efforts served only to spur the revolutionaries 
on to bolder acts of propaganda and terrorist intimidation. Jordan was 
accurate in his assessment that the T'ung Meng Hui was not yet ripe for a 
massive attack on the government. But in the years 1906-1911, no less than 
eight separate insurrections were staged by the T’ung Meng Hui and three by 
independent revolutionary groups, as well as six attempts at assassination of 
high Manchu officials.
In December 1906, the first in the series of uprisings occurred in 
P’ing-hsiang, Li-ling and Liu-yang, villages in Hunan and Kiangsi. These 
areas were rife with secret society members, many of them followers of the 
Ko-lao Hui chief Ma Fu-i, who had been executed in 1904 for his part in a
28brief insurrection staged by Huang Hsing and the Hua Hsinq Hui in Changsha.
^Jordan to F.O., 2 May 1907 (confidential) FO 371/220. His 
views were shared by the general manager in China of the alkali manufacturers, 
Brunner, Mond and Co., in their despatch to F.O., 29 Apr. 1907, ibid.
^Jordan to F.O., 2 Apr. 1907, FO 371/127, and 4 Mar., ibid; 
Brunner, Mond and Co., to F.O. 29 Apr. 1907, FO 371/220.
28See C.T. Hslieh, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution 
(Stanford 1961) 13-25; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Shih-kao (shanghai, 
1938) III, 676; Feng Tzu-yu, "Chang-sha Hua-hsing Hui," in HHKM I, 503-5;
Ch’en Kung-fu, Chung-kuo ko-ming shih (Shanghai 1933) 713.
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Now Liu Tao-i, a Tung Meng Hui member and close associate of Ma, decided to
rally the local secret societies and raise a rebellion as a form of vengeance
for Ma's death. Circumstances favoured him, for famine broke out in Hunan,
Hupeh and Kiangsi in that winter. A strike by the miners of PVing-hsiang
signalled the start of a general movement, which quickly spread into the
near-by villages. The insurrection was essentially an independent attempt
under the personal direction of Liu, although the T’ung Meng Hui assisted
him with reinforcements of men and money in the later stages. In spite of
this, the movement was short-lived, and was suppressed by Imperial forces
29
within a week. Liu was captured and executed on 31 December, 1906.
As the rebellion had taken place so near the Yangtze capital of
Changsha, the British authorities in the area were naturally much concerned.
However, they were encouraged from the beginning by the fact that the rebels
aimed only at attacking government officials and showed the utmost respect
30for foreign lives and property. British information was that the movement
was instigated by the revolutionary T’ung Meng Hui, which they mistakenly believed
to be the new name adopted for the amalgamation of the Ko-lao Hui and the Triads.
"The supreme head of the Society and of the revolutionary party is of course 
31Sun Yat-sen." What was disturbing to the British observers, nevertheless, 
was the fact that the danger in the situation arose less from the actions of
29T'ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution 
(London 1930) 57-8; Cheng Ho-sheng. Chung-hua Min-kuo chien-'kuo shih (Shanghai 
1946) 37-8; Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chunq-shan hsien-sheng nien-p’u ch’u-kao 
(Taiwan 1958) I, 166-9; Ch'en Ch’un-sheng, "Ping-wu P’ing-Li ch’i-i chi" in 
HHKM II, 463-75. See also Jordan’s telegram of 12 Dec. 1906, FO 371/41 and 
15 Dec., ibid; North China Herald 4 Jan. 1907, p.17, col. 3.
Jordan to F.O. 21 Feb. 1907 (confidential) FO 371/220.
O I
Changsha intelligence report, enclosed in Jordan to F.O. 21
Feb. 1907, ibid.
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the rebels than from the unreliability and inefficiency of the Chinese
Government troops. It was reported that the soldiers could not be depended
on to meet the rebels in open fight, and on several occasions they had thrown
away their arms and fled. It was also known that a considerable proportion
of them were in sympathy with the rebels, and were themselves members of
secret societies. The uprising was finally suppressed only after additional
32troops arrived from Hupei. London thus found it difficult to be too
optimistic about the state of affairs in China: "It is said that if the
uprising in Hunan had not taken place prematurely, results might have been
very serious. It is expected to break out again at the first favourable 
33
opportunity."
On the part of the Chinese Government, these rebel activities demanded
the severest form of reprisals. An intensive search for revolutionaries and
their sympathisers was instigated throughout the Yangtze provinces, and
34
executions took place every day. In one instance, the Chinese authorities 
again encountered difficulties with the Mixed Court in Shanghai, when they 
attempted to capture two men in connection with the uprising. It was never
32
ibid.
33
Campbell minutes on above, ibid. His views were shared by
F.A. Mackenzie in an Interview for the London and China Express, 7 Jan. 1907, 
p.431, col. 1-2: "It would be folly, remarked Mr. Mackenzie, to deny the fact
that the present rising is graver than anything the Empire has seen since the 
momentous days of 1900...The Revolutionary party has arms, money and organization. 
In Mr. Mackenzie’s opinion, if the anti-dynastic revolutionaries and peasant 
rebels work together, the situation will at once take a more sinister aspect."
34
See the reports in the North China Herald, 18 Jan. 1907, p.119, 
col. 1-3; 1 Feb., p.233, col. 2-3; 1 Mar., p.437, col. 2 and 5 Apr., p.29, 
col. 1-2; the Times of 1 Feb. 1907, p.3 col. 6; the Changsha Intelligence 
report enclosed in Jordan to F.O. 21 Feb. 1907 (confidential) FO 371/220.
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clear whether the two Hunanese, Chang Pao-ch’ing and Huang-i had actually taken
any part in the recent insurrection: the only evidence supporting the Chinese
demand for extradition came from the confessions of a captured rebel. Chang
was a hostel-keeper in Shanghai, catering to students going to and from
Japan; in this connection he had probably something to do with the activities
of student radicals. Huang was a medical student and wrote books for a living.
35They had both lived seven years in Shanghai.
On 9 January, 1907, the two men were arrested in Shanghai on a warrant
issued at the instance of the Nanking Viceroy. The Shanghai authorities,
36however, refused to hand them over" on the mere demand of the Viceroy," and
insisted on a prima facie case being made out against them, based on more
37concrete evidence than the verbal charges of a captured rebel. This was
regarded as reasonable by Jordan and the Foreign Office, though on this
occasion neither was prepared to go any further in support of the Shanghai
Municipality. Jordan suggested, "It seems to me important from a political
point of view that great care should be taken to prevent Shanghai being
38
regarded as a refuge for revolutionaries." Sir Walter Langley (1855-1918)
at the Foreign Office agreed: "This is all that we are entitled to do ... and
there seems no reason why we should go out of our way to prevent the Chinese
39dealing with them in their own manner." He realized that there was no use 
-
Ch'en Ch’un-sheng, ibid, in HHKM II, 466, only mentions the 
names of Chang Pao-ching and Huang-i among those captured in Hunan, without 
reference to their actual role in the insurrection.
^Jordan telegram of 11 Jan. 1907, FO 371/213. and Jordan to 
Warren. 16 Jan. 1907 (private) FO 350/4.
37
Warren to Taotai Jui, 13 Jan. 1907, in Jordan to F.O. 18 Feb.
1907, FO 371/213.
38Jordan telegram of 11 Jan. ibid.
39Langley minutes on above, ibid. Langley had been Assistant 
Undersecretary at the Foreign Office since 1907.
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referring to the precedent of the Su-pao case: "In the present temper of the
Chinese they are not likely to repeat the performance of the Tao-tai (in 1903)
in agreeing to have the case tried at the Mixed Court, and there seems no
reason why we should court a quarrel with the Chinese by doing more than taking
40evidence that the case is bona fide,"
/
In actual fact, as F.A. Campbell (1852-1911) Assistant Undersecretary
Av
at the Foreign Office soon revealed, there were more pragmatic aspects of the
41matter influencing British attitude,
"The Shanghai Municipality are very anxious to extend the area of the 
Settlement, and we are resisting attempts by the Chinese to establish 
Chinese 'municipalities’ on the borders of the Settlement with a view 
to blocking the extension. If the Settlement is to become an Alsatia 
for Chinese sedition-mongers, the opposition to extension must be 
intensified ten-fold, and extension will become impossible of realization."
The fate of the two alleged rebels was thus decided not by any positive proof
of their culpability, but because the British, who could have interceded on
their behalf as they had done for the Su-pao writers, would not now sacrifice
certain political objectives in the interests of justice and fair play. A
subsequent telegram from the Viceroy testifying to the guilt of the two men
was deemed sufficiently formal evidence, and after a preliminary hearing on
28 January, Chang and Huang were handed over to the Nanking Government. The
40., . , xbid.
41Campbell minutes on Jordan’s telegram of 11 Jan,, ibid. See 
also Jordan to Campbell, 24 Jan. 1907, (private) FO 350/4: "It would never
do in the present state of things in the Yangtze Valley to shelter revolu­
tionary characters in the Shanghai Settlement." Sir Francis Campbell was 
Senior Clerk at the Foreign Office 1896-1902, and became Assistant Under­
secretary in charge of the Far Eastern Department In 1902. Jordan was a 
close friend of Campbell's and they corresponded regularly on the affairs of 
China, until the letter's death in December 1911, when Sir Walter Langley 
succeeded to the charge of that department.
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Foreign Office did, however, take pains to ensure that the trial was held in 
public, to forestall protests from sympathetic elements among the Shanghai 
community. "I cannot help thinking that in the eyes of the Shanghai community, 
the only satisfactory way will be at a public sitting of the Mixed Court
before the Magistrate and Assessor. They will probably suspect foul play
42 tin any other arrangement." The case was then regarded/satisfactorily
closed,4^
Meanwhile, the T'unq Meng Hui began its own uprising against the 
Manchu Government, in a coastal area called Huang-k'ang, about forty miles 
north of Swatow. It was a small-scale undertaking, led by’two T'unq Meng Hui 
members of the area, Hsil HsUeh-ch'iu and Teng Tzu-yh. Trouble had long brewed 
in the area owing to excessive taxation on sugar and a corresponding shortage 
of food. Hsb, a Cantonese, had since 1905 contemplated stirring up local 
discontent with the help of his secret society following to raise an insur­
rection. But news of his activities became known, and he had to flee to Hongkong
in 1906. There he met up with Feng Tzu-yu and Teng Tzu-yb, and together they
made plans again for action. Sun Yat-sen despatched Japanese friends to 
help, and from Singapore also sent $30,000 collected from the overseas Chinese.
A date was originally set for the uprising to begin in February of 1907, but 
again news leaked, and activities were postponed. Then on the night of 21 May,
Langley minutes on Warren's telegram of 17 Jan. 1907, FO 371/213. 
Grey's comment was "Yes, we should never extradite anyone from this country in 
a secret enquiry and cannot be a party to it in Shanghai." ibid.
43Warren memo, enclosed in Jordan to F.O. 18 Feb. 1907, ibid.
The British Government soon learned, however, that in Nanking the two men were 
put on trial and sentenced on account of a number of charges that had nothing 
to do with the ones on which they had been handed over by the Mixed Court.
The Foreign Office began to have some misgivings about surrendering them too 
readily, though they were unwilling to interfere further in the matter. See 
Jordan to F.O. 1 Apr. 1907 (confidential) FO 371/213. enclosing an account by 
Consul at Nanking W.P. Ker, and Langley's and Campbell's minutes.
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a fray occurred between some peasants and local officials over the price of
grain, and the revolutionaries quickly moved in to fan the flames of rebellion.
The yamen was stormed, two magistrates were killed and public buildings burned.
For a few days the insurgents were able to hold Huang-k'ang, until Imperial
troops began pouring in from neighbouring cities. Within a week the rebellion 
44
was over.
To the British, the outstanding feature of this insurrection was again
the fact that it was purly anti-dynastic, and in no way posed a threat to
foreigners and missionaries in the area. "Perfect order was maintained ... I
have not heard of any complaints as to their proceedings or misconduct," so
45
reported the British Consul at Swatow. On the other hand, "With the
arrival of government troops, a different state of affairs began to prevail,
many houses of both converts and non-converts were being looted and in some
46cases burnt to the ground." One can detect some feelings of sympathy 
from Sir John Jordan when he commented, "The contrast between the behaviour 
of the rioters ... and that of the Imperial troops ... tends to show these 
so-called rebellions are mainly ill-directed efforts of a discontented 
population to secure some relief from the oppressive conditions under which 
they live."4,7 It is possible to think that Jordan regarded the Huang-k'ang
44
Accounts of the uprising are given in Chou Lu, op.cit. Ill, 
717-9, IV, 1300; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, 174-9; Teo Eng-hock, Nan»yang yh 
Ch'uang-li Min-kuo (Singapore 1934) 28-31; Huang Fu-luan, Hua-chiao yh Chung- 
kuo ko-ming (Hongkong 1955) 130-2; Chang Ching-sheng "Ting-wei Chao-chou 
Huang-k'ang ko-ming" in HHKM II, 550-3; Teng Mu-han, "Ting-wei Huang-k'ang 
chh-i chi" in HHKM, II, 541-5. See also the Times of 30 May 1907, p.5 col. 2; 
North China Herald, 7 June, 1907, p. 589, col. 1-3; Jordan to F.O. 12 June 
1907, F O 3717229, and 25 June, ibid, both enclosing reports from the Consuls 
at Swatow and Pakhoi.
45P.F. Hausser to Jordan, 12 June, 1907, ibid.
4^ibid.
4<7Jordan to F.O. 26 June 1907, ibid.
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affair as merely a traditional-style Chinese peasant rebellion brought on by
economic distress. Yet he was in possession of detailed and accurate information
which suggested that the rising was really part of the revolutionary movement.
Accounts sent to Jordan by the local British representatives described the
insurgents as carrying flags proclaiming themselves the "ko ming chhn" and that
48
they issued notices to the populace announcing their aims and policies.
49Jordan insisted that the accounts of the events were "grossly exaggerated."
With his assurances that the movement was being quickly and effectively 
50
suppressed, the Foreign Office was happy to note, "As the missionaries are
51in safety, there seems no need for further action."
Consistent in his belief in the non-political nature of the rebellion,
Jordan refused to comply when confronted on 12 June by a demand from the Wai-
wu Pu for the extradition of Feng Tzu-yu from Hongkong (where he had allegedly
fled after the rising). As the Wai-wu Pu communication was based upon
information from the Viceroy at Canton, who merely asked that the man be
deported from the British Colony, Jordan saw fit to ignore the Chinese Note 
52altogether. This probably incited the Chinese authorities in Canton to 
secure the punishment of another rebel by means which were not entirely 
legitimate. It happened that on 16 April, 1907, a Chinese merchant was robbed 
by pirates near Huang-k'ang. On 27 June a T'unq Meng Hui member Yh Chi-ch'eng
^Hausser to Jordan, 27 May 1907, ibid and Savage (Pakhoi) to 
Jordan, 27 May 1907, ibid.
49Jordan telegram, 8 June 1907, ibid. 
ibid.
^F.O. minutes on Jordan's of 27 May 1907, ibid.
52Jordan to F.O, 25 June 1907, ibid.
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was arrested in Hongkong at the request of the Canton Viceroy as being
responsible for the robbery. It was evident that the charge was trumped up
by the Chinese government to capture Yb for his role in the recent insurrection.
Fortunately for Yb, the T'unq Meng Hui obtained the legal services of Dr, Ho
53Ch'i in Hongkong, and the trial ended in an acquittal in February, 1908.
The Huang-k'ang uprising thus terminated with comparatively little loss of lives 
for the revolutionary party, and some credit, at least from certain sections 
of the British community in China, for their respect for foreign lives and 
property.
A succession of five more isolated uprisings was staged by the T'ung
Meng Hui in 1907-8. In June 1907, a movement was started in Ch'i-nu-hu, a
coastal town seven miles from Wai-chow in Kwangtung. Again making capital out
of local discontent caused by a corrupt and harsh governor, the T'unq Meng Hui
initiated clashes with the Imperial troops on 2 June and were able to hold out
for ten days. Supplies however, soon ran short, and when Imperial reinforce-
54
ments arrived, the revolutionaries quickly disbanded. Three months later, 
the rebels rose again, this time in the village of Ch'in-chow in Southwest 
Kwangtung. The government military commanders in charge of this area were 
Kuo Jen-chang and Chao Sheng. It is important to note that during prepar­
ations for the insurrection, the T'unq Meng Hui sent Huang Hsing and Hu Han-min 
to persuade these two militarists to join their ranks, or at least sympathise
Teo Eng-hock, op.cit. 38-44; Feng Tzu-yu Ko-ming i-shih 
(Chungking, 1945) III, 266-70; Chou Lu, op.cit. Ill, 720; the China Mail. 15 
Nov. 1907, p.5 col. 2-3; 17 Feb, 1908, p.5 col. 3, and 25 Feb. 1908, p.4 col. 6. 
54Chou Lu, op.cit. Ill, 724; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, 181;
Huang Fu-luanm, op.cit. 141-5; China Mail 5 June 1907, p.4 col. 7 and 21 June, 
p.4 col. 6. May to C.O. 10 July, 1907 (confidential) CO 129/341; and North 
China Herald 8 Nov. 1907, p.334, col. 2.
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55
with the movement. On 1 September, the rising began, and by the 4th the
insurgents had captured Fang-ch'eng. Both Kuo and Chao, however, failed to
keep their tentative promises of support, and the revolutionaries had to flee
56to French Indo-China when the movement fizzled out. The crucial importance
of winning over sections of the government military set-up was now clearly
demonstrated to the revolutionaries.
After a respite of another three months, the T!ung Meng Hui was ready
to strike again. From 1-8 December, 1907, the revolutionaries held three
fortresses at Chen-nan-kuan, a strategic border area between Kwangsi and French
Indo-China. This was the only insurrection at which Sun Yat-sen was personally
present, and it resulted in his being banished from the territory by the French
colonial government. On 27 March, 1908, Huang Hsing directed another uprising
in Chin-chow and near-by Lien-chow, which lasted only four days before it
57
collapsed for lack of food and supplies. At the end of April 1908, a more 
complicated movement took place at Ho-k’ou in Yunnan province, which was 
separated from French territory by a narrow river. The revolutionaries 
crossed into Yunnan from Tonkin on the night of 29 April. Through the 
treachery of some members of the Imperial garrison at the border, they were 
able to gain possession of the town and a number of forts by the next day.
See C.T. HsDeh, op.cit., 65.
56Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. 145-50; Chou Lu, op.cit. Ill, 734-7;
Teng Mu-han, "Shu Ting-wei Fang-ch’eng ko-ming chhn-shih" in HHKM II, 546-8; 
and Sun Yat-sen’s letters to Teng Tse-jl!i recording events in Chou Lu, op.cit.
Ill 735-7; T'ang Chen-ch'u, Kuo-fu shu-hsin hsban-chi (Taiwan 1952) 27-9; see 
also the Tung-fang Tsa-chih, No. 7, 1907, "Kuang-tung Hsin-chou hsiang-min k'ang 
chhan" in HHKM III, 367-8.
57
Chou Lu, op. d t . Ill, 738-45, IV, 1311; Hu Han-min, "Nan-yang 
yh Chung-kuo ko-ming" appended in Teo-Eng-hock, Nan-yang yh ch*uanq-li Min-kuo 
7-16, "Hu Han-min tzu-chban" Ko-ming wen-hsien III, 395; Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. 
151-60; Chou Lu, "Ting-wei Ch'en-nan-kuan chih-i" in HHKM III, 217-20; China 
Mail, 11 Feb. 1908, p.4 col. 7.
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They made Ho-k'ou their headquarters, but for nearly a month failed in their
endeavours to make incursions into the surrounding countryside* On 26 May,
58Ho-k'ou was recaptured by Imperial troops, and the uprising ended.
An unusual circumstance of this movement was the fact that Ho-k'ou fell
into the insurgents' hands with such ease and rapidity. The Chinese Government
began to entertain doubts of French complicity in the plot. It was true that
the rebels had entered Yunnan from Tonkin, that arms had regularly been
smuggled over the border for some time, and that a large section of the
French press proclaimed their sympathies with the rebels and tended to look
59upon the movement with friendly eyes. Matters were not improved by a
statement submitted to Jordan by Morrison of the London Times, in which an
escaped revolutionary specifically charged that the French "knew what we were
going to do. They had telegraphed to the tao-tai that an attack was intended,
but he did nothing, or we could not have taken the forts. It was he who
had been promoted for recapturing the forts. If the French had tried to
stop us we should not have dared to do anything. They said it was no business 
60of theirs." Such information now raised even British suspicions regarding 
French motives in the whole undertaking. An unfortunate incident then occurred 
which seemed to justify Britain's worst fears, and which permitted the French 
to seize an opportunity to satisfy some imperialistic ambitions all under the 
pretext of "compensations."
58
Chou Lu, "Wu-shen Ybn-nan Ho-k'ou chih-i" in HHKM III, 259-68? 
Carlisle (Consul at Hanoi) to F.O., 8 May, 13 May, 15 May and 18 May, 1908,
FO 371/430? Jordan telegram 18 May, 1908, ibid. See also the Times 28 May 1908, 
p.7 col. 3; 2 June, 1908, p.7 col. 2; North China Herald 16 May, 1908, p.417, 
col. 1-3.
~*^ See Carlisle to F.O., 18 May, 1908, FO 371/430; Acting Consul 
Sly at Yunnan to F.O. 14 May and 24 May 1908, ibid; Witton (Consul at Yunnanfu) 
to F.O., 23 July 1908 (confidential) ibid; "French Interferance in the Chinese 
Revolution" in Chinese Public Opinion 17 Sept. 1908, p.2 col. 3; the telegrams 
of Viceroy Hsi-liang to the Wai-wu Pu in HHKM III, 273-4 and 275-6.
Jordan to F.O., 31 July 1908, FO 371/431.
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It happened that on 3 June, 1908, while chasing a party of retreating 
revolutionaries, some Chinese troops crossed the border into French territory.
In a subsequent scuffle, a French officer and six of his men were killed. It 
was in all probability an accident; the French, however, made much capital 
out of the generally undisciplined behaviour of Chinese troops, whose arrival
61on the frontier "was much more to be feared than that of the revolutionaries." 
French demands for reparation were submitted to the Chinese government; punish­
ment of the culprits and the recall of the Viceroy; an indemnity for the families 
of the victims; the adjustment of French rights in Yunnan, the exercise of which
had been hindered by the local authorities; and finally the right to extend
62the Cheng-ting Tai-yhan-fu Railway to Hsian-fu. It was this last demand
which aroused instant British objection; "It would revive the old ’Battle of
Concessions' at the end of the last century, and we should if possible
63endeavour to nip it in the bud." The French government, on their part,
explained that France had done much to restrain the Chinese revolutionaries
^Carlisle to F.O. 8 June 1908, (confidential) FO 371/430.
^Jordan telegram of 16 June 1908, FO 371/431.
63Alston minutes on above, ibid. The Chengting-Taiyuan-fu 
Railway was originally granted to the Russo-Chinese Bank in 1898. The line 
was opened in 1907 and was understood to be worked by the Peking-Hankow 
Railway Administration and was therefore in a sense a Franco-Belgian concern.
The British had heard in 1904 that a map with the propectus, issued in Paris, 
showed that the line was eventually to be extended to Sian-fu, about one 
hundred miles from Taiyuan. The Foreign Office suspected that "The ultimate 
object of this line was unquestionably Szechwan" ibid. See G.B. Rea,
"Railway loan agreements and their relations to the open door, a plea for 
fair play to China" Far Eastern Review, supplement, VI, 6 (Nov. 1909)
231-9; Hsieh Pin, Chung-kuo t’ieh-tao shih (Shanghai 1929) 50-2; Grover 
Clark, Bconomic Rivalries in China (New Haven 1932) 18-26.
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in Tonkin, while the Chinese had repaid this by maintaining officials 
hostile to the French in Yunnan, and by other acts had consistently been 
disgracieux towards France, They felt that the time had now come for China
to make some amends by granting a request which had been made some time ago
® 64(i.e. the extension of the railway line). The real reason for the fuss
which the French were making out of a border incident was no doubt the fact 
that for two years no economic negotiations between France and China had 
made any progress or come to anything profitable for the French, while the
65
Chinese had settled various matters with the British and other nations.
As far as the British were concerned, the railway issue was now 
the focal point, and Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, was instructed 
to exert pressure on the French not to jeopardize Anglo-French enterprises in 
China by allowing the Chinese to attach a political aspect to industrial 
undertakings.^ This prompt intervention managed to check French ambitions.
On 20 June, the French Government made it known that the extension of the 
railway would not be one of the demands for reparation; but if the Chinese
Government were to consent to the extension, ’’the French Government would be
* 67accommodating (bien dispose) in the settlement of the outrage question.”
This was obviously the thin end of the wedge, and not an entirely satisfactory
solution. ”The methods of the French are calculated to bring odium upon them,
and as their partners we share it, but if they must mix political questions
and concessions it is better that they should do so in regard to concessions
in which we are not interested. We have a grievance, as they are exhausting
^Jordan telegram, 19 June, 1908, FO 371/431.
65
This was quickly recognized by the Foreign Office. See F*Q. 
to Bertie 30 June 1908, (confidential) ibid.
66
F.O. telegram to Jordan and Bertie, 18 June 1908, ibid.
/»7
Bertie telegram F.O., 20 June 1908, ibid.
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68their credit, and will have none left with which to fight our joint battles." 
Nevertheless it was no use doing anything further, and in the end the French 
obtained satisfaction for the first three demands, while China promised to
69review the mining rights and railway concessions in which France was interested.
From another direction, French involvement in the Ho-k'ou insurrection
caused further embarrassment for the British Government. As the uprising
dwindled out, large numbers of revolutionaries began escaping over the border
into Tonkin, where they were rounded up and disarmed by the French authorities.
Then the French did not know what to do with these men. As they had not
committed any crimes against French laws they could only be classed as
political refugees. On 18 May, 1908, a French mail-steamer suddenly arrived
at Singapore, and some six hundred revolutionaries were deposited with the
police authorities there. When informed, the British Colonial Office was
outraged at this "dumping" of Chinese refugees. R. Stubbs (1876-1947) an
Undersecretary, felt "There is no reason why they should be sent there
70rather than kept in Saigon." G. V. Fiddes (1858-1936), the Assistant
Undersecretary thought, "We must try to get this stopped," and Lord Crewe
(1858-1945), Colonial Secretary since April 1908, decided, "A pretty strong
71protest is necessary." The Foreign Office was thus requested to communicate
1 1 j 1 1 ,r'_
Langley Minutes on Jordan telegram of 11 Aug. 1908, ibid.
^Jordan to F.O. 19 Aug. 1908, (confidential) ibid.
70
Stubbs minutes on Anderson to C.O., 4 June 1908, CO 273/337.
See also Chou Lu, "Wu-shen Ylin-nan Ho-k’ou chih i" in HHKM III, 261. Stubbs 
entered the Colonial service in 1900. He became governor of Hongkong in 1919.
^Minutes on Anderson to F.O., 4 June 1908, CO 273/337. Lord 
Crewe was generally regarded as a valuable addition to the inner councils of 
the Liberal party on his appointment as Colonial Secretary. He was a man of 
calm judgment and strong conviction who devoted himself assiduously to his 
work. He discouraged extreme views among the party leaders and always 
exercised a healing influence among his colleagues when there were differences 
of opinion. Crewe was Colonial Secretary 1908-19, Secretary of State for 
India 1910-15, and Ambassador in Paris 1922-8. He was also author of a biography, 
Lord Rosebery (London 1931).
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with the French Government and make known to them the objections to such 
72
practices. Beilby Alston (1868-1929) of the Foreign Office suggested that
" ... the matter should not be allowed to pass without notice ... it certainly
is rather a strong order that Singapore should be used by the Indo-Chinese
73
authorities as a dumping-ground for Chinese revolutionaries."
Yet the irony was that the Singapore Government with Sir John
Anderson at its head, did not really object to the disposal of Chinese
refugees in his area of jurisdiction; it was the high-handed manner of the
French in not giving him prior notice that was offensive. In fact, the
additional Chinese labour was much welcomed in the Colony* s rubber industry.
When the French Government asked if the Singapore authorities would accept
74
another shipload of refugees in July, Anderson readily agreed. This of
course, placed the Foreign Office in an awkward positions "If the Governor
was going to consent to receive these men it was hardly necessary to make so
75much * pother* at the beginning." Finally, protests at Paris were made, an
apology was received, and Langley commented that "As the French admit that
76they were wrong, there is no harm our having complained,"
72C.O. to F.O. 21 July 1908, FO 371/432.
73Alston minutes on above, ibid. Alston was a clerk in the 
Foreign Office in 1890. In 1909 he accompanied Ts'ai-hsbn on his mission to 
England, and in 1911 was attached to Ts'ai-chen when he was the Chinese 
Emperor*s representative at the coronation of King Edward VII. He was
Councillor of the Peking Legation 1911-12 and often acted as Charge of the
Legation during Jordan* s absence.
74Although there were certain conditions regarding good behaviour, 
the French to reimburse any costs of banishment or imprisonment, etc. See 
Young (Deputy Governor) to C.O., 9 July 1908, ibid.
F.O. minutes on C.O. to F.O. 18 Aug. 1908, ibid.
Langley minutes, ibid.
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It is clear that the exceptional behaviour of the Chinese revolutionaries
towards foreigners as well as the local populations in the areas in which they
acted was the one aspect of the revolutionary movement before 1909 which
caught the special attention of the British authorities in China. By contrast
the excesses of the Imperial troops and the cruel reprisals instigated by the
provincial governments appeared barbarous to humanitarian Britons. In 1906
the Changsha Consul reported that the critical nature of the situation
" ... arose less from the preparations of the rebels than from the unreliability
77
and the inefficiency of his (the Governor’s) own troops." And again, "Since
the middle of December, the history of the rising has practically been a tale
of rebels killed in flight or captured and beheaded. No quarter is given, and
the authorities have set themselves the task of exterminating them altogether
as far as possible ... no one who in the past has given the slightest cause
78for suspicion appears to be safe." In 1907, at the height of the Huang-
k'ang insurrection, repeated reports testified. "There is no looting and
79foreigners are not being molested ... " The Swatow Consul recounted, "Having 
captured the town of Huang-k’ang, ... the rioters remained quietly in possession 
of the place, putting out proclamations calling on the inhabitants to carry 
on business as usual, and threatening severe penalties on anyone guilty of
80
looting chapels or molesting converts. Perfect order was maintained ... "
77Enclosed in Jordan to F.O. 21 Feb. 1907, FO 371/220. 
ibid.
Jordan telegram, 26 May 1907, FO 371/229.
^Hausser to Jordan, 12 June 1907, ibid.
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81In Yunnan in 1908 it was the same:
11 It has been frequently said that the arrival of Chinese troops on 
the frontier was much more to be feared than that of the revolu­
tionaries ... It is a fact Europeans were never in any way inter­
fered with by rebels. The Imperial forces have also suffered in 
reputation for the disgusting scene which was witnessed after the 
taking of Ho-k'ou (the brutal killing of some villagers suspected 
of sympathising with the revolutionaries.)"
Such a situation, nevertheless, was soon to be drastically changed. 
Revolutionary movements would no longer be confined to small, isolated 
incidents in the countryside, and the lives and property of foreigners would 
no longer be so secure in the face of growing Chinese national consciousness. 
The deaths of the Empress Dowager and Emperor Kuang-hsh in November 1908, 
served as a dividing line. After this the British government found it 
increasingly difficult to maintain such a benign attitude as revolutionary 
activities became more violent, while correspondingly the Government at 
Peking fell into greater confusion under the direction of the Prince Regent.
81
Carlisle to F.O., 8 June 1908, (confidential) FQ 371/430.
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The Regency
Since the coup d* etat of 1898, and particularly since the return of
the Court to Peking after the Boxer debacle of 1900, the Empress™Dowager had
been the real ruler of the Empire. Whatever little news was known of the
Emperor Kuang-hsh was usually in connection with his ill health and rumours
of his imminent deposition by the Empress Dowager. In January, 1901, Satow
reported that the Emperor was said to have ”... gone off his head and
82
amuses himself with eating tallow candles.” A year later, when the
Empress Dowager held an audience for the Foreign Representatives, all those
present noted the sickly appearance of the Emperor, and that ”no one pays
83any attention to him." But Satow conceded that "It is possible that he
84may be intelligent," and this was borne out by Liang Chen™tung,(who
accompanied the Chinese Minister to the Coronation of Edward VII) who said
85
that the Emperor "is intelligent but very patient." On the other hand,
the Empress Dowager was always accredited with energy and robustness, with
a particular fondness for ruling despite the fact that she was seventy-one
86years of age in 1904. Various rumours of her intention to depose the
8^Satow to Bertie, 17 Jan. 1901, PRO 30/33, 14/11.
8^Satow to Lansdowne, 29 Jan. 1902, FO 800/118; Times 24 
Jan. 1902, p.3 col. 3.
8^Satow to Lansdowne, 29 Jan. 1902, FO 800/118.
85Satow to F.O., 12 Nov. 1902, PRO 30/33, 7/2.
88See Satow to F.O. 17 Dec. 1902 (secret) FO 17/1527, and 
16 June 1904, FO 800/119i Stanley F. Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs 
(Belfast, 1950) 846-7; Shinshu Nakakuki, Man-Ch'inq hsien-shih mi-mi shih 
(Shanghai n.d.) 7b-8b; Katherine A. Carl, With the Empress Dowager of China 
(London, 1906) 100-10.
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Emperor were thus circulated from time to time.
On 10 November, 1908, Jordan in Peking heard about the Emperor's
88condition, and was already speculating on the vital question fo succession.
On 13 November, a decree was issued appointing Prince Ch'un (Ts'ai-feng)
brother of Kuang-hsb as Regent, and his five-year-old son for the Imperial
succession. This was regarded by Jordan and the Government in London in
general as being the best arrangement possible under the circumstances, though
Jordan did later express anxiety regarding the upbringing of the infant
Emperori " ... being exposed to the influences to which the late Emperor
89had succumbed was a bad training for the future Ruler." He hoped for some
90
measures of palace reform in this connection.
The next day the deaths of both the Emperor and Empress Dowager 
were announced, and the Regency instituted. The coincidence of the two 
nearly simultaneous deaths led naturally to much talk of conspiracy and foul 
play. Even the English Secretary at the Chinese Legation in London, Sir 
John McLeavy Brown, believed that the Emperor was made away with by the 
Empress-Dowager, and his forecast for the stability of the Chinese Government 
was therefore gloomy.^ In spite of the expected confusion which would
^For example, Townley to Satow, 12 Feb. 1903, PRO 30/33, 7/9, 
and Jordan to F.O., 1 Aug. 1907 (confidential) FO 371/220.
^Jordan telegram to F.O. 10 Nov. 1908, FO 371/434, and Jordan 
to Campbell, 12 Nov. 1908 (private) FO 350/5.
^Jordan telegram to F.O. 14 Nov. 1908, FO 371/434» and F.O. 
telegram in reply, 14 Nov. 1908, ibid.
^Jordan telegram to F.O. 14 Nov. 1908, ibid. See also Jordan 
to Campbell, 26 Nov. 1908 (private) FO 350/5, in which he commented on the 
appallingly high rate of infant mortality in Peking.
91Alston minutes, 16 Nov. 1908, FO 371/434. Jordan however, 
was furnished with a report by the Legation physician on the medical 
circumstances of the two deaths, and discredited whatever rumours of foul 
play there was. See Jordan to F.O. 24 Nov. 1908, ibid. Another interesting 
account of the deaths is found in Isaac T. Headland, Court Life in China 
(New York 1908) 8-11; see also Ai-hsin chio-lo P'u-yi, Wo-ti ch1ien-pan-sheng 
(Peking & Hongkong 1964) 19-20; North China Herald 21 Nov. 1908, p.441, col. 1-3.
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necessarily accompany the dramatic demise of both heads of state, the change
of government in Peking was&chieved with exceptional peace and facility.
There was calmness everywhere, and in Peking itself so little impression was
made that even the shops remained open on the fateful day, content with merely
putting up a few emblems of mourning, and "there was nothing to show that the
92
people sympathized with the Palace ... "
This was a satisfactory state of affairs, as far as the foreign
governments were concerned. In fact, the Regency began in an atmosphere
of hope and optimism. The Prince Regent had seen something of the Western
world, had worked on the special Commission on constitutional reform, and was
on good terms with the foreign Legations in Peking. Though not strong
physically or even mentally, he "possessed sagacity and a sound common 
93sense." There were expectations on all sides that the new reign would
continue or even surpass the old in its reform programme. Admittedly the
Regent was yet an untried hand at diplomacy but for the British there need
be no apprehensions so long as Ytian Shih-k'ai was present to wield his
influence. Sir Edward Grey felt, "If Yllian Shih-k’ai comes uppermost it
94will be all right," and Jordan agreed, "He is the one sensible broad- 
95
minded man here."
^Jordan to Campbell, 26 Nov. 1908 (private) FO 350/5; also 
Jordan’s telegram to F.O. 17 Nov. 1908, FO 371/434. In his private letter to 
Campbell, Jordan expressed an unofficial opinion that "as it had to come some 
time, perhaps it was as well it was done quickly and so to speak doubly."
^Jordan telegram, 21 Nov. 1908, FO 371/434 and again to 
Campbell, 26 Nov. 1908 (private) FO 350/5. See also the Times of 18 Nov.
1908, p.9 col. 3.
^Grey minutes on Jordan’s telegram of 17 Nov. 1908, FO 371/434.
^Jordan to Campbell, 24 Nov. 1908, FO 350/5. In an article, 
"Some Chinese I have known," in the Nineteenth Century Magazine, Vol. 88, 
December 1920, 953-4, Jordan wrote of Yhan: "He Is the Chinese of all others
for whom I have the greatest admiration ... "
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It is interesting to note Britain1s concern with the fortunes of 
Ylian Shih-k'ai ever since he emerged as the foremost educational and military 
reformer during his Governorship of Shantung (1899-1901) and Viceroyalty of
Of.
Chihli (1901-9). Ylian also enjoyed the Empress-Dowager's favour after the
1898 movement. Thi s, together with his efforts at Westernization and the
creation of the Peiyang Army, was sufficient justification for the British
to single out Ylian for attention as being a potential force in shaping the
policies of China. Early in 1901, Sir Ernest Satow took pains to refute an
impression of Ylian furnished by Major G. Periera of the Grenadier Guards,
who toured through Shantung and Chihli. Periera had found Ylian to be "...
not a man of very strong character, and he was more or less a figurehead and
97
really guided by advisers ... " Satow insisted at the time that this
opinion did not agree with his own views of Ylian, who "possessed elements of
character which have gradually secured him a strong position, not only in
98foreign opinion, but also in the opinion of his countrymen."
Satow was probably the more accurate judge of the two, and his
99favourable appraisal of Ylian was echoed in 1903 during the Manchurian crisis. 
Townley, British Charge d*Affaires in Peking, was much impressed with Ylian's 
handling of the situation and bore testimony to his "energy, ability and 
soundness of purpose ... I am convinced that he is a disinterested and
^See the biography of Ylian in Shen Tsu-hsien, et.al. (comp) 
Yung-an ti-tzu chi (Taipei 1962); other accounts of Ylian's career are found 
in Ch'en Po-ta, Ch'ieh-kuo ta-tao Ylian Shih-k'ai (Chungking 1945, Peking 1949) 
1-5; R.L. Powell, "The rise of Ylian Shih-k'ai and the Pei-yang Army" in 
Harvard University, Papers on China III, (1949) 225-56; Jerome Ch'en, Ylian 
Shih-kai (London 1961) Chap. 3-6; Norman D. Palmer, "Makers of Modern China, 
the Strong Man: Ylian Shih-k'ai" in Current History XV, N.S. 85 (Sept. 1948)
149-55.
^Periera's report, in Satow to F.O., 22 June 1901 (confidential)
FO 17/1474.
98 • r* j ibid *
99
See Chapter V.
258
enlightened patriot who has his country’s interests at heart. He is, more­
over, the only Chinese statesman strong enough to keep order in this province 
... " Campbell a g r e e d . T o w n l e y  continued to sing Ylian1 s praises in two 
private letters to Campbell. It was perhaps part of Ylian*s political acumen 
to demonstrate at least in the summer of 1903, that among all the foreign 
Powers he counted only on Britain's support, because he felt Britain's aims 
in China were "based upon legitimate trade aspirations, which would equally
101benefit China and herself, rather than any dreams of territorial expansion ... "
Townley consequently urged that it was an opportunity for Britain to win to
their interests a man who, he was convinced, would "in all probability be
102the most important man by far in China at no distant date." In his second 
letter, Townley reasserted his confidence in Ylian: "He is, I think, most
certainly a man to be supported cautiously and even if need be strongly, 
should the occasion require it, as he is one of the very few provincial
officials who are worth a row of pins. He has strength, determination and
103 104honesty on his side ... " Campbell appeared convinced. This was, of
course, an isolated instance, and coloured very much by the circumstances of
Russian manoeuvres in Manchuria. Yet Britain continued the tendency of
looking to one strong man on the Chinese scene on whom the British government
depended as a stabilizing influence against the fluctuations of the Chinese
Court. This proved all the more significant after Ylian*s appointment to the
■^^Townley's telegram to F.O. 2 May 1903 (secret) FO 17/1603. 
Campbell's minutes on above: "He is doubtless the strongest and best man
available."
■^Townley to Campbell, 6 May 1903 (private) FO 17/1598.
103Townley to Campbell, 13 Aug. 1903 (private) FO 17/1599.
^^Campbell’s minutes to F.O. 22 June 1903, FO 17/1598, suggesting 
that Townley be authorised to give Ylian such support as he could privately 
and cautiously.
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Presidency of the Wai-wu. Pu in September, 1907.
With this background, it is thus easy to comprehend the furore which
greeted news of Ylian Shih-ka'i's dismissal from office by the Prince Regent
in January, 1909. This was the first major policy decision taken by the
Regent since his assumption of power, and at one stroke he dashed to the
ground all the high hopes entertained by the British Government of his
pursuing an enlightened and reformist rule. It must be remembered that the
Regent was after all, a brother of Emperor Kuang-hsli, who was "betrayed" by
Ylian in 1898. Nevertheless, when news arrived that on 2 January, Ylian was
relieved of his offices because of alleged bad health, the British roundly
condemned the Regent for taking this foolish and retrograde step. "China
106can ill afford to lose the services of such an able man ... " was the
Foreign Office reaction. "This cold, callous Decree has contemptuously
dismissed the statesman in whom foreigners had the highest confidence, and who
stood in the sight of Foreign Representatives for order, stability and
107
progress ... " was the remark from the London Times. It was generally
acknowledged that the decision was the result of reactionary intrigue among
Court circles and that it signified the resurgence of Manchu ascendency in
108
the government. The Regent had already proved a bitter disappointment.
1   105
See Jordan's telegram of 4 Sept. 1907, (confidential)
FO 371/226. In a private letter to Campbell, 4 Sept. 1907, FO 350/4 Jordan 
suggested that Ylian's appointment was a means by which the Manchus "trembling 
in their shoes ... hope to save the situation by attaching to themselves the 
Chinese who carry the most weight in the country." On the other hand, in 
Hillier to Addis, 5 Jan. 1909, FO 371/612, this policy of attaching complete 
confidence in one man was attacked as being unsound.
Stewart minutes on Jordan's telegram of 2 Jan. 1909, FO 371/612.
107
Times, 4 Jan. 1909, p.5 col. 5.
^33See Jordan's telegram to F.O. 2 Jan. 1909 (urgent) FO 371/612: 
Jordan to F.O. 16 Mar. 1909 (confidential) FO 371/635, 15 July 1909 FO 371/640; 
London and China Express 11 Mar. 1909, p. 196-7; Lancelot F. Lawton and H.
Hobden, "The fall of Ylian Shih-k'ai" in Fortnightly Review, O.S. Vol. 93 (Mar. 
1910) 420-34; the Editor, "Dropping the Pilot" in China, Vol. 27 (Apr. 1909)
241-5.
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To Sir John Jordan the frustration was especially keen. He too saw in Ylian
a guarantee of the peace and good order in the Empire, which was the first
prerequisite for British trade. Over the years, Jordan had thus quietly built
up friendly relations with Ylian and gained his support in many matters. The
policy behind this was of course to see that the Chinese Government turned to
Britain rather than any other Power for assistance in enterprises such as the
development of railways and the reorganization of the navy, among other
things. "All that is now gone, and we have to start afresh with the handicap
109
of having been closely associated with the losing party ... "
The British Foreign Office decided to protest against Ylian's dismissal
and attempt to have him reinstalled. "It seems hardly likely to be successful
now, but if it were it would probably have the added effect of inspiring Ylian
with sentiments of gratitude, and is certainly worth a t t e m p t i n g . T h e  British
Government, in leading the clamour over the Ylian incident, obviously had other
long-range projects in mind. It did not matter if their actions smacked of
interference in China's internal politics. As Campbell put It, "We do interfere
111occasionally in the internal affairs of China, and can hardly avoid it."
In Peking, however, Jordan managed only to rally the support of the United 
States Minister W. W. Rockhill, in sending a petition to the Regent. The 
main obstacle to his efforts among the diplomatic community was Japan, who 
clearly regarded the scheme as an interference if not a threat to the Chinese 
Government. "The Japanese Government consider that the dismissal of Ylian is
^3^Jordan to Campbell, 7 Jan. 1909 (private) FO 350/5.
II n
Stewart minutes on Jordan's telegram of 2 Jan. 1909 (urgent)
FO 371/612.
III .Campbell minutes on Jordan's telegram, 3 Jan. 1909, ibid.
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a purely personal matter ... and they would rather not interfere on his behalf
for they consider that such interference would have the appearance of meddling
112
in the private affairs of the Court and Government." But Jordan and the
United States Minister had no such scruples? a joint representation was made
to the Regent on 15 January, which evoked a promise from the Wai-wu Pu that
Yhan's retirement was of a temporary nature. Confidentially Jordan was
informed that the petition was sure to have a "steadying effect" on the Prince
113Regent. A restraining influence on the Regent1s reactionary tendencies was
exactly what the British hoped to achieve by making an issue out of Yhan's
114dismissal, so Jordan's efforts were not regarded as having been wasted,
115Grey expressed his pleasure,
"I was originally doubtful about the wisdom of this representation, 
but suppressed my doubt owing to my confidence in Sir John Jordan's 
knowledge of the Chinese, and his judgment as to its probable effect.
The confidence in Sir John Jordan has been justified, for the effect 
is apparently excellent. If YOan Shih-k'ai returns to power the fact 
that we made the representation, which is creditable to us in any case, 
will be useful.”
For the time being, while the British Government waited to gauge the 
effects of its interference, conditions in the Chinese Empire continued to 
deteriorate and confound those who earlier expressed hopes that the Regency 
would see a period of rejuvenation and strengthening. The chief disappointment
112MacDonald's telegram to F.O., 10 Jan. 1909, ibid. Subsequently 
there was much talk of Japanese intrigues in causing Yftan's dismissal, as he 
was proving an obstacle to their Manchurian negotiations. See confidential 
notes on MacDonald's telegram of 10 Jan. 1909, Jordan's telegram of 11 Jan.
1909, and MacDonald's telegram of 14 Jan. 1909, ibid.
Jordan's telegram to F.O. 15 Jan. 1909, ibid*
■^^Alstons' minutes on above, ibid; "This is satisfactory and
I think we may take it that the representations have not been taken amiss, and 
will do no harm - on the contrary, they may have the 1 steadying effect' 
anticipated by Prince Ch'ing".
115Grey's minutes, ibid.
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continued to be the Prince Regent himself. He turned out to be a man of
little strength of character and no great qualities as a ruler. His ministers
would get no decisions from him, while he attempted unsuccessfully to shoulder
all the responsibilities of state alone. Meanwhile, as central authority
waned, the provinces asserted themselves and found more and more ways of
ignoring the decisions made at Peking. At the same time, the growth of a
national consciousness among the educated and intellectual classes had now
culminated in a "Rights Recovery Movement," which threatened all foreign
interests in the country and came close to being a xenophobic outburst.
Students were again at the forefront of the agitation; excessive deeds of
heroism or patriotism were reported from many quarters. In April, 1910,
serious rioting occurred in Changsha, originally caused by famine and economic
distress, but subsequently turned into an anti-foreign and to some extent
117
anti-dynastic movement by the encouragement of political agitators. It
was an unsettling period, and the British Government watched with apprehension
the concentration of agitation in the Yangtze provinces. Pessimistic reports
regularly reached London. Sir Edward Grey commented," I am not at all
118sanguine; things have relapsed since Ylian fell."
In Changsha some three thousand students of a missionary 
school appealed to the Governor for arms to be issued to them, for the defence 
of Hunan against foreign aggression. See the report of the Commander-in-chief, 
in Admiralty to F.O. 23 Mar. 1910, FO 371/862. In Hankow, bands of uniformed 
youths paraded in the streets distributing anti-dynastic proclamations and 
urging the resistance to foreign encroachments. S,e:e Admiralty to F.O. 29 Oct. 
1910, ibid. For other observations, see Jordan to Grey, 28 June 1909 (private) 
FO 800/43; Brunner, Mond & Co., to F.O. 31 Jan. 1910, FO 371/866.
1 17
See the Times of 18 Apr. 1910, p.7 col. 1 and 14 May, p.5 
col. 2; Parliamentary Debates 18 Apr. 1910, XVI, p.1713; MaxMhller to F.O.
21 May 1910, FO 371/867; North China Herald, 27 May 1910, p.479-80.
1 1 8
Grey’s minutes on Brunner, Mond & Co., to F.O. 31 Aug. 1909, 
FQ 371/641. On one occasion the Commander-in-chief in China, Vice-Admiral 
Winsloe, blamed the Consuls especially Goffe in Hanking, for exaggerating the 
situation in the Yangtze, and charged that "the Consuls are as a rule inclined 
to cry ’wolf’" See Winsloe to Admiralty, 10 June 1910, in Admiralty to F.O.
13 Aug. 1910, FO 371/868. Langley commented, "It is not our experience here 
that our China Consuls cry ’wolf”' ibid.
263
For the British commercial interests doing business in the Far East
the situation was equally bleak. In at least one instance it was reported
that "there is a feeling among Britishers out here that the home government
119do not fully realize the situation." The charge was not entirely true,
of course, but it served to bring home to the Foreign Office the helplessness
of those watching events in China, as well as of themselves reading accounts
of it in London. Alston admitted that news from China was " ... unpleasant
reading, but a great deal of it is no doubt quite true. The relapse of China
120since the fall of Yhan Shih-k'ai is steadily progressing." Sir Edward
Grey complained that the Brunner-Mond report " ... stops short of any
conclusion as to what the British Government should or could do. China is
according to this paper heading for one of the greatest revolutions the
121
world has ever seen. If so we can do nothing .... " It was with a sense 
of real helplessness that Grey and his colleagues observed the quickening pace 
of events in China which would culminate in the "revolution" Grey was 
contemplating.
In the meantime, the British Legation in Peking sought to prepare 
itself for whatever contingencies should befall, by making arrangements
122
for a substantial increase in its reserve of food supply in case of trouble. 
Substantiation of their fears of imminent unrest did appear in June, 1910.
A letter signed by Hsh Cheng-hsiang, "Chief of the War Board of the three 
Chiang provinces" was sent to all the foreign Legations in Peking, announcing
^ ^Brunner, Mond & Co. to F.O. 2 Mar. 1910, FO 371/863.
120Alston minutes on above, ibid.
121Grey minutes on above, ibid.
122War Office to F.O. 3 July 1909, and Jordan to F.O. 6 Aug.
1909 (confidential) FO 371/639.
264.
that a day had been fixed for a revolutionary movement to destroy the Manchu
Dynasty, and it asked that foreign subjects should not interfere on the side
123of the government. The contents of the missive were simultaneously released
to the English press in China, which served only to initiate a wave of panic 
124and speculation. Grey, who seemed to be much more disheartened by the
disappearance of Ylian Shih-k’ai from Peking than his Foreign Office colleagues,
now evidently did not think China without Ylian worth saving. When first told
of this note from a supposed revolutionary, he felt, 1 If any such movement
takes place we should abstain from interference except to protect British 
125subjects,” and again later, "It is not worth our while to risk anything on
126behalf of the present incompetent government of China."
Such was the mood of the British Government when confronted with the 
situation in China after 1909. These were to tally new conditions which 
seemed to bear no relation to the period of reforming zeal in 1898, or the 
Manchu flirtation with constitutionalism from 1905, or even to the recent 
outburst of insurrections, which did not seem to do any harm to British 
interests in China. In their search for some rationale for the accelerated 
pace of deterioration in the Manchu government on the one hand, and in the 
spread of revolutionary ideas on the other, the British tended to simplify
123
A translation of the text of the letter is given in MaxMhller
to F.O. 3 June 1910, FO 371/864. The original in Chinese has not been found.
See Jordan to F.O. 5 Mar. 1911, FO 37l/l089: "Whether this letter was a hoax
or not has never been clearly established.
124See London and China Express 3 June 1910, p.456 col. 1;
Times 4 June 1910, p.7 col. 5; North China Herald 10 June 1910, p.601, col. 1-3.
■^^Grey1 s minutes on MaxMliller’ s telegram of 3 June 1910, FO 371/
864.
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matters and fix blame squarely on the shoulders of the Prince Regent,
especially for his unforgiveable dismissal of Ylian Shih-k’ai. In one respect,
at any rate, this rationalization was justified! the removal of Ylian
did cause a certain amount of confusion and uncertainty in the Chinese
military administration. This was particularly noticeable in the central
and southern units which were already weak and divided. These circumstances
therefore provided the Chinese revolutionaries with the necessary opening to
infiltrate the armed forces with revolutionary sentiments.
It will be remembered that in the earlier T’ung Meng Hui insurrections,
failure had often been attributed to lack of ammunition, bad strategy and most
of all ill-trained and unreliable fighters among the secret society bands.
Now it was recognised that cooperation from regiments of the Army was
imperative for future armed conflicts, and towards this end the revolutionaries
directed their campaigns. Huang Hsing had by now cultivated the friendship
of Kuo Jen-chang, commander of a regiment in Hunan, which was especially
useful with the latter's transfer to service in Kwangtung in 1908. Then two
other officers of the Yangtze regiments, I Ying-t'ien and Chao Sheng, also
became disillusioned with the government and expressed their sympathies with
the revolutionaries. Chao later in 1908 joined the T’unq Meng Hui, and
. . 127
resigned his commission to devote himself to revolutionary activities.
I Ying-t'ien, a native of Anhwei, was also transferred to Kwangtung about the 
same time. Earlier in 1906, when the Anhwei army was mobilized to crush the 
P’ing-Liu-Li risings, he had taken a short leave of absence rather than fight_ , —-^27
Hu Han-min, ”Hu Han-min tzu-chuan" in Ko-ming Wen-hsien 
III, 403-4; Chang Shih-chao, Chao Po-hsien shih-ltteh" in HHKM IV, 312-5.
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against the revolutionaries. In 1908 he too resigned his commission and
joined the revolutionaries in Canton, where his military connections proved
128
useful in bringing anti-dynastic ideas into the regiments stationed there.
In fact, units of the Chinese army stationed in the South offered 
considerable prospects for revolutionary infiltration at this time. Many 
of the recruits were enlisted from provinces in which revolutionary activity 
had been intense, and the men were often relatives or clansmen of leading 
rebels among the Tung Meng Hui. At this time there were three regiments 
in Kwangtung province, and among the officers who had been contemporaries of 
Hu Han-min in the Kwangtung Military Academy were Chou Lu, Chh Chih-hsin,
Hu I-sheng and Yao Yh-p'ing. About a year earlier in 1907, the Canton 
government began a large-scale recruitment for the Waichow army, and many 
T'ung Meng Hui members had seized the opportunity to make their way into the 
armed forces.
From these beginnings, anti-dynastic sentiments began to spread
among the Chinese troops. To the foreign representatives in China, this was
perhaps the most sinister feature of the situation. P.H. Warren, the British
Consul in Shanghai, reported that in a three month period (early in 1910)
there had been mutinous outbreaks in three areas of the province among the
foreign-drilled troops, and that in two cases the officers had openly shown
130
themselves to be afraid of the soldiers. From Nanking, Goffe supported this
Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, 1324-5; Feng Yzu-yu, Ko-minq i-shih I, 
289-90; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Keng-hsh Kuang-chou hsin-chhn chh-i chi" in HHKM 
III, 358-60.
1 on
Chou Lu, op.cit., III, 766; see also Yoshihiro Hatano, 
"Revolutionary Movements in the Chinese Modernized Armies," unpublished paper 
presented at the research conference on the Chinese Revolution of 1911,
New Hampshire, 1965.
■^^Warren to MaxMllller, 18 Apr. 1910, FO 371/864.
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with the information that the Chinese authorities there were also "nervous
131of the foreign-drilled troops whose loyalty was doubtful." And in Chengtu,
Consul Wilkinson observed: "There is no doubt a considerable section of the
officers and men are anti-dynastic, and the army is honeycombed by secret 
132societies. These forebodings of danger were not taken lightly by the
British government in London. It was generally recognised that for a return
to peaceful conditions in China, much depended on the ability of the Chinese
Government to suppress these seditious activities among the troops before
they became too widespread. Yet the Government’s "future power to do so
depends on the loyalty of the newly-raised Chinese troops who appear to be a
133
source of danger to Chinese and foreigners alike." Grey went a step
further and recalled the Boxer troubles: "The worst danger, I think, lies in
the weakness and contemptible character of the central Government. When their
own incapacity provokes a dangerous feeling against them, they will endeavour
to save their own skins by diverting the agitation into an anti-foreign channel.
However, for the time being at least, Grey’s premonitions were happily
not to be realized. The revolutionaries now embarked on a new phase of
activities which were directed exclusively against the Manchu authorities. They
resorted to assassination attempts on various high Manchu officials, designed
not so much to eliminate them as to dramatise their revolutionary zeal and
1 0*1
Reported in Captain Kiddie at Nanking, to Commander-in-chief 
in China, 31 May 1910, in Admiralty to F.O. 13 Aug. 1910, FO 371/868. See also 
Goffe to MaxMUtller of 20 Apr. 1910, FQ 371/864.
^^Wilkinson to MaxMhller, 23 May 1910, ibid.
i ^
Foreign Office minutes on MaxMBller to F.O. 14 Apr. 1910,
FO 371/863.
134Grey’s minutes on above, ibid.
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thus to sustain morale.
The first assassination attempt was carried out by a returned
student from Japan, Liu Ssu-fu, who was editor of a revolutionary pamphlet
in Hongkong. In 1907, shortly after the Ch'i-nu-hu uprising, Liu decided
that Admiral Li Chun, instrumental in suppressing the movement, must
be eliminated from the ranks of the Southern officials. On 21 June, 1907,
planted himself along a path through which Li Chun was expected to pass.
Due to carelessness, his bomb exploded prematurely and resulted in causing
injury only to himself. Though the local police were unable to determine
135the nature of his mission, Liu Ssu-fu was imprisoned for two years.
Within a month of this, a more daring attempt was carried out 
against Governor En~ming of Anhwei. Another returned student from Japan, 
HsU Hsi-lin, was the activist this time. On his return to China, Hsti 
had obtained a post as expectant tao-tai in Anking, capital of Anhwei, 
and soon proved himself a competent administrator. At the time of the 
assassination he had risen to the position of an Assistant Director of 
the Police Training College in Anhwei.
“135
Chou Lu, op.cit. Ill 722-3; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch1iao 
ko-ming kai-kuo shih 113-5; ko-minq i-shih II, 207-11; Lo chia-lun, 
op.cit. I, 181-2; the China Mail 19 June 1907, p. 5 col. 5; Robert A. 
Scalapino and George T. Yu, The Chinese Anarchist Movement (Cal^ j.
1961) 35-6. Martin Bernal has written a Ph.D. thesis for Cambridge 
University on the Chinese anarchist movement, to which I have not had 
access. See extracts from his dissertation, presented as an article. 
"Origins of Chinese Socialism" to the Working Group on China and the 
World, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Chi/l9.
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On the fateful morning of 6 July, 1907, while the Governor was proceeding to 
inspect the cadets at the Training school, Hsh fired several shots at the 
Governor, who died the next morning, Hsh was captured and summarily executed, 
after loudly proclaiming that his act was part of a general plot against the 
Manchu dynasty.
Two consequences of this incident especially drew the attention of the
British government. Firstly, the bare-faced manner in which Hstt carried out
his crime, and his utter unconcern when arrested, suggested to them that the
strength of anti-Manchu feeling in the Yangtze was greater than generally 
137understood. Secondly the British observed that the local government
displayed undue nervousness in the drastic measures of repression that
followed. It was felt that much harm was done by the panic-stricken Anhwei
and Chekiang officials by their indiscriminate torture and execution of all
who were suspected. A woman revolutionary, Chiu Chin, head of the Ming-te
Girls' School, was thus executed, This led to a storm of indignation, Chinese
and foreign, at the methods of the Manchu authorities. At the same time, it
was reported throughout the country that Manchu officials now lived closely
138
guarded in their yamens for fear of attempts upon their persons. If this
Chou Lu, op.cit. Ill, 727-33; Chang Ping-lin, "Hsh Hsi-lin, 
Ch’en Po-p'ing, Ma Tsung-han chuan" in HHKM III, 178-31; Ko-ming wen-hsien I, 
125-6; Feng Tzu-yu "Chi Chung-kuo T’ung Meng Hui" ibid. II, 151; Times 8 and 
9 July 1907; North China Herald 12 July, 1907, p.69-70; Jordan to F.O. 10 July 
1907 FO 371/231, and a long account by the Rev. C. Bone in North China Herald
11 May 1908, 371-2.
137Jordan to F.O. 21 Feb. 1908, FO 371/428.
138Both Chang Chih-tung and Tuan Fang had allegedly received 
threatening notes, Jordan to F.O. ibid, and on 20 Aug. 1908, FO 371/217. On 
one occasion, when Jordan was speaking about this to Chao Erh-hslin in Peking, 
the latter*s interpreter interjected the remarks "This should stir them up 
a bit," Jordan was also told that "Serve them right" was the comments of students 
at the Imperial University. See Jordan to Campbell, 11 July 1907, (private)
FO 350/4. See also the London and China Express 30 Aug. 1908, p.661, col. 1.
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was true, it would have given the revolutionaries much satisfaction in having
achieved one of their foremost objectives. The disturbances which followed
in the wake of the Anking murder had indeed far outweighed the importance of
the deed itself. Jordan thought that, "This form of crime is a startling
indication of the difficulties and dangers which the misgovernment of the
139country has called into being."
Following this, in November 1908, a few days after the change of
government in Peking, another upheaval took place in Anking. This time it was
an abortive military coup led by a captain in the artillery, Hsiung Ch'eng-chi.
On the night of 19 November, Hsiung and his band of followers attempted to
storm the city gates as a prelude to a general uprising in the city. But the
Governor, Chu Chia-pao, had previous intelligence of the plot, and was able
to frustrate their plans all along. Hsiung managed to hide and subsequently 
140fled to Japan. The attempt was ill-organised and had little hope of success
against the energetic measures taken by the Governor. Initially the British
Foreign Office was inclined to think the outbreak was "possibly ... a ballon
141d'essai to test the spirit of the army." But with additional information
coming to light, the prospects did not appear promising. The British considered
the movement important in "showing that a considerable amount of disaffection
142still exists in Anhui ... " and from another observer, "I think myself that 
if the able Governor had not been here, the rebels would probably have been
139Jordan to F.O. 10 July 1908, FO 371/231.
140Hsiung later in 1910 was arrested in Harbin, where he had 
gone to arrange a secret deal with Russia concerning Manchuria, and subsequently 
executed. For this see C.T. Hstteh, op.cit. 74-5; Shih-ming, "Hsiung-an shih-mo' 
chi" in HHKM III, 238-9. For the Anking revolt, see Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, Wh-shen 
Hsiung Ch'eng-chi An-king ch'i-i "chi" in HHKM III, 229-34; Chou lu, op.cit.
Ill, 753-63; IV, 1313-5.
Alston's minutes on Jordan's telegram of 21 Nov. 1908 FO 371/434.
142Jordan to F.O. 4 Dec. 1908, FO 371/435.
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successful in taking the city from which it would have been very difficult
to dislodge them ... The Nankin (sic) troops ... about whose loyalty is some
doubt, would also probably have joined in with the result that there would
143have been a general insurrection in the Yangtze Valley." The peace of the
Yangtze had consistently been of prime importance to the British government,
and so it was no wonder that when the revolutionaries allied their activities
with that of disaffected troops, the movement increasingly attracted the
attention of the British authorities in China.
For over a year after Hsiung's attempt, the revolutionaries lay low,
until the T'ung Meng Hui was ready to launch two uprisings again, both
starting in Canton and with cooperation from large segments of the Southern
Army. Preparations for a Conton coup had begun with the establishment of a
Southern Bureau (Nan-fang chih-pu) in Hongkong, in October 1909, and a date
was set for 10 February, 1910, the Chinese New Year’s Day. On 9 February,
however, a few soldiers of the New Army were involved in a fracas with a
shopowner in Canton, and the police interfered. When two soldiers were
arrested, the whole of the First Battalion stationed in Canton came out the
next day to seek redress. A riot developed between the Army and the Police,
and this became the premature start of the 1910 Canton mutiny. For three
days there was street fighting, until a Manchu garrison under Li Chun arrived
144to quell the revolt.
Capt. Nugent to the Commander-in-chief, 27 Nov. 1908 in 
Admiralty to F.O. 19 Jan. 1909, FO 371/629.
144
Hu Han-min, op.cit. Ill, 403-4; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Keng-hsh 
Kuang-chou hsin-chl!in chtt-i chi" in HHKM III, 347-61; Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming 
i-shih I, 288-96; Chou Lu, op.cit. Ill, 766-9; the Hongkong Daily Press lb Feb. 
1910, p.3 col. 4, 16 Feb. p.2 col. 5, 18 Feb. p.2 col. 4, and 19 Feb. p.2 col. b 
Times lb Feb. 1910, p.b col. 3-4; North China Herald 18 Feb. 1910, p. 3b4 
col. 1-3.
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The massive insurrection was plotted in Hongkong, and carried out in
Canton; London would have expected comprehensive reports of the proceedings
from its representatives in the two outposts. Yet on this occasion no such
cooperation was forthcoming. George Jamieson (1843-1920) the Consul at Canton,
submitted a brief account of the events in Canton, but refused to attribute
them to revolutionary societies. "The incident may therefore be considered
practically closed and has in my opinion no political significance. The
rumour, quoted to the effect that agents of the Ko Ming Tong were stirring
145up the soldiers, is as far as I can ascertain, without foundation."
Jamieson deemed it of so little importance that he did not care to inform 
the Governor of Hongkong, Sir.Frederick Lugard, of the uprising until a week 
later, when the matter was considered "closed" by the Canton Consulate. Mean­
while well-to-do Chinese as well as escaping revolutionaries began flocking 
into Hongkong for safety. Lugard was understandably offended, and complained 
to the Colonial office and asked in future the Canton Consulate should be
instructed to inform Hongkong by telegram of any serious matter which might
146involve the interests of the Colony. The Colonial Office was not too
sympathetic with the Governor; "I suppose we are bound to support Sir Frederick
147
Lugard, but I do not think he has a strong case over this incident." But
the Foreign Office realized the difficulties of Lugard1s position: "The request
148is clearly reasonable ... " and Alston felt that Jamieson has been
"^Jamieson to Jordan, 25 Feb. 1910, FO 371/862. Jamieson
entered the Consular Service in 1864, and in 1861 was Consul and Judge of the
Supreme Court in Shanghai, Throughout 1910 and 1911 he refused to admit the 
existence of a revolutionary movement in Canton and Hongkong.
146Lugard to C.O., 21 Feb. 1910 CO 129/365.
^4^Cox minutes on above, ibid.
^4^Foreign Office minutes on C.O. to F.O, 12 Apr. 1910, FO 371/862.
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149’’unnecessarily crochety, it seems to me ... ” The incident constituted the
beginning of a feud between Lugard and Jamieson* which was especially unfortunate,
during these critical years, as the Chinese revolutionary movement continued
to use Canton and Hongkong as its mainsprings of action. Abundant information
was clearly essential if British policy was to be realistically formulated,
and there needed to be friendly cooperation between the Colonial Government
150and the Canton Consulate.
The last struggle against the Manchu dynasty before the final revolution
of 1911 took place again in Canton, early in 1911. By this time, revolutionary
sentiment had clearly proliferated to include many areas of south and central
China. As a result of liason with comrades in the Yangtze areas, the rebels
decided that for this insurrection coordinated risings would occur in the
central provinces once the initial movement had begun in Canton. In January,
1911, a General Planning Department (T’ung-ch'ou Pu) was set up in Hongkong,
with over forty branches in Canton. On the military side, Yao Ytt-p’ing, Chou
Lu and Chu Chih-hsin contacted their former colleagues and friends in the
151Rapid Results College (formerly the Military Academy) and the Bogue
Military School. Chao Sheng and Huang Hsing wielded much influence among the
Circuit Battalions (the provincial reserve forces) and the Regular Standing 
152Army. By April, a civilian Corp was formed in Canton, eight hundred
Alston minutes, ibid.
150In the summer of 1911, Lugard in an effort to obtain speedy 
information, began corresponding directly with certain Chinese officials in 
Canton over the head of the Consul. Another storm was raised over this. See
correspondence in FO 371/1091 and CO 129/384, June-August, 1911.
151The Military Academy was reorganized in 1906 by Governor 
Ch'en Ch?un-hstian into the Su-ch'eng Hsheh-hsiao (Rapid Results Academy) which 
led to some dissatisfaction among the students, thus rendering them targets 
for revolutionary infiltration. See Chou Lu, op.cit. Ill 817, and Wen Kung-
chih, ’’Hsin-hai ko-ming yhn-tung chung chih Hsin-chl!»n’’ in HHKM III, 337.
152
Chou Lu, op.cit. Ill, 817-9.
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"braves" were selected as the vanguard of the revolutionary army, sympathisers 
from the police and navy were recruited, and the inevitable secret societies 
were organized. The date for action was set for 13 April, 1911. A postpone­
ment was soon found necessary: the assassination of the Manchu Commander of
153Garrisons on 8 April by a revolutionary hot-head had caused the Canton 
authorities to strengthen their surveillance over the city. Besides, funds 
from overseas had not reached the collection center at Hongkong, and shipments 
of weapons from Japan and French Indo-China had been delayed. Then when it
was rumoured that two regiments of the New Army were to be transferred by the
beginning of May, the revolutionaries quickly decided to rise on 20 April.
Huang Hsing left for Canton, but finding that weapons were not yet sufficient, 
decided to postpone the movement again. The revolutionary bands were told 
to await instructions in Hongkong. On the 24th Huang learned that the Manchu
authorities had wind of the conspiracy and were taking strict measures of
prevention. Further delay would mean complete disbanding of the revolutionary 
troops and the abandonment of the movement. Huang ordered that the insurrection 
start on the afternoon of the 27th. This time, the men from Hongkong were late 
in arriving, the other groups in Canton soon scattered in face of overwhelming 
opposition from the government, and in the end only three detachments under 
Huang's command faced the Imperial forces. Defeat was certain by 28 April,
153See the following pages.
154This Canton uprising of 1911 is sometimes called the "March 
29 revolution," because it occurred on the 29th day of the third lunar month, 
which in 1911 fell on 27 April. Accounts of the attempt are given in Chou Lu, 
op.cit. Ill, 826-32? Huang Hsing, "Kuang-chou san-ytteh erh-shih-chiu ko-ming 
chih ch'ien-yin hou-kuo" in HHKM IV, 167-71? Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih I,
218-222; C.T. Hsheh, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution 88-93; Chou Lu,
Kuang-chou san-yheh erh-shih-chiu ko-ming chi (Changsha 1940); the Hongkong
Daily Press 29 Apr. 1911 p.2 col. 6, 1 May p.3 col. 2-3; London and China
Express 5 May 1911, p.323, col. 1-2; North China Herald 6 May 1911, p.332,
col. 1-3; Memorandum on the outbreak in Jamieson to Jordan, 1 May 1911, FO 37l/lQ90.
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Considerable excitement and panic was caused among interested Britons
in this short-lived mutiny. Repeated questions were asked in Parliament
155regarding the safety of the British subjects in China. It was no comfort
to learn that the "revolutionary movement has been highly organized and well
156provided with arms, ammunition and dynamite bombs," and that "resentment
against the Manchu Dynasty had been actively fanned by the Japanese who have
157always an eye to their own advantage." These comments came from Consul
Jamieson of Canton, who even now sought to throw blame for the disturbances
in that city on an outside force, in this case the Japanese.
On their part, the Canton authorities carried out an intense search
for the rebels. About a thousand arrests were made; some seventy failed to
158
give satisfactory accounts of themselves and were summarily executed. It
was obvious that by this time, the revolutionary movement had grown to such
proportions that repression only seemed to engender more resentment, and
hence more explosive situations. The Hongkong observers noted, "Living in
Canton just now is like living on a volcano; the slumbering fires beneath
159may break forth in uncontrollable fury at any moment." Even Jamieson 
admitted that "it cannot be said that all trouble is over."^0 Jordan again 
noticed that the most discouraging effect of the Canton outbreak in other 
provinces was the panic it caused among the Manchu officials. In Foochow
^ ^ Parliamentary Debates, XXV, 408-9 and 572-3.
^^Jamieson to Jordan, 4 May 1911, FO 371/1090.
157.,ibid.
158They became the famed "seventy-two martyrs of the March 27 
revolution" buried at Huang Hua K'ang.
159An editorial in the Hongkong Daily Press 1 May 1911, p.2 col. 1-2. 
^^Jamieson to Jordan, 4 May 1911, FO 37l/lQ90.
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and Nanking the Tartar-Generals and Viceroys did not leave their yamens for
several weeks after the incident, and considerable anxiety was caused among
161the authorities of Changsha, Hankow and Amoy. This very knowledge, that
high officials were in a state of trepidation, served naturally to encourage
the revolutionaries, whose resort to terrorist activities and assassination
now seemed justified.
Assassination was an organised part of the whole anti-dynastic movement
after the formation of the Chih-na an-sha t'uan (China Assassination Society)
in Hongkong, April 1910. The Society was not affiliated to the T'unq Meng Hui,
though its members were all adherents of the larger group. Liu Ssu-fu, released
from prison after his attempt on Li Chun in 1907, was dismayed by the failure
of the 1910 uprising and became determined that organized assassination was
the only alternative to armed movements. Gathering seven other comrades,
he drew up regulations and defined the objectives of the Assassination Society
as mainly the high Imperial authorities of Kwangtung, with special reference
to Governor Chang Ming-ch'i and Admiral Li Chun. Their plans also envisaged
162
sending delegates to Peking to assassinate members of the Imperial family.
Just at this time and unknown to the Assassination group, Wang Ching-wei
163decided to make an attempt on the life of the Prince Regent in Peking. He 
and his accomplice Huang Fu-sheng set up headquarters in Peking in October, 1909 
in March the next year they planted their bombs along a bridge over which the
161Jordan to F.O., 16 Sept. 1911, ibid.
162Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao ko-ming kai-kuo shih 22-4, Ko-ming 
i-shih IV, 202-3; Chou Lu, op.cit. Ill, 887.
t™," 163
He expressed his views and his intentions to Hu Han-min. See 
Hu Han-min, "Hu Han-min tzu-chuan,r in Ko-ming Wen-hsien III, 402;LI Chien-nung, 
Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih (Taiwan 1957) I, 287-9.
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Prince Regent was accustomed to travel. The dynamite however was discovered
by police and the culprits were soon traced. Both were arrested on 16 April.
Yet the suprising thing was that when tried, and after both had admitted
their anti-dynastic motives, the committee set up by the Board of Justice
pronounced extraordinarily light sentences of life imprisonment for Wang
and ten years for Huang. The generally anticipated death sentence was allegedly
waived by the orders of the Prince Regent himself, on the ground that the two
were only trying to draw the government's attention to the need for constitutional 
164reforms. It was clear to all that this clemency was motivated merely by
the Regent's fear that the execution of Wang and Huang would provoke other
assassination attempts and further intensify revolutionary feeling. In reality,
of course, this only accentuated the debilitated condition of the central Government,
and as Davidson of the British Foreign Office commented, "This seems to be rather
mistaken leniency and to be a policy dictated by weakness rather than by strength.
Hanging people does not usually induce others to commit murder - notwithstanding
165the well-known mot that it might serve 'pour encourager les autres'"
Wang's example was in fact to be followed by three other assassination
attempts in the next year. In April 1911, Wen Sheng-ts'ai, a former member 
of the Kwangtung Army, gave his life to kill the Manchu Commander Fu-ch'i.
Wen's original object was Li Chun, whom the revolutionaries believed to be the 
single greatest obstacle to the Canton uprising then in preparation. On 8 April 
Wen stationed himself in the streets when a procession arrived and fired from
164MaxMinier to F.O., 4 May 1910, FO 371/869. See also Chou Lu, 
op.cit. Ill, 784-92; T'ang Leang-li, Wang Ching-wei, a Political Biography 
(Peking 1931) 42-6; Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih III, 244.
■^^Davidson minutes on MaxMhller to F.O. 4 May, 1910, FO 371/869.
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his revolver, thinking he was aiming at Li, but it turned out that Fu-ch’i
was in the sedan chair. Wen was instantly arrested and executed on 15 April,
166
1911. The deed caused great excitement in the province, as one of the 
highest of provincial officials had been murdered in such a dramatic manner. 
Public opinion in Canton was reportedly largely in sympathy with the captured 
assassin, and even many of the educated were rejoicing in the fact that there
1 A 7
was one Manchu the less among the official hierarchy. What really discredited
the Canton government in British eyes was the fact that at the sound of the
first shot from Wen, the richsha chairs were dropped and the chair-bearers
and the Commander's bodyguard of about twenty men, all promptly fled. This
cowardice was felt to be responsible for the success of the assassin, and
"the local press had found the occasion in this to comment on the inefficiency
168
of the Manchu garrison." But Wen’s deed was ill-timed despite his sincere 
intentions, as it served to warn the Canton authorities of revolutionary 
activities in the city and thus helped to cause at least one postponement in 
the Canton insurrection of 1911.
Soon after this another attempt was made on the life of Li Chun.
Li had successfully suppressed every uprising in Kwangtung since 1906; his 
elimination was now regarded essential to the furtherance of the revolution 
in the South. This attempt was carried out by two founder members of the 
Assassination Society, Lin Kuan-tz'u and Ch'en Chiang-ylieh. On 13 August 1911, 
X66For accounts of Wen’s attempt, see Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. II, 
290-4; Huang Hsing, "Fu Wen Sheng-ts'ai chi Fu Ch'i" in HHKM IV, 172; Chou Lu 
op.cit. Ill, 811-3, IV 1326; the Hongkong Daily Press 13 Apr. 1911, p.2 col. 4;
Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, 236-7, which claim that Wen had actually aimed to kill 
Fu Ch'i, having failed to find an opportunity of approaching Li Chuns Times 
11 Apr. 1911, p.5 col. 3; North China Herald 22 Apr. 1911, p.212 col. 2-3.
167
Hongkong Daily Press 11 Apr. 1911, p.2 Col. 6.
168Jamieson to Jordan (undated) in Jordan to F.O, 28 Apr. 1911,
FO 371/1090.
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a home-made bomb was thrown at Li and his entourage, but Li was only slightly
1 £ Q
injured while Lin was shot dead by the Admiral's guards. A more fruitful 
attempt was recorded in October, soon after the revolution of 1911 had broken 
out in Hankow. The target this time was the Manchu General Feng-shan, noted
for his cunning and ferocity, who was coming to Canton on a special mission
| A
to curb the distg^bances. Li P'ei-chi and the others achieved their aim on 
25 October when their bomb killed Feng-shan, while they managed to escape unhurt 
to Hongkong.
These isolated instances of terrorist activity were on the whole regarded
as ill-advised and senseless by the British authorities who observed the proceedings
with distaste? yet they were also a source of satisfaction to the British
representatives in the South in that these were the work of "a few desperate 
171
characters only" and did not have the destructive potential of a full- 
scale armed revolt. This was of course, not the attitude of the Chinese revo­
lutionaries themselves. When morale was low among their party, when insurrections 
all seemed to end in failure and result in mass executions, such outward shows 
of revolutionary zeal were essential aspects of the programme to keep the 
revolution going. In one, instance, the repeated efforts against Ll-chun, 
for example, led to the latter's renunciation of the Manchus when the revolution
was in full swing, and resulted in facilitating the bloodless transfer to
172republican government in Kwangtung.
" —  ’"’"’""169
Ts'ao Ya-po, "Kuang-chou san-yheh erh-shih-chiu jih chih-i" 
in HHKM IV, 241-2; Chou Lu, op.cit. Ill 887-90; Feng Tzu-yu- op.cit. IV, 203-8,
215-6; Jordan to F.O. 30 Aug. 1911 enclosing Jamieson to Jordan, 14 Aug. 1911,
FO 371/1092; North China Herald 19 Aug. 1911 p.477, col. 2-8; London and China 
Express 25 Aug. 1911, p.605, col. 1.
170Chou Lu, op.cit. Ill, 891-3; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, 209-11;
Ts'ao Ya-po op.cit. in HHKM IV, 242-4; the Hongkong Daily Press, 26 Oct. 1911, 
p.2 col. 4, and 28 Oct. p.3 col. 1.
■^See Admiralty to F.O., 2 Nov. 1911 (confidential) FO 371/1096.
1 72For details see unpublished M.A. thesis, Mary Chan Man-yue 
"Chinese Revolutionaries in Hongkong, 1895-1911" University of Hongkong, 1961 p.231-5.
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The period 1905-1911 has therefore special significance in the history 
of the Chinese revolutionary movement. For the Chinese rebels, it was a 
necessary and frustrating time. They pitted their strength frequently against 
the government, and failed, not realizing that the numerous rebellions were 
merely stepping-stones for the final eruption in 1911. These early contests 
demonstrated to the T*ung Meng Hui and its military leaders the weaknesses
173
inherent in their movement and the formidable forces of the Imperial troops.
Most important of all, they revealed the need to rally professional military 
assistance to their programme; and it was the military which finally made the 
revolution possible in October, 1911.
For the British Government, which was watching events in China with
keen interest, and sometimes with apprehension, 1905-1911 was a time for
reassessment of their outlook and attitude. Britain had always stood for a
strong China, especially a strong central authority with whom to deal in
matters of trade, diplomacy and missionary endeavour. When that central authority
seemed weakened by foreign war, and when there were forces within the country
seeking its revitalization (as in 1895-98) Britain gave full-hearted support
to the Reformers. Then when the central Government decided to take the
initiative and institute wide-ranging constitutional reforms, (as in 1905-11)
Britain greeted the movement with good wishes and encouragement.—
There is much truth in the contention of Lyon Sharman, Sun 
Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning (New York 1934 2nd ed 1965) 109-110, that 
the early uprisings "seem naively ambitious projects, considering the small 
force of amateurs. Faultiness of coordination was the commonest cause of 
disaster; some one acted prematurely, failed to keep an appointed date, or 
divulged secrets. Shortage of ammunition was perennial." See also Shelley 
H. Cheng, "The Chinese Republican Movement, 1894-1912," an unpublished paper 
presented to the International Conference on Asian History held at the 
University of Hongkong, 1964, p.7-8,
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But reform from above seemed not to work in China. Meanwhile the anti- 
dynastic movement gained ground and made itself noticed. It was thus necessary 
to decide how to react to this new force on the scene. For a time Yban Shih-k’ai 
seemed to offer the best hopes for a strong man at the helm, until his dismissal 
from office in 1909. The situation was thus drastically changed, insurrections 
began to break out over the countryside, and the newly-elected constitutionalists 
loudly demanded hasty measures of reform. During 1905-11, Britain was thus 
mainly concerned with a revaluation of its stake in China, endeavouring not 
to be committed to any one force in the field until it was time to make a 
pronouncement.
The time for a definite stand would soon come, of course, when the 
revolution proper began in October, 1911, and Britain found itself dealing once 
again with Y5an Shih-k’ai.
CHAPTER VII
THE REVOLUTION, 1911-12
The Outbreak
By 1911 anti-Manchu sentiment had spread to most of the important 
population centres of South and Central China. Apart from the efforts of 
the revolutionaries working towards the downfall of the Manchu rulers, 
there were other factors in the situation which contributed to the final 
disintegration of the Chfing Dynasty. We have seen that the government- 
sponsored reform programme of 1905-1911 only produced effects which were 
detrimental to the Ch’ing cause: the new students produced by the educational
reforms became the intellectual leaders of the revolutionary movement; the 
new armies resulting from military reforms became targets of infiltration 
by the rebels; and constitutional reforms led to agitation for political 
concessions from the Throne which went far beyond what the government had 
originally intended. Amidst these potentially dangerous issues the in­
creasing alienation of the government from large segments of the population
1
came to focus on the problem of the nationalization of railroads.
Details of the railway question will not be entered here. 
Well-documented studies of the subject include Cheng Lin, The Chinese 
Railways (Shanghai 1935) especially p. 101-3; Hsieh Pin, Chung-kuo 
t1ieh-tao shih (Shanghai 1929) which gives clear accounts of all the 
foreign-operated railways; "Ssu-ch*uan tieh-lu an tang-an" in HHKM IV, 
457-522; Li Kuo-ch*i, Chung-kuo tsao-ch1i t1ieh-Iu ching-ying (Taipei,
1961) 117-78; Tai Chih-li, Ssu-ch*uan pao-lu ytin-tung shih-liao (Peking 
1959) which is the most comprehensive documented account of events from 1903 
to 1912.
For the biography and career of Sheng HsUan-huai see Albert Feuerwerker, 
China's Early Industrialization, Sheng Hsban-huai and Mandarin Enterprise 
(Cambridge. Mass. 1958) 58-95: and Howard Boorman, Men and Politics in 
Modern China (New York, I960) 109-14.
283
284
In all fairness the policy proposed by Sheng Hshan-huai, (1844-
1916) president of the Communications Ministry since January 1911, to put
under central control the main railway lines, was probably sound. But the
measures were directly linked to the loan activities of the foreign Powers,
which in turn generated struggles among the Imperial relatives and other
high officials for shares of the commissions. At the same time, government
action towards the privately-donated shares of the Szechwan-Hankow and
Canton-Hankow Railroads was inconsistent and unfair, and in the end brutal
tactics of arrests and murders of railway petitioners were resorted to.
This brought about the rebellious situation in Szechwan province, where^it
has been contended, the outcry though not based on any real revolutionary
inclinations, had in fact instigated a "social revolution", which soon
2developed into a part of the "national revolution."
The basic area of contention in the railway controversy was the
old struggle between central control and provincial autonomy. This fact
was recognised by the London Times as early as November, 1907, and the
paper suggested that the best course for Britain to take in the matter was
3
to stand solidly behind the central government. This course of action,
providing as it would some form of protection for Britain's high financial
stakes in the Chinese railways, turned out to be the only possible stand
4
the British government could take in the years ahead. In 1911, the
^Kuo Mo-jo, "Fan-cheng ch'ien-hou" in HHKM IV, 449.
See also the North China Herald 24 June, 1911, 801-2, which analyses 
the reasons why government policy regarding railways was so vehemently 
objected to by various sectors of Chinese society.
\ondon Times* 16 November, 1907, p. 5, col. 1.
4
See E-tu Zen Sun, Chinese Railways and British interests 
1895-1911 (New York 1954) 5-6.
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railway issue had already reached crisis proportions in Szechwan. On 9 
May, 1911, the Edict authorising the nationalization of trunk lines was 
promulgated; Szechwan reacted immediately in the form of bloodshed and 
armed rebellion, fomented by the Railway Conservation League, Ssu-ch1uan 
pao-lu t'ung-chih Hui« British press and official opinion stood clearly 
behind the decision of Peking to quell the agitation, by forceful means 
if necessary. The North China Herald urged that "A resolute display of 
strength on the part of Peking should therefore be enough to overawe the 
agitators ... a single sharp lesson might work wonders as with a naughty 
child .... " Sir Francis A. Campbell, Assistant Secretary at the Foreign 
Office, agreed with this. He put in a nut-shell the reason why Britain 
could not afford to see the provincial movement get out of hands "If 
they (Peking) give way the example of Szechwan will assuredly be followed 
by other provinces, with the result that no railways will be built, and 
foreign trade suffer correspondingly.He further felt that the British 
Consul-General at Chengtu, W. H. Wilkinson, "ought to have put some back- 
bone into the authorities and told them to stand firm,.... "
Despite such moral support from British opinion, the days of 
the Manchu Dynasty in China were already numbered, as events elsewhere 
in the Empire moved rapidly to a climax. After the failure of the 1911 
uprising in Canton, Huang Hsing and the other revolutionaries decided to 
stage another attempt later the same year in Hupeh^where conditions
^North China Herald 9 Sept. 1911, p* 617, leader.
6F. Campbell to Sir J. Jordan, 15 Sept. 1911 (private)
FQ 350/1.
7
Campbell to Jordan, 22 Sept. 1911 (private) ibid.
286
8
appeared ripe for action. On 9 October* 1911* a bomb accidentally exploded 
in the revolutionary headquarters in Hankow. The place was searched by 
local police, and some revolutionaries were arrested; most important of all, 
it was widely rumoured that in the raid the authorities had got hold of a 
list of T'ung Meng Hui members. Since many members of the armed forces 
in the area were now implicated, they advocated immediate action. The 
Chinese Revolution was a reality by 10 October, 1911* On 12 October the 
Viceroy of Wuchang took refuge on a Chinese cruiser anchored astern of a 
British gun-boat. By the next day the city was entirely in the hands of 
the revolutionaries. On 14 October, Ylian Shih-k’ ai was recalled to office 
by Peking, and appointed Viceroy of the Hu-kuang provinces. The revolu­
tionary movement spread rapidly as city after city declared its independence
from Peking, culminating in the fall of Nanking to the revolutionaries on 
9
2 December, 1911.
Initial Reactions 
The suddenness of the Revolution and the see-ming ease with which 
the revolutionaries claimed province after province within the first two
Huang Hsing's analysis of the Hupeh situation, and the 
decision for action, is seen in a letter he wrote to Feng Tzu-yu, dated 
5 October, 1911, in C.T. Hslieh, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution 
(Stanford 1961) 104-6.
9Reliable accounts of these events are given in C.T. Hslieh, 
op.cit. 107-117; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Shih-kao (Shanghai 1938) 
III, 911-922; Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fuSun Chung-shan hsien-shenq nien-p'u 
ch!u-kao (Taipei 1958) I, 248-84; H.G.W* Woodhead, "The Revolution in 
China, 1911-1912" in The China Year Book, 1912; Chung-hua min-kuo kai-kuo 
wu-shih-nien wen-hsien pien-mu wei-yhan-hui (ed) Hsin-hai ko-ming yh 
Min-kuo chien-yhan (Taiwan 1961-2) Vol. I; Chih-chieh, Wu-ch'ang ch'i-i 
ti-ku-shih (Hankow 1956) 26-34; Josef Fass, "Revolutionary activity in 
the province Hu-pet and the Wu-ch'ang uprising of 1911" in Archiv 
Orientalni XXVIII, 1 (i960) 127-49; Ts'ao Ya-po, Wu-ch'ang ko-ming chen- 
shih (Shanghai 1930) Part II, and "Wu-ch'ang ch'i-i" in HHKM V, 104-168.
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months of the uprising took the British, as well as the other interested
10
Powers, completely by surprise. In British official circles the tendency 
was at first to be fairly sympathetic towards the revolutionaries, doubt­
lessly subscribing to the theory that nothing could be worse than the rule 
of the Manchus under the Regency of Prince Ch'un. There was also the 
possibility that with a changed government there would be better opportunities 
for foreign trade and commerce. Furthermore in line with the thinking of 
missionaries and other educators with knowledge of China, the new regime 
promised to be in every way more enlightened and Western-oriented than the 
Manchus, since the revolutionaries were themselves mostly products of the 
new education,
■/
Yet for all such sentiments in m e  favour of the revolutionaries, 
Britain came out openly neither for the rebels, generally identified with 
the South, nor the remnants of the government at Peking in the North, In 
the disorderly conditions and facing an unpredictable future, Britain was
10
The London Times was the only foreign paper which claimed 
not to have been startled by news of the Revolutions “The rebellion 
has not come as a surprise to those who have had special opportunities of
watching Chinese affairs during the last year or two. 'Experience proves,'
says Tocqueville,'1 that the most perilous moment for a bad government is 
that in which it begins to reform itself. The ills borne patiently because 
they seem to be inevitable appear insupportable when once the idea is 
conceived of getting rid of them.1 The truth of this has again been ex­
amplified in the case of China ... " Times, 14 October 1911, p. 7, col. 3-4, 
leading article. The editorial no doubt reflected the sentiments of the 
Times1 Peking correspondent. Dr. G.E. Morrison, who had little love for 
the Manchu Dynasty. Morrison telegraphed on 13 October 1911. "The Manchu 
dynasty is in danger. The sympathies of the immense mass of educated 
Chinese are all with the revolutionaries. Little sympathy is expressed 
for the corrupt and effete Manchu. dynasty with its eunuchs and other 
barbaric surroundings. The Court is in great anxiety and the outlook for 
the throne ... ominous." See Cyril Pearl, Morrison of Peking (Australia
and London 1967) p. 288.
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not going to burn any of its bridges and lose the support and friendship 
of either side prematurely. The British Government proclaimed a policy of 
neutrality in the Chinese Revolution.
Neutrality, however, was feasible only when the other Powers could
also be prevented from taking advantage of the situation and supplying help
to the adversaries in the conflict. Towards this end Britain thus worked,
successfully, to bring pressure on France, Germany and the United States to
11
agree to take only concerted action in China. With Japan, however, the 
task was more complicated, in view of Japan's special geographical, politi­
cal and economic interests in China and the outcome of the Revolution.
Later when the cause of the Manchus became increasingly desperate and 
Britain decided that the only safe course to take was to pin its hopes on 
the strong man Yhan Shih-k'ai, Japan was reluctant to go along, having no 
great liking for Yhan anyway. Then when the future form of government for 
China came under discussion during the negotiations between North and South, 
Britain was willing to accept the overwhelming clamour of the Southern 
delegates for a Republic, while Japan did not hide the fact that a republic 
so near her shores was anathema to her. Finally when it was necessary to 
obtain concerted action from the Powers with regard to the financing of the 
new Chinese Government of Yhan Shih-k'ai, the Japanese were not averse to 
resorting to signing loan contracts with the South in defiance of Britain's 
specific pleas for financial nonintervention.
Despite these difficulties in working with Japanese allies,
British policy in the Chinese Revolution was remarkably successful, insofar 
as it achieved the three limited aims of alienating neither of the adversaries,
For reactions to the Revolution from these Powers see G.
Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers 1908-1912, an episode in pre­
war diplomacy (California 1935).
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preventing the prolongation of hostilities and anarchy in the countryside, and
strengthening Ytian1s hand in securing the abdication of the Manchus and the
subsequent establishment of the Chinese Republic.
Sir John Jordan’s first report to come out of Peking on the outbreak
of the Revolution indicated relief that the movement was entirely anti-dynastic
12
and not anti-foreign in any respect. But the seriousness of the situation
13was appreciated by the Foreign Office. The reasurrances of the Chinese
Minister in London that the disturbances were only motivated by anger against
14foreign capital in the railway question were not entirely convincing. In
fact, Jordan feared that the Chinese Minister was purposely misrepresenting
the facts to "save face," and suggested to Campbell, "Ask my friend Liu to
explain why the revolutionaries are killing every Manchu they can lay hands
lbupon and are everywhere proclaiming death to the Dynasty ... "
Having ascertained the nature of the uprising, Jordan found little
cause for encouragement for the Manchus, as reports reached him daily of the
revolutionary successes in the provinces. The unreliability of the Imperial
troops, the unpreparedness of Peking for these emergencies, and by contrast
the outstanding leadership of the revolutionary forces by Li Yhan-hung (1864
1928), a trained and experienced Wuchang commander, so impressed Jordan that
16
he felt "the revolutionary cause seems to me the more hopeful of the two."
■^Jordan telegraph to F.O. 11 October 1911, FQ 371/1093.
13Campbell Minutes on Jordan tel. 12 Oct.. 1911, ibid.
■^Liu Ytt-lin told this to Alston on 10 October. See Alston’s 
minutes on Jordan’s tel. of 11 October, ibid. See also Liu's statement in 
Times of 14 October 1911, p.6 col. 1-2 in which he concluded, "whatever the 
rebels may do locally, I am certain that they cannot bring about a general 
revolution."
^Jordan to Campbell, 30 Oct. 1911 (private) FO 350/7.
16Jordan to Campbell, ibid. See also Shen Yhn-lung, Li Yuan- 
hung P'ing-chuan (Taiwan 1963) 1-39.
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Jordan again stated, "The whole movement is being conducted in such an orderly
way as to make revolution respectable and even here (in Peking) commands a good
IT 18deal of sympathy." The Manchus meanwhile, "are trembling in their shoes ... "
Campbell shared his views: "Taking a broad view, it is doubtful policy on our
part, I think, to bolster up this corrupt and rotten Manchu government. I can
hardly help feeling that putting aside present convenience, it might be the
19best thing for China in the long run if the rebellion were successful ... "
These were only the privately-expressed, initial reactions of two
competent British officials concerned with the Chinese scene. The British
government had made no pronouncements yet as far as policy was concerned. But
on 16 October, two days after Yhan's recall, Sir Edward Grey arrived at a policy
decision; "We must do what is in our power to protect British life andd
property when in danger, but any action we take should be strictly limited to
20this purpose ..." In a subsequent despatch Grey clarified this and stated
21more specifically what Britain's hopes and aims were in the Chinese crisis;
"I hoped that the outcome of things in China would be a Chinese Government 
that would make China stronger, and conduct her affairs free from outside 
diplomatic interference. Such a government would not only be recognized 
by us but would have our friendship and any support that we could usefully 
give. We wished to see a strong Chinese Government that would keep the 
open door for trade. It was indifferent to us by whom this government 
was constituted,"
These were Jordan's directives: as far as overt action was involved
Britain must at all times preserve an attitude of absolute non-interference.
■^Jordan to Campbell, 14 October 1911 (private) FO 350/7. He 
again gave an evaluation of Li and the rebel forces.
18Jordan, ibid.
■^Campbell to Jordan, 20 October 1911 (private) FO 350/l.
20F.O. tel. Jordan 16 October, 1911, FO 371/1093. and communicated 
to MacDonald in Tokyo, 26 Oct. 1911, FO 371/1094.
21F.O. to Jordan, 14 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1095.
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But this did not mean that the Legation in Peking or the Consuls scattered
around the important Yangtze cities could not indirectly undertake to advance
the cause of one side or the other, or to help limit the area end duration of
the hostilities between the North and South. By the beginning of November,
Jordan had come to the conclusion that the plight of the Manchus was extremely
serious, and that the tacit support of Yhan Shih-k'ai offered the best hope
of a settlement that was acceptable to the Chinese as well as to British
interests in China.
The desperate situation of the Manchus was constantly on Jordan's
mind. He observed that the ruling dynasty was largely discredited among its
22own people, and that there was no public sympathy with their cause. The worst 
feature as it appeared to him was the depression he saw among the Manchu digni­
taries in Peking. Prince Ch'ing was found busy converting his treasure into
23gold bars, "as being more portable in flight." The two brothers of the
24
Regent had sent their families away to a retreat in the hills. While this
was a pitiable state for the Manchus to be in, Jordan nevertheless found
their defeatist attitude contemptible, "The Princes, Na-t'ung and others,
who have been attempting to run the Empire for the last three years, spend their
time in tears and are all ready to decamp at a moment's notice. Even in Corea
25
at its worst I have never seen such craven helplessness and want of manhood."
A few days later, when Na-t'ung asked Jordan in despair if he could make any 
suggestion to save the Dynasty, Jordan regretted that"I was able to give him 
little consolation," and felt instead that perhaps Na-t'ung was responsible
22Jordan despatch of 16 Oct. 1911, 37j/l094.
22Jordan to Campbell, 23 October 1911 (private) FO 350/7.
24
ibid.
25Jordan to Campbell, 3 Nov. 1911 (private) ibid.
“^ Jordan to Campbell, 8 Nov. 1911 (private) ibid.
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more than anyone else for the pass which things had now reached.
As the Manchus displayed such inability to influence the situation in
China, all attention was now focused on the activities and intentions of Yhan
Shih-k’ai, This was no difficult task for Sir John Jordan, taking into
consideration the keen interest he had always shown in the fortunes of Yhan
since the early days of their friendship in Korea. On 14 October Yhan was
appointed by special decree Viceroy of Hu-kuang and asked to proceed immediately
to the post. Jordan was hopeful that as a result, ’’the present revolt will 
28be suppressed.” Yet Yhan, being the astute politician that he was, and
relishing the idea of being appealed to for help by the Prince Regent who
had so ignominiously dismissed him in 1909, now delayed obeying the summons
while assessing the situation and his own powers of manoeuvre. His tardiness
in answering the call caused some misgivings in Peking, and it was the
contention of Ylian's son that in the interval YUtan's name was being utilized
29
by the Regent to insure loyalty of the Northern Army. Grey chose to conclude
from this information that ’’This all points to the care in giving any ... support
30to the Chinese Government.” Jordan decided to do nothing until Yhan's arrival
,, 31on the scene.
— 27
ibid.
28Jordan to P.O. 16 Oct. 1911, FO 371/1094.
29This was related to Jordan by Yhan's son on 20 October, in 
Jordan's tel. to F.O. 21 Oct, 1911 (confidential) FO 37l/l093«
30Grey's minutes on the above. The reason for Ylian’s reluctance 
to proceed to Hankow was his demand for direct control of at least a portion 
of the expeditionary forces in the area, while what the Regent feared was "his 
coming back to Peking as dictator.” Jordan to Campbell, 23 Oct. 1911 (private)
FO 350/7.
31Jordan tel. F.O. 29 Oct, 1911 FO 371/1094. See a recent study 
of the subject, by Kit-ching Lau, "Sir John Jordan and the Affairs of China, 
1906-1916, with special reference to the 1911 Revolution and Yhan Shih-k'ai” 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1967, especially Chapters 2 and 3.
The end of October saw a number of important cities falling into the
hands of the revolutionaries. On 27 October Yhan was further appointed
Imperial Commissioner to deal with the crisis. Jordan applauded the move,
"No man could be better fitted to play the role of mediator between the Chinese
people, of whom he is the most trusted living representative, and the Manchu
32Dynasty, whom he and his family have served for several generations.” On
30 October came two remarkable edicts, couched in penitential language, one
of which condemned the Manchus for the calamity brought upon the country, and
the other excluded all princes of the blood from holding offices of state.
On 1 November, another edict appointed Yhan Prime Minister, with powers to
33form a new Cabinet. These measures offered conclusive evidence that Yttan
was now clearly the only element in the situation worthy of British support,
and Jordan would see to it that the Foreign Office acted accordingly.
To begin with, Jordan noted that the announcement of YUan’s appointment
did have an immediate tranquilising effect in the capital, and the exodus of
Peking residents since mid-October, which had reached about a quarter of the
34whole population, was markedly^decreasing. He felt that Britain had acted
wisely in 1909 in protesting^the dismissal of Yllan: "We put our money on the
right horse at that time, and had the Regent only listened to British and
American advice he might have been spared the deep humiliation he is now suffering.
Sir Edward Grey agreed! "There seemed however to be one good man on the side
opposed to the revolutionaries, Yhan Shih-k’ai, whom we all respected and
under whom we believed China was progressing until the Manchu Dynasty dismissed 
36him." It appeared to be a simple matter now, to work out a solution for the
^Jordan to F.O. 30 Oct. 1911 FO 371/1095.
33The edicts are given in Jordan to F.O. 6 Nov. 1911, ibid: and
"Wu-ch'ang ch’i-i Ch'ing-fang tang-an" in HHKM V, 302-4.
34
Jordan to Canpbell, 3 Nov. 1911 (private) FO 350/7.
35.ibid.
Grey to Jordan, 14 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1095.
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Chinese crisis provided that agreement could be reached among Yban Shih-k'ai,
the Manchu Court and the Southern revolutionaries as to the nature and
leadership of the government that would succeed the Manchu Dynasty. In reality
that proviso proved to be an almost insurmountable obstacle to peace.
Yban Shih-k'ai reached Peking on 13 November, and immediately
consulted with the British Legation as to what form of government would best
gain Britain's support. On the 14th, as a feeler to test British reactions
to some of his intentions, Yban sent his son to see Jordan. The son announced
that Yban's natural desire was loyalty towards the Manchus, but that because
of the strong public opinion against the Dynasty, he had to abandon any thought
of retaining the Manchu Dynasty in its original form. Yban had been approached
by Li Yban-hung and the other Southern leaders who promised him support if he
would become the president of a Chinese Republic. But the son testified that
this would be at variance with Yban's own admitted preference for a full
constitutional government with the retention of the Manchu Dynasty as a figure- 
37
head. Yban now wanted to know how Jordan felt. In reply Jordan admitted
that among foreign Powers the general belief was that the Chinese did not
seem to be fitted for a republican form of government, and therefore the
suggestion of a constitutional monarchy under the nominal sovereignty of the
Manchus would be the best solution. To this the son stated that "A republic
would be only a transitional stage, and that his father might be acclaimed
38Emperor. The rebels wanted him to be their ruler." Grey's response to
~37
Yban's son to Jordan, in Jordan tel. to F.O. 2 Nov. 1911,
FO 37l/l094. The Foreign Office found his suggestion entirely agreeable.
Campbell: "(This) offers probably the best chance of an early solution" ibid.
38The conversation between Jordan and the younger Yban is recorded 
in Jordan tel. F.O. 14 Nov. 1911 (very confidential) FO 371/1095. The last 
remark regarding Yban's hitherto unknown aspirations to the empire evoked 
astonishment at the Foreign Office. MaxMbller commented, "This is strangely 
at variance with Sun Yat-sen's story" and Campbell agreed, "Entirely." ibid.
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Yhan’s trial balloon was typically cautious and non-committal: "His previous
record has given us very friendly feelings and respect for him personally.
What we desire to see as the outcome of the revolution is a government strong 
enough to deal impartially with foreign trade in China. We should give all 
diplomatic support we could to a government that would make this policy 
effective.
Duly instructed, Jordan met with Yl!ian on 15 November. Once again the 
Premier declared his own preference for a limited monarchy in China, but he 
found the Southern revolutionaries intent on driving out the Manchus and 
establishing a republic. Yuan indicated that in the end he might have to 
form the n|ucleus of a government in the North which would then eventually 
either gain over the South, or recover it by force of arms. But he made it 
clear to Jordan that his task was not an easy one: the Empire was broken up
into a number of disjointed units, his former associates were scattered and 
disinclined to join him; and most of all the treasury was empty and he could 
not pay his troops upon whose loyalty all depended. His specific request from 
the British government, however, was in the nature of some English statesman
40
to act not as an adviser, but as a friend, to assist him in his colossal task. 
Grey was alert to Yttan's plea for an English "friend" instead of "adviser" and 
would not make any promises.^ Jordan was even more concerned with Yttan's
Grey tel. Jordan, 15 Nov. 1911 (in Grey's own draft) ibid.
40
Jordan tel. F.O. 15 Nov. 1911, ibid.
41Grey minutes, ibid. Yban did obtain an English adviser later, 
in the person of Morrison of the London Times. By then he was in a consolidated 
position, as President of the Chinese Republic, and his choice of Morrison was 
generally approved by the Foreign Office, See C. Pearl, op.cit. 257,272-4, 
and F.O. correspondence in FO 371/1346.
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talk of civil war, and was not too happy when Yban, pressed, insisted that his
42
policy was "one of conciliation backed by such force as he could command ... "
Jordan was frankly disappointed after this interview with Yban, who
did not strike him as having reached any definite policy decisions, though
what the British Minister expected to hear given the chaotic circumstances
at the time is hard to imagine. "The impression I gathered from a long talk ...
was that Yban will watch events and do whatever the country requires him to
do. He may champion the Manchu cause for a time, but his advocacy must be
rather lukewarm at the best. Many of his friends are anxious for his safety,
43
and I think that his end will be assassination."
The Japanese Attitude 
Whatever Jordan thought of Yban Shih-k’ai and his vague intentions, 
British reactions to the revolutionary situation was bound to be influenced 
by Japan1s response to the revolution, by virtue of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
and Grey's insistence on concerted action among the Powers, For all the 
activity of Japanese agents and military instructors an the Chinese revolutionary 
organization, Japan was as much surprised by the outbreak of the Revolution 
as the other Powers. It was soon evident however, that though the Japanese 
Government had very little liking for Yban Shih-k'ai, it had an even greater 
aversion to the establishment of a republican form of government in China, so 
close to its own borders. To prevent such an eventuality, the Japanese 
Government was often moved to intervene actively in China, only to be restrained
Jordan to Campbell, 17 Nov. 1911, (private) FO 350/7.
43ibid. Jordan proved to be more of a prophet than he realized, 
as an assassination attempt was indeed made on Yban on 16 January, 1912.
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by its ally Great Britain. For a time Japanese policy wavered between support
for the revolutionaries and for the Manchus, between ambition to reap political
profits in the situation and timidity when faced with disapproval at home
and abroad. The Japanese finally resorted to supplying clandestine help to
both sides in the Chinese struggle, and ended up being criticised by all 
44
factions. The first reports in Japan regarding the outbreak of the Chinese 
Revolution revealed the confusion and disparate reactions among the populace 
and government. Some thought the movement would be quickly suppressed while 
others took a more gloomy view of the future. Commercial interests feared 
for the loss of trade if the disturbances spread, while others dreaded the out­
break of another anti-foreign movement. Most Japanese were concerned with 
the safety of the lives and property of their compatriots in China, while some
elements were already hinting at Japan1s ability to supply the two contending
45sides in China with material and funds.
By December, 1911, the Japanese Government was ready to approach the 
British Foreign Office with a suggestion to deal with the Chinese situation.
The Charge d1Affaires, Yamaza Enjiro, on 1 December communicated to Sir Edward 
Grey the views of the Japanese Government. The document first made the 
observation that the situation was worsening day by day, that the revolutionary 
camp was divided, and that Yban did not seem to be able to cope. It was there­
fore necessary for the Powers interested in China "not to maintain any longer 
an attitude of mere onlookers, but that it is essential for them to take proper
~~44
Japan's response to the Revolution is discussed in M.B. Jansen, 
The Japanese and $un,Yat-sen (Cambridge, Mass. 1954) 131-53? A. M. Pooley,
Japan's Foreign Policies (New York 1920) 69-74; V. Chirol, "The Chinese 
Revolution" in Quarterly Review Vol. 216, No. 43 (Apr. 1912) 552-3? A.L.P. 
Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (California 1934) 41-2; T.£.jYenaga,
"China, the new Republic" in The World's Work, XIX, 114 (May 1912; 599-608?
Masaru Ikei, "Japanese response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911" in 
Journal of Asian Studies XXV, 2 (Feb. 1966) 213-27.
4 5
A summary of the Japanese press on the subject of the Revolution 
is provided by MacDonald, 17 October 1911, FO 37l/lQ94.
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46measures with a view to safeguarding their interests as soon as possible ... "
The communique continued to emphasize that the basic cause of trouble in China
was the uncertainty regarding the future form of government. "In the opinion
of the Japanese Government, not only is in principle a republican system
impracticable in China in view of her traditional conditions, but under the
present circumstances she cannot be considered as prepared to put the idea 
4 7
into practice." Japan^s ■ proposal at this time was therefore that the
fa
Powers should use their efforts to establish in China "a government practical^
48by the Chinese, but under the nominal sovereignty of the Manchu Dynasty."
It is well to remember that at this stage such a form of government,
a limited constitutional monarchy under nominal Manchu sovereignty, was
regarded by both Jordan and Yban as being the best and only solution. Yban
had made known his views as early as 2 November, when his son informed Jordan
that Yban's wish was "to establish a full constitutional government with the
49retention of the Manchu Dynasty." Jordan had agreed, and had noted that as
there was no one element in the situation which could replace the dynasty,
its retention as a figurehead would undoubtedly be the practical solution, and
50
he had felt that Yban would "honestly try to keep it on its legs." A week later
Jordan had reiterated, "I must say the prospect of a Chinese Republic frightens
51
me as likely to lead to endless friction and internal dissensions."
AC
Yamaza to Grey, 1 Dec. 1911, FO 371/1096; also communicated 
to Jordan by Ijuin, 5 Dec. 1911 (confidential) FO 371/1098.
47ibid.
48... . ibid.
49Jordan tel, F.O. 2 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1094.
"^Jordan to Campbell, 3 Nov. 1911 (private) FO 350/7.
^Jordan to Campbell, 19 Nov. 1911 (private) ibid.
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Thus when the Yamaza communication came to the British Government, it
would seem that Japan and Britain were both working towards the same objective
in China. Yet the British were concerned at the hint of intervention in the
wording of the Japanese proposals. F.O. Lindley thought, "I do not see how
the Japanese view is to be imposed (on both opposing parties) without the
possibility of active intervention. It is more than probable that if a view
52
is imposed from outside, the solution will not be a satisfactory one ... "
53
Jordan too had the same doubts and fears:
"Any agreement among the Powers for the maintenance of the dynasty 
in its present form would be very unpopular in the country, and would 
entail upon the Powers which became parties thereto serious respon­
sibilities. They would be regarded as champions of an effete regime 
against the declared wishes of half the country, and that the more 
intelligent half. They would have to be prepared if necessary to 
coerce the South into accepting their programme and would presumably 
make themselves responsible for the observance of the constitution 
by the Throne. In practice this would probably require the exercise 
of constant pressure which would give the Japanese and Russians, in 
virtue of their military proximity, an undesirable measure of tutelage 
over the Court .... Intervention is in my opinion a measure to which
we should have recourse only in the last resort ... ”
To Sir Francis Campbell all this talk of intervention seemed to
suggest sinister motives on the part of the Japanese. He wanted to know,
"Do you think they have any particular axe to grind, or are they merely
anxious for the re-establishment of a normal state of things?.... One feels
54inclined to be a little suspicious ... " Jordan quite understood the 
unease at the Foreign Office, but drawing on his knowledge of the Japanese, 
he was at this time disposed to give them credit for a sincere desire to see
'^Lindley memorandum, on Yamaza to Grey, 1 Dec. 1911, FO 37l/lQ96.
53
Jordan tel. F.O. 3 Dec. 1911, ibid.
^Campbell to Jordan, 2 Dec. 1911 (private) FO 350/l.
a peaceful settlement* What he objected to was their tendency "to push matters
55ahead of my instructions and to commit us to a definite policy ... " But as
with the Japanese, Jordan admitted, "I have no faith in a republican form of
government proving workable in China, where fully ninety per cent of the population
neither read nor write, and care not how they are ruled so long as they are
56allowed to do their daily work in peace," Nevertheless there was a very
real difference between the British and Japanese policies, in the extent to
which they were prepared to go to prevent the establishment of republicanism
in China. "I do not know how far the Japanese would be prepared to use coercion
in forcing the republicans to accept a limited monarchy, but it would I conceive
be very difficult for us to join them in such a policy. It would alienate the
whole population of the South and cause intense annoyance to the Chinese settlers
57in Hongkong and Singapore."
Thus Britain's neutrality in the Chinese Revolution was to be clearly 
and consistently adhered to, in the face of recurring attempts by the Japanese
to drag them into some form of intervention. Sir Edward Grey explained the
t 58
position to the United States Charge d'Affaires*
"The opinion of those who knew China best was that some kind of monarchy 
be best suited to the country? but, I had felt a policy of non-interven­
tion between the contending parties the only one that was wise. To side 
with the North in favour of a monarchy might precipitate a separation of 
the South in the form of a republic, and it was desirable if possible, to 
avoid such a separation. In the next place, foreigners hitherto have 
been untouched. British subjects are distributed over China. It was 
important to protect them all if attacks were made upon them, and if 
we sided with one part of China it would lead to attacks upon our subjects 
in another part. It seemed therefore to me that it was still as true as 
it ever had been that in the interests of the unity of China and the 
safety of our own subjects we must avoid intervention,"
^Jordan to Campbell, 20 Dec. 1911 (private) FO 350/7. 
56ibid.
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British Public Opinion
During the initial shock of the Revolution, there were not wanting
voices from among the English population at home and in China urging the
government to take active steps on behalf of one faction or the other in
China. A typical reaction from those Britons who had some knowledge and
experience of China was the plea sent to the Foreign Office by Charles J. H.
Holcombe, speaking as an honorary member of the "Chinese Reform Party," and
as a member of the "Friends of China Society" founded in London by Dr. James
Cantlie in 1898. Holcombe emphasized that the leaders of the revolutionary
movement in China were Christian converts and hence friends of the English
nation. In his opinion the Chinese people were not naturally antagonistic
to foreigners, but were only rendered so on occasion by the misleading propaganda
of the Manchu government* Thus it would be folly for Britain to take the side
of the Manchu Dynasty in the present struggle. "The insurgents entertain the
best feelings towards us, but to intervene at this critical juncture would not
only be fatal to their cause but also to the continued supremacy of British
trade in West and South China, this being a national and long-premeditated
59uprising of the hereditary Chinese against a corrupt administration."
It is interesting to note that the London Times seemed to have 
premonitions of such appeals on behalf of the revolutionaries, for it warned 
early in October that though the temptation to intervene must be considerable, 
the Powers should bear in mind that "any such action would not only be 
indefensible in itself but would obviously involve great danger to international 
peace ... Nonetheless a general survey of the opinions of scholars and
writers in England revealed a good deal of sympathy for the revolutionary cause
"^Holcombe to Grey, 18 Oct* 1911 (private) FQ 37l/lQ93.
60
Times, 14 Oct. 1911, p.7 col. 3-4, leader; see also the North 
China Herald, 21 Oct. 1911, p.125, col. 1-3, leader.
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in China. A common feature among all the comments elicited was the genuine
hope that the Revolution would mean a greatly reformed China for the future,
Manchu corruption and inefficiency having by this time become a rallying cry
61for all those who spoke about China* One of the strongest pleas for British
intervention came from an anonymous correspondent of the North China Herald
who argued that on the grounds of British self-interest, China’s need for
outside assistance and the advantages to be reaped from such action, Britain
62should assume an active role in the Revolution. Yet another source of protest
against British neutrality involved the support the government seemed to be
giving to Yhan Shih-k'ai, whose role in crushing the 1898 reform programme
would immediately alienate him from the reformers among the Southern ranks.
63"The future of the country is with the men who are revolutionaries .... 1
The situation was somewhat different for the British consular officials
scattered among the cities of China. They were more directly involved with
protecting British lives and property, and so tended to advocate strong
policies when it came to dealing with elements disruptive of peace and order.
The Consul in Shanghai watched with growing apprehension as the city fell to
the rebels early in November, and suggested that should the latter fail to
maintain some form of administration in the city, and especially in the foreign
64
settlements, foreign military intervention should be resorted to. Even Jordan 
61The London and China Express on 20 October, 1911, and 3 November, 
published collections of interviews with prominent figures, including Geo.
Jamieson of the China Association, Arthur Diosy, a friend of Sun Yat-sen's, 
and Dr. H. A. Giles of Cambridge University.
62
North China Herald 18 Nov. 1911, p.464-5.
^This came from J. Ross, 23 Dec. 1911 (private) F0 371/1098.
^Jordan tel. Grey, 7 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1094. Parliament debated 
the question the following day. See the Parliamentary Debates of 8 Nov. 1911, 
vol. 30, p. 1631-2.
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had to concede that if a general massacre by the Imperial troops should occur
in Peking, the diplomatic corps would be justified in intervening in, the 
65
situation. This however was the only occasion on which Jordan allowed his
concern for the safety of foreign lives to indicate a momentary deviation
from his stand of strict neutrality. A few days later, a delegation of three
republicans called on him and pressed for British influence in effecting the
withdrawal of the Manchu garrison from Peking and the retirement -of the
Court to Jehol, as prerequisites for peace talks. Jordan stood firm and told
them it was out of the question.^ By December, it was also becoming clear
to the Japanese that there was little hope of getting the British to acquiesce
to any form of open intervention, and Sir Claude MacDonald reported from Tokyo
that they were willing to take no other steps other than those in cooperation
67
with Britain and the other Powers.
One inherent difficulty in the observance of neutrality in the 
revolutionary situation in China was whether to afford the rebels the status 
of belligerents. This was especially complex for Britain in view of the wide 
diversity of Englishmen involved in commercial, missionary, educational and 
other pursuits in China. The problem was first raised in Changsha and Ichang, 
which had fallen to the revolutionaries on 21 and 22 October respectively.
The government’s instructions to the Consul-General at Hankow was to communicate
Jordan tel. F.O. 12 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1095. The Foreign Office, 
however, was fairly reluctant to consent, see MaxMliller's minutes on the above, 
ibids "Any use of force by the employment of the small Legation guards would 
entail great risk and might lead to great complications."
Jordan tel. F.O. 20 Nov. 1911, ibid.
^MacDonald tel. F.O. 7 Dec. 1911, FO 371/1096. MacDonald 
revealed confidentially however, that the Japanese were still convinced that 
the revolutionary party was not as strong and united as they would seem, and 
that the country was still in favour of a monarchy. The Japanese were soon 
to make another bid at interference.
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with the rebel leaders regarding matters such as contraband of war, but on no
account to recognise them as belligerents and thus entitled to the rights of 
68war. But with regard to Hankow itself, the very seat of the revolutionary
movement, the matter was not so easily defined. There the consular body had
daily discussions with the military government of Li Yllian-hung in matters
concerning the ordinary administration of the city and the foreign community.
It would have been far more convenient for the British Consul to regard the
revolutionaries as belligerents and deal with them officially. Jordan however,
was firm and realised that any recognition of the rebel government would justify
69a protest from Peking. Nevertheless the question was brought up repeatedly
as the revolutionaries continued to expand their influence in the central
provinces. In actual fact, the military governments in many provinces had
already been exercising unofficially most of the rights of belligerents, such
as searching vessels for contraband, firing on merchant ships, seizing cargoes
70meant for the Imperialists, and so on. The whole situation in short was 
anomalous, and Lindley suggested, "it will soon become a question whether it
71
would not be more convenient to recognise the rebels as belligerents." Such
a step of course, would involve consulting with Japan and the other Powers,
and the Foreign Office would much rather leave matters as it stood, since
the revolutionaries appeared to be satisfied and the Imperialists were not 
72dissatisfied. The issue was thus never clearly defined, and the British
68Jordan tel. F.O. 22 Oct. 1911, FO 371/1093.
^Jordan to F.O. 8 Nov. 1911, FQ 371/1096. Campbell agreeds
"I certainly do not think we should formally recognise the rebels at Hankow 
as belligerents."
78The details are given in Jordan to F.O. 28 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1097.
71Lindley minutes on the above, ibid.
72Langley minutes on the above, ibid.
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Consuls dealt with specific incidents as they occurred from day to day.
By December 1911, British policy in the Revolution seemed to have 
achieved a certain degree of stability. British neutrality was clearly 
established and recognised, the ambitious plans of Japan for interference were 
temporarily checked, and the way seemed clear for Britain to play a part in 
initiating negotiations between Ytian Shih-K'ai and the Republicans. Yet 
before actual peace talks could begin, there were still two basic issues 
unresolved: a decision regarding the form of government to succeed the Ch1ing
Dynasty, and the problem of financing YUan Shih-k’ai.
The Debate over the Form of Government
As far as the form of government was concerned, there was never any
doubt that Britain had always been in favour of a monarchy in China. There
were too many reasons to argue why the Chinese were best adapted to a monarchical
74system, and far too few guarantees that a republic would work. We have seen
73In mid December, when the North-South negotiations were under 
way, the Foreign Office was able to stand firm in its policy of not recognising 
the revolutionaries, despite appeals from the British Consul at Shanghai. The 
reason was that the revolutionaries, by their recalcitrant demands for a 
republic, were causing a deadlock in the negotiations, and the British Government 
did not feel inclined to "reward them for their unreasonableness by a recognition 
of their belligerency ..." Jordan to F.O. 4 Jan. 1912, FQ 371/1311, and the 
attached minutes,
74Even Sir Henry Blake, a former supporter of the reform movement
in China, now felt that provincial and regional differences in the vast Chinese
Empire were too deep-seated to allow for any political unity which a successful 
republic would require. " ... new wine fermenting in old bottles has yet to 
produce certain definitions that are unsettled ... " he wrote in "Will China 
break up?" in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. 70 (Dec. 1911) 1105-6, also quoted 
in the London and China Express, 8 Dec. 1911, p. 873 col. 1-2 The North China
Herald of 18 Nov. 1911, p. 415-6, noted "A republic is a delicate and capricious
instrument even in the most highly educated countries. In China it must be 
deemed an impossibility ... practically it would mean a new tyranny." The Times 
of 14 Nov. 1911 p. 5 col. 1 also observed, " ... there is no doubt that sober 
Chinese are beginning to realize that the. republican ideal is utterly 
impracticable ..." The former military attache at Peking, Colonel George
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that Jordan himself has stated constantly that his own preference was for a
limited constitutional monarchy under Manchu sovereignty. Late in November,
when the three republican delegates came to seek British support, Jordan had
spent the better part of an hour "trying to prove to them the risky nature
of the experiment (of republicanism) and imploring them as an old friend of
7 5
China to lose no time in settling their differences." Again during an inter­
view with Yban, Jordan gave it as his personal opinion that he could never 
recommend the adoption of a republic because he felt the country was unsuited 
for this type of control.7^
And yet it became increasingly clear that the Southern revolutionaries 
would accept nothing less than the total elimination of the Manchus and the 
establishment of a republican form of government. It was then that the Foreign 
Office began to cast around for an alternative to the dilemma. The scheme was 
broached by Sir John McLeavy Brown, Councillor at the Chinese Legation. He 
suggested that as the Manchus seemed to be the sole target of the revolutionaries,
more than the institution of monarchy, there was available a living descendent
77
of Confucius who could be made to found a new Chinese dynasty. Jordan was
Periera in his memorandum on the Chinese Revolution, stated categorically that 
the political indifference and general apathy of the Chinese population only 
fitted them to a monarchical system of government, as the "large bulk of the 
people are far happier and more contented when they are ignorant of better
things .... " The Periera memorandum, 6 Apr. 1913, FO 371/1623.The question
is also dealt with by Archibald Colquhoun, "China a republic?" in Fortnightly 
Review, New Series, XC (1911) 1032-43, and Sir Frederick Whyte, China and the 
Foreign Powers (Oxford 1928) 14-6.
^Jordan to Campbell, 10 Dec. 1911 (private) FO 350/7.
^Jordan to Grey, 28 Dec. 1911, FO 371/1310.
^Campbell to Jordan, 8 Dec. 1911 (private) FO 350/1. I have 
not been able to find any biographical details regarding this descendent of 
Confucius, but a report by the British Consul-General at Nanking contains the 
information that this "Duke K’ung" was a colourless man over fifty yeavs of 
age, and representative of a conservative caste. He had spent his life in 
Shantung secluded from foreign influences, and would therefore not be a good 
choice as emperor of a reformed and progressive China. See Jordan to F.O. 4 
Jan. 1912, FO 37l/l311.
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consulted, and was asked to solicit Yhan's opinion. Yttan did not think the
person would carry sufficient weight to restore order and maintain the unity 
78of the country. The Japanese too, when approached, thought the idea "somewhat 
79fantastic.” With that the plan was abandoned, though Lindley still failed
80to see why Ylian did not seize on the scheme as a compromise measure at least.
When it was evident that the Republicans were determined not to concede 
any of their objectives, and when even Yhan began to show signs of weakening 
towards the republican cause, Jordan realised that Britain's best course was 
to continue supporting Yhan's position while officially remaining neutral.
The question of arranging loans for Yhan and the Peking government thus came 
to the fore.
The Financial Question
Soon after the outbreak of the Revolution it was obvious that Peking
was in dire financial straits, at a time when it was important to have
sufficient funds to pay the Imperial troops who would maintain order in the
North. On 17 October, 1911, the Wai-wu Pu informed Jordan that the Chinese
Government felt obliged to appeal to the Powers for a temporary postponement
81of indemnity payments. The next day the Board of Posts and Communications 
applied for a loan of 500,000 taels from the four financial groups (British, 
American, German and French). The representatives of the three latter Powers
78F.O. tel. Jordan, 15 Dec. 1911 (secret) FO 371/1097, and 
Jordan to F.O. 18 Dec. 1911 (secret) FO 371/1310.7W
88Lindley minutes on Jordan tel. F.O. 21 Dec. 1911, FO 371/1098. 
Another reason why the British Government decided not to mention the subject 
again was expressed by Walter Langley, "As we have reason to believe that Yhan's 
ambition was to found a dynasty, there would be some danger of our losing his 
goodwill If the first suggestion of any other candidate for the sovereignty 
were to come from us ... ” Langley minutes on Jordan's tel. of 15 Dec. 1911,
FO 371/1097.
^Jordan tel. F.O. 18 Oct. 1911 (confidential) FO 37l/l093.
308
were ready to assist the Chinese Government immediately, but Jordan alone
demurred, and wished to delay a reply till they had all consulted their home 
82
governments. The British Government in fact was caught unprepared by this
new test of neutrality. At first it was thought that a foreign loan by the
four Power Consortium would seem a better solution to the Chinese financial
question than agreeing to a postponement of indemnity payments. A loan would
be more effective in assisting the speedy restoration of order and would not
involve "the direct support by His Majesty's Government of the corrupt and
83effete Chinese Government which never does anything." Yet Campbell knew that 
the issue was neither so simple nor superficial. On the one hand it could 
be argued that the Manchu government was so effete and inefficient that it 
was hopeless trying to keep them on their legs. On the other hand it was 
certainly to the interest and convenience of the British government to have 
a sound government with whom to deal, and the Manchus were better than no 
government at all. But more important at this stage of the Revolution, there 
was also the question of security. The Southern revolutionaries had recently 
announced that they would recognise all the past loans and agreements made 
by Peking, but not new ones. The fear was thus that a new loan would be 
repudiated by the revolutionaries should they gain total control of the new
o4
government. This was in short the whole dilemma of Britain's trying to avoid
" op
Jordan tel. F.O. 18 Oct. 1911 ibid. An account of the formation 
of the four-Power Banking Consortium in 1910 and its subsequent activities is 
found in W.W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China (Baltimore 1927)
II 1030-46; see also W. Levi,, Modern China's Foreign Policy (Minneapolis 1953) 
124-36; H. Croly, Willard Straight (New York 1924); F. Field, American 
Participation in the China Consortium (Chicago 1931) 34-54; L. Graves, "Willard 
Straight in Far Eastern Finance" in Asia, XXI, 2 (Feb. 1921) 160-66; Liu Ping-lin, 
Chin-tai Chunq-kuo wai-chiao shih-kao (Peking 1962) Part II.
 ^MaxMhller minutes on Jordan tel. F.O. 18 Oct. 1911, FO 371/1093. 
84Campbell minutes, ibid.
309
antagonising both sides in the Revolution. As Jordan saw it, the choice was
simply one between chaos and boycotts. The government at Peking would not
last long without money, and if not paid the troops would turn to brigandage,
resulting in an upheaval which would upset whatever semblance of government
was left. The alternative, supplying Peking with loans, would incur the anger
of the South and the risk of a boycott of British trade in those centres of
revolutionary fervour, such as Hongkong, Canton and Shanghai, where British
85merchants were bound to suffer. The financial question, more than anything
else, was to prove a real yard-stick of British determination to preserve
its neutral stand in the Revolution.
On 19 October, 1911, the loan application to the four Groups was raised
to 2,000,000 taels, and the Chinese Ministry of Finance further applied for
a loan of 10,000,000 taels. The sheer amount of these needs made it essential,
in Jordan's view, that the four Powers should take careful stock of the situation
before deciding on a common policy. His personal prediction was that compliance
with the request would in future entail some form of international control of
86the finances of China. It was obvious to the Foreign Office that Jordan,
despite his guarded language, did not approve of the Powers supplying the
loans: "Financial control sounds very nice but the difficulties of carrying
87it into effect in China would be enormous." Campbell agreed: "China is
already unable to find money for the indemnity loan ... and to go on piling 
up debt in this way must mean financial ruin unless there is international
^Jordan to Campbell, 10 Dec. 1911 (private) FO 350/7.
86Jordan tel. F.O. 19 Oct. 1911, FO 37l/l093.
87MaxMuller minutes, ibid.
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88control." Sir Edward Grey followed Jordan*s lead and decided: "As at
oq
present advised, I am opposed to lending money."
Be that as it may, Britain, being a member of the Consortium, was
not entirely free to act independently of the other Power?-. There was reason
to believe that both France and the United States were applying pressure on
Jordan through their representatives at Peking, for compliance with the Chinese 
90demands. This would explain Jordan's telegram of 21 October, in which he
seemed to have softened his opposition to the loans, by arguing that since
the revolutionary troubles originated in the railway dispute, it gave the
Chinese government "a moral claim to our support and with all its faults it
is probably no worse than any administration which is likely to take its
91place. It cannot possibly go on without financial assistance ..." Thus 
to protect whatever loans Britain and the Powers would give to the Chinese 
Government, Jordan proposed a set of guarantees to which the Chinese must 
agree. The safeguards were to include a foreign supervisor in the principal 
spending departments in Peking and the provinces, and Chinese promises to 
cease forthwith obstructing river conservancy measures and to place a 
reformed government in power in Peking. Jordan realized, "These may seem 
counsels of perfection, but nothing short of drastic measures will meet the
92
situation." In their private correspondence, Jordan tries to justify his
 gg
Campbell minutes, ibid.
89
Grey minutes, ibid.
90
The French Charge d*Affaires at Peking frankly admitted to 
Jordan that the object of his government was to hasten international control 
in China. See Jordan tel. F.O. 24 Oct. 1911 (confidential) FO 371/1093. The 
United States interests were represented by Willard Straight, whose aim was 
to bolster the Chinese Government and save the currency loan on which is reputation 
rested. See H. Croly, op.cit. 378; A.W. Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of 
the United States (New York 1938, reissued Jan. 1962) 130-71; F.R. Dulles,
China and America (New Jersey 194b) 139-40; L. Graves, "Willard Straight and 
the Revolution in Peking" in Asia, XXI, 4 (1921) 337-40.
91
Jordan tel. F.O. 21 Oct. 1911 FQ -371/1093.
92ibid.
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"drastic measures” to Campbell. He explained that he was forced to formulate 
these conditions by the consideration that if they really had to finance the 
Chinese Government, "I cannot see there is much difference between a state and 
an individual, and no one in private life would lend money to a person who
93was at the end of his resources and not competent to look after his affairs."
Fortunately for Jordan at this juncture, the other three Powers failed to
94agree on the exact terms for a loan to the Chinese Government, and Grey
decided on a wait-and-see policy to watch developments in the revolutionary
95and financial situation.
The government at Peking meanwhile took the initiative in two
developments. On 25 October the Wai-wu Pu suddenly announced that they wished
96to drop the proposal to postpone the indemnity payments. This was a surprise
e
to the Powers concerned, as the Chinese Government was in as desperate a financial
position as a week earlier when the postponement was requested. Grey suspected,
correctly as it turned out, that Peking was really more interested in a loan,
and feared that the Powers would agree to the postponement of the indemnity
9 7
payments as an alternative to a loan. Then on 30 October it was discovered 
that the Chinese government had approached a private Franco-Belgium-English 
banking group, represented by a Frenchman Baron Henri Cottu, for a loan of
go
150,000,000 francs. Such a move was naturally viewed with much displeasure
98Jordan to Campbell, 23 Oct. 1911 (private) FO 350/7.
94Telegrams from Washington, 24 October, Paris, 26 October, and 
Berlin, 27 October, 1911 FO 37l/l093.
95F.O. to MacDonald, 26 Oct. 1911 FO 37l/l094.
96Jordan tel. F.O. 25 Oct. 1911 FO 371/1093.
97Grey minutes, ibid.
98Jordan tel. F.O. 30 Oct. 1911, FO 371/1094. Cottu was 
associated with de Lesaps in the Panama Canal scheme, but the Foreign Office 
had no knowledge of who the English in it were. See Campbell minutes, ibid.
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by the Powers, including Great Britain. Cottu called at the Foreign Office
late in November, hoping to elicit a promise from the British government
that they would not openly disavow the loan when it was negotiated. Grey 
99refused. By then, it was evident that there was very little financial support 
for the Cottu group, and the Foreign Office did not think anything was likely
r *4. 100to come of it anyway.
Meanwhile Jordan was more than ever convinced of the wisdom of not 
lending money to either side. His argument now was that either the Manchu 
Dynasty would fall amid confusion, or would remain in position but not in power. 
Thus the Powers were likely to be in a position to exercise a far more salutary 
and abiding influence if instead of supplying money to prolong the civil war, 
they reserved it for the use, under suitable guarantees, of whatever administra­
tion eventually emerged from the R ev o l u t i o n . T h i s  was the most sensible
observation to come out of the financial tangle, and the Foreign Office would
102
adhere as far as possible to these principles.
It was at this time, 2 November, that the four-Power Consortium was 
again approached for a loan, this time by the Chinese Government with the 
approval of the National Assembly. The British representative in the Group
(the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation) now felt that, in view of the
Grey Memorandum, 24 Nov. 1911 FQ 37l/lQ91. His reply was, "If 
I was asked in public I should say that we have not given support or encouragement 
to any proposals for a loan."
■''^Campbell minutes, ibid. The Contract between Peking and Cottu 
was finally cancelled in December. The British Government had stood firm and 
refused any recognition of the loan, so the French Government informed Cottu 
that they could not permit his loans to be quoted on the Bourse, even though 
they were favourable to French industries. See Addis (of the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank) to F.O. 30 Dec. 1911, FO 371/1318.
101
Jordan tel. F.O. 3 Nov. 1911
102MaxMhller minutes, ibid.
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approval of the National Assembly, the circumstances were substantially changed
103and it might be desirable to take up the loan. In actual fact, of course,
the real motives behind the Group was fear of competition from the Cottu
negotiations then in progress. Campbell was against the Group taking action,
104and Grey concurred, "This is no time to lend to the Chinese Government."
105
On 8 November the Group refused the Chinese application.
The Peking Government was thus left entirely to its own devices as far
as funds were concerned? the outlook was not hopeful. However, on 13 November
Yhan Shih-k'ai arrived to assume the Premiership, and to Sir John Jordan at
least, this gave the situation a totally different perspective. With the
stabilizing effect of YUan's presence in the capital, Jordan was disposed to
a more sympathetic view of the financial difficulties of the Chinese Government
When it was learned that early in the month thirty-three boxes of gold bars
from the Palace treasure hoarded by the Empress Dowager were handed over to
the Ministry of Finance to defray government expenses, the urgency of the
government's troubles was manifest. Jordan commented, "Nothing could more
forcibly illustrate the dire financial straits of the situation than does this
unprecedented use of Palace money for the needs of the Government.
Then in December, a number of events occurred which led directly to
a modification of Jordan's loan policy. On 3 December, the first truce between
107
North and South was signed, and on 6 December the Regent abdicated. The
■^^Townsend to F.O. 3 Nov. 1911 ibid.
104Grey minutes, ibid.
105Addis to F.O. 11 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1095.
^^Jordan to F.O., 16 Nov. 1911 (confidential) FO 371/1096.
107These will be dealt with in the following pages.
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same day Yhan approached Sir Francis Aglen, Inspector of Customs who succeeded
Sir Robert Hart in October 1911, to surrender some Customs funds earmarked for
pension purposes (Aglen would rather resign than do so). "In these circumstances,"
wrote Jordan, "I can no longer withhold sanction to a temporary accommodation
by the Groups, but to guard against possible boycott I would propose to inform
Yhan that he could not have the money until it had been explained to the
revolutionaries at Hankow and Shanghai that the advance was necessary in the
108
interest of negotiations, and their acquiescence secured." As will be seen,
the truce and the subsequent negotiations were largely the result of Jordan's
indirect role as intermediary between Yftan and the Southern republicans, so
it was no surprise that he was prepared virtually to reverse his loan policy
in order to prevent a renewal of hostilities, to keep the negotiations going,
and to maintain as stable a government as possible in Peking with whom the
republicans could negotiate. In short, Jordan was proposing to buy time to
keep Yhan in a position to bargain with the republicans.
The government in London however, still entertained considerable
doubts, which were only slightly dispelled by Jordan's suggestion to consult
the revolutionaries before arranging a loan for Ytian. Campbell noted, " ...
to make an advance to Yhan would be taking sides to some extent, whereas so
far we had pronounced ourselves in favour of complete neutrality. However
Sir John Jordan's proposal to obtain the assent of the rebels meets this
109difficulty, I think." Grey was of the opinion that at least the 
acquiescence of the South must be a sine qua non before any loan proceedings 
should start.
"^^Jordan tel. F.O. 6 Dec. 1911 FO 371/1096.
109Campbell minutes, ibid.
^^Grey minutes on Bertie tel. F.O. 9 Dec. 1911 FO 371/1097.
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Even so, Jordan’s plan soon ran into difficulties from several sides,
and the situation was worse than ever by the end of December, The first
indication of trouble came from the Japanese who though allied with Britain,
were not represented in the four-Power Banking Consortium. When they learned
of Jordan’s latest loan designs the Japanese revealed that they were upset and
disappointed: Britain had not consulted with them first before the proposal
was made known, thus implying that they were to be excluded from participation
in the proposed loan. The fact would create a very bad impression in Japan,
"and throw her into the arms of Russia who ... had also been excluded.
The Foreign Office could see little reason why the Japanese should be so
incensed, since they were not part of the Banking Consortium anyhow; it would
hardly be fair to the Group Powers to defer consulting them until the Japanese
112
had been informed. What it all boiled down to, of course, was the fact 
that Japan merely wanted to participate in whatever loan activities the Powers 
were contemplating. Jordan even seemed to see an advantage in admitting the
Japanese, " ... it appeared to me that the more Powers participate the better
113as this would distribute the responsibility of meeting a possible boycott."
Even so, the government still felt that in the circumstances it would be "for
114
the Japanese to ask, and for us to inform our group that we do not object."
Having placated the Japanese by an invitation to join in the proposed 
loan, Sir John Jordan was faced with an even louder outcry against his policy, 
this time from the republican representative Wu T'ing-fang (1842-1922). An 
angry telegram sent to the British Consul at Shanghai embodied the feelings 
of the South. "I am asked to beg the attention of His Majesty's Government
U 1 MacDonald tel. F.O. 10 Dec. 1911 FO 37l/l097.
1 1 2
Campbell minutes, ibid.
11 3
Jordan tel. F.O. 11 Dec. ibid.
114Campbell minutes, ibid.
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to the direct injury such a loan will do our ca>use, and the prolongation of
misery and disturbance to trade that will surely result from any financial
115
assistance to our enemies." Although Wu had clearly misrepresentated the
objects of such a loan, not to prolong the present struggle but rather to see
it terminated by peaceful negotiations, Sir Edward Grey feared that no amount
116of explanation was likely to satisfy the Republicans. Jordan's financial 
policy was doomed to failure. By mid-December, the diplomatic body at Peking 
realised that there was no chance of obtaining the acquiescence of the
revolutionaries to the loan for Ytian Shih-k'ai, considering the temper of
Wu’s protests. Jordan was near despair, "If Chinese accounts can be believed, 
YHian cannot go on without funds for more than a week at the outside, and the
117
government here will then probably collapse."
Telegram enclosed in Jordan tel. F.O. 11 Dec. ibid. Wu T'ing-
fang was a Cantonese, born in Singapore. He received his early education in
Hongkong, and worked for a time in the Legal Department of the local government. 
At the age of 33 he decided to make law his profession, and proceeded to further 
his special education in England, at Lincoln's Inn, from which he obtained the 
barrister's degree. He returned to practise in Hongkong, and married the 
sister of the eminent Hongkong doctor and barrister Ho Ch'i. His knowledge 
of European law and his brilliant practice in Hongkong soon came to the 
attention of the then Viceroy of Chihli Li Hung-chang, who offered him a 
lucrative post with the Governor-General Shen Pao-chen of Kiangsu, Kiangsi and 
Anhwei, to assist in the handling of foreign relations. In 1896 Wu was 
appointed Minister to the United States. In 1902 he returned to undertake 
Imperial legal reforms for the Ch'ing Government. The next year he was 
appointed Vice-President of the newly created Board of Trade, and in 1908 
Wu served on the Board of Law, where he continued his reform programme. See 
Shen YUn-lung, Chin-tai chenq-chih jen-wu lun-ts'unq (Taipei 1965) 132-8;
Wu Sheng-lin, Prominent Chinese of Hongkong, (Hongkong 1959).
^^Grey minutes on Jordan's tel. 11 Dec. FO 37l/l097.
117Jordan tel. F.O. 16 Dec. ibid.
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Another reason why the loan activities were so quickly curtailed was
the reluctance, strangely, of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the British
partner in the Consortium. The Bank maintained close ties with the merchants
of the coastal cities, and at the first indication that the Southern revolution-
0|cuVs' 118
aries would protestjrthe plan, they informed the Foreign Office of their oppositions
"Our opinion is we should not give loan to YUtan Shih-k'ai, Consider 
such action almost certain result in anti-foreign movement, most serious 
to foreign trade and residents .... Our opinion is solution of trouble 
will be effected sooner by withholding financial support from both sides... 
Strongly recommend Groups make no loan. British Con-General agrees with 
foregoing."
The possibility cannot be ruled out that Wu T'ing-fang and others probably had
pressure brought to bear on the British mercantile communities.
In any case, the financial situation was more desperate than before,
and most assuredly Britain had lost credit with the Southern faction by having
initiated the loan proposals in the first place. As Lindley put it, "The choice
lies between probably offending the rebels and possible, or perhaps probable,
anarchy at Peking. It is difficult here to judge which alternative is the
worst ... the residents in the cities of the interior are defenceless; most
119of British shipping is also at the mercy of the rebels ... " The question
120of a choice has also occurred to Jordan:
"One feels literally between the devil and the deep sea. All his (Ytian's) 
people say that he cannot go on without money, and as he himself puts 
It, 'the pot will cease boiling in a few days' But one cannot be sure 
that things are quite as bad as they are represented or that the 
Palace hoard is exhausted. The South will keenly resent foreign 
assistance to Yhan, but rather than let the government here collapse,
I should be inclined to come to his rescue. It seems to be a choice of 
evils ... "
Tel. from Shanghai, 11 Dec. enclosed in Addis to F.O., 12 
Dec* ibid. Contrast this with the Bank's policy in February 1912, after Sun 
Yat-sen's resignation from the Nanking Government, in M. Collis, Way-foohg: 
the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (London 1965) 133.
^^Lindley minutes on Jordan's tel. 16 Dec. FO 371/1097.
^^Jordan to Campbell, 20 Dec. 1911, (private) FO 350/7.
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At this time, a final alternative for a solution came from Sir Claude
MacDonald, who suggested that all the Powers should combine to make a small
121loan to both the Imperialists and the Republicans. His idea met with
objections! Ytian would surely resent assistance for the revolutionaries, and
Britain would lose his friendship if he knew that it was a British proposal;
the amount of the loan would come into question, as it would be difficult to
make each loan proportionate to the needs of each party; and most important
of all, it was finally recognised that the two sides were more likely to come
122
to terms if without means than if both were financed by outside help. The 
negotiations between the two parties had commenced two days previously, on 
18 December, and as far as British policy was concerned, the financial 
settlement now became an integral part of the general efforts made to 
produce a peaceful solution to the North-South conflict.
The Armistice and Negotiations 
If there is to be any criterion for determining the influence exerted 
by British policy on the course of the Chinese Revolution, it must be sought 
for in the roles played by Jordan in Peking and the British Consuls in the 
Yangtze in arranging and sustaining the armistice and subsequent negotiations 
from December 1911 to February 1912. Strictly interpreted British action 
during the period may be construed to smack of interference in Chinese internal 
affairs. But Britain’s good offices as a mediator was a necessary preliminary 
to bringing the two sides to the conference table, divided as they were by 
such deep-seated mistrust and hostility. There was never a question of Britain 
abandoning her official posture of neutrality: all diplomatic efforts during
^“^ MacDonald tel. F.O. 20 Dec. FO 371/1097.
122Pearson and Langley minutes, on above, ibid.
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the negotiations were made in the form of unofficial advice and proposals,
available to Yhan Shih-k'ai on the one hand and the Republicans represented
by Wu T'ing-fang on the other. As for Britain's motives in stepping into
this difficult civil dispute, it was the simple desire to terminate the
sporadic clashes between the armed forces of the two sides and to reestablish
the conditions of peace and stability under a nationally accepted government.
British neutrality was never forfeited in the pursuit of these motives. As
Jordan testified, "I receive numerous letters both from Republicans and
Imperialists expressing appreciation of the impartial attitude we have
observed throughout, and when the New York Herald recently took exception to
British policy, quite a number of unknown Chinese took up our defence in the 
1 93
local papers."
There is no doubt that the decision to mediate a negotiated peace
between the North and South was arrived at only after Ytlian' s appearance in
Peking in mid-November, when he resumed his close relationship with Sir John
Jordan. Late in October, 1911, Jordan had insisted that "I do not think that
mediation is practicable or stands any chance of success at present ... no
basis of compromise seems possible ... as the struggle proceeds some opportunity
124
for mediation may occur." The revolutionary movement spread with great
] 93
Jordan to Langley, 17 Jan. 1912 (private) FO 350/8. The 
incident involving the New York Herald concerned a commentary by a correspondent, 
Mr. Ohl, who accused the British Government and Jordan in particular of 
undermining the Manchu cause by arranging the truce with the republicans, and 
proceeded to argue that^doing so Britain was "backing the wrong horse," as 
China could only survive under an old-style monarchy. The column was widely 
read and circulated, although repudiated by the American Minister at Peking.
This led to Jordan being singled out by some Manchu fanatics as YUian Shih- 
k'ai's "evil genius." See North China Herald 13 Jan. 1912, p.102, col. 2-3; 
Jordan to Langley, 5 Feb. (private) FO 350/8. Langley decided that Ohl "must 
be a proper sort of ruffian only produced by the American press" ibid.
124Jordan tel. F.O. 29 Oct. 1911, FO 371/1094.
320
rapidity in November, which saw the bulk of the cities and provinces falling
125into Republican hands. Disorderly conditions reached an alarming scale and
on 25 November the British Acting Consul-General at Hankow reported that shells
126were falling into the foreign legations from the nearby battlefields. The
next day Jordan met with Yhan to protest/the threat to the British community
/v
at Hankow, to which Yhan replied that the Imperial troops were acting entirely
on the defensive, and"as proof of his sincerity assured me he would gladly
order a suspension of the hostility if an armistice could be arranged on
127
mutually satisfactory terms." There is reason to believe that the challenge
to arrange a truce was immediately taken up by Jordan. His instructions to
Joffe were to send "a verbal and unofficial message" to Li Yhan-hung regarding
Ytian’s willingness to call a truce, "taking care to explain that our only object
is to avert useless bloodshed and to prevent the prolongation of the dangerous
128situation in which the British community has been placed for some six weeks."
On 27 November, Han-yang was recaptured by the Imperial troops. Li was ready
to accept an armistice based on three termss the armistice would last for
fifteen days, each side holding territory presently occupied; the representatives
from all the revolutionaries of the provinces to meet in Shanghai to elect
plenipotentiaries to negotiate with Yban; and the armistice to be extended
129for a further fifteen days if necessary Yban found the conditions acceptable,
125Some of the important ones include Shanghai, which fell on 
4 November, Hangchow the next day, and Canton on 9 November. After some bitter 
fighting Nanking fell on 2 December. C.T. Liang, The Chinese Revolution of 
1911 (New York 1962) Table C in the Appendix, gives a table of the dates and 
circumstances of the uprisings in all the provinces following the Wuchang outbreak.
Joffe tel. enclosed in Jordan tel. F.O. 26 Nov. 1911, FQ 37l/lQ96.
127Jordan tel. Joffe, enclosed in Jordan tel. F.O. 26 Nov. ibid.
128., . , ibid.
129Joffe tel. Jordan 27 Nov. enclosed in Jordan tel. F.O. 28 Nov. ibid.
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but would not agree to them finally until he was better informed as to how
130
representative Li was of the Southern faction. In fact, with the recapture
of Han-yang Yban was not too eager for a truce, and he intimated to Jordan that
he had heard it rumoured that Li's position was much shaken because of the loss
of those cities. Here Jordan demonstrated the extent of his influence over
Yban; "I took the occasion to point out to the Premier that an advance by the
Imperial army on Wuchang (where Li's troops had fled) would throw upon him
131the responsibility of further bloodshed." The warning had effect; On 1
December Yban came up with his own set of terms for a truce. These differed
from the suggestions of Li Yban-hung in that the truce was to be for an initial
three days, and that the British Consul-General at Hankow was to sign the
armistice agreement as a witness.^32
As the arrangements were so hastily made, Jordan had little time
for consultations with London before sanctioning the moves made by both Yban
and Li. Initially the Foreign Office did not take too enthusiastically to
the idea of British mediation. The primary concern was that "it will be
awkward if either side fails to observe the armistice after it has been signed
133by the British Consul-General, even as a witness." Another concern was that
"comment may be made by the other Powers, and it would have been preferable
134
if all or none of the Consuls had been asked to witness." But these factors 
were offset by the salutary aims of the armistice, and Jordan's initiative was 
generally applauded. Campbell pointed out that witnessing the agreement did
Jordan tel. Joffe, 28 Nov. enclosed in Jordan tel. F.O. 28 Nov. ibid. 
Jordan to F.O. 17 Dec. FO 371/1310.
132Jordan tel. F.O. 1 Dec. FO 371/1096.
133Lindley minutes, ibid.
134A.N. minutes, ibid.
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not bind the British Consul-General to see that the terms were not infringed 
135by either side, and since the issues were too important to allow for delay,
Grey agreed that "It is not an occasion when we should be punctilious, and
136
Sir John Jordan acted cjuite rightly."
The truce of three days began on 3 December 1911. The fall of Nanking
the previous day was bound to restore the confidence of the revolutionaries,
137
so Yban was eager to work out the arrangements for convening talks. He
had another meeting with Jordan on the same day, and tried to gauge from
Jordan what sort of settlement would meet with the approval of the foreign
Powers. Jordan adhered to his repeated views that a constitutional government
with nominal Manchu sovereignty would generally meet with foreign approval.
Yban however, recognised that the Southern revolutionaries were adamant about
a republic, and suggested two ways to circumvent the difficulty. On the one
hand he urged that Jordan and the British Government should dispel the belief
of the Yangtze revolutionaries that a republic would enjoy the support of
foreign public opinion, and on the other hand, Yban proposed to work for the
abdication of the Regent as a step towards making constitutional government
1 oo
palatable to the South. For both plans Jordan expressed his support.
London also regarded Yban’s views sound. "The most pressing necessity of the
situation are (sic) a prolongation of the armistice and removal of the Regent
139... something might be done ... at Peking to help Yban in his efforts."
On 4 December terms were drawn up by Yban in consultation with Jordan
for the extension of the truce on its expiration for a further fifteen days.
Campbell minutes, ibid.
^■^Grey minutes, ibid.
^Jordan tel. F.O. 3 Dec. ibid.
Jordan tel. F.O. 4 Dec. (confidential ibid.
139Lindley minutes, ibid.
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T'ang Shao-i (1860-1934) was appointed to represent Ytian in talks with the
140republicans, and he was expected to reach Hankow in the same week. The
Foreign Office, pleased with the turn of events, decided to inform the Japanese
of the proceedings 1 otherwise the Japanese may think we are going behind their 
141backs#1 It was then discovered that the Japanese were Indeed suspicious of
Britain's involvement in the armistice, and were placated only after Jordan's 
assurances that in future Japan would be invited to cooperate with Britain in 
assisting the negotiations. "It would strengthen our hands if we were in a 
position to let it be known that other Powers were with us. But concerted action
142
of more than two or three legations is too unwieldy to be (workable)" The
Japanese were only too glad to cooperate, and recognising the special position
which Jordan held with Yhan they were also amenable to Jordan being the
only active intermediary.’*'43
On 6 December, two objectives of British policy at this juncture
were realized* the truce was extended again, and the Regent abdicated. This
last development did not visibly Improve the situation, nor have the effect
144that Yftan hoped for. But it was proof to the revolutionaries that Yban
was determined to strip the Manchus of all their power, and in this way .
Jordan tel. F.O. 4 Dec. ibid. T'ang Shao-i was born in Kwangtung 
and in 1873 sent by the Imperial Government to study in the United States, where 
he remained for seven years at Columbia and New York Universities. In 1883 he was 
appointed secretary to YVtan Shih-k'ai as Resident in Korea. By 1905 he had 
reached the position of a Junior Vice-President of Foreign Affairs, as well as 
Director-General of the Shanghai-Nanking and Lu-Han Railways. In 1907 T'ang was 
Senior Vice-President of the Board of Communications, and in 1911 President of the 
same Board. See Max Perleberg, Who's Who in Modern China (Hongkong 1954) 204;
Chtin x, T'ang-tai ming-jen shih-lheh (Shanghai 1912) 9b-13b.
^Lindley Minutes, Jordan tel. F.O. 4 Dec. FO 371/1096.
 ^^ Jordan tel. F.O. 8 Dec. ibid.
143MacDonald tel. F.O. 9 Dec. FO 37l/l097.
^44Jordan to Campbell, 10 Dec. (private) FO 350/7. and Jordan to F.O 
20 Dec. FO 37l/l310. in which he reported that the native press was suspicious that 
the Regent's abdication only indicated a victory of the Empress Dowager's party 
in their attempt to revive the old rule.
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145ought to help in reconciling the North and South. On 9 December a further 
fifteen days’ truce was signed at Hankow, and the first peace talks took place 
at Shanghai on 18 December. Because of the speed with which decisions must 
be made, Jordan acted throughout on his own initiative in giving personal 
advice to Yban and telegraphing instruction to the Consuls at Hankow and 
Shanghai. It is to the credit of the Foreign Office in London that his efforts 
were always supported and appreciated. "It is doubtful whether there would 
ever have been an armistice if Sir John Jordan had not advised Yban."'*'^
With the commencement of negotiations British policy entered into a 
new and decisive phase. All the earlier debates over a practicable form of 
government for the new China, the degree of support to be accorded to Yban Shih- 
k’ai, the financial question and Japan's aims and intentions must now be 
resolved whether by compromise or concession. While Sir John Jordan continued 
to give top priority to the espousal of Yban's policies, changed circumstances, 
which included the defection of T'ang Shao-i to the Republican camp and the 
arrival of Sun Yat-sen to head a rival government at Nanking, made it necessary 
for both Yban and Jordan to abandon some of their old aspirations and instead to 
facilitate the election of Yban as provisional President of the Chinese 
Republic which eventually took place in March 1912.
It was therefore Yuan Shih-k’ai, and not Sun Yat-sen or any of the 
other revolutionaries, who held the centre stage in the final drama of the 
Revolution. In an interview with Dr. George Morrison of the London Times on
See the London and China Express p.873, col. 1. There is, of 
course, also a possibility that the South would see it as a sign of weakness 
on the part of Peking, and strengthen their demands for the Emperor's abdication. 
Yban first broached the subject of abdication to the Regent late in November, 
but the Regent refused to contemplate the idea. Jordan tel. F.O. 26 Nov. 
(confidential) FO 371/1096. MaxMbller commented, "The Prince Regent with his 
character was sure to show firmness or rather obstinacy at the wrong moment," 
ibid.
■'■^ Lindley minutes, on Jordan to F.O. 17 Dec. FO 37l/l310.
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20 November, 1911, Yhan reiterated his belief that retention of the monarchy
was still the best safeguard against anarchy and disintegration of the Empire.
No amount of argument on Morrison's part could convince Yiian of the determination
147
of the South to abolish the Manchu Dynasty altogether* Jordan's impressions
of Yban at this time, however, obtained after an interview on 26 November,
was: "I don't believe he has any real intention of effacing himself, and in
148the end he will probably keep to the winning side ... " Taken together
the two accounts go a long way towards explaining Yban’s subsequent actions
during the peace talks.
The first stumbling block to the convening of the peace conference
was disagreement over the choice of a meeting place. As we have seen, on 7
December T'ang Shao-i was appointed to represent Yban, and he left for Hankow
where it was presumed the conference would take place, with the assistance of
Everard D. Fraser, the British Consul-General. On arrival, however, T'ang found
that the revolutionaries now insisted on Shanghai as meeting place. Yban yield
to their demands; the first meeting between T'ang and Wu T'ing-fang was
149scheduled for 18 December. Wu's intransigent attitude from the very 
beginning served to convince Jordan that he represented at Shanghai only the 
147
Times 21 Nov. 1911, p.8 col. 1-2; see also C. Pearl, op.cit. 
231-2; J.O.p. Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in China (Philadelphia 
1912) 152-3.
■^Jordan to Campbell, 27 Nov, (private) FQ 350/7.
149Wu T'ing-fang explained that he was unable to meet T'ang at 
Hankow because of the multitude of duties which demanded his presence at 
Shanghai. See Jordan tel. F.O. 12 Dec. FQ 37l/l097. It was clear that there 
was dissension among the revolutionary ranks, and that the leaders at Shanghai 
denied the authority of those at Wuchang to speak for all the eleven revolution­
ary provinces. The British attitude was summed up by Campbell, "it doesn't 
matter where the conference takes place. The important thing is that all 
revolutionaries should be represented." His minutes on Jordan's tel. ibid.
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extreme faction of the revolutionary party, and since they were expected to
reject outright any hope of the retention of the Manchu Emperor, Jordan
confided to Campbell that "it will probably take a plain threat of
150foreign intervention to bring them to their senses," It is clear that
when negotiation began, the British Government was aiming not for the fulfilment
of republican ideals in the Chinese Revolution, but rather for the realization
of the dreams of such earlier reformers as Liang Ch’i-ch'ao, the establishment
of a Western-styled constitutional monarchy in China,
On 15 December, the revolutionary party proposed the terms on which
negotiations were to be based: the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty, liberal
treatment of the Imperial family, and the generally considerate treatment of
all the other Manchus and a united China. Both the British Government and
Yban Shih-k'ai regarded the terms as reasonable, though predictably Yban
151refused to accept the first condition. The deadlock over the question of 
the future form of government now seemed the only obstacle to a successful 
peace conference, and Yban when queried by Jordan replied that he had no 
fixed policies to deal with the eventual failure of the Shanghai assembly,
"and that probably he would be compelled to ask for the good offices of the 
friendly Powers.1
At this point the Japanese Government saw an opportunity for an attempt 
at Anglo-Japanese intervention in the Chinese situation. In an interview with 
Yban on 17 December, the Japanese Minister, Ijuin Hikokichij anticipating the 
failure of the Shanghai conference, expressed an opinion that if China found 
it necessary to have recourse to foreign intervention, she should leave the 
1J30Jordan to Campbell, 10 Dec. (private) FQ 350/7.
151Jordan tel. F.O. 15 Dec. FQ 37l/l097.
‘''^Jordan tel. F.O. 17 Dec. (secret) ibid.
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question to the decision of Great Britain and Japan to the exclusion of all 
153the other Powers. The Japanese tactics were naturally viewed with displeasure
by London. Sir Walter Langley feared that the Japanese Minister seemed to be
"going rather fast and we shall have to be careful not to be dragged further 
154than we wish." Sir Edward Grey at this stage seemed to have sensed that
republicanism was bound to win over Yhan's monarchical policy. His comment
155on the Japanese opinion is interesting:
"The Japanese ought to be as good as, or better judges than we are of 
the situation, but the (stand) taken by them would possibly have placed 
us both in the position of being committed to intervene on the losing 
side. This would have caused great damage to British life, property and 
trade, and have given a great opening to other Powers who played a 
waiting game."
At the opening session of the peace conference, the two commissioners
T’ang Shao-i and Wu T'ing-fang exchanged credentials, discussed the suspension
of hostilities and postponed further meetings pending the acceptance by Yban
of the conditions set forth earlier. Meanwhile the six Powers interested,
Japan, the United States, Germany, France, Russia and Britain, decided at a
meeting of the Diplomatic Corps in Peking that an identical note should be sent
to the Shanghai conference, calling its attention to the necessity of arriving
156as soon as possible at an understanding to end the conflict. The futility 
of these polite exhortations would soon be seen. The determination of the 
revolutionaries on a republic was as strong as ever, and any hopes of a speedy 
peace would have to come in the form of concessions from Yban and Peking. It
^^Jordan tel. F.O. 18 Dec. (secret) FQ 371/1310.
■^^Langley minutes on Jordan tel. 17 Dec. (secret) FQ 371/1097. 
"^^Grey minutes on Jordan tel. 18 Dec. (secret) FQ 371/1310.
Jordan tel. F.O. 15 Dec. FQ371/1097.
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was not an easy task that Jordan and Joffe had undertaken.
On 19 December, T'ang Shao-i came to see Joffe at the British Consulate.
T'ang had learned that the republicans intended to demand an acceptance of a 
republic as a condition to further talks, and Joffe was requested to see Wu 
T'ing-fang and reason with him. Wu proved to be truculent and intimated that 
the time had come for the Powers to declare for one side or the other. "If 
they did not support the revolutionary side," he insisted, "the people would
157
never forget it ... Yban Shih-k'ai must go if there were to be any compromise."
The British efforts at mediation was bound to run into trouble if this enmity
continued between Yban and Wu. The problem was compounded in the next few days
when T'ang began to show signs of weakening, and finally deserted Yban's cause
158to join the Republicans.
At the second peace meeting on 20 December, T’ang and Wu managed to
agree on the terms for an extension of the armistice, to 31 December. On the
subject of the form of government, however, no compromise seemed possible.
It was after this confrontation with the Republicans that T'ang indicated to
Joffe he had found republican feeling very strong all along the Yangtze and
159
that his opinion was Yban must modify his policy." On the next day,
T'ang's break with Yban was out in the open. A communique was sent to all the 
Shanghai newspapers declaring that T’ang Shao-i was ready to accept Wu's views;
^^Joffe tel. Jordan, in Jordan tel. F.O. 20 Dec. (private) FQ 37l/l098.
158J.O.P. Bland, op.cit. 159-63, 215-22, gives an interesting 
analysis of T'ang's motivations. Bland suggests that T'ang had never concealed 
his republican sympathies, and therefore Yban's sincerity in appointing T'ang 
as representative was open to doubt. Bland thinks also that to a certain extent 
T'ang was led astray, towards dizzy heights of personal ambition, by "the 
fascination of Sun's political will-of-the-wisps." Most telling of all, an 
explanation could be found, according to Bland, in the fact of T'ang's being a 
Cantonese, and thus displaying all the clannishness of his people, the tendency to 
consider himself a Cantonese first and a Chinese official afterwards.
■^^Joffe tel. Jordan, 20 Dec. In Jordan tel. F.O. 21 Dec. FQ 371/1098.
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T'ang himself confirmed the report to Joffe, arguing that it was the only
solution that would stop the f i g h t i n g . T h e  British mediators were caught
in the dilemma. Jordan, knowing that Yban still professed to be opposed to a
republic, was convinced that "a continuance of the struggle seems highly
probable." The Foreign Office echoed, "This is not at all hopeful.
Finding himself momentarily isolated against the Republicans, Yban
Shih-k'ai looked to the two foreign Powers on whom he could best rely for
championship of his case. Both Jordan and Ijuin were summoned to see the
Premier on 22 December at two separate sessions. Jordan met with Yban first.
It was evident that Yban desired a promise of support and intervention from
the British Government for a limited monarchy, as he "stated most emphatically,
163he would have nothing to do with a republic." Jordan would not be committed.
"I said that intervention to be effective would apparently mean coercing half
the country, and he would realise what a serious task that implied. We wanted
a strong and united China, under whatever form of government the Chinese 
1 f\£
people wished." Jordan however, did give It as his personal 0£Ani°n that 
he agreed with Yban* s arguments that the Imperial idea was too firmly rooted 
in the habits and minds of the people to tolerate such a violent break with 
the past. The outcome of the interview was thus a compromises Yban promised
■^^Joffe tel. Jordan, 21 Dec. in Jordan tel. F.O. 21 Dec. ibid.
T'ang did not tender his resignation to Yban until 30 December.
161.,. , ibid.
^^Lindley minutes, ibid.
163Jordan tel. F.O. 22 Dec. ibid.
164.,.,ibid.
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to get the Throne's acceptance of T'ang’s proposal that the form of government
should be left to the decision of a representative assembly convoked for the 
165purpose.
Ijuin saw Yban immediately after Jordan, When the two Ministers met 
outside Yban's chambers, the Japanese informed Jordan that he proposed to say 
that Japanese Government wanted a strong and united China, "and adhered to 
a limited monarchy as the best solution." At the interview, however, the 
Japanese indulged in another bungling attempt to force Yban's hand to declare 
for a monarchy under the threat of foreign intervention. The incident led 
to a diplomatic scandal which threatened to upset the negotiations completely. 
Contrary to his statement to Jordan, Ijuin advised Yban that Japan would 
never recognise a republic in China, and would interfere with force if neces­
sary to prevent it. Yban then lost no time in wiring T'ang in Shanghai that,
"the six Powers would not recognise a republic and would Insist on a monarchy."*-67 
T'ang related the news to Dr. Morrison, who was then in Shanghai, and the story 
broke in the London Times the same day. The Foreign Office demanded an 
explanation from Jordan, and it was then that tempers cooled and facts became 
distinguishable from some consciously perpetrated rumours.
It was a fact that Ijuin had made the threat to Yban. Since Yban had 
constantly been told that the British and the Japanese were acting in complete
accord, it would have been natural that he should think the British Government
168 .
agreed with the Japanese attitude, (though it is difficult to see how he 
could have given credence to this theory having just obtained Jordan's views 
an hour ago.) Yban decided to wring the most political capital out of the
Jordan to F.O. 28 Dec. (confidential) FQ 371/1310.
166Jordan tel. F.O. 22 Dec. FQ 371/1093.
167Jordan tel, F.O. 23 Den. FQ 371/1098.
■^®The interview between Yban and Ijuin is also dealt with 
in A.M. Pooley, op.cit. 66.
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situation? his mischief was in the wording of the telegram to T'ang, in which
he indicated that all the six Powers were ready to intervene* No doubt he
wished to give the republicans the impression that this action was along the
same lines as the identical note sent by the six Powers on 20 December, Yban
purposedly manipulated to his own advantage what could have been at best a
mere misunderstanding. London was most distressed? "We knew that as far
as we are concerned, Yban has no ground whatsoever for his assertion....
169This is very mischievous ...."
Yban's motives were variously interpreted. In the first place, Yban
was obviously hoping to use the ruse to strengthen his hands against the
cries for a republic from the South. Yet it was also possible that Yban wanted
to be urged by the Powers, and especially Britain and Japan, to accept the
presidency of the republic, and hope^that the events would force them to do so.
Finally the Foreign Office began to suspect that T’ang would not have expressed
his personal defection to the revolutionary camp if he had not previously
170
obtained the private concurrance of Yban. In fact, Yban seemed to have
played' an important role, both openly and surreptitously, in all the recent 
developments, to the chagrin of the British Government which was trying to 
assist the negotiation of an honourable peace.
However, an important point was arrived at during this stage of the 
negotiations. On 24 December Jordan held a lengthy meeting with Yban and 
Prince Ch’ing, at the conclusion of which the Chinese government agreed to
■^Langley minutes on Jordan tel. F.O. 23 Dec. FQ 371/1098.
170
These were the F.O. minutes attached to Jordan's telegrams 
of 22-24 December, 1911, ibid. See also H. Croly, op.cit. 430-1. Some 
general views of Yban's manipulations during the negotiations are also seen 
In Y. C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West (N. Carolina, 1966) 292-4.
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authorize T'ang Shao-i to leave the decision as to the future form of 
government to a special National Assembly composed of representatives from all
171provinces to be elected in the next three months on mutually agreed conditions.
The decision was heartily endorsed by Jordan: "I said that the proposal seemed
to me a fair one and would place the government in a morally strong position
and throw upon the revolutionaries the responsibility of continuing the war
172
if they rejected it." Ijuin was informed the same day. Resorting to 
delay tactics, the Japanese Minister asked Yban to defer sending the instruc­
tions to T'ang pending the opinion of Tokyo.
It turned out that Tokyo was entirely against this concessionary step.
After an interview with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Claude
MacDonald reached certain conclusions regarding Japanese policy. The
Japanese Government, he found, was still convinced that a republic in China
would end in the disruption of the Empire; they believed that a further
combined effort by the six Powers should be made, in the form of an ernest
appeal to the revolutionary party to accept a limited monarchy. It was clear to the
Japanese, (as to the British Foreign Office) that the proposed National Assembly
would almost assuredly vote for a republic, and if the Powers agreed to this
174
step, they would be committed to accepting the Assembly's decision.
Unappealing as this would seem the British Government nevertheless would not 
and could notendorse Japan's attempt again to rally support for intervention.
. ~171
Report of the interview, enclosed in Jordan to F.O. 28 Dec. 
(confidential) FQ 371/1310. It was at this meeting that Yban spoke scathingly 
of the incompetence of the republicans and declared he would re-sign from 
office should the Assembly select a republic; ibid.
172Jordan tel. F.O. 24 Dec. FQ 371/1098.
173Xbid.
174MacDonald telegrams of 24 and 26 Dec. ibid.
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Sir Edward Grey decided that “the advice (from the Powers to the revolutionaries)
will not be given now, for I don't suppose we shall be the only Power opposed 
175
to giving it*"
The Japanese bid for intervention was carried out on two fronts* On
the day that MacDonald was trying to restrain the Minister for Foreign Affairs
in Tokyo, the Japanese Charge d*Affaires in London delievered a similar note
to the Foreign Office, which resorted to a naive use of bluff to influence British
policy. ' The Yamaza Memorandum began by accusing Sir John Jordan of having told
Ijuin that “in view of the difficulty of the Shanghai Conference coming to a
satisfactory conclusion on the basis of a constitutional monarchy, it would
be better to save the situation for the present at least by supporting Yban
176
Shih-k'ai as the president of the republic." The Japanese Note then
proceeded to argue against such a policy, and reasserted their wish to see
177
the Powers take concerted action for a limited monarchy. The Foreign 
Office was taken back, to say the least, at this supposed commitment made by
178
Jordan* Once again Grey explained to Yamaza Britain's unshakable neutral stands
“We should be careful not to be drawn into any attempt to force upon 
the Revolutionaries and upon Ytian a solution that either of them is not 
prepared to accept: we should confine our action to mediation as
hitherto, making it clear that we desire to see a united and strong 
China, ... And if we go beyond this action to the extent of expressing 
to the Revolutionaries a preference for a constitutional monarchy it 
should only be done after consultation and in concert with other Powers, 
otherwise the Powers will get into opposite camps, and there will be all 
sorts of trouble between Chinese and foreigners. Indeed this is a grave 
risk to be considered before any preference is expressed or anything like 
preference exerted even by all the Powers in concert."
Grey minutes on Jordan tel. 26 Dec. FQ 371/1097. and F.Q. 
tel. MacDonald 29 Dec. FQ 371A 098.
^78Yamaza memorandum, 24 Dec. (confidential) FQ 371/1098.
177., 
ipi d »
178Grey's reply, ibid.
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Meanwhile from both Peking and the British Embassy in Tokyo came 
denials of the statement charged to Jordan by the Japanese, Jordan telegraphed, 
"I am not in favour and have never been in favour of supporting Yhan as 
president of the republic. He has always told me (that he?) would accept no 
such office ... I have invariably made it clear that the question of monarchy
179or republic is one which the Chinese people are best qualified to decide ...”
MacDonald was convinced that Ijuin must have misunderstood Jordan, of whose
views he himself was well informed. In a ’’very confidential” addendum MacDonald
suggested that the Japanese Foreign Office was aware that Ijuin's knowledge of
the English language has not been sufficient to make him understand others
fully, or to make himself understood, so that the Incident could have been
180a genuine case of misunderstanding. It might well be. On the other hand, 
this could have been just another endeavour by the Japanese to create a 
situation in which foreign intervention would be called for to aver a supposedly 
worse evil.
By 26 December Japan's stalling tactics were foiled when YUan
telegraphed T'ang to broach the idea of a National Assembly vote on the form
181of government, without waiting for Tokyo's opinion, Jordan did meet 
with Ijuin though, on the same day the instructions were despatched, and pointed 
out to him that the revolutionaries held as hostages three-quarters of all the 
foreign lives and property in China, and the fear was they would resent any 
attempt to dictate to them the form of government and resort to retaliatory 
measures against foreigners in their territory. The British position was
......  179
Jordan tel, F.O. 25 Dec. ibid.
^88MacDonald tel. F.O. 26 Dec.ibid.
"^Jordan tel. F.O. 26 Dec. ibid.
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particularly delicate, as the great bulk of the population of Hong Kong and 
Singapore was drawn from the Southern provinces of China and openly sympathetic
warned against any form of over-enthusiasm* "I think we should not become 
responsible for any proposals made by Yban to the revolutionaries, further than 
to say when asked whether we see objection to them or not, or whether they 
appear to us prima facie to be reasonable .... If there is any question of 
going beyond this the other four Powers should be brought into consultation .* * 
but my personal view remains unchanged,, that any attempt to decide the issue 
by preference is very risky o'1
Japanese dreaded the outcome of a National Assembly vote on the form of 
government* Once again he sought to use this knowledge and manipulate the 
situation to force the Japanese into an open posture of acquiescence, and at 
the same time faciliate his own subsequent conversion to republicanism* In his 
wire to T’ang Shao-i concerning the Assembly, Yban stated explicitly that the 
Japanese absolutely objected to a republic* As he expected, the information 
was leaked to Wu T’ing-fang, who immediately declared that the publication of 
this news would unite all the Chinese in a fight to the death* The revolution­
aries, he declared, were prepared to resume hostilities on 31 December (when 
the armistice expired) unless they heard to the contrary* A telegram was
sent to Tokyo holding the Japanese responsible for the continuance of the
1 84
struggle with all its consequences*
towards the revolutionaries*
182
Grey meanwhile endorsed Yban’s move, but
Yban Shih-k’ai, of course, was fully aware of the fact that the
182
Jordan to F*0* (confidential) 28 Dec* FO 371/1310.
183
Grey memorandum, 26 Dec.
184Shanghai tel. Jordan (secret) enclosed in Jordan tel* F.O.
28 Dec* ibid.
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Yuan’s double-dealing yielded the results he desired. The Japanese
ecu
announced that they had no objections to the of a National
185Assembly, An Imperial decree calling for the Assembly was issued on
28 December.'1'8^ But events were speedily moving on to a different solution
of the Chinese crisis, and the Assembly was never actually convened.
On 27 December, T'ang Shao-i telegraphed Yban that the revolutionaries
would accept nothing but a republic, and if this was not to be a basis then
they were unwilling to continue the negotiations. T’ang reported that from
his own investigations popular feeling in all the Eastern and Southern
provinces was firmly established in favour of a republic| with the armistice
due to expire in a few days he urged that the National Assembly should be
convoked immediately and the question of the form of government settled. One
further complication in the situation was that Sun Yat-sen had arrived in Shanghai
(he reached Shanghai on 24 December) and was engaged in organizing a provisional
187
republican government. On the 29th, and without authority from Yban, T’ang
signed four articles with the revolutionaries, which were in Jordan's opinion
188"one-sided and unfair to the Imperialists." By these T’ang agreed that 
the Manchu Government should be precluded from raising any loans, and that all 
the Imperial troops should retire to a considerable distance from their actual 
positions on the expiration of the truce. The next day T'ang signed a further
Jordan tel. F.O, 28 Dec. ibid.
Yban's trickery was all too apparent to the F.O, Lindley noted, "I have little 
doubt Yban has misrepresented the Japanese attitude to Wu." ibid.
T Q£.
Jordan tel. F.O. 28 Dec, ibid, and 31 Dec. F.O. 371/1310.
187
. T'ang tel. Yban, enclosed in Jordan to F.O. 2 Jan. 1912.
FQ 371/1311.
188Jordan to F.O. 6 Jan. 1912, ibid,
Jordan was also aggrieved with T’ang when he "tried to make out that the consular
body in Shanghai favoured a republic, and he also laid stress on the fact that
the identic communication presented to both parties at the conference by the 
six Powers had been regarded by the revolutionary party as implying recognition 
of their having formed a government." Ibid.
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set of four articles whichde&it with the composition of the proposed National
Assembly. Yban's reply to these actions on 30 December was to refute some
of the articles, especially those relating to loans and the withdrawal of troops.
He also reminded T'ang that his powers were limited to discussions only. T'ang's
reaction to the rebuke was to resign his appointment as peace commissioner, which
Yban accepted on 2 January, 1912, Henceforth all negotiations were personally
189
handled by Yban in telegraphic communications with Wu T'ing-fang.
The news of T'ang's resignation and the inevitable break-down of
the peace talks was received with anger and dismay among the British communities
interested in C h i n a . T h e  suddenness of T'ang's departure and the general
mystery which surrounded most of his actions in Shanghai now became the focus
of much analytical^iscussion. All previous suspicions of his personal sympathies
with the republicans while officially speaking for Yban Shih-k'ai were now confirmed
the general view in Peking was that T'ang thought he could force the hand of
the Government and bring about a situation which must leave Yban no option but
191to accept the presidency of a republic. On the other hand. Sir John Jordan
suggested that since it was obvious Yban must have known about T'ang1s real
sentiments all along, why such a person was chosen to go to Shanghai "is only
explicable on the theory that Yban, in spite of all his protestations, would
192
In the end accept the Presidency of the Republic." The one person who held 
the key to the baffling circumstances was still Yban Shih-k’ai.
On 1 January, 1912, Jordan saw Yban to discuss the critical turn of
events, Jordan found the Premier in a strange and unusual mood. He looked ill_ ... fgg
Details are given in C.T. Liang, op.cit. 32-5j "Nan-pei i-ho"
in HHKM VIII, 84-99. See also Jordan to F.O, 6 Jan. 1912, FQ 371/1311.
190See London and China Express 5 Jan. 1912, and Times 5 Jan. 1912,
191Jordan to F.O. 6 Jan, 1912, FQ 371/1311.
1 92Jordan to Campbell, 4 Jan. 1912, (private)
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and depressed, and declared that as he had exhausted all his efforts to effect
a peaceful settlement, and was no longer able to control the situation, he too
was contemplating resignation. Jordan recalled, "Yban’s manner and language
were so different, from (what) they have hitherto been, and so tantalisingly
puzzling that I felt constrained to ask if there were no outside influence at
193work, but he replied in the negative," Since Yban had always been very frank
and open with the British Minister, the latter now admitted to some misgivings
and wondered what Yban's game really was, "Perhaps he scarcely knows himself,
and his personal safety is evidently causing anxiety. He told me the sooner
194he died the better, as he had nothing to gain by living ..." The view of
the British Consul-General at Nanking, however, would suggest that Yban had a
great deal to live for, William H, Wilkinson reported that in the revolutionary
camp it was generally believed that Yban, if assured of his personal safety would
agree to a republic. "The remarkable currency obtained by this belief,"
Wilkinson testified, "is perplexing in view of the Premier's stated and vehement
denials of any such intention. It may be, however, that the public thinks he
protests too much, and is unable to explain by any other theory the open defection
195of his henchman T'ang to the republican camp ..." It would thus seem that 
T'ang's resignation was only the outward expression of a development that had 
been brewing for some time past in the private calculations of Yban Shih-k'ai: 
his own conversion to republicanism.
Sun Yat-sen
From another direction Yban's position was also forced out into the opens 
the activities of Sun Yat-sen, The last occasion on which Sun had personally 
r .....   1 Q3
Jordan tel. F.O. 2 Jan (secret) FQ 371/1310.
^^Jordan to Campbell,, 4 Jan, (private) FO 350/8.
195Wilkinson tel, Jordan, enclosed in Jordan to F.O. 4 Jan. FQ
371/1311.
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been involved in the revolutionary movement was the 1908 uprising in French
Indo-China. Since then he had been travelling in South-east Asia and Europe,
working in one way or another to promote his revolutionary cause, and in so
doing had from time to time come into contact with either the British Foreign
Office or the Colonial Office,
Soon after the Chen-nan Kuan debacle of 1908 the Foreign Office had
been informed that Sun Yat-sen was residing in Singapore (where he had fled
from French Indo-China) in the house of Chang Yung-fu, the local revolutionary 
196leader. On 30 January, 1908, the Wai-wu Pu had addressed a Note to Jordan 
requesting that the British Colonial Government should banish Sun from all 
British possessions because of his revolutionary activities. As the request 
was nothing but a favour asked of the British Government, Jordan had not thought 
there was any need for immediate haste in dealing with the matter, and in
197fact had not even informed the Foreign Office of the Note till much later.
On 9 February the Wai-wu Pu had sent Jordan another Note with a similar
request? on 10 February the Chinese Minister in London had also made a formal
198
request for Sun's banishment. Both the Colonial authorities and Sir John 
Anderson, Governor of the Straits Settlements, had been reluctant to comply with 
the Chinese demand. R. E. Stubbs at the Colonial Office had felt "It would be 
a strong measure to banish him if he is living peaceably and there is nothing
 ... ' 1 y 96
For Sun's travels and movements see Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I.
197Jordan to F.O. 20 Feb. FQ 371/421.
He had his reasons: he waited till he 1 had seen (his) way more clearly towards
obtaining a favourable solution of one or two other pending questions," ibid.
198 /
Li Ching-fang to F.O. 10 Feb. 1908, FQ 371/421.
Alston's reaction tallied exactly with Jordan's on rece'ipt of tfte Chinese request.
"In view of the Chinese bad faith in the matter of Sir Robert Hart's successor
we do not seem called upon at present to fall In with every demand that the
Chinese may make from us." Alston's minutes, ibid.
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199to show that he is not devoting his zeal for reform to reforming himself."
On 14 February, however, it had been known that the government of Kwangsi Province
had posted a reward of $20,000 for any person who could capture Sun dead or
alive,2"  There had been a real fear of Sun Yat-sen1s assassination on
British soil, and Anderson had decided that he should be warned not to stir up
any trouble while enjoying British refuge, all the while putting Sun under
201local police surveillance.
At the end of the year Sun had left Singapore and arrived in Bangkok,
202
where his brief sojourn had not been welcomed by the native Siamese population.
Before his departure for Singapore and Europe, however. Sun had made a public
203
statement of his aim, "to create an independent Republic in South China,"
This had drawn the special attention of the Colonial authorities in London, and
Stubbs had remarked that the statement "should not be forgotten when reference
204
is made to the 'right of assylum'"
In August, 1909, Sun Yat-sen had been in London, where he had personally
penned an appeal to the Colonial Office asking for permission to return to
Hong Kong to visit his family. He h3d written, "I will guarantee that I will
205
engage in no political affairs ..." Sun had obviously hoped for the same
199 „Stubbs minutes on F.O. to C.Q, enclosing Li’s Note, 12 Feb.
2Q0North China Herald, 14 Feb. 1908, p. 367 col. 2-3.
201Anderson tel, C.O. 5 Mar. 1908, CO 273/336
202The Siam Observer of 5 Dec. 1908, in a leading article, condemned 
the activities of this "unsuccessful rebel" in the country, causing embarrassment 
between the Siamese and Chinese Governments. See W.R.D. Beckett (Consul at
Bangkok) to F.O. 12 Dec. 1908 (confidential) CO 273/353.
203,Beckett to F.O. ibid
I-
205
294Stubbs minutes, ibid,
Sun Yat-sen to C.O. 13 Aug. 1909, CO 129/364.
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sort of treatment awarded him by Sir John Anderson in Singapore, where his stay
had been permitted as long as he kept out of trouble. This time however, his
appeal had fallen into the hands of Stubbs, who delivered a furious condemnation
of Sun and his activities
".I earnestly trust that this firebrand will not be allowed to enter 
Hong Kong ... Even if we could trust his promise not to take part 
in politics - and it is a risky thing to do - the Chinese Government 
will not ... they will be furiously indignant with His Majesty's 
Government - and with reason, for you will see from (his statement
in Bankok) that he makes no secret of his object in life ... The man
is not a mere doctrinnaire, but a clever and brave rebel who has 
not only organized but led risings ....
A further point is that if he is allowed to reside in Hong Kong, 
the Chinese Government will do their best to get him assassinated.
They will probably succeed - I believe there is an enormous price 
on his head, and we shall have a lot of trouble and shall probably have to 
insist on the punishment of a lot of officials, etc. This will create 
a lot of ill-feeling and cannot fail to damage the relations between 
China and His Majesty's Government."
Having read this, Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for Colonial
207Affairs, had suggested that the Foreign Office refuse Sun's application.
At first there had been again an inclination at the Foreign Office to use the 
Sun incident to gain other political ends. It had been felt that Jordan 
should be referred to, and "In view of the manner we have been treated by the 
Chinese recently ... Jordan might possible be glad of some weapon of offence,
208such as the presence of this notorious revolutionary on the Chinese frontier."
But Langley had restrained all such thinkings "I don't think this is the sort
of weapon which Sir John Jordan could wish to have. It is too obvious that it
209might turn in one's hand."
Stubbs minutes, ibid.
207
C.O. to F.O. 19 Aug. 1909 (immediate) FQ 371/735.
208
R.H.G. minutes, ibid.
^^Langley minutes, ibid.
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His Hong Kong plans foiled, Sun Yat-sen had then departed/ London for
A
a tour of the United States and Canada. In May 1910 he had left San Francisco
for Japan, and in July the same year he had gone back to Singapore. On 30
October at Penang Sun had made an inflammatory speech in a Chinese club, which
had got him into trouble again with the British authorities. He had subsequently
been asked to leave the Colony, and the Colonial Office had decided that he should
210never be allowed back into Hong Kong. He had left for Europe and early in
1911 had revisited the United States.
Thus Sun Yat-sen had been generally out of touch with the development
of the revolutionary movement during these years before 1911, although his
activities and presence in various parts of the British Empire at least had not
escaped the attention of the appropriate British authorities. Finally, early
in November 1911, Sun arrived in London, accompanied by "General" Homer Lea,
and immediately set about arranging a loan with the British government to finance
the revolution. Sun acted' through Sir Trevor Dawson, of Messrs. Vickers, Sons
and Maxim, who on 14 November communicated to the Foreign Office a statement by
211Sun setting forth his aims and policies in China. Sun declared, among other 
things, that he wished to make "an alliance with Great Britain and the United
Anderson to C.O. 29 Dec. 1910 (confidential) CO 273/359 
Even the North China Herald of 11 Nov. 1910 condemned Sun for his "abuse of 
hospitality" Extracts of the speech was translated from the Penang Sin Poe 
and sent to London by Anderson, where Stewart of the C.O, summarised! "Dr. Sun 
made it the principal point of his speech to point out that revolution was the 
most lucretive form of speculation." CO 273/359 Such a conclusion was not 
surprising, as Sun’s aim In all these years of foreign travel had been to recruit 
funds for the revolution,
211Sun apparently had gone to the Foreign Office and had an Inter­
view with Addis a few days previously. His statement and his subsequent actions 
left no doubt that he immediately considered himself the leader of the Revolution 
and President-elect of the new republic, though Campbell had his doubts. "I 
told him he (Addis) had better see the man, hear what he had to say and let me 
know, but that we had no reason to suppose that the rebels were taking their 
orders from him ... "Campbell to Jordan, 11 Nov. 1911 (private) FQ 350/l.
Dawson's firm was obviously hoping to get orders for firearms from "President 
Sun."
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States of America In addition, Dawson revealed that Sun would be able
to obtain a loan of one million pounds if the British Government would agree
+ • j. 213to it.
Sir Edward Grey would have nothing to do with Sun Yat-sen's plans.
It was impossible for him to take a hand in a revolution, and Grey at this time
214
was certainly not thinking of lending money to either side in the struggle.
The Foreign Office impression of Sun Yat-sen, quite distinct from that of his
many other English friends, was voiced by Campbell, who asked Jordan if Sun
215
was no more than "an armchair politician and windbag." Jordan's reply;
Your views of Sun Yat-sen are exactly those I have expressed ... I was
actually going to use the description 'armchair politician' but thought it rather
long for telegraphic purposes.
If their attitude towards Sun was none too complimentary, the Foreign
Office did make an important concession to him now that the Revolution was
a reality. Again through the efforts of Dawson, Sun requested permission to
go to Hong Kong. "In the event of his shortly becoming President of the Chinese
United States," Dawson urged," it would be very prejudicial to British interests
217
that he should have a grievance against the British Government." Sun was 
ready to forego having the banishment order against him rescinded publicly.
Statement handed by Dawson to F.O. 13 Nov. 1911 FQ 371/1095.
21 3
F.O. to Jordan, 14 Nov. 1911, ibid. 
lfo id *
OIR
Campbell to Jordan, 11 Nov. 1911 (private)
^^Jordan to Campbell, 27 Nov. 1911 (private)
The word Jordan chose instead was "coward" see Jordan tel. F.O. 20 Nov, 1911
^^Dawson to F.O. 15 Nov. Ibid.
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218
as it was "really a question of personal feeling only with him." Both
Sir John Jordan and the Hong Kong Government felt that under the changed
circumstances there was perhaps little reason why Sun should be prevented from
219
visiting the Colony, but it would be preferred if he did not reside there,
Stubbs at the Colonial Office was reluctant to concede even this much, and
insisted that not only must Sun not take up residence in Hong Kong, but he must
220
abstain from any public action or speech while there. In actual fact, Sun 
did stay two days In the Colony before leaving for Shanghai on 22 December, 1911.
With Sun's arrival at Shanghai on 24 December, the negotiations between 
North and South entered their final and most critical phase. Since 12 December 
a conference of delegates from the thirteen revolutionary provinces had been 
sitting at Nanking, and on 29 December Sun Yat-sen was officially appointed 
provisional President to head a Revolutionary Chinese Republic. Sun accordingly 
arrived at Nanking on 1 January, 1912, when the inauguration ceremonies took 
place. In his inaugural speech Sun announced the aims and policies of the new 
Republic, which included the federation of the revolutionary provinces under 
a central government, and various other administrative reforms. He concluded 
with an expression of thanks to the foreign Powers for their sympathy with the 
revolutionary cause, and promised that the new government fully intended to 
carry out its duties to win recognition as a civilized state. The offer 
was again made to YUan Shih-k’ai that he would be invited to take over the 
Provisional Presidency at Nanking immediately on the abdication of the Manchu
”218
ibid.
219
Jordan tel, F.O. 20 Nov, ibid.
220
Stubbs minutes, on F.O. to C.O. 22 Nov, (urgent) CO 129/385.
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Government, when Sun would resign in his favour. On 11 January the newly-
appointed Revolutionary Minister of Foreign Affairs telegraphed the Foreign
Office in London informing the British Government of the Cabinet members in the
new government, and hoping that the new Republic "will be accorded the same
222
rights, immunities and privileges (nations) accord one another." In
accordance with their non-partisan policy, however, London decided that since
there was no intention of recognizing this government the communication should
223
remain unanswered.
This indifference notwithstanding, Sun Yat-sen was now the chief spokes­
man for all the revolutionary provinces, and took over direct negotiations with 
Yl2an Shih-k'ai by means of telegraphic communications. By mid-January the 
possibility of a compromise solution seemed in the making. Ylian indicated that 
agreement had been reached with Nanking that he should be authorised by decree 
after the Manchu abdication to carry on a government on a republican basis during 
the interval, pending the election by provincial deputies at banking and Peking 
of a President, which should follow in about a week’s time. This would allow 
a new government to start at once on the task of restoring order and pacifying 
the country. He also intended to move the seat of government to Tientsin for 
a few months, first because it was necessary to make a complete break with the
221Accounts of these developments are seen in Chang Nan-hsien, 
"Chung-hua Min-lcuo cheng-fu ch!eng-li" in HHKM VIII, 11-18; Lo Chia-lun, 
op.cit. I, 287-301; J.O.P, Bland, "A financial housecleaning for China" in 
Asia, XXI, 1 (Jan. 1921) 56-7, In which he gives an indictment of the Nanking 
government; North China Herald comments on the new government, 20 Jan 1912, p.
177 col. 2-3; The Republican Manifesto, published on 5 Jan. 1912, Is given in 
'the Times 6 Jan, 1912, p. 6 col. 3, also in Sun Yat-sen, Kuo-fu Ch’han-shu 
(Taiwan 1950) 446.
See also Wilkinson to Jordan, 27 Dec. 1911, 2 Jan. 1912, 5 Jan. and 11 Jan, 1912, 
enclosed in Jordan to F.O. 9 Feb. 1912, FQ 371/1314.
222
Wang Chung-hui tel. F.O. 11 Jan. 1912,
223Langley minutes, ibid; and F.O. tel. Jordan, 15 Jan. ibid.
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past3 and secondly the Republican leaders would not risk their lives by coming 
224to Peking, The propdsed settlement seemed completely reasonable to the
British authorities. When Ytfan appealed for support from the British Government?
Jordan readily agreed: "My own view.-is that the recognition of Yhan affords
225
the only hope of securing anything like a stable government in China."
The hopes of a speedy settlement were therefore running high$ it was 
with a jolt that the British authorities received news a few days later that 
the whole arrangement had become stalled by new demands from Sun Yat-sen. On 
20 January Sun dispatched two telegrams to Yuan, which stated that no provincial 
government must be established in the North? and that YUan must receive his appoint­
ment from the Republicans and could not derive any authority from the Manchus.
On 22 January? Sun made known in a telegram to Wu T’ing-fang at Shanghai, the 
five conditions on which he would hand over the Presidency to YUan after the
Manchu abdication. These would include a public declaration by YUan that he
226absolutely supported the object of republicanism. Jordan was bitter at Sun
and the revolutionaries for this uncompromising attitude. He gathered that
their objective was to show that victory rested with them? the realization
227
of which was bound to create a dangerous situation in the North. Stewart
at the Foreign Office put the blame for the deadlock on the rise of a radical
party among the influential revolutionaries, but concluded that "We are very
228
much in the dark now as to what the situation is." Both the North China
"224
Jordan tel. F.O. 19 Jan.
225Jordan? ibid.
Sun Yat-sen, op. cit. 454$ Wilkinson to Jordan, 24 Jan,
enclosed in Jordan to F.O. 9 Feb, 1912? FO 371/1314, See also Times 22 Jan. 
p. 9 leader.
Jordan to F.O. 22 Jan. (confidential) FO 371/1312,
^*St ewa rt mi nut e s, ibid.
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Herald and the Times roundly condemned Sun for his obstinacy.
One of the inherent dangers in the threatened breakdown of the negotiations 
was that of foreign intervention, and once again it was all Britain could do 
to restrain the Japanese inclinations in this direction. Ijuin saw Ytlan on 
21 January, and came away with gloomy impressions. Indeed Ijuin confided to
230
Jordan that "no settlement seemed practicable, without foreign intervention."
Yamaza also came to the Foreign Office to find out what the British Government
proposed to do. Grey would hear of no talk of intervention and cautioned,
231"We had better wait." Only after this did the Japanese concede that the
monarchical cause in China was doomed, although they were as convinced as
232ever that this form of government was best for China1s needs*
Meanwhile the renewed intransigence of the South was matched by the
growth of a conservative movement among the Manchu dignitaries in Peking. The
confused situation has given encouragement to those who opposed the proposed
233abdication of the Throne, and there was fear of intensified hostilities.
Peking was in a state of chaos, Tieh-liang (formerly Minister of War and a rival
of Yban) has suddenly returned to the capital and was supposedly organizing
the Imperial forces for a final show-down with the republicans, the machinery
of government was entirely disorganized, and the foreign legations were full
of Manchu refugees. The armistice was due to be expired on 29 January, and in
234the current deadlocked atmosphere was not likely to be renewed again.
229The Times of 23 Jan. p. 9 leader, stated flatly "the conduct
of the Nanking party and of their leader appears to be inexcusable." The
North China Herald of 27 Jan. p. 214-5 claimed "Dr. Sun Yat-sen has betrayed 
the confidence that the world was inclined to repose in his ability to take 
a strong and statesmanlike line of action..."
230Jordan tel. F.O. 22 Jan. FO 371/1312 
931
Grey minutes, ibid.
232MacDonald to F.O. 28 Jan. (confidential) FQ 371/1314. Langley 
commented, with a certain amount of satisfaction, "The Japanese found out that 
they had got their money on the wrong horse .»Vibid.
2??Jordan to F.O. 22 Jan (confidential) FO 371/1312
T Jordan to F. 0. 27 Jan., ibid.
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Sir John Jordan, trying to implement Britain’s impartial stand, found
himself the target of a wave of anti-British feeling in the capital. It was
reported that several menacing letters were sent to him, probably from
235
aggrieved Imperialists. Ylian Shih-k’ai was again in despair and talked 
of resigning. The British reacton to this threat was probably as he ex­
pected; Jordan wired, "The situation is strained and may possibly become
236
serious if ... Ylian resigns or leaves Peking ... " Bindley proposed that
"to reaffirm Yban's position ... some joint action might be concerted on his
237
behalf - otherwise the situation will be as bad as ever." Even Walter 
Langley suggested, "This would perhaps take the form of a joint warning from 
the Powers to the Manchu princes of the risks they would run if they depart
onp
from the policy hitherto adopted on Yban's advice" (Abdication in
return for favourable treatment). Yet on this occasion, because the talk
of intervention was primarily to strengthen Yban's hand, the Japanese were
239unwilling to commit themselves, and Grey fell back again on a wait-and-
see policy. "We had better wait till Sir John Jordan or the Japanese
suggest moving. My personal feeling is still against moving! we know
240too little of the Chinese forces at work to be sure of our ground."
235
North China Herald 3 Feb. p. 304, col. 1. Other Englishmen 
in Peking were also warned to leave their houses for fear of bomb threats. 
Ibid.
236
Jordan tel. F.O. 23 Jan. FO 371/1311.
237
Lindley minutes, ibid.
238
Langley minutes, ibid.
239
Jordan’s tel. 23 Jan. ibid.
240
Grey minutes, ibid.
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Yban Shih-k’ai thus continued to be the object o£ the British Government's
watchfulness* On 16 January he barely escaped an assassination attempt in the
streets of Peking., which incident he was able to utilize to dispel whatever distrust
241
of him entertained by some members of the Manchu Court. On 26 January the
Empress Dowager decided to confer on Yban the highest honour possible for a
Chinese official, the title of Marquis. It was a clever move, obviously
meant to impress the Chinese people that Yban was actually working hand in
glove with the Manchus. Yban declined the honour three times before he finally 
242
accepted it. But by this time whatever honours the Manchus chose to bestow 
ceased to have any significance as far as Yban was concerned$ he had already 
decided that capitulation to the republican demands was the only course to take, 
and was rapidly working for the final abdication of the Dynasty.
The Abdication
Early in January both Jordan and Yban had recognized that the only
stumbling block to a settlement was the .continued presence of the Emperor and
Court in Peking, The manner and consequences of the abdication now formed the
243
main theme of the communications between Yban and Sun, On 13 January further 
indications of the general clamour for the abdication came with a telegram from 
the Committee of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, representing a body of 
foreign merchants, promising the former Prince Regent and Yban that they would
241
See J. Ch'en, Yban Shih-k'ai, p. 125-6. Jordan’s visit 
to him on 18 January was initially to congratulate him on his escape.
242Jordan to F.O. 3 Feb. FO 371/1313. enclosing translations
of Yban’s lengthy memorials detailing his reasons for declining the honour.
See also Times 20 Feb. 1912.
243 ,
See Jordan to Langley, 10 Jan. 1912 (private) FO 350/8
in which Jordan dismissed as amusing a suggestion then current in Peking
that the foreign Chambers of Commerce should petition the Throne to
abdicate in the interests of trade. It later turned out to have been the
very expedient used by Yban to force the hand of the Manchus.
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work for a conciliatory spirit on the part of the revolutionaries if the Throne
would abdicate,^44 It will be remembered that it had constantly been Jordan's
personal view that "China is not suited,, and will not for many years to come,
be suited for constitutional government or a republic, and that it matters little
what form of government is adopted provided she can obtain some capable men
245
to govern the country," Now at this stage in the negotiations, it was clear that
both Chinese and foreigners realised that nothing but a republic would do, and
Jordan conceded, "My own view is, as it has always been, that a republic is a
very risky experiment, but 1 feel no alternative except a division of the country
246
into a Northern monarchy and a Southern republic."
Following the example of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, various other
bodies of influential opinion, foreign and native, now began to campaign actively
for the early abdication of the Throne. Aside from the official communications
between Sun Yat-sen and Ylltan Shih-k'ai, the revolutionaries also sent several
delegates to Peking to talk with Ylian on the subject. A movement was further
initiated to get all the Chinese Ministers serving abroad to telegraph petitions
247to the Throne urging abdication. On 18 January a petition came in from the
248Hankow Cahmber of Commerce supporting the action of their Shanghai counter-part.
249
The Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce followed suit. This last was somewhat
J o r d a n F . O .  14 Jan. FO 37l/l310. In a secret addendum 
Jordan noted that the action of the Chambers was clearly prompted by Ylian's 
party to bring pressure on the Throne.
Jordan to F.O. 6 Jan. FQ 37l/l311.
Jordan tel. F.O. 14 Jan. (confidential) Fo 371/1310.
247 /See Jordan to F.O, 16 Jan. FO 371/1312.
248Jordan tel. F.O. 19 Jan. ibid. MaxMuller was resigned!
"Nothing is surprising in China and apparently foreigners after a long
residence there can act in as strange and unpredictable a manner as any
Chinaman." ibid.
^4^Jordan tel. F.O. 28 Jan. ibid.
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embarrassing for the British Government, as W. G. MaxMuller pointed out, "it
is clearly most improper for the Chamber at Hong Kong to petition the Chinese
Government in favour of the abdication of the Throne, when His Majesty's Government
250
is trying to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality,"
If these endeavours were found insufficient to convince the Throne of
the necessity of relinquishing its hold on the Chinese Empire, Yhan Shih-k’ai
saw to it that a stronger reminder was in order. Early in February a remarkable
memorial appeared in all the Peking newspapers. It was signed by forty-four
generals and commanders, and the Throne was given to understand that it could
no longer count on the support of the army in forcing upon the people a form
of government to which they Objected, so it had better make up its mind to
251
accept the verdict of the country and declare itself for a republic. It
was evident to Jordan and others in Peking that the army had acted on the
inspiration of Yhan. He had often made it seem that his hand was being forced
by the army, but "all evidence goes to show the soldier has been as wax in the
hands of the astute politician, whose masterly brain has been directing all the
252
moves in this long drawn out game of Chinese statecraft The desertion
of the army had the desired effect5 YUan was authorised to bargain with the
253
Republicans the exact terms which would allow the Manchus and honourable retirement.
One of Yuan's first predicaments when it came to implementing the
abdication was the arrangements ’for a provisional government to exist right after
the departure of the Manchus, He had two plans in minds the South could send
^-^MaxMuller minutes, ibid, Harcourt of the C.O. dismissed tie 
action as "silly." His minutes, on F.O. to C.O. 6 Mar. 1912, CO 120/395.
25^Memorandum enclosed in Jordan to F.O, 10 Feb. Fp 37l/l314.
^^Jordan, ibid.
253Jordan tel. F.O. 1 Feb. FO 37l/l312.
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delegates to Peking, await the issue of the abdication decree, and then join
with members of the Northern party to form a coalition government to take
over directly, all this to be done in one day^ or alternately they could
allow the lapse of two days after the decree, during which Sun would resign,
Yhan would be elected, and the coalition government established. As was
his wont, YiLian wanted to know how much British support he could muster. On
8 February he sent two of his aides to see the British Minister. Jordan was
asked if he could promise British backing for YUan's first plan, which the
Premier himself favoured, but which Sun would not accept. Yhan also desired
to know if anything could be done by unofficial representations to Sun through
the British Consul at Nanking, and if all else failed, and YlSan had to establish
as a last resort his own provisional government in the North while negotiating
for a coalition with the South, would Britain recognize such a government?
Jordan made it clear to the two delegates that his own friendship and sympathy
for Ylian notwithstanding, the British Government was committed to a policy of
non-intervention, and could therefore, not give Yhan any of the official or
254
unofficial assurances he desired.
In the meantime, Ytian had succeeded in persuading the Dynasty that
255
it was wiser to retire peacefully than wait until it was forced to go.
On 12 February the Manchu abdication decree was proclaimed. Jordan commented, 
"As the last act of a dynasty which had ruled China for two hundred and sixty 
seven years, and whose earlier Emperors had raised the country to a state of
254Jordan to F.O. 10 Feb. FO 371/l314.
255Rumours were circulated in Peking that the revolutionary 
forces were coming North by sea, and that a landing could be expected any 
day at Chefoo, or Ching-wan-tao, See Jordan tel. F.O. 16 Jan. (confidential)
FO 371/1312.
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prosperity end greatness it had never before attained, this valedictory edict 
is one of some historical interest ..."256 On the same day YUan telegraphed
to Nanking his acceptance of a Republic, and the following day, 13 February,
257
Sun.. Yat-sen tendered his resignation to the Nanking Assembly. On 14
February YUan Shih-k'ai was elected by the Assembly as Provisional President
in succession to Sun,258 Jordan and B. Alston visited YUan soon after, to offer
him their congratulations* They found the new President-elect in an optimistic
mood, and YUan hastened to express his warm gratitude for all the sympathy
and support he had received from Great Britain, and "looked forward to the
259
closest relations in the future
Unfortunately the removal of the Manchu Dynasty and the proclamation 
of a Republic did not mean the immediate restoration of good relations between 
Y&an Shih-k'ai and the South* For one thing the very nature of the establishment 
of the Republic came under attack from the Nanking revolutionaries. Sun telegraphed 
to YUan that a republican government could not.be formed under the mandate of
‘^ Jordan's comment, to F.O, 13 Feb. FQ 37l/l314. The Decree 
is given in "Nan-pei i-ho" in HHKM VIII, 183-5, in translation in Jordan's 
despatch. To the Foreign Office, the most striking feature of the decree was 
its lack of historical precedent. The minutes on Jordan's tel. of 11 Feb. 
(secret) FO 37l/l312, pointed outs "An abdicating dynasty in this instance 
replaces itself by a republic by its own decree. I doubt if recent history 
records a similar precedent ... " The significance of the events, however, 
seemed to have escaped those who should have been most concerned. Jordan 
reported that "Peking has received the edict with marked indifference and 
the people follow their ordinary pursuits unmoved by the political changes 
... the citizens of the latest and largest republic in the world cannot yet 
grasp the fact that government is possible without an Emperor ... " Jordan 
to F.O. 13 Feb. FO 37l/l314. His sentiments were echoed by the Times of the 
same day, "Some of us who know China best cannot but doubt whether a form of 
government so utterly alien to Oriental conceptions and to Oriental traditions 
as a^republic can be suddenly substituted for a monarchy in a nation of 100 
million men ...." Times 13 Feb., p. 9, leader. See also London and China
Express 16 Feb. p. 125, col. 2 for further comments along the same lines.
257<rhe North China Herald called it "the supreme test of 
republican good faith." 17 Feb. p. 409, 10, leader, and the Times paid tri­
bute to Sun's "self-restraint" 27 Feb. 1912, p. 5.
2^8Wilkinson tel. Jordan, Jordan tel. F.O. 16 Feb, FO 371/1312.
^Ijordan to Langley, 17 Feb. (private) FQ 350/8«
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the Manchu Emperor* and he should therefore come immediately to Nanking to take 
office. The seat of the provisional government should also be at Nanking,
A delegation headed by T'ang Shao-i was on its way to Peking to persuade Ytian 
to go South as soon as possible.260 Another month was to elapse before Yhan 
wore down the opposition of the South and induced the Nanking government to 
agree to his inauguration at Peking,26’*'
While the location of Yhan's inaugural ceremonies mattered little to 
the British Government, the question of a possible transfer of the capital 
from Peking was a different story. This time the Foreign Office stood solidly 
behind Yttan's reluctance to move. When it was first learned that Sun insisted 
on Nanking being the capital, Langley warned that "if eventually the Chinese
wish to make a permanent transfer of the capital, the Powers will have a good
262deal to say in the matter.” The British were ready to back their arguments 
with treaty stipulations, in which Peking had always heen designated the capital, 
and the location and frontiers of the legation quarters had been clearly defined 
in Peking. There was also the enormous expense^ involved in moving the legation
Q/ q
staff out of Peking. British merchant opinion in the South, however, jumped 
at the opportunity of having the Chinese capital installed in the very centre 
of commercial activity in Nanking. The Shanghai branch of the China Association 
telegraphed to Londons26^
260Jordan tel. F.O. 14 Feb. FO 37l/l312.
Ytian indicated to Jordan that he had no personal objection 
to agreeing with their proposal, if he thought he could leave Peking with 
safety. But he pointed out that there were some twenty-five thousand Manchu 
troops in the capital, and his departure would be a signal for conflict be­
tween them and the Chinese troops, over'whom he alone could exercise proper 
control. He convinced Jordan that his departure was impracticable in the 
circumstances. See Jordan to Langley, 17 Feb. (private) FQ 350/8. J. Chen, 
jOp_1(cit. 136-7 gives some more of Ydan's reasons for remaining in Peking.
262Langley minutes on Jordan tel. F.O. 16 Feb., FO 37l/l312.
OfC. o —  ---- f-  
^uoMaxMuller memorandum, 19 Feb., FO 371/l313.
^hina Association, Shanghai,Branch, tel. London Headquarters,
28 Feb. 1912, in China Association to F.O. 5 Mar. FO 371/1314.
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’'From the standpoint of British interests and trade there can be no 
question if reformed government instituted at Nanking it will be 
incalculable advantage. Central as regards Canton, Tientsin, Chentu - 
magnificently served by Yangtze - cities convenient of access of water, 
rail to sea, all parts of country. Nanking also centre of former Britida 
spher e of influence, and part of country where British trade far out­
weighs that of other nations ... It appears of first importance such 
official influence as we possess should be used, towards bringing about 
change ...."
Even the British Consul at Nanking felt that the republicans were not "without 
,265
justification.
The Foreign Office, though conceding that the mercantile community
had some strong reasons in favour of a transfer of the Chinese capital,
nevertheless suspected that, as during the abdication talks, the Shanghai
and Nanking residents might have been inspired to move by such revolutionary
leaders as Wu T ’ing-fang, in order to bring pressure to bear on Ydan Shih- 
266
k'ai. Jordan's opinion was referred to. By then Yiian had concrete proof
267 26;
of the inadvisability of his departure from Peking. His views prevailed.
265
Wilkinson tel. Jordan 16 Feb., in Jordan tel. F.O. 24 Feb.,
FO 371/1315.
266MaxMuller minutes, ibid.
267On 29 February, the troops in Peking mutinied, looted and 
burned a large part of the Chinese and Manchu cities. The republican 
delegates, headed by T ’ang Shao-i, in town to persuade Ydan to go South, 
were the first to be singled out for attack, and in many cases had to make 
ignominious escapes to the Legations quarters. Similar disturbances broke 
out also in Tientsin and other cities. It has often been suggested that
the whole affair was staged by Ydan to influence the Southern delegates. See
J. Ch'en, op.cit. 137-85 C. Pearl, op.cit. 244-8, in which Morrison tried to
vindicate charges that Ydan engineered the plot. "Could anything conceivably
be more preposterous than the suggesllon that Y.S.K. inspired the mutiny in 
Peking in order to prevent his going to Nanking? ... no man ever seriously 
believed that he could leave Peking at this time, and for him to have brought 
about the mutiny and shattered his reputation throughout the world seems to 
be as unreasonable as to employ a steelhammer to crush a gooseberry..."
268
Jordan tel. F.O. 28 Feb. FQ 37l/l313.
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On 10 March 1912, Yhan Shih-k'ai was inaugurated as the second Provisional 
President of the Chinese Republic in Peking* Following Jordan's advice, the 
Diplomatic Corps was not invited to attend the ceremonies, which "might cause
269embarrassment," and Yhan confined himself to a mere notification of the ceremony.
On 1 April Sun Yat-sen formally laid down the seals of office.
Paradoxically, as revealed in foreign opinion at least, Sun Yat-sen
seemed to have achieved the greatest success of his long revolutionary career
not in his energetic efforts plotting against the Manchu Dynasty, not even when
he established the provisional Nanking government, but in his final departure
from the Chinese political scene* Whereas he had no lack of foreign critics
270
belittling his career before 1912, - the term "visionary" was the most
frequently used epithet - his resignation of the Presidency in favour of Yhan
was hailed as the supreme political sacrifice, a magnanimous gesture worthy of
the finest in the Chinese tradition. The London Times declared that "he has
displayed conspicuous gifts of statesmanship, he retires into privacy widely
271respected as a man and a patriot," The North China Herald in an editorial
also commented, "it is impossible to read his farewell speech unmoved by the
269Jordan to F.O, 11 Mar. FQ 371/1314.
270G* Morrison wrote m  his diary that Tsai Ting-lean, an emissary
of YUian to the negotiations, had found little respect for Sun as a leader in
the Wuhan revolutionary camp. "The revolutionaries whom Tsai met spoke with 
some contempt of a man who had been only a dreamer of the revolution, always 
keeping away in order to save his own skin.” C, Pearl, op.cit. 231,
Morrison, of course, had always been a staunch supporter and personal friend 
of YUan1s,
271Times 2 Apr, 1912, p. 5 col.l.
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evident sincerity of his faith in a noble ideal* More than this Dr. Sun stands 
out conspicuously for an absolutely disinterested conduct throughout. The 
pledges that he gave he has performed;, and having seen the inauguration of the 
Republic he retires from office to labour on its behalf in a field that gives 
best play to his genius
Sun Yat-sen, Yhan Shih-k'ai and Sir John Jordan played the three key 
roles in the final drama of the Chinese revolutionary movement. Sun was the 
original architect of the Revolution, Yhan brought it to fruition, and Jordan 
was the British observer on the scene who protected and upheld British interests 
in China while at the same time exerting considerable influence over the turn 
of events which brought down over two hundred and fifty years of Manchu rule 
in China and replaced it by a modern republic. Sometimes deliberately, though 
more often unwittingly involved, British policy in China had to do with every 
stage of the Chinese revolutionary movement throughout 1895-1912.
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North China Herald 6 Apr. 1912, p. 1 col. 1-3, leading article.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
It can be said that there was no policy as such with which Great 
Britain reacted to the Chinese revolutionary movement of 1895-1912. But 
there were certain principles and aims which characterised British relations 
with China during this period. For one thing, it is clear that there was 
a good deal of sympathy from British opinion in and out of China for the 
Chinese movement for liberty and reform. This sentiment was shared among 
the diplomats, the government officials as well as the public, especially 
those who had made the personal acquaintance of Sun Yat-sen or K'ang Yu-wei. 
The feeling was widespread that any changes in China had to be an improvement 
on the attitudes and administration of the Manchus. Coupled with this was 
the instinctive sympathy for the underdog which has been frequently identi­
fied with British foreign policy throughout history. There were marked 
manifestations of this during the years of revolutionary struggle, when the 
T'ung Meng Hui suffered atrocities of reprisal at the hands of the Imperial 
troops. Missionary zeal for the cause of reform in China was of course the 
clearest case of British support. The fact of Sun Yat-sen being a Christian 
and many of the other student revolutionaries being products of missionary 
education goes far to explain the British missionary's interest in China at 
this time. Unfortunately the missionaries were often too close to the men 
and motives implicated to be of practical value in the formulation of policies 
from London: their reactions were usually based on vague sentiment rather
than on the vital issues involved.
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Self-interest or self-preservation, however, were more realistic 
motives to be attributed to Britain's general interest in the Chinese revo­
lutionary movement, more than any high-sounding sentiments in favour of 
liberalisation or democracy. To obtain improved conditions of trade and 
commerce, Britain had every desire to see a new and enlightened administration 
in Peking. On the other hand, the activities of the revolutionaries, the 
potential new rulers, spelled chaos and disruption in those key areas where 
British traders were concentrated. Hence Britain's difficulty in proclaiming 
any definite policy towards the revolutionaries during this period. For the 
sake of expediency, all pointed to the wisdom of supporting the strong man 
Yuan Shih-k'ai, the only person capable of centralizing authority and pre­
venting the tendencies towards provincial autonomy once the Revolution had 
broken out. Since YOan was in the eyes of all China identified with the 
Manchu Government and Peking, British support for him must be rendered in 
such a manner so as not to alienate at the same time the revolutionaries in 
the South and Central provinces, where British merchants still harboured 
memories of the 1905 boycott against American goods. Thus Sir Edward Grey 
declared British neutrality in the Chinese Revolution, while simultaneously 
urging Sir John Jordan and the Yangtze Consuls to give whatever unofficial 
support was necessary to enable Yuan to arrive at a speedy settlement with 
the revolutionaries. British policy was therefore an erratic line, determined 
from day to day by the opinion of vested interests, by sentimental considera­
tions, or by the force of circumstances.
In the early days of the revolutionary movement, Lord Salisbury's 
handling of Sun Yat-sen's kidnap in London was fairly typical of the vacillating 
nature of British policy. It was clear to the Foreign Office that Sun was the
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chief engineer of an uprising in Canton in 1895, and that he was banished 
from Hong Kong for this. When it was known that the Chinese Legation had 
captured their culprit in London and abused their diplomatic privileges in 
doing so, Salisbury still hesitated to take any action, despite strong 
pressure from Bertie and Campbell in the Far Eastern Department. It was 
only when Sir James Cantlie threatened to expose the whole story in the 
press that Salisbury was jolted into the decision to demand Sun’s release, 
and subsequently to send a watered-down note of protest to the Chinese 
Legation. His rescue of Sun embarrassed the Hong Kong Government, of course, 
who failed to see why the Colonial Office sanctioned his expulsion from Hong 
Kong for his political views, only to have him protected again on British 
soil in England. On the other hand, the episode infinitely advanced Sun's 
revolutionary career, and the British public was the first to which Sun 
turned whenever he required sympathy or publicity.
When K'ang Yu-wei began his reform activities in Peking, many Britons 
were genuinely interested in the outcome of the movement, especially when 
the Emperor himself was involved. But the coup d* etat dashed all hopes of 
reform from above in China, and once again Britain took part in the rescue of 
the chief character in the drama. The decision to protect K'ang from the 
agents sent after his head by the Empress Dowager characteristically did not 
come originally from Londons the personal respect for K*ang and his ideas 
on the part of Timothy Richard in Peking, the Acting British Consul Brenan 
in Shanghai and Sir Henry Blake in Hong Kong resulted in his being assured 
of British sanctuary wherever he subsequently travelled. British action 
was criticised by the other Powers as being interference in Chinese internal 
affairs. But there was little policy guidance from Lord Salisbury, and the
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Foreign Office merely followed the lead of its representatives in the Far 
Hast,
Sir Henry Blake, Governor of Hong Kong, in many ways was an 
important influence on the Chinese revolutionary movement. His great 
sympathy for the local revolutionaries and their cause, and his unconcealed 
disgust at the methods employed by the Peking Government, such as the 
murder in British territory of known rebels by hired assassins, probably 
made him, unofficially at least, the finest foreign friend the Chinese 
revolutionaries had in the early days of their movement. In 1900, the 
year of great confusion in China, with the Boxers in the North, two revo­
lutionary groups operating in the South, the reformers, revolutionaries 
and their Japanese sympathisers agitating in the Central provinces, Blake 
sought to promote peace and stability in at least a portion of the Empire 
by attempting to bring together Sun Yat-sen and Viceroy Li Hung-chang in 
a common scheme to liberate the South from Manchu rule. It was an un­
realistic plan, to say the least, but London was so concerned with and 
perplexed by the Chinese situation in that year that the Foreign Office 
was on the verge of sanctioning Blake's suggestions.
After 1900 the Chinese revolutionaries turned away from their
n
sole reliance on the secret societies in the South. The movement began 
to include among its ranks more of the students in the Yangtze Provinces, 
and thus came in direct contact with many British traders who were resident 
in the treaty ports. Shanghai became the headquarters of student activities 
where they enjoyed relative freedom from persecution for their seditious 
attitudes. The foreign merchants would have been expected to view with 
disfavour the anarchical policies of the students, but they valued their
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independence and autonomy even more. These circumstances thus produced 
the surprising outcome in the Su-pao case, where the Shanghai Municipality 
insisted on protecting the Chinese journalists from capture by the Chinese 
Government. This was not because the British-dominated Municipal Council 
agreed with the radical views of the writers, but because it would not 
surrender its freedom of action in all matters concerning the Shanghai 
Settlement and bow to the requests from both the Diplomatic Corp in Peking 
and the Chinese Government to hand over the prisoners. The liberal treat­
ment of the Su-pao writers served only to encourage the revolutionaries, 
and enhanced the value, in their eyes, of Shanghai as a base of operations*
Chinese radicals in Shanghai took the lead again in 1905 in 
organizing the first outward manifestation of Chinese national unity, 
the boycott against American goods in retaliation for the United States' 
discrimination against Chinese immigrants* The movement proved awkward 
for Britain: despite the obvious advantages to be gained from helping
the Chinese Government suppress the boycott in British territories, Sir 
Ernest Satow was diffident, fearing an extension of the boycott to British 
goods; on the other hand, endorsing the movement would probably increase 
the trade for British merchants, though it would surely antagonise the 
United States* After much soul-searching Britain decided to assume a 
detached attitude and let the movement work itself out. The lesson of 
the American experiences was not lost, however, and in the future policies 
towards the Chinese revolutionary movement would have to take into con­
sideration this new national consciousness among the Chinese radicals.
1905 was a milestone in modern Chinese history: the Manchu
Government decided to initiate far-reaching constitutional reforms to
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placate the agitation in the country, while the revolutionaries organized 
themselves in the T'una Mena Hui and began a programme of vigorous rebel­
lions against the government* The government's attempt to take the lead 
in a modernization campaign was generally applauded by British observers 
in China, although from the first there was scepticism whether the Chinese 
were ready for the sort of constitutional government that was envisaged* 
Meanwhile attention was drawn to the numerous uprisings staged by the 
T'una Mena Hui against the provincial government in several areas. Britain's 
foremost concern was for the safety of the lives and property of its 
citizens in China. Sir John Jordan was able at first to assure the Foreign 
Office that the Chinese government seemed capable and determined to suppress 
these rebellions. In time, however, it was soon known that many regiments 
of the Imperial troops were themselves sympathetic to the revolutionary 
ideology, and that they often proved unreliable in action against the 
rebels. The cruel treatment of captured rebels by the troops also served 
to influence British public opinion against the questionable ethics of 
the Government.
The Regency, heralded with such optimism and good-will, was fast 
proving a disappointment. As far as Britain was concerned, the single 
act which stamped the Regent as a reactionary instead of a progressive, 
as was generally anticipated, was his dismissal of Yhan Shih-k'ai from 
office in 1909. Britain’s relations with Yhan had always been cordial, 
especially after Jordan's arrival in Peking in 1906. Ytian's reforming 
zeal was acknowledged in all the areas in which he served, and his handling 
of the Boxer situation in Shantung was widely respected. He has always 
been regarded as the one stabilizing influence in Peking, and his removal
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indicated, to Britain at least, the beginning of the real decline in the 
prestige of the Ch'ing Government. It was not until after the outbreak 
of the Revolution in October, 1911, that the Regent, in desperation, recalled 
Ytlan to Peking*
The suddenness and rapid progress of the Revolution when it came 
was a surprise to the Chinese Government as well as to the foreign Powers*
For lack of any guidance with which to deal with the new situation, Grey 
indicated from the beginning that Britain would observe neutrality and 
await developments. Only later, when Ytian was in a position of influence 
in Peking, did Grey come round to Jordanfs suggestion that Britain should 
back Yiian as the only stable factor in the circumstances. From then on, 
while officially standing clear of Chinese internal politics, Jordan was 
working behind the scenes in Peking by his personal influence with Yilan, 
to bring about first an armistice and subsequently peace talks with the 
republicans from the South.
There were several problems which complicated British policy­
making. The first obstacle to peace in China was the difficulty of deciding 
upon a form of government for the new China. The South insisted on a 
republic, which neither Ytian nor Jordan felt the Chinese were ready for.
The question was how to convince the revolutionaries that there were other 
alternatives, and here it is clear that in 1911-12 Britain had no real 
influence in the South or among the republican ranks comparable to that 
which Jordan had over Ytian in the North. Another problem was that of 
finances if Ytian was to be supported, he must have means with which to 
run the government 5 yet supplying him would evoke the antagonism of the 
Southern faction, in whose territories resided most of the British subjects 
in China. Even Jordan wavered in his thinking on this5 though he finally
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decided that Britain had better not finance either side in the struggle, 
he had already lost credit with the revolutionaries for having broached 
the idea of lending money to Ytian in the first place.
By December 1911 Britain appeared to have achieved at least her 
limited objectives for this stage in the Revolutions a truce had been 
signed and was renewable? negotiations had begun between North and South, 
thanks to the mediation of the British Consul at Hankow; and the Regent 
had abdicated. But a settlement was not yet in the making. The South 
would accept nothing short of the retirement of the Manchu Dynasty and 
the establishment of a republican form of government* The Japanese,
Britain’s allies in the Far Bast, would not like to see a republic as her 
neighbour and were intent on provoking incidents which would call for 
foreign intervention. Meanwhile Yilan, seeing that his proposal of a 
limited monarchy under Manchu sovereignty was not acceptable to the South, 
was already calculating the steps by which his ’’conversion" to republicanism 
would take, which would ultimately leave him the strongest single factor 
in the state. He tried dubious means to test Southern and British reactions 
before allowing his representative in the negotiations to declare for a 
republic. Then Sun Yat-sen arrived back in China and in January 1912 formed 
a rival republican government in Nanking. Ytian saw that despite his open 
disavowal of Sun's recalcitrant attitude at the peace conferences, Jordan 
was adverse to the development of a civil war situation in China, with a 
monarchical North and republican South. With that, it was easy for Ytian 
to claim majority opinion in the country and consent to accept the presidency 
of the republic.
Ytlan Shih-k'ai's actions and motives from December 1911 to March 1912,
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when he was inaugurated as Provisional President of the Chinese Republic, 
were often a puzzle even to Sir John Jordan, It is clear that Ytian played 
on the fears and weaknesses of Britain when faced with the revolutionary 
situation in China, and was able to secure a settlement which served his 
own interests best without at the same time upsetting Britain's Interests 
in China. Ytian had nothing to lose by allowing Jordan to arrange the 
armistice and negotiations —  the cities were falling and he had no 
money in the government coffers —  so he readily went along with the 
British plans. But it must have been obvious to him then that the South 
would never relinquish the main objective of the Revolution, the removal 
of the Manchus, and accept the British proposal of a constitutional 
government under nominal Manchu sovereignty. It is ironical that after 
a decade of sympathy and moral support for the Chinese movements for reform 
and revolution, Britain should at the last stage repudiate the very objective 
of the Chinese revolutionaries and then to have the fruits of the Revolution 
go to Ytlan Shih-k'ai, who in 1898 had helped to suppress the Hundred Days' 
Reform Movement. Britain ended up by alienating the radicals in the 
South and supporting Peking, thus laying the foundations of the anti- 
British outbursts in the following decade.
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